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Tab A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(1) Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.140 (law prior to 
1991 amendment)i1 
1. Directors and officers shall 
exercise their powers in good faith and 
with a view to the interests of the 
corporation. No contract or other 
transaction between a corporation and one 
or more of its directors or officers, or 
between a corporation and any corporation, 
firm or association in which one or more of 
its directors or officers are directors or 
officers or are financially interested, is 
either void or voidable solely for this 
reason or solely because any such director 
or officer is present at the meeting of the 
board of directors or a committee thereof 
which authorizes or approves the contract 
or transaction, or because the vote or 
votes of common or interested directors are 
counted for such purpose, if the 
circumstances specified in any of the 
following paragraphs exist: 
(a) The fact of the common 
directorship or financial interest is 
disclosed or known to the board of 
directors or committee and noted in 
the minutes, and the board or 
committee authorizes, approves or 
ratifies the contract or transaction 
in good faith by a vote sufficient for 
the purpose without counting the vote 
or votes of such director or 
directors• . . . 
1. The 1991 amendment to this section deleted the first 
sentence of paragraph one which read: "Directors and 
officers shall exercise their powers in good faith and 
with a view to the interests of the corporation." 
2. Common or interested 
directors may be counted in determining the 
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the 
board of directors or a committee thereof 
which authorizes, approves or ratifies a 
contract or transaction, and if the votes 
of the common or interested directors are 
not counted at the meeting, then a majority 
of the disinterested directors may 
authorize, approve or ratify a contract or 
transaction. 
3. Unless otherwise provided in 
the articles of incorporation or the 
bylaws, the board of directors may fix the 
compensation of directors for services in 
any capacity. 
Stat. § 78.140 (law prior to 1991 amendment). 
Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.135: 
1. The statement in the certificates 
or articles of incorporation of the 
objects, purposes, powers and authorized 
business of the corporation constitutes, as 
between the corporation and its directors, 
officers or stockholders, an authorization 
to the directors and a limitation upon the 
actual authority of the representatives of 
the corporation. Such limitations may be 
asserted in a proceeding by a stockholder 
or the state to enjoin the doing or 
continuation of unauthorized business by 
the corporation or its officers, or both, 
in cases where third parties have not 
acquired rights thereby, or to dissolve the 
corporation, or in a proceeding by the 
corporation or by the stockholders suing in 
a representative suit against the officers 
or directors of the corporation for 
violation of their authority. 
2. No limitation upon the business, 
purposes or powers of the corporation or 
upon the powers of the stockholders, 
officers or directors, or the manner of 
exercise of such powers, contained in or 
implied by the articles shall be asserted 
as between the corporation or any 
stockholder and any third person• 
3. Any contract or conveyance, 
otherwise lawful, made in the name of a 
corporation, which is authorized or 
ratified by the directors, or is done 
within the scope of the authority, actual 
or apparent, given by the directors, binds 
the corporation, and the corporation 
acquires rights thereunder, whether the 
contract is executed or is wholly or in 
part executory. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.135 (1949 Supp). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
OLSON, PAYNE & COMPANY, INC. 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID ENZER and L.A. 




CASE NO. C-91-6266 
This action was commenced as an interpleader proceeding by 
plaintiff Olson, Payne & Co., Inc. on October 2, 1991. Recognizing 
it had no claim to the interpleaded fund, the plaintiff sought an 
order from this Court to deposit the res of the dispute with the 
clerk of court, namely, $568,231.25 cash, and 3,030,500 shares of 
L.A. Entertainment ("LAET") stock issued to David Enzer ("Enzer"). 
This Court ordered the deposit March 3, 1991. The respective 
defendant crossclaimants presented evidence at trial held February 
9, 1993 through February 11, 1993. The Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the exhibits received, the testimony 
elicited, the respective trial Memoranda and proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and is now prepared to rule. 
M-ZWQ 
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The essential issue in this case is which of the two 
contenders to the fund on deposit with the court has better claim 
to the same. 
Enzer argues that the stock was duly authorized and issued to 
him by virtue of actions of the Board of Directors of LAET as 
compensation for his services, both as a director and consultant. 
Enzer claims that 3.5 million shares were issued to him (2 million 
for consulting services, and 1.5 million shares as director 
shares), pursuant to duly constituted and authorized Board of 
Directors Resolutions of May 3, 1991, Ex. 131; June 14, 1991, Ex. 
155; the second June 14 Resolution, presumably effective January 
22, 1991, Ex. 153; and July 19, 1991, Ex. 173. 
Enzer claims entitlement to the fund on the basis that the 
shares were validly authorized and issued to him by the pertinent 
resolutions, signed by himself and the other Board member, Daniel 
Lezak ("Lezak"); the stock was then issued to Enzer by the 
authorized transfer agent at the direction of LAET's independent 
counsel, which conduct, it is alleged, was ratified by LAET. 
LAET, on the contrary, claims that the authorization and 
issuance of the shares was ultra vires, and beyond the authority of 
either or both Enzer, and Lezak, due to the Articles of 
Incorporation and By-Laws of LAET; that the Consulting Agreement 
(k.C'CB! 
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purportedly approved by Enzer on 12/1/90, Ex. 34, and certain of 
the pertinent resolutions were the subject of fraud and 
manipulation; and that the actions of Enzer while a director and 
attorney constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties toward LAET, 
and thus pursuant to Nevada law, the Consulting Agreement and 
resolutions represented a windfall to Enzer, with no tangible 
benefit to LAET, and are thus void or voidable by LAET. 
The evidence establishes as follows: 
1. LAET is a Nevada corporation, with its headquarters in 
Los Angeles, California. During the relevant time period, the 
stock of LAET traded publicly on the NASDAQ index. LAET was a 
reporting company with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
2. Enzer is a graduate of the Hastings School of Law in 
1986, and engaged in the private practice of law for two and one-
half years, specializing in corporate finance, mergers, 
acquisitions and securities. Ex. 576. 
3. Enzer became a director of LAET in approximately April 
1989, and continued as such through September 26, 1991. 
4. At the time that Enzer became a director, LAET had at 
least four directors on its Board, including Daniel Lezak, a 
founder of the company and director since 1984. 
v 0 ^  ,«. ,„ 
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5. At the time that Enzer became a director, the Fifth 
Article of Incorporation of LAET (Ex. 501), provided in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
The number of directors may from time to time be 
increased or decreased in such manner as shall be 
provided by the By-Laws of this corporation, provided 
that the number of directors shall not be reduced to less 
than three (3). . . . 
6. At the time that Enzer became a director, the Ninth 
Article of Incorporation of LAET, provided as follows: 
[T]he board of directors is expressly authorized: 
Subject to the by-Laws, if any, adopted by the 
stockholders, to make, alter or amend the by-Laws of the 
corporation. 
7. At the time Enzer became a director, the By-Laws of LAET 
(Ex. 502), Article III, Section 11, provided for the payment of a 
fixed sum or a stated salary to directors for attendance at each of 
the meetings of the Board of Directors. 
8. On November 1, 1989, after giving the required notice 
(Ex. 506) , LAET held a special meeting of shareholders of the 
company. Both Enzer and Lezak were in attendance. At that 
meeting, a motion was made and unanimously passed to eliminate 
director's fees (Minutes, Ex. 507). 
9. At the November 1, 1989 special meeting of shareholders 
of LAET, Lezak ceased being a member of that Board, and the Board 
was thereby reduced to three in number. 
oo:063 
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10 • From late 1989 until September 26, 1991, when he resigned 
from the Board of Directors, Enzer acted as an attorney for LAET, 
representing himself to be such. He gave advice to LAET on legal 
matters, prepared documents customarily prepared by attorneys, and 
submitted a statement or statements for his services rendered in 
that regard. (Exs. 1, 2 & 534). 
11. As of August 3, 1990, with the resignation of LAET Board 
members, Enzer became the sole director and chairman of LAET. He 
continued in this capacity until January 22, 1991. 
12. On December 1, 1990, Enzer, as sole director, held a 
meeting of the LAET Board, at which time he voted to approve a 
Consulting Agreement between LAET and himself (Ex. 34) . Said 
Consulting Agreement provides as compensation to Enzer, monthly 
payments of $200.00, commencing December 1, 1991. 
13. On January 22, 1991, Lezak rejoined the LAET Board of 
Directors as Chairman, with Enzer continuing as a director. 
14. For the time period January 22, 1991 through September 
26, 1991, Lezak had limited involvement in the affairs of LAET. 
Enzer actively directed the operations of LAET. As of January 22, 
1991, LAET's stock was listed on the NASDAQ index at $.03 per 
share. 
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15. On May 23, 1991, Enzer signed on behalf of LAET a Letter 
of Intent (Ex. 5) , to merge with certain Japanese companies 
referred to as "Marutaka." Enzer understood as of the date of the 
signing of the Letter of Intent that Marutaka had booked assets 
valued in excess of $1 billion. 
16. On May 30, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to George Houston 
("Houston"), transfer agent for LAET stock, misrepresenting that he 
had purchased shares of LAET stock constituting the majority block 
of LAET stock, and requesting that the block of stock be placed in 
his name. Enzer was not successful in this endeavor. 
17. On June 4, 1991, Jehu Hand ("Hand"), outside counsel for 
LAET, forwarded to Enzer by telecopy, a photocopy of SEC Regulation 
S. 
18. On June 4 and 5, 1991, Enzer finished preparation of 
certain purported minutes of special meetings of the LAET Board of 
Directors, and certain stock option agreements referenced in said 
minutes. These purported minutes referred to meetings supposedly 
held on May 3 and 7, 1991, at the offices of Lezak in Calabasas, 
California, at which the LAET Board resolved to issue LAET stock, 
with an agreed value of $60,000.00 to Holmby Capital Partners, and 
$30,000.00 to CD. Management, Inc., together with certain stock 
options to each party. 
(.;!? 
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19. The minutes completed on June 4 and 5, 1991 were 
backdated to make it appear that the action memorialized therein 
had occurred prior to the execution of the Mirutaka Letter of 
Intent of May 23, 1991, when in fact all discussions of the 
issuance of shares to the entities listed occurred after May 23, 
1991. This was done with Lezak's knowledge and acquiescence. 
20. On June 6, 1991, Hand forwarded to Enzer and Lezak 
separately, a draft Form S-8, for the issuance of 3 million shares 
of LAET stock to consultants, directors and professionals, with 
blank signature pages. Hand directed each to execute the signature 
page and return it to him. 
21. Lezak executed the blank signature page to the S-8, and 
returned it to Hand. The S-8 as finally filed with the SEC called 
for the issuance of 20 million shares of LAET stock. 
22. On June 6, 1991, Enzer caused a paragraph to be added to 
the form of his Consulting Agreement as approved at the Board 
meeting of December 1, 1990, that was numbered as paragraph 3, and 
read as follows: 
Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or 
LAET common stock as a bonus in the following percentages 
for transaction engaged by consultant and closed by LAET 
in the following "booked" asset amounts: 5% of the first 
100 million, 4% of the next 100 million, 3% of the next 
100 million, 2% of the next 100 million, 1% of each 100 
million thereafter. LAET stock shall be valued on the 
closing day or the prior business day. 
OLSON, PAYNE V. ENZER PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
23. Enzer photocopied from a Consulting Agreement to which 
Sherman Mazur ("Mazur") was a party, the signature of James Kolitz, 
who had been the President of LAET when the December 1, 1990 Board 
meeting took place. He "cut and pasted" this copied signature 
(Exs. 577, 578 & 7), to the revised Consulting Agreement, with the 
intent to make the resulting document appear to be bona fide. This 
document or a copy was admitted at trial as Exhibit 577. Exhibit 
3 was derived from Exhibit 577. (Cf. Exs. 581 & 582 overlay 
transparencies) . 
24. On June 7, 1991, Enzer and Mazur met with Hand and his 
law partner, Roland Day ("Day") . Lezak was not present at this 
meeting. Thereafter, on June 7, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to Hand, 
enclosing therewith, a copy of Exhibit 577, and representing it to 
be his (Enzer7s) Consulting Agreement. 
25. On June 14, 1991, following instructions from Enzer, Hand 
telecopied to Lezak the signature page only (Ex. 521) , of a two-
page document styled "Unanimous Written Consent of the Board of 
Directors or L.A. Entertainment, Inc." (the "Resolution"), with 
directions that Lezak sign the document and return it by Federal 
Express to Hand. 
26. Before signing the signature page, Enzer spoke to Lezak. 
Enzer instructed Lezak to telecopy the signed signature page to 
LAET's offices, rather than forwarding it to Hand. Enzer falsely 
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represented to Lezak that the first page of the Resolution set 
forth the amount of shares to be issued, as memorialized in the 
purported minutes of the May 3 and 7, 1991 Board meetings. 
27. Relying on the representations of Enzer with respect to 
the contents of the first page of the Resolution, Lezak executed 
the signature page of the Resolution and forwarded it by telecopy 
to LAET's offices. 
28. Two hours later, Enzer received from Hand by telecopy the 
first page of the Resolution. Enzer executed the signature page 
telecopied by Lezak, and attached it to the first page from Hand. 
This document was then telecopied to Hand, with instructions from 
Enzer that Hand "coordinate with Houston". 
29. The Resolution provided for the issuance of 2 million 
LAET shares to David Enzer for "Consulting Services under 
Consulting Agreement," and 1 million shares to David Enzer as 
"Directors Shares". Although executed on June 14, 1991, the 
Resolution purported to be effective as of January 22, 1991. 
30. As of June 14, 1991, LAET stock was selling on NASDAQ for 
$.31 per share (Ex. 511). 
31. This Resolution was forwarded to Houston in order to 
obtain issuance of the shares identified. 
! » ( . : 0 6 8 
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32.. While in Japan with Day during the week of June 17, 1991, 
Enzer agreed to certain changes on the first page of the 
Resolution. These were communicated to Hand, who made the changes 
and forwarded a first page of the Resolution, revised to show the 
agreed changes, to Houston, with a copy to Enzer, but no copy to 
Lezak. 
33. Thereafter, in late June, 1991, 3.5 million shares of 
LAET common stock were issued to Enzer. 
34. On June 19, 1991, Lezak executed a telecopied signature 
page for the 1991 LAET Form 10-K at the Los Angeles offices of BDO 
Seidman. At the time he executed the signature page, Lezak had not 
reviewed any draft of the Form 10-K. 
35. While at the Seidman offices, Lezak also executed a 
second signature page to the Resolution. Enzer did not review the 
first page of the Resolution to which the signature page was to be 
attached. With respect to the Form 10-K and the Resolution 
signature page, Lezak was told and understood that only signature 
pages were available. 
36. Following the execution of these signature pages, Lezak 
learned on or about July 19, 1991, that the amount of certain 
shares set forth in the Resolution, including those for Enzer, was 
much greater than the amount that he had understood was approved in 
«1i,r, > C\ 
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the purported minutes of May 3 and 7, 1991, special meetings of the 
Board of Directors. He demanded a meeting with Enzer and Mazur at 
the offices of LAET on Saturday, July 20, 1991, to discuss this 
matter before Enzer and Mazur left for Japan. 
37. On July 20, 1991, Lezak, Enzer and Mazur met at the LAET 
offices and discussed the number of shares listed in the 
Resolution. Lezak expressed his disagreement with the increased 
number of shares. Enzer and Mazur represented to Lezak that they 
would deal with the matter during the trip to Japan, and take care 
of it before the filing of the Form 10-K. 
38. In reliance on these representations, Lezak took no 
further steps at that time with respect to the shares of LAET stock 
approved for issuance to Enzer. 
39. On August 6, 1991, Hand filed with the SEC the 1991 LAET 
Form 10-K (Ex. 183) . This signature page of the Form 10-K was the 
telecopied page signed by Lezak of July 19, 1991, which also bore 
the signature of Enzer. 
40. Before signing the 1991 L.A. ET Form 10-K, Enzer read the 
document and thereby had knowledge of its contents and the 
representations contained therein. 
41. The misrepresentations contained in the 1991 LAET Form 
10-K included the purported issuance on January 22, 1991, of stock 
iU2; 
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to David Enzer in the amount of 3.5 million shares, with the 
explanation that the company entered into a Consulting Agreement 
with Enzer, a director, providing compensation for $200.00 per 
month, commencing December 1, 1991. 
42. Attached to the LAET Form 10-K as Exhibit 10.12, was a 
copy of the Consulting Agreement created by Enzer on June 6, 1991. 
This copy of the Consulting Agreement was supplied to Hand by Enzer 
on June 7, 1991, with the intent that Hand and LAET rely on its 
contents in preparing documents to be filed with the SEC. 
43. In making representations set forth above, Enzer made 
knowing and intentional misrepresentations of material fact, and 
intentionally failed to disclose certain material facts to the SEC, 
to the investing public, and to LAET. 
44. Enzer made such misrepresentations and omissions with the 
intent that LAET and its agents rely on them to carry out and 
affirm the issuance of 3.5 million shares of LAET common stock to 
him. 
45. LAET reasonably relied on such misrepresentations and 
material omissions in permitting the filing of the 1991 LAET Form 
10-K, and in not taking immediate action to prevent the issuance of 
the stock to Enzer. 
0 U 2 G 7 i 
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46. On September 16, 1991, Lezak and Enzer held a formal 
meeting of the Board of Directors of LAET, the first since Lezak 
rejoined the Board on January 22, 1991. Enzer conducted the 
meeting. 
47. Following the September 16, 1991 Board meeting, Enzer 
forwarded by telecopy to Lezak draft minutes (Ex. 527), of the 
meeting. Lezak did not approve the draft minutes. 
48. By September 20, 1991, Enzer had sold 469,500 shares of 
the LAET stock issued to him pursuant to the Resolution. The 
proceeds of these sales, together with the remaining 3,030,500 
shares of stock, were ultimately transferred to the plaintiff 
Olson, Payne and Company. 
49. On the afternoon of September 26, 1991, Enzer caused the 
draft minutes of the September 16, 1991 Board meeting to be edited, 
to provide for express approval by the Board of the issuance of the 
3.5 million shares of LAET stock to him. 
50. A half hour later, Enzer dictated a memorandum to the 
Board of Directors of LAET announcing his resignation from the 
Board, and telecopied that document to Lezak. 
51. On October 2, 1991, Olson, Payne and Company commenced 
this action by interpleading into this court the stock and proceeds 
held by them in the account of Enzer. 
0020', 2 
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52. The shares of LAET stock issued to Enzer were treasury 
stock of the company. 
Enzer's testimony at trial was not persuasive or convincing. 
It was characterized by evasiveness, lack of candor, insider self-
dealing, and document manipulation. His testimony was wholly 
unsatisfactory in his attempt to explain the errors in the 
documents he either drafted or caused to be drafted. Lezak's 
testimony was, on the contrary, believable, persuasive and candid. 
In this Court's view, the evidence has established clearly and 
convincingly that Enzer committed common law fraud on LAET. 
Moreover, Enzer has failed to meet his burden by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he has better claim or 
entitlement to the interpleaded stock and funds on deposit with the 
clerk of court. 
The stock and proceeds held by the Court are ordered to be 
released to LAET. 
This Court accepts the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law of LAET, and directs counsel to submit the final draft and 
Judgment. 
Dated this of February, 1993 
J. PWNIS 
DIOTRICT'fojUBfT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 3JJ?^ day of 
February, 1993: 
Brent V, Manning 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric C. Olson 
Attorney for Defendant LAET 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 





VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Eric C. Olson (4108) 
Marvin D. Bagley (4529) 
Jon E. Waddoups (5815) 
Attorneys for Defendant L. A. Entertainment 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLSEN PAYNE & COMPANY, INC. , a ) 
Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 910906266CV 
DAVID ENZER, and L. A. ) 
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. , a Nevada ) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
On February 9 through February 11, 1993, this Court 
held the trial in this matter. The defendant David Enzer 
("Enzer") was represented at trial by Brent V. Manning and Sheri 
A. Mower of the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen. The defendant 
L. A. Entertainment, Inc. ("LAET") was represented at trial by 
Eric C- Olson and Marvin D. Bagley of the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court having heard and 
considered the evidence at trial, having reviewed the trial 
briefs setting forth the legal arguments of the parties, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated February 26, 1993 and being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court enter 
the following as its findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. LAET is a Nevada corporation with its 
headquarters in Los Angeles, California. During the relevant 
time period, the stock of LAET traded publicly on the NASDAQ 
index. Further, LAET was a reporting company with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"). Previous 
to the time period relevant in this action, LAET was known as 
"Supermarket Video" and "Super Video." 
2. Enzer is a resident of Los Angeles, California. 
He is a 1986 graduate of the Hastings School of Law and engaged 
in the private practice of law for two and one-half years in the 
areas of corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions and 
securities. 
3. Enzer became a director of LAET in approximately 
April, 1989 and continued as a director of the company through 
September 26, 1991. 
4. At the time that Enzer became a director, LAET 
had at least four directors on its board including Daniel Lezak 
("Lezak"), a founder of the company and director since 1984. 
5. At the time that Enzer became a director, the 
Articles of Incorporation of LAET, Fifth Article read as follows 
in pertinent part: 
The governing board of this corporation shall be known 
as directors, and the number of directors may from 
time to time be increased or decreased in such manner 
as shall be provided by the By-laws of this 
corporation, provided that the number of directors 
shall not be reduced to less than three (3), except 
that in cases where all the shares of the corporation 
are owned beneficially and of record by either one or 
two stockholders, the number of directors may be less 
than three (3), but not less than the number of 
stockholders. 
6. At the time that Enzer became a director, the 
Articles of Incorporation of LAET, Ninth Article read as follows 
in pertinent part: "[T]he board of directors is expressly 
authorized: Subject to the by-Laws, if any, adopted by the 
stockholders, to make, alter or amend the by-Laws of the 
corporation. " 
7. At the time that Enzer became a director, the By-
Laws of LAET, Article III, Section 11, read as follows: 
The directors may be paid their expenses, if any, of 
attendance at each meeting of the board of directors 
and may be paid a fixed sum for attendance at each 
meeting of the board of directors or a stated salary 
as director. No such payment shall preclude any 
director from serving the corporation in any other 
capacity and receiving compensation therefor. Members 
of special or standing committees may be allowed like 
compensation for attending committee meetings. 
8. On November 1, 1989, after giving the required 
notice, LAET held a special meeting of shareholders of the 
company. Both Enzer and Lezak were in attendance at this 
meeting. The minutes of the November 1, 1989 Special Meeting of 
Shareholders state in pertinent part: 
Lawrence Kieves made a motion to eliminate directors 
fees by modifying Section 11 of the Corporate Bylaws. 
The motion was seconded by Norman Gross. A vote was 
called and by unanimous consent the Bylaws were so 
modified to eliminate directors fees. 
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9. At the November 1, 1989 Special Meeting of 
Shareholders of LAET, Lezak ceased to be a member of the LAET 
board of directors and the members of the board were reduced to 
three. 
10. From late 1989 when he became involved in 
advising LAET regarding the Grand Union transaction until he 
ceased to be a member of the LAET board on September 26, 1991, 
Enzer acted as an attorney for LAET representing himself on 
occasion to be such, giving advice to LAET on legal matters and 
preparing documents customarily prepared by attorneys. 
11. Following the resignations of LAET board members 
on June 22, 1990 and August 3, 1990, Enzer became the sole 
director and chairman of LAET. He continued as sole director 
until January 22, 1991. 
12. On December 1, 1990, Enzer as sole director held 
a meeting of the LAET board at which time he voted to approve 
consulting agreements between LAET and himself and Sherman Mazur 
respectively. The Court finds that Exhibit 34 is the Consulting 
Agreement approved by the LAET board on this occasion. As 
compensation to Enzer, that Consulting Agreement provides for 
monthly payments of $200 commencing on December 1, 1991. 
13. On January 22, 1991, Lezak rejoined the LAET 
board of directors as chairman with Enzer continuing as a 
director. 
14. For the time period from January 22, 1991 through 
September 26, 1991, Lezak had limited involvement in the affairs 
of LAET. He visited the company' s offices approximately twice a 
week and participated occasionally in informal directors 
meetings. Enzer was actively involved in the operations of the 
company. 
15. As of January 22, 1991, LAET was experiencing 
financial problems and its common stock was listed on the NASDAQ 
index at $. 03 per share. 
16. On May 23, 1991, Enzer signed on behalf of LAET a 
Letter of Intent to merge with certain Japanese companies 
hereinafter referred to as "Marutaka." Enzer understood as of 
the date of the signing of the Letter of Intent that Marutaka 
had booked assets valued in excess of $1 billion. 
17. On May 30, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to George 
Houston ("Houston"), transfer agent for LAET stock, 
misrepresenting that he had purchased certain shares of LAET 
stock constituting the majority block of LAET stock and 
requesting that the block of LAET stock be placed in his name. 
Enzer was not successful in having the block of LAET stock 
placed in his name. 
18. On June 4, 1991, Jehu Hand ("Hand") as outside 
securities counsel to LAET forwarded to Enzer by telecopy a 
photocopy of SEC Regulation S. 
19. On June 4 and 5, 1991, Enzer finished preparation 
of certain purported minutes of special meetings of the LAET 
board of directors and certain stock option agreements 
referenced in the purported minutes. These minutes referenced 
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meetings supposedly held on May 3 and 7, 1991 at the offices of 
Lezak in Calabasas, California at which the LAET board resolved 
to issue LAET stock with an agreed value of $60,000 to Holmby 
Capital Partners and $30,000 to CD. Management, Inc. together 
with certain stock options to each party. 
20. The minutes completed on June 4 and 5, 1991 were 
backdated to make it appear that the action memorialized therein 
had occurred prior to the execution of the Marutaka Letter of 
Intent on May 23, 1991 when, in fact, all discussions of the 
issuance of shares to the entities listed occurred after May 23, 
1991. This was done with Lezak' s knowledge and acquiescence. 
21. On June 6, 1991, Hand forwarded to Enzer and 
Lezak separately a draft Form S-8 for the issuance of 3,000,000 
shares of LAET stock to consultants, directors and professionals 
with blank signature pages. Hand directed each to execute the 
signature page and return it to him. 
22. Lezak executed the blank signature page to the S-
8 and returned it to Hand. The S-8 as finally filed with the 
SEC called for the issuance of 20,000,000 shares of LAET stock. 
23. On June 6, 1991, Enzer caused a paragraph to be 
added to the form of his Consulting Agreement as approved at the 
board meeting of December 1, 1990 that was numbered as paragraph 
3 and read as follows: 
Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or LAET 
common stock as a bonus in the following percentages 
for transaction engaged by Consultant and closed by 
LAET in the following "booked" asset amounts" 5% of 
the first $100 Million, 4% of the next $100 Million, 
"
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3% of the next $100 Million, 2% of the next $100 
Million, 1% of each $100 Million thereafter. LAET 
stock shall be valued on the closing day or the prior 
business day. 
Enzer further photocopied, from a Consulting Agreement to which 
Mazur was a party, the signature of James Kolitz, who had been 
the president of LAET when the December 1, 1990 board meeting 
took place. He "cut and pasted11 this copied signature to the 
revised Consulting Agreement with the intent to make the 
resulting document appear to be a bona fide Consulting 
Agreement. This document or a copy thereof was admitted at 
trial as Exhibit 577. Exhibit 3 was derived from Exhibit 557. 
24. On June 7, 1991, Enzer and Mazur met with Hand 
and his law partner, Rowland Day. Lezak was not present at this 
meeting. Thereafter, on June 7, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to 
Hand enclosing therewith, among other things, a copy of Exhibit 
577 and representing it to be his (Enzer7s) consulting 
agreement. 
25. On June 14, 1991, following instructions from 
Enzer, Hand telecopied to Lezak the signature page only of a 
two-paged document styled "Unanimous Written Consent of the 
Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment, Inc. " (the 
"Resolution") with directions that Lezak sign the document and 
return it by Federal Express to Hand. 
26. Before signing the signature page, Lezak spoke 
with Enzer. Enzer instructed Lezak to telecopy the signed 
signature page to LAET' s offices rather than forwarding it to 
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Hand. Enzer further falsely represented to Lezak that the first 
page of the Resolution set forth the amount of shares to be 
issued as memorialized in the purported minutes for the May 3 
and 7, 1991 board meetings. 
27. Relying on the representations of Enzer with 
respect to the contents of the first page of the Resolution, 
Lezak executed the signature page of the Resolution and 
forwarded it by telecopy to LAET" s offices. 
28. Two hours later, Enzer received from Hand by 
telecopy the first page of the Resolution. Enzer executed the 
signature page telecopied by Lezak and attached it to the first 
page from Hand. This document was then telecopied to Hand with 
instructions from Enzer that Hand "coordinate with Houston." 
29. The Resolution provided with respect to Enzer as 
follows: 
Name Consideration Shares 
David Enzer Consulting Services under 2, 000,000 
Consulting Agreement 
Directors Shares 1,000,000 
The Resolution further provided for the issuance of 500,000 
options to Holmby Capital Partners at a price per share of $. 03. 
Although executed on June 14, 1991, the Resolution purported to 
be effective as of January 22, 1991. 
30. As of June 14, 1991, LAET stock was selling on 
NASDAQ for $.31 per share. 
-
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31. Hand forwarded the Resolution to Houston as part 
of the process of obtaining the issuance of the shares 
identified in the Resolution. 
32. While in Japan with Day during the week of June 
17, 1991, Enzer agreed to certain changes in the first page of 
the Resolution. These were communicated to Hand who made the 
changes and forwarded a first page of the Resolution, revised to 
show the agreed changes, to Houston with a carbon copy to Enzer 
but no copy to Lezak. 
33. Thereafter, in late June, 1991, 3. 5 million 
shares of LAET common stock were issued to Enzer. 
34. On July 19, 1991, interrupting his vacation, 
Lezak executed a telecopied signature page for the 1991 LAET 
Form 10-K at the Los Angeles offices of BDO Seidman. At the 
time he executed the signature page, Lezak had not reviewed any 
draft of the Form 10-K. 
35. During his visit to the BDO Seidman offices, 
Lezak also executed a second signature page to the Resolution. 
Enzer did not review the first page of the Resolution to which 
the signature page was to be attached. With respect to the Form 
10-K and the Resolution signature page, Lezak understood that 
only signature pages were available. 
36. Following the execution of these signature pages, 
Lezak learned that the amount of certain shares set forth in the 
Resolution including those for Enzer was much greater than the 
amount that he had understood was approved for Holmby Capital 
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Partners consistent with the purported minutes for the May 3 and 
7, 1991 special meetings of the board of directors. He demanded 
a meeting with Enzer and Mazur at the offices of LAET on 
Saturday, July 20, 1991 to discuss this matter before Enzer and 
Mazur left for Japan in connection with the Marutaka 
transaction. 
37. On July 20, 1991, Lezak, Enzer and Mazur met at 
the LAET offices and discussed the number of shares listed in 
the Resolution. Lezak expressed his disagreement with the 
increased number of shares. Enzer and Mazur represented to 
Lezak that they would deal with the matter during the trip to 
Japan and take care of it before the filing of the Form 10-K. 
38. In reliance on these representations, Lezak took 
no further steps at that time with respect to the shares of LAET 
stock approved for issuance to Enzer. 
39. On August 6, 1991, Hand filed with the SEC the 
1991 LAET Form 10-K. This signature page for the Form 10-K was 
the telecopied page signed by Lezak on July 19, 1991 which also 
bore the signature of Enzer. 
40. Before signing the 1991 LAET Form 10-K, Enzer 
read the document and thereby had knowledge of its contents and 
the representations contained therein. 
41. Among other representations in the 1991 LAET Form 
10-K were these: 
On January 22, 1991 the Company awarded common stock 
to members of its Board of Directors for their 
services as board members and for consulting services 
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under an Consulting Agreement as follows. All shares 
issued to Mr. Lezak were registered in the name of 
C. D. Management, Inc. , a corporation controlled by 
him. 
David Enzer 3, 500,000 
Daniel Lezak 1,250,000 
(p. U.) 
On January 14, 1991, the Company entered into a 
Consulting Agreement with David Enzer, a director, 
providing for compensation of $200.00 per month 
commencing December 1, 1991, and, a bonus for any 
acquisition made by the Company arranged by that 
consultant. (p. 12. ) 
42. Attached to the 1991 LAET Form 10-K as Exhibit 
10. 12 was a copy of the Consulting Agreement created by Enzer on 
June 6, 1991. This copy of the Consulting Agreement was 
supplied to Hand by Enzer on June 7, 1991 with the intent that 
Hand and LAET rely upon its contents in preparing documents to 
be filed with the SEC. 
43. In making representations set forth in paragraph 
41 above and in acquiescing in and approving of the attachment 
of the Consulting Agreement as Exhibit 10. 12 to the 1991 LAET 
Form 10-K, Enzer made knowing and intentional misrepresentations 
of material fact, and intentionally failed to disclose certain 
material facts, to the SEC, to the investing public and to LAET. 
44. Enzer made such misrepresentations and omissions 
with the intent that LAET and its agents rely on them to carry 
out and affirm the issuance of 3. 5 million shares of LAET common 
stock to him. 
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45. LAET did reasonably rely on such 
misrepresentations and material omissions in permitting the 
filing of the 1991 LAET Form 10-K and in not taking immediate 
action to prevent the issuance of the stock to Enzer. 
46. On September 16, 1991, Lezak and Enzer held a 
formal meeting of the board of directors of LAET, the first 
since Lezak rejoined the board on January 22, 1991. Enzer 
conducted the meeting. 
47. Following the September 16, 1991 board meeting, 
Enzer forwarded by telecopy to Lezak draft minutes of the 
meeting. Lezak did not approve the draft minutes. 
48. By September 20, 1991, Enzer had sold 
approximately 500, 000 shares of the LAET stock issued to him 
pursuant to the Resolution. The proceeds of these sales 
together with the remaining 3, 000, 000 shares of stock were 
ultimately transferred to the plaintiff Olsen Payne & Company. 
49. In the afternoon of September 26, 1991, Enzer 
caused that the draft minutes of the September 16, 1991 board 
meeting be edited to provide for express approval by the board 
of, among other matters, the issuance of 3,500,000 shares of 
LAET stock to him. 
50. A half hour later, Enzer dictated a memorandum to 
the board of directors of LAET announcing his resignation from 
the board and telecopied that document to Lezak. 
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51. On October 2, 1991, Olsen Payne & Company 
commenced this action by interpleading into this Court the stock 
and proceeds held by them in the account of Enzer. 
52. The shares of LAET common stock issued to Enzer 
were treasury stock of the company. 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
1. All issues of corporate governance and authority 
in this action are governed by the law of Nevada and, 
specifically, by Nevada Revised Statutes Title 7, Chapter 78. 
2. All issues with respect to the duties and conduct 
of directors are governed by the law of Nevada. 
3. All issues with respect to duties of attorneys, 
failure of consideration, constructive fraud and common law 
fraud are governed by the law of California. 
4. The powers of Enzer and Lezak, as directors, to 
act for the company are subject to the limitations set forth in 
LAET' s Articles of Incorporation. 
5. Any limitation on the authority of directors set 
forth in the LAET Articles of Incorporation may be asserted in 
this action between LAET and Enzer. 
6. The actions of the LAET board of directors in 
approving the issuance of shares to Enzer as set forth above are 
void for noncompliance with the requirement of the LAET Articles 
of Incorporation that the LAET board of directors consist of at 
least three persons. 
7. All actions of Enzer and Lezak as directors were 
subject to the By-laws of LAET adopted by the stockholders of 
LAET and any action taken contrary to such By-laws was without 
actual authority and may be voided by LAET. 
8. Enzer and Lezak as directors did not have power, 
either expressly or by implication, to waive or alter any 
provision of the By-laws of LAET adopted by the stockholders of 
LAET. 
9. The issuance of LAET stock to Enzer as "Directors 
Shares" constituted directors fees and is void as contrary to 
the By-laws of LAET as amended by the LAET stockholders. 
10. Enzer7 s rights to any stock or proceeds held by 
this Court must be defined solely by written agreements duly 
approved by a sufficient vote of the board of directors of LAET 
and legitimately executed by an authorized agent of the company. 
11. The transaction memorialized in the June 14, 1991 
and July 19, 1991 Corporate Resolutions superseded any rights 
created by the May 3 and 7, 1991 Corporate Minutes and Enzer may 
not now seek enforcement of any resolutions set forth in these 
superseded minutes. 
12. At trial, Enzer had the burden of proving that 
any Corporate Resolution providing for the issuance of the LAET 
stock to him, Lezak and others was approved by a vote sufficient 
for the purpose of said approval without counting the vote of 
any director having a financial interest in the subject matter 
of the Corporate Resolution. 
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13. Both Enzer and Lezak were interested directors 
with respect to the transactions memorialized in the May 3 and 
7, 1991 Corporate Minutes and the June 14, 1991 and July 19, 
1991 Corporate Resolutions and their votes were not sufficient 
to approve the Corporate Resolution. 
14. In the absence of votes sufficient to approve the 
Corporate Resolution, Enzer had the burden of proving that the 
issuance of LAET stock to him was fair as to LAET at the time it 
was authorized. 
15. Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving 
the fairness to LAET of the issuance of 3. 5 million shares of 
LAET stock to him and that issuance is void. 
16. As a director and as an attorney, Enzer stood in 
a fiduciary relationship to LAET and, as a consequence of that 
relationship, owed LAET a duty to act with a view to the 
interest of LAET, to act honestly with respect to LAET, to 
exercise his powers as a director in good faith and consistent 
with the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of LAET, to 
disclose to LAET material facts known to him with respect to the 
stock issuance in dispute in this action, and to account to the 
company for any profit obtained by him at the expense of LAET. 
17. LAET has met its burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Enzer breached his fiduciary 
duty to LAET by reason of the following acts and omissions: 
-
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a. Enzer accepted corporate benefits approved 
in violation of the Article of Incorporation, By-laws 
of LAET and the statutes of the State of Nevada. 
b. Enzer manufactured and published the "cut 
and past" Consulting Agreement that was attached to 
the 1991 LAET Form 10-K and cited in both the 1991 
LAET Form 10-K and the Corporate Resolution as the 
purported basis for the issuance of LAET stock to him. 
c. Enzer misrepresented the terms of the 
Resolution and failed to disclose the true terms of 
the Resolution prior to Lezak' s signing of the 
Resolution' s second page. 
d. Enzer misrepresented the occurrence of and 
date of the meetings of the LAET board memorialized in 
the May 3 and May 7, 1991 Corporate Minutes. 
e. Enzer misrepresented the date of approval of 
the issuance of shares to him and other directors and 
professionals in the 1991 LAET Form 10-K. 
f. Enzer backdated documents to give the false 
appearance that stock had been approved for issuance 
to him before the execution of the Marutaka letter of 
intent rather than after that material event. 
g. Enzer accepted stock that, on the day its 
issuance was approved, had a public market value of 
over ten times the value recited for the stock in the 
document authorizing its issuance. 
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h. Enzer authorized the issuance of stock for 
services rendered under a Consulting Agreement that 
did not obligate LAET to make any payment to him. 
i. To the extent that Enzer deemed the issuance 
of stock to constitute payment for services to be 
rendered in the future, Enzer authorized issuance of 
the stock in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78. 210. 
18. Enzer' s approval of the issuance of LAET stock to 
him under any set of minutes or corporate resolution before the 
Court is void by reason of his breach of fiduciary duty. 
19. Enzer committed common law fraud on LAET by 
reason of his conduct cited at Conclusion of Law No. 17(b) 
through (h) above. 
20. The award of LAET stock to Enzer, insofar as the 
consideration cited is "Consulting Services under Consulting 
Agreement, " is void for lack of consideration, and the 
Consulting Agreement is void because its execution was not 
authorized by a sufficient vote of the LAET board of directors 
and because the referenced document has been tampered with and 
manipulated by Enzer. 
21. Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence any estoppel theory advanced in 
this Court because any payment of stock could only legally be 
for past services and, hence, there could be no detrimental 
reliance as to future performance. 
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22. Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that LAET, acting with full 
knowledge of the facts relevant to the issuance of 3. 5 million 
shares of LAET stock to Enzer, ratified that issuance or waived 
any objection to that issuance. 
23. (a) Enzer' s having no valid claim to the stock 
and proceeds held by this Court and (b) both the stock now held 
by the Court and the stock from which the proceeds were derived 
having come from the treasury of LAET, LAET is entitled to the 
entry of Judgment declaring it the rightful owner of the stock 
and proceeds and directing the Clerk of this Court to release 
to LAET such stock and proceeds held by that office in 
connection with this action. 
DATED this u l ^ day of March, 1993. 
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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment, 
Inc. a Nevada corporation was held May 3, 1991 at the offices of 
its Chairman, Daniel Lezak, 23801 Calabasas Road, Suite 2050, 
Calabasas, CA, 91302. All members of the Board received notice of 
the meeting in accordance with the Company's by-laws or 
approximately waived notice thereof. 
The following directors were present: 
Daniel Lezak 
David Enzer 
The Chairman indicated that the meeting was called to compensate 
certain Directors and Consultants to the Company for work performed 
on the Company's behalf to date. Mr. Lezak indicated that Mr. 
Enzer, a Director and Consultant to the Company, and through his 
partnership, Holmby Capital Partners ("Holmby"), has worked 
diligently without any compensation therefor, and has expended 
substantial resources to date on the Company's behalf with respect 
to numerous outside transactions, internal financing and 
restructuring, and working with the investment community. In light 
of all of the foregoing and the Company's desire for Mr. Enzer to 
continue the efforts described above, Mr. Lezak proposed 
compensating those parties by granting Common Stock to Holmby 
equivalent to a bonus of $60,000, and granting Holmby 500,000 
options to purchase common stock at $.03 per share. It was 
therefor (Mr. Enzer not voting), 
RESOLVED, that the Board hereby grants a bonus of $60,000 to Holmby 
Capital Partners, payable in L.A. Entertainment Common Stock, at an 
issuance price of $.03, or the amount equal to the bid price at 
this date as found on NASDAQ; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Board hereby grants Holmby Capital 
Partners an option to purchase 500,000 shares of Company Common 
Stock at $.03 per share pursuant to the forms set forth in the 
Stock Option Agreement attached hereto. 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall cause to be issued such 
shares to Holmby that are freely tradeable and not restricted and 
that such shares shall be issued upon completion of the current 
registration statement currently under review by the S.E.C., and 
the Company shall execute the Stock Option Agreement attached 
hereto; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall pay the tax upon Holmby at 
such time as such is required to be paid by Holmby for the stock 
and options granted hereby, whether such is a federal or state tax, 
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owing by Holmby; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that all prior acts of the Company's directors or 
officers to date is hereby approved, confirmed and ratified. 
There being no further business to come before the meeting, it was 
upon motion duly made and seconded and carried, adjourned. 
By execution of these minutes jfette'BoardXmembers^^AGknowledge 
received a copy of these minutes/and waive notice to^6his meeting. 
Daniel Leeakl Chairman 
Attests
 r 
Ffancene Wilson, Secretary 
LAET01481 
L. A. Entertainment 
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT 
I. STOCK OPTION. 
A stock option for a total of Five Hundred Thousand (500,000) 
shares of Common Stock, no par value, of L. A. Entertainment, a 
Nevada corporation at 1875 Century Park East, #2679, Los Angeles, 
CA 90067 (the "Company") is hereby granted to Holmby Capital 
Partners, a California limited partnership (herein the "Optionee") . 
Subject in all respects to the terms and provisions set forth 
hereunder. The date of this grant is May 3, 1991. 
II. OPTION PRICE. 
The option price as determined by the Board of Directors of the 
Company is $.03 per share (three one-hundreths of One Dollar). 
III. INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION. 
This Option may not be exercised if the issuance of share of Common 
Stock of the Company upon such exercise would constitute a 
violation of any applicable Federal or State securities or other 
law or valid regulation. The Optionee, as a condition to its 
exercise of the Option, shall represent to the Company that the 
shares of Common Stock of the Company that is acquires under this 
Option are being acquired by it for investment and not with a 
present view to distribution or resale, unless counsel for 
Optionee, with Company's approval, is then of the opinion that such 
a representation in not required under the Securities Act of 1933, 
as amended or any other applicable law, regulation, or rule of any 
governmental agency. 
IV. TERM OP OPTION. 
The term of this Option shall be for a period of five (5) years 
from the date hereof. In no event may the Option be exercised 
after five (5) years from the date hereof. The Option may be 
exercised in whole or in part, at any time, during its term, or 
from time to time. 
The holder of the Option shall not have any of the rights of a 
stockholder of the Company with respect to the shares covered by 
the Option except to the extent that one or more certificates for 
such shares shall have been issued to it upon the due exercise of 
the Option. This Option may be exercised during such term only in 
accordance with the terms herein. 
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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment, 
Inc. a Nevada corporation was held May 7, 1991 at the offices of 
its Chairman, Daniel Lezak, 23801 Calabasas Road, Suite 2050, 
Calabasas, CA, 913 02. All members of the Board received notice of 
the meeting in accordance with the Company's by-laws or 
approximately waived notice thereof. 
The following directors were present: 
Daniel Lezak 
David Enzer 
The Directors indicated that the meeting was called to compensate 
certain Directors of the Company for work performed on the 
Company's behalf to date. Mr. Enzer indicated that Mr. Lezak, a 
Director to the Company, and has worked diligently without any 
compensation therefor, and has expended substantial resources to 
date on the Company's behalf with respect to numerous outside 
transactions, internal financing and restructuring, and working 
with numerous investors and broker dealers in the investment 
community. In light of all of the foregoing and the Company's 
desire for Mr. Lezak to continue the efforts described above, Mr. 
Enzer proposed compensating those parties by granting Common Stock 
to Mr. Lezak's management company, C D Managment, Inc. ("CD") 
equivalent to a bonus of $30,000, and granting 250,000 options to 
purchase common stock at $.03 per share. It was therefor (Mr. 
Lezak not voting), 
RESOLVED, that the Board hereby grants a bonus of $30,000 to CD, 
payable in L.A. Entertainment Common Stock, at an issuance price of 
$.03, or the amount equal to the bid price at this date as found on 
NASDAQ; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Board hereby grants CD an option to 
purchase 250,000 shares of Company Common Stock at $.03 per share 
pursuant to the forms set forth in the Stock Option Agreement 
attached hereto. 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall cause to be issued such 
shares to CD that are freely tradeable and not restricted and that 
such shares shall be issued upon completion of the current 
registration statement currently under review by the S.E.C., and 
the Company shall execute the Stock Option Agreement attached 
hereto; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall pay the tax upon CD at 
such time as such is required to be paid by CD for the stock and 
options granted hereby, whether such is a federal or state tax, 
upon request by CD upon written notice of the amount of tax 
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owing by CD; 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that all prior acts of the Companyfs directors or 
officers to date is hereby approved, confirmed and ratified. 
There being no further business to come before the meeting, it was 
upon motion duly made and seconded and carried, adjourned. 
By execution of these minutes the^^Board'Nmembers acknowledge 
received a copy of these minutes and waive notice to this meeting. 
Attes dttfUf •fjd*L, 
'rancene Wilson, Secretary 
LAET01485 
L. A. Entertainment 
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT 
I. STOCK OPTION. 
A stock option for a total of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (250,000) 
shares of Common Stock, no par value, of L. A. Entertainment, a 
Nevada corporation at 1875 Century Park East, #2679, Los Angeles, 
CA 90067 (the "Company") is hereby granted to C D Management, Inc., 
a Nevada corporation (herein the "Optionee"). Subject in all 
respects to the terms and provisions set forth hereunder. The date 
of this grant is May 7, 1991. 
II. OPTION PRICE. 
The option price as determined by the Board of Directors of the 
Company is $.03 per share (three one-hundreths of One Dollar). 
III. INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION. 
This Option may not be exercised if the issuance of share of Common 
Stock of the Company upon such exercise would constitute a 
violation of any applicable Federal or State securities or other 
law or valid regulation. The Optionee, as a condition to its 
exercise of the Option, shall represent to the Company that the 
shares of Common Stock of the Company that is acquires under this 
Option are being acquired by it for investment and not with a 
present view to distribution or resale, unless counsel for 
Optionee, with Company's approval, is then of the opinion that such 
a representation in not required under the Securities Act of 1933, 
as amended or any other applicable law, regulation, or rule of any 
governmental agency. 
IV. TERM OP OPTION. 
The term of this Option shall be for a period of five (5) years 
from the date hereof. In no event may the Option be exercised 
after five (5) years from the date hereof. The Option may be 
exercised in whole or in part, at any time, during its term, or 
from time to time. 
The holder of the Option shall not have any of the rights of a 
stockholder of the Company with respect to the shares covered by 
the Option except to the extent that one or more certificates for 
such shares shall have been issued to it upon the due exercise of 
the Option. This Option may be exercised during such term only in 
accordance with the terms herein. 
LAET01486 
V. MANNER OF EXERCISE. 
This Option may be exercised by written notice delivered to the 
Company stating the number of shares with respect to which the 
Option is being exercised, together with cash or check in the price 
of such shares and the written statement provided for in Paragraph 
III hereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this agreement 
as of the date first above written. 
da corporation 












OF PAGES? -^ IKCLUDIKC COVER SHEET . 
1? VOU HAVS ANY QUESTIONS, OR VOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES 
INDICATED, PLSASS CALL AT: 213-957-290$ 
OUR PAX: 213-466-6370 
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RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY UKAHI2«DU8 WRXTTCT CONSSUT OF 
TEE BOARD OP DIRECTORS OF L.X. BHTBRTACDtlNT , ZKC. 
The undersigned members of the Board of Directors of L.A. 
Entertainment, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Corporation"), 
acting pursuant to Section 78*315 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, 
hereby consent to take the following actions and adopt the fol-
lowing resolutions effective as of January 22, 1991: 
WHEREAS, the Company presently does not have cash 
available to compensate certain of its directors, consultants and 
service providers, and such persons have served without substantial 
cash or other compensation to date. 
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the appropriate 
officers of the Corporation with the assistance of counsel, be and 
they hereby are, authorized to prepare and execute and file with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for and 
on behalf of this Corporation, one or more Registration Statements 
on Form S-8, and all amendments thereto, including the Prospectus 
and any and all exhibits and other documents relating thereto, for 
the registration, insofar as required under the Securities Act of 
1933, pursuant to which the Corporation may register under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 20,000,000 shares of Common stock, 
including shares offered under the 1990 stock Option Plan; and 
RESOLVED, that the Corporation authorize for issuance 
Shares of its Common Stock to the following persons and for the 
consideration set forth below, to be registered for sale under the 
Registration Statement: 
Hams consideration Shares 
David Enzer Consulting Services 2,000,000 
under Consulting 
Agreement 
Director shares 1,000,000 
Daniel Lezak Director shares 1,000,000 
to be issued in the name of C D Management, Inc. 
Sherman Masur Consulting Services 2,000,000 
under Consulting 
Agreement 
Rowland W. Day II Legal Services 250,000 
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the exercise of five year options 
issued on January 22, 1991 at $.03 per share by C 0 Management, 
Inc. (250,000 options) and Holxaby Capital Partners (500,000 
options) be, and the same hereby is, accepted by the Corporation, 
and any director or officer of the Corporation is hereby directed 
to cause such 750,000 option shares and the other shares described 
above pursuant to the Form s-8. 
i» w w r W I T H i u I- r- x O ^ 
«4viflAhii *- ^ of th* officer t»icift« M ! T * otB** action whiah 
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McKITTRICK, JACKSON, OeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH 
4041 MacArthur Blvd. 
Newport Beach, California 92660 
P. 0. Box 2710 
EAK &QVER S&M.HQ 
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 
TO: Name: Mr. George Houston 
Company: California Stock Transfer 
Fax No.: (503)273 9168 
Number of pages, including this cover memo: 6 
We are transmitting from a Panafax UF-400AD 
PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY IF NOT RECEIVED PROPERLY. CALL (714) 7S*$S$5. 












CAUTION; CONFIDENTIAL' THE DOCUMENT BEING TELECOPIED TO YOU MAY 
CONTAIN INFORMA TION PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CUENTJWORK PRODUCT 
PRIVILEGES. It is Intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended 
recipient or an authorized agent* then this is notice to you that dissemination, distribution or copying of 
this document is prohibited. If this was received in error, please call us at once and destroy the 
document 
MCKJTTRICK, JACKSON, DEMARCO & PECKENPAUOH 
George Houston 
June 17, 1991 
Page -2-
Sherman Mazur 2r000,000 
(address to be supplied) 
Rowland W. Day II 250,000 
1 Hampshire Court: 
Newport Beach, California 92660 
Please call me if you have any questions. The Company 
also would like you to send a shareholder list to my attention 
dated on or about June 1, 1991• 
yours, 
JH:kp 
cc: David Enzer 
Tab 4 
IMOLOTXQXS ADOPTS© BY UHAJUXCUS V&ZTTSV COOTO? Of 
O B BOARD of DZAICTOIS or L.X. uraiarAiaxwrr, me. 
The undersigned meabars of the Board of Directors of L.A. 
Intertainment, Inc., a Kevada corporation (the "Corporation"), 
acting pursuant to Section 78.315 of the Kevada Revised Statutes, 
hereby consent to take the following actions and adopt the Col-
loving resolutions effective as of January 22, 1991: 
WHEREAS, the Company presently does not have cash 
available to compensate cartain of its directors, consultants and 
service providers, and such persons have served without substantial 
cash or other compensation to date. 
NOV THZRSTORS, BE IT ABSOLVED, that the appropriatt 
officers of the Corporation with the assistance of counsel, be and 
they hereby are, authorised to prepare and execute and file with 
the Securities and exchange Coamission (the "Commission") for and 
on behalf of this Corporation, one or more Registration Statements 
on Form S-8, and all amendments thereto, including the Prospectus 
and any and all exhibits and other documents relating therato, for 
the registration, insofar as required under the Securities Act of 
1933, pursuant to which the corporation may register under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 20,000,000 shares of Common Stock, 
including shares offered under ths 1990 Stock Option Plan; and 
RESOLVED, that the Corporation authorize for issuance 
Shares of its Common stock to the following persons and for th« 
consideration set forth below, to be registered for sale under the 
Registration Statement: 
KAlft Consideration SbftU! 
David Enter Consulting Services 2,000,000 
under Consulting 
Agreement 
Director shares 1,500,000 
Daniel Lasak Director shares 1,230,000 
to be issued in the name of C D Management, Inc. 
Sherman Kasur Consulting Services 2,000,000 
under Consulting 
Agreement 
Rowland W. Day ZZ Legal Services 400,000 
RXSOLVZD FURTHER, that tha officsrs of tha Corporation ara 
haraby authorized, empowered, and directed, in tha name and on 
behalf of tha Corporation, to tafce any and all othar aotion which 
in tha judgment of tha officar taking tha same as necessary, 
advisable, or appropriate in order to render such aecurities 
eligible for offering and sale under the so-called Blue Slcy Lavs 
of any stats in which ths offering is to be made, and that the 
forms of resolutions specifically prescribed for such purpose by 
the various states are hereby authorized and approved and 
incorporated herein by reference with the same effects* if set 




McKITTRICK, JACKSON, DeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH 
A LAW CORPORATION 
4041 MacArthur Boulevard, Fifth Floor 
Post Office Box 2710 
Newport Beach, California 92658-8995 
(714) 752-8585 
DATE: June 13, 1991 
TO: Dan Lezak 
FROM: Jehu Hand 
SUBJECT: L.A. Entertainment, Inc. 
ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND: 
One copy of the Form S-8 Registration Statement for 
the above referenced corporation. 
FOR YOUR FILES 
FOR YOUR INFORMATION 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST 
PLEASE COMMENT 
PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN 
PLEASE TELEPHONE ME 





As filed June 13, 1991 
FORMS-8 
REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
CONFORMED COPY 
LA. ENTERTAINMENT. INC. 
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) 
NEVADA 88-0199674 
(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization)(IJLS. Employer Identification No.) 
401 East Pine Street Seattle, Wa«h™f*rm Qftir> 
(Address of Principal Executive Offices)(Zip Code) 
1990 Stock Option Plan 
Stock Compensation Plan 
(Full Title of the plans) 
Larry Trusty. President L A Ent^ rr*™™*"*'| inc. 401 East Pine Street Seattle, W»<hinpton 98122 
(Name and address of agent for service) 
f 206) 329-0928 
(Telephone number, including area code, of agent for service) 






Amount to be 
registered 
Common StockW 20,000,000 
mflYiirmm 
maTfrmim offering 








(1) Represents 1,500,000 shares of common stock issuable under the 1990 Stock Option Plan, and 
18,500,000 shaies issuable as compensation pursuant to informal stock plans, and includes reoffers of 
such shares. 




LA. ENTERTAINMENT, INC 
Up to 3,000,000 Shares of Common Stock 
Received by Directors and Officers 
Under Employee Benefit Plans and 
Reoffered by Means of this Prospectus 
This Prospectus shall be supplemented from 
time to time as the identity of these 
officers and directors becomes known 
Investors should note that the Company's independent auditors, Laventhol & Horwath, whose re-
port is incorporated by reference in this Prospectus, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on November 21, 1990. That filing may have an adverse effect on an investor's ability to 
sue and recover damages from that auditing firm with respect to its report on the Company's finanri^l 
statements. Further, Laventhol & Horwath discontinued performing accounting and auditing services on 
November 21, 1990; as a result, it was unable to consent to the incorporation of its report in this 
prospectus, and did not perform any subsequent review procedures with respect to the financial statements 
incorporated in this Prospectus. The lack of a consent by Laventhol & Horwath may preclude investors 
from suing that firm for damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. See Tacperts." 
Selling shareholders will offer their shares through the over-the-counter market or through NAS-
DAQ, if the Company's common stock is then included for quotation on NASDAQ. Selling shareholders, 
if control persons, are required to sell their shares in accordance with the volume limitations of Rule 144 
under the Securities Act of 1933, which restricts sales in any three month period to the greater of 1% of 
the total outstanding common stock (or 329,000 shares) or the average weekly trading volume of the Com-
pany's common stock during the four calendar quarters immediately preceding such sale. It is expected 
that brokers and dealers effecting transactions will be paid the normal and customary commissions for 
market transactions. 
RISK FACTORS 
The purchase of the securities offered hereby is subject to risk. Investors should evaluate these 
risk factors carefully. 
L Operating History. The Company has incurred losses in fiscal year 1988 and a small loss in 
fiscal year 1989. Although normal profitability has returned, Investors should not expect the 
Company to generate significant profits over the short term. 
2. Capital Requirements, In order for the Company to continue with its expansion plans, it will 
require capital beyond the amounts currently available from operations. 
3. Dependent on Customers. The Company is substantially dependent on one customer, Safeway 
Stores, which accounted for approximately 60% of the Company's gross revenues for the year 
ended March 31, 1990. The Company expects that this dependence will diminish in the cur-
rent fiscal year as other retail operations are expanded. Safeway has notified the Company 
that it intends to eliminate all of its video departments, and is operating on a month to month 
basis with the Company. 
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4. Competition. The videocassette rental industry is highly competitive, both within the industry 
and with other sources of video entertainment such as broadcast television, movie theaters and 
cable television. Many of the Company's competitors have greater financial resources. 
INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPANY 
This prospectus is accompanied by the Company's Annual Report to security holders for the year 
ended March 31, 1990 and the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 1990 
or the latest Annual Report and Quarterly Report filed subsequent thereto. These Annual Reports and 
the Form 10-Qs as well as all other reports filed by the Company pursuant to Sections 13(a), 13(c), 14 or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are hereby incorporated by reference in this prospectus and 
may be obtained upon the oral or written request of any person to the Company at 401 East Pine Street, 
Seattle, Washington 98122. 
INDEMNIFICATION 
The Company's Bylaws and Section 78.751 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provide for indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers against certain liabilities. Officers and directors of the Company are indemni-
fied generally against expenses actually and reasonably incurred in connection with proceedings, whether 
civil or criminal, provided that it its determined that they acted in good faith, were not found guilty, and, in 
any criminal matter, had reasonable cause to believe that their conduct was not unlawful. 
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may be permitted 
to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, or 
otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unenforceable. 
-3-
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PART II 
5. Incorporation of Documents by Reference. 
The Registrant incorporates the following documents by reference in the registration statement: 
(a) The Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K filed for the year ended March 31,1990; 
(b) The Company's Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the quarters ended June 30, 1990, 
September 30,1990 and December 31,1990; 
(c) A description of securities is incorporated by reference from the Registrant's Registration 
Statement on Form 8-A, File No. 1-17874. 
(d) All other documents filed in the future by Registrant after the date of this Registration 
Statement, under Section 13(a), 13(c), 14 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prior to the 
filing of a post-effective amendment to this Registration Statement which deregisters the securities covered 
hereunder which remain unsold. 
Item 6. Indemnification of Officers and Directors 
The Company's Bylaws and Section 78,751 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provide for indemni-
fication of directors and officers against certain liabilities. Officers and directors of the Company are in-
demnified generally against expenses actually and reasonably incurred in connection with proceedings, 
whether civil or criminal, provided that it its determined that they acted in good faith, were not found 
guilty, and, in any criminal matter, had reasonable cause to believe that their conduct was not unlawful. 
Item 7. Exemption from Registration Claimed 
All of the sales are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as 
amended, by virtue of Section 4(2) thereof covering transactions not involving any public offering or not 
involving any "offer" or "sale*. As a condition precedent to each sale or gift, the respective purchaser was 
required to execute an investment letter and consent to the imprinting of a restrictive legend on each stock 
certificate received from the Company. 
Item 8. Exhibits 
4. Instruments defining the rights of securityholders are incorporated from the following pre-
viously filed exhibits: 
3.1 Articles of Incorporation of Registrant, as amendedW. 
32 November, 1988 and 1989 Amendments to Registrant's Articles of Incorporation^). 
33 ByiawsC1). 
3.4 December, 1989 Amendment to Registrant's Articles of Incorporation™. 
3.5 Certificate of Determination for Series A Preferred Stock(2). 
-4-
5.0 Opinion of McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh regarding legality of shares 
being issued(^). 
24.1 Consent of Benson & McLaughlin, P.S. (3). 
242 Consent of McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh (contained in its opinion 
filed as Exhibit 5 to this Registration Statement^). 
(1) Incorporated by reference to the Company's Registration Statement on Form S-4, File No. 33-
29746 filed on July 3,1989. 
(2) Filed with Amendment No. 1. 
(3) Filed herewith. 
Item 9. Undertakings 
(a) The undersigned registrant hereby undertakes: 
(1) To file, during any period in which offers or sales are being made, a post-effective 
amendment to this registration statement: 
(i) To include any prospectus required by section 10(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 
1933; 
(ii) To reflect in the prospectus any facts or events arising after the effective date of 
the registration statement (or the most recent post-effective amendment thereof) which, individually or in 
the aggregate, represent a fundamental change in the information set forth in the registration statement; 
(iii) To include any material information with respect to the plan of distribution not 
previously disclosed in the registration statement or any material change to such information in the registra-
tion statement, including (but not limited to) any addition or election of a managing underwriter. 
(2) That, for the purpose of determining any liability under the Securities Act of 1933, 
each such post-effective amendment shall be deemed to be a new registration statement relating to the 
securities offered therein, and the offering of such securities offered at that time shall be deemed to be the 
initial bona fide offering thereof. 
(3) To remove from registration by means of a post-effective amendment any of the 
securities being registered which remain unsold at the termination of the offering. 
(b) The undersigned registrant hereby undertakes that, for purposes of determining any liability 
under the Securities Act of 1933, each filing of the registrant's annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and, where applicable, each filing of an employee benefit 
plan's annual report pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) that is incorporated 
by reference in the registration statement shall be deemed to be a new registration statement relating to the 
securities offered therein, and the offering of such securities at that time shall be deemed to be the initial 
bona fide offering thereof. 
(i) Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 
may be permitted to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing 
provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange 
-5-
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Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unen-
forceable. In the event that a r\**n% for indemnificaaon against such liabiliaes (other than the payment by 
the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit or proceeding) is asserted by such director, of-
ficer or controlling person in connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in 
the opinion of its counsel that matter has been settled by controlling precedent, submit to a court of ap-
propriate jurisdiction the question whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed 





Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, the registrant has duly caused this 
registration statement to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized in the City 
of Los Angeles, California, on June 7,1991. 
LJL. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
By: /s/ Lanv Trusty 
Larry Trusty 
President 
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, this registration statement has been 
signed by the following persons in the capacities indicated on June 7,199L 
Signature Title 
/s/ Larry Trusty President (principal executive officer) 
Larry Trusty 
(*{ Daniel Lgrak Director 
Daniel Lezak 
(*/ Flamft Mftlnyfc Chief Financial Officer (principal financial and 
Elaine Melnyk accounting officer) 
/s/ David Enzer Director 
David Enzer 
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L. A. Entertainment, Inc. 
401 East Pine Street 
Seattle, Washington 98122 
Re: Registration Statement on Form 8-8 
Gentlemen: 
L. A. Entertainment, Inc. (the "Corporation") has requested 
our opinion as to the legality of the issuance by the Corporation 
of up to 20,00,000 shares of common stock, par value $.001 (the 
"Shares"), all as described in a Registration Statement proposed 
to be filed on Form S-8 pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
"Registration Statement"). All terms not otherwise defined herein 
shall have the meaning set forth in the Registration Statement. 
As your counsel, we have reviewed and examined: 
1. The Articles of Incorporation, as amended to date (the 
"Articles") of the Corporation as certified to us by the Secretary 
of State of the State of Nevada; 
2. The Bylaws of the Corporation, as certified by the 
Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Corporation; 
3. The minute book of the Corporation; 
4. Certain resolutions of the Corporation, as certified to 
us by the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Corporation; 
5. The Registration Statement; 
6. The 1990 Stock Option Plan; and 
7. Such other matters as we have deemed relevant in order 
to form our opinion. 
In giving our opinion, we have assumed without investigation 
the authenticity of any document or instrument submitted us as an 
original, the conformity to the original of any document or in-
strument submitted to us as a copy, and the genuineness of all 
signatures on such originals or copies. 
KJTTR'.CK, JACKSON, DEMARCO & PECKENPAUGH 
Based upon the foregoing, and subject to the qualifications 
set forth below, we are of the opinion that the Shares, if sold as 
described in the Registration Statement, will have been duly 
authorized, legally issued, fully paid and nonassessable. 
Our opinion is subject to the qualifications that no opinion 
is expressed herein as to the application of state securities or 
Blue Sky laws* 
This opinion is furnished by us as counsel to you and is 
solely for your benefit. Neither this opinion nor copies hereof 
may be relied upon by, delivered to, or quoted in whole or in part 
to any governmental agency or other person without our prior writ-
ten consent. 
Notwithstanding the above, we consent to the use of our 
opinion in the Registration Statement. In giving this consent, we 
do not admit that we come within the category of persons whose con-
sent is required under Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission promulgated thereunder. 
Very truly yours, 
MCKXTTRICK, JACKSON, DEMARCO 
& PECKENPAUGH 
^v6. t . / 21 
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Form S-8 Registration 
Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 pertaining to the Stock 
Compensation Plan and 1990 Stock Option Plan for the registration of shares of 
common stock of L.A. Entertainment, Inc. (formerly Supermarket Video, Inc. 
and Subsidiary) and in the related Prospectus of our report dated June 3, 1988 
except for Note 1 as to winch the date is November 1,1989 and for Note 2 as to 
which the date is June 28, 1989 with respect to the consolidated financial 
statements and schedules of LA. Entertainment, Inc. for the year ended 
March 31,1988, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission-
Benson & McLaughlin, P.S. 
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LA. Entertainment Inc, formerly known at Super Market Video, Inc. (the 'Company') was iacrn 
pocated unlet the law of the State of Nevada in May, 1984. The Company maiotaina its principal bun 
neas and executive offices * 401 East Pine Street, Seattle, Waihmgton 96122, telephone (206) 329*0928. 
The Company is primarily engaged b the busbiess of operating concessions for the renting of pt* 
recorded videocassettes in super markets located is the Northwest United Stales. The Company has u 
stand-alone retail videocassettc rental location in Seattle. 
On June 26, 1991 the Company entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement with Maniaka lrnxi 
Company, Ltd., Hollywood Land Tokyo, Udn and Haniau Redevelopment Ca Ltd. pursuant to which UM. 
Company will acquire all of the capital stock of these three Japanese real estate companies tor 1,000 than.;. 
of a new Scries B Preferred Stock. The Series B Preferred Stock has voting rights equal to die number of 
shares into which the Preferred Stock would be converted, including the right to elect a majority but aot all 
the board of directors* is to be convertible after one year into a number of shares of common stock equal 
to 60% of die total Company outstanding stock. These three Japanese companies own or control two goli 
courses under construction, have an option on a third golf coarse, a 23»acre parcel outside Tokyo to \H 
developed into mixed use property, including hotels, commercial and industrial brikBop, and 32 office ami 
catertatnment properties near Osaka. The closing is antiripatftd to take place in August, 1991, and i 
subject to the completion of certain due riffigemr procedure*. 
VMeofental 
As of March 31, 1991, the Company operated concessions in 40 supermarkets in the North** » 
Uaked States. Such concessions include 15 m Safeway stores, 13 in Uddenberg retail stores, 9 in indepc * 
dent grocery and convenience stores, and 3 in 741 convenience stores. Since year end, the Company ha, 
doted 3 Safeway stores and 4 independent stores. However, since year end, the Company has added 
additMMml concession* in 7-11 convenience store locations, 2 in Carousel supermarkets (these were 2 of il. 
independents closed since year cad), 2 in Stockmarket supermarkets and 1 m a Thriftway wpcrmark 
The Company is also under contract to hutall concessions in 2 Thriftway supermarkets, and Sentry Maikt. 
supermarkets. Pursuant to the concession agreements between the Company and the concessionaire, ti 
Company is entitled to s fixed percentage of the udeo rental receipts, and the Company supplies it. 
vidaocasaette rental inventory, the retail display fistures and materials, and the software and hardwan 
required to admmister die check-out and return of videocsasette tapes. Labor for on site rental i 
provided by the concessionaire, and the Company's distribution managers visit the stores on appraomat< . 
a twice weeldy basis to inspect inventory, restock, and review and prepare billing from rental transactions. 
Each concession stocks from 750 to 3,000 videocassettes, with emphasis on new releases and fi. 
run movies. The concession areas occupy from 18 co 72 lineal feet and are primarily located toward il 
front of the supermarket where they are highly visible to shoppers. 
The Company's one retail store is located in Seattle, Washington, and stocks approximately 6,1* o 
prerecorded videocassettes for rental. 
The Company purchases its prerecorded video cassettes for rental from various suppliers (see m>u 
10 to the financial statements included ekewfaere herein). The Company does not presently intend to aiM 
items for sale to its Seattle store. Tbe Company does bowercr, intend to add free-standing retail stoma u 
tbe Seattle area, as they can be affordabty capitalized, which can operate on a modest scale. 
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Dtpe&cace upon Customers • Competition 
The Company's principal concessionaire ts Safeway Stores, which accounted for approximately 53 * 
of t ie Company's gross revenues for the fiscal year ended March 31* 1991 Safeway accounted for q, 
praaaaately 64% and 68% of the Company's grow revenues for 1990 and 1989 respectively. Uddenbciy 
stores constituted 26% of the Company's revenue base in 1991, 16% in 1990, aad 14% ia 1989, respectively 
The Company operates the videocassette rental concessions in approximately one-third of the larger Safe 
way stores in the Pacific Northwest The Company expects that its dependency upon the Safeway duin 
wfl decline in its current fiscal year as it enatimms to open new supermarket aad comemence store con-
cessions. The Company's contract with Safeway expired Jane, 1990, bet the Company continues to opera!< 
such concessions on a month to month basis. The Company continues to have discussions Mth Safeway 
regarding extensions to its existing relationship. However, Safeway baa mrijcaftrd that it intends to plum 
oat concessions in future years and has closed 3 stores since year end 
The videocassette concession business is extremely competitive. Factors associated with compeatio t 
ia the industry include the percentage of cnacrssion revenues, the number and qeaity of videocassette tide ± 
stocked by the concession operator, the level of service provided, and the financial wherewithal of the co» 
ccmionaae. The Company believes it is in a competitive position wkh respect to each of these categoric 
The Company competes with other concessionaire in super marheta, with video specialty stores, con 
veaaence stores, drug stores, record stores, and videocassette vending machines. There has also been > 
trend recently ia ±c industry coward a leased department, which as compared to a revenue sharing <• 
raagement that utilizes supermarket employees, operates strictly ss a lease of die premises to the opera; > 
at a fiicd rent using hired outside employees (and perhaps iadudes some percentage rent component) 
The Company is prepared to operate concessions in this new structure. The Company is also in coaipu. 
tkm or may be affected by various forms of revenue sharing arrangements with motioa picture product u . 
companies commonly called "pay-per-view," which provide customers with the ability to view movies throu <. 
cable ccoaected television. The Company also competes with movie theaters, cable television and otli.. 
special events. To date mail order sales of prerecorded vidaocasscttes have not been a competitive factor 
Employees 
As of March 31,1991, die Company had 19 employees, inriuding five administrative and execuu 
personnel, 6 full time field staff, and 4 full time and 2 part time employees in the Seattle retal store. 
The Company operates its concessions through a written license with die concessionaire*. 11 
lease for the retail store ia Seattle, which also houses corporate offices aad warehouse space, conum.. 
approximately 9*800 square feet, of which, approximately 2,500 is retail space. Total monthly rental pa\ 
aaafe are 53,000 through November, 1992 wkh a five year Teaewal option. The Company also hat u 
aaceth-to-asoisth lease on leas than IJOOQ square feet in Hollywood, California far certain accounting a<i<i 
acfeaiaistrative functions. The Coaapany believes that its current leased bolides are adequate to tupptut 
current and future operations. 
Ugal LsnHiassa&gi 
On November 8,1969, the Company fifed a complaint in the U S . District Court, Orntial Dmt.u i 
of California, against The Grand Union Company. The complaint alleges that the Cooapany and Grin i 
Uaioo entered into a license agreement and asset purchase agreement on October 13, 1989, aad th<t 
Graad Union failed to perform ia accordance with these agreements. The Cosapany seeks $20,000,000 I.I 
compensatory damages The Grand Union Company filed an answer to the complaint denying all alky., 
doss. The court dismissed the Company's complaint oa November 6,1990; such dismissal was set aside .. . 
appeal of the Company on February U , 199L Tlisactiooasdiodafcdtcgptotml«iktel9Ql. 
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A rnmplnint for open account was fifed in Soperior Court of Los Angeles, California against the 
Company on April U, 1990 by Lieberman Enterprises, a supplier of video and mode merdiandise for talc 
(Uebermai*), concerning Liebennan's provision of same to the Company's Eaciao Store. The Company 
fifed its cross- complaint on or about June 4, 1990 against Liebennan far damages arising out of Ueber 
man's fmhre to perform its supplier agreement with the Company. Ibe Company entered bto a stipulated 
jucfcpncat in the approximate net amount of $190,000, which requires the Company to amke monthly pay 
nents to satisfy such amount The Company made partial payments thereon, and settled this matter in Jufy 
W91 by a payment of $100 # » • 
On August 10, 1990 Video Trend fifed a onmplaim for S13Q.890 against the Company in U» 
Angeles Superior Court far amounts allegedly due on a trade account The Company believes thai Vide* 
Tr end is not entitled to the M amount sought, but a total of $100,500 has been accrued for this Hafaifity. 
On April 30, 1990, Matin & Dvoretzky Architects, Inc. fifed a complaint in Los Angeles Super*.. 
Court 9eeking $47,000 for services allegedly rendered The Company fifed an answer, alleging breach • 
contract by MatUa, on June 26,1990. On April 1,1991 the parties settled for $15,000 to be paid by th* 
Company at $500 per month. 
la 1991 various legal complaints were fifed against the Company for the safe of goods and service 
The Company has answered these complaints denying liability, for die total amount sought of $27,500, e» 
eluding one claim settled for $15,000. Two other video suppliers have threatened to fife claims for i < 
aggregate of $71,600. 
The Company is being sued for $250^ 000 of damages incurred by the lessor of the supersio, 
subsequent to the closure of the superstore. A preliminary motion may be able to dfemiss the Compni. 
from thk case; however, in management's and legal counsel's opinion, the ultimate settlement is s... 
expected to have a material adverse effect upon the financial statements. 
Item 4 SiibmkfflnnnfMattminVf^ 
On January 22, 1991 the registrant held its annual shareholders' meeting. At the meeting David Eozer an< 
Daniel Lezak were elected to serve as directors. No other matters were submitted to shareholder vote. 
PART II 
l i B E l My** for Rfffffrjfffs Corajnon ffiflrt
 t lyj ftfourf Sfrckhqlfrf Matt** 
The Company Common Stock has been traded an NASDAQ since January 24, 1990 under tin 
symbol "LAET, and prior thereto in the "pink sheets', with its price quotations pnhfahcri in the National 
Daiy Quotation Service ("NDQS*) of the National Quotations Bureau. As of May, 1991, there were 6fe. 
bolters of record of the Company Common Stock. 
The table below shows the high and low bid prices as reported in the NDQS since April 1, 1<*> 
aad cm NASDAQ since January 24, 199a No cash dividends have been paid on the Company Conn* i. 
Stock. The quotations for the Company Common Stock reported by the NQB represent prices betvu i 




















The Company has not paid any dividends on its common stock, and anticipate tfant any dividend 
wil not be paid in the foreseeable fature and any earning wil be retained lo develop the Company's butt 
ac& The Company has outstaadmg 2,642,468 shares of Series A Preferred Stock aa ol March 31, 199) 
No dividends may be paid on the Common Stock unless all accrued dividends in the Series A Preferred 
Stock have been paid. As of March 31, 1991, afl accrued dividends had been paid by the iasuaaee of ad 
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Item 7, M m g r ^ s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition tt>d Rrjyrfr tf Qp^flons of J* 
Company 
Etsetts of Operations: 
Year coded March 31,1991 compared to year coded March 31,1990. 
total Reveaues 
Gross revenues from rental transactions were $2,306£7Q for die year eaded March 31, 1991 ai 
compared to $2,277,140 for die same period ia 1990. The increase ia revenues was due in part to 
successful marketing and merchandising program* which resulted in generally higher revenues pet More, 
offset ia part by the loss of Safeway locations. Additionally, revenue* for the present period were com 
parably better than 1990 becaase the Company was adversely affected by a strike in 1990 by supermarket 
employees in the Seattle area which affected 22 concessions located ia Safeway, Stock Market ami 
Thriftway supermarkets for that latter period Further, the; increase in revenues was obtain**) 
notwithstanding che fact that the Company operated 13 fewer confessions in the Pacific Northwest area *t 
die end of the current period than it did at the end of die comparable period in 1990. See discussion 
regarding die Company's dependence upon revenues from Safeway superaarkets it Item L 
SaksEetenues 
Gross revenues from sale transactions were $63*106 for the year ended March 31, 1991 as com 
pared to 5206,610 for the same period ia 1990. Sales for the current period were due priaurily to tht 
Company's efforts to sell previously viewed rental tapes in its Seattle retail location and one concessit* 
location, whereas sales for the comparable period in 1990 were derived principally from musk* video anj 
other related products at the Company's masic and video superstore located in Enema* California, which 
store the Company sold in March, 1990. The Company hopes to increase the number of retail location* 
seling previously viewed video tapes in Company concessions where agreements can be secured. 
Salts Growth 
The Company has been informed by Safeway that it intends to phase out concessions in fetuir 
years and has dosed 3 coaensions since year cod Commencing in die 1991 fiscal year, die Company 
eas&arked on an aggressive program to increase its video rental concession base. It is also seeking to 
impiirmmf sales programs in new concessions opened The Company will also continue to espion 
opportaaaies to acquire other onmpanios which operate video rental or compatible businesses 
Management believes thai it wil be able to acquire additional new financing necessary to support thia 
powth, which will oftet the anticipated loss of Safeway store omieessinns. 
Operating Income 
The Company had an operating loss of $609,098 for the year ended March 31,1991 as comparul 
to an operating loss of $ljQ89,1Q3 tot the same period in fiscal 1990. Four significant factors contributed 
to die improvement for the current period first, and most significantly, die Company sold its Eacinc vc« 
which eliminated the operating losses of that location; secondly, the 1991 Ions was anaffected by lat^. 
strikes; third implementation of marketing and merchandising programs in easting concessions i*re mi 
oassful; and fourth, the Company's lone retail store in Seattle ahwed revenue growth. Offsetting d**. 
improvements was the fact that dm Company operated 13 fewer concessions at die end of dm csT^t: 
period than it did for the comparable period ia 1990, and an increase m general aad admmstxition x i , 
due to stock compensation paid m fiscal 1991 to consultants aad directors, oAct by a decrease m 
accounting, travel aad salary eapwura during die current period as compared to the same period n 1990 
which resulted from decreased acquisition and expansion activity. 
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Operating Coats, Genera) aad Administrative Expcaees 
The Company incurred store and concern* operating costs of 5868351 for the year ended 
March 31,1991 as compared to 5U55,306 for the same period in 1990. This decrease was due pranarity 
to the fact that the 1990 expense* included costs incurred primarily in behalf of the Badno tore* now 
sokL 
Year ended Man* 31,1990 verses Year coded March 31,1919, 
•natal Revenues 
Gross revenues from rental transactions were $2^77,140 for the year ended March 31, 1990 a? 
compared to $2,099,967 for the same period in 1989. Two offsetting factors ooatribrtcd to the change in 
revenues for that period: first, overall revenues iacreaacd due to the adefidon of seven rental concession 
in the Seattle area, and the addition of the music and video superstore in Eacino, California (the 'Eurino 
Store1) during Angwt, 1989, secondly, total revenues were reduced significantly during May, 1989, dtfoogt* 
August, 1989, due to a strike by supermarket employees in the Seattle area which affected 22 coocesaona 
located in Safeway, Stock Market and Thriftway supermarkets. The combined net effect of these factor* 
resulted! in a modest increase in total rental revenues for that period 
For concessions that were in operation for the full Escal years 1989 aad 1990 which were act 
affected by the strike, revenues on a per concession basis increased by an average of 111% for the year. 
Comparatively, revenues for concessions affected by die strike thai were m opcradon for those same 
periods decreased by an average of 16.7%. 
Saks Revenues 
Gross revenues from sale transactions were 5206,610 for dm year ended March 31, 1990 as com 
pared to 537,136 tor the same period in 1989. This increase is substantially attributable to the Eacino 
Store. Overall kales results for the Eacino Store were less than expected, which the Company believes M 
attributable in part to poor performance by dtaribttcrs servicing that store. Managcanrnt determined 
that economic conditions, competition in the local consumer video rental market and for mnsunirr enter 
tainment dollar* were particularly intense. As a result, the Company determined that h was in its best 
Interests to sel die Eacino Store rather than utilize other concession cash flow to support maturity of the 
Enciao Store. 
Operating Lous 
Although the Company had a sizeable operating loss for the year ended March 31,1990, this was 
substantially dan to the Company's Enciao Store, which was sold March 30, 1990. The results of the 
Enciao Store are amre ftiDy detailed betow. 
Opaatfag Casta! General aad Administratis Expenses 
The Company incurred an operating loss of $1*089/703 for the year ended March 31, 1990 * 
compared to operating income of $13,495 for the comparable period in 1989. The substantial compooea> 
of the loss was the expense incident to developmeat aad operation of the Encmo Store, which incurred a 
net operating loss of 5777,271 Operating costs related to pre-opening expenses consisting of six aoatk> 
rent for the Eacino Store, or 1127,284, aad salaries of $19,980. The Eacino Store was sold for S48B.G26, 
receivable as a promissory note ("Note9) to the Company beariag iaterest at 14%, dae March 30, 1993 
(See Note 4 to Consolidated Financial Statements). The Note k secured by al of the preferred stock in 
the Company owned by Ac Company's principal tharehnkter. 
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The Company incurred $132,413 additional general and administrative expenses during the yeai 
ended March 31, 1990 ovo the same period ended March 31, 1989, $55,395 of which were travel et 
peases. The major portion of these inaeaaed expeaaea were incurred by the Company in its attempt to 
acquire other video companies. The Company spent substantial resources to acquire 125 concessions from 
The Grand Union Company which ultimately resulted in a breach of contract action filed by the Company 
against Grand Union that the Company is currently pursuing afpesaively. Travel aad adaamistrstwe ex-
penses were also incurred from the Company's effort* to acquire Comet Entertainment, Inc. which oper-
ated 19 free standing video retail stores in five western states, and had six franchises in two states at the 
that af the proposed acquisition. 
The Company experienced an overall increase of $197,368 far salaries and related expenses as s 
result of the foregoing efforts and the related expenses incurred to gear up for the aihstanrial mfkapatrd 
frowth resulting therefrom. However, the Company did experience a reduction in co&sattmg fee expenses 
of $59,282 for 1990 over 1989, and subsequent to March 31* 1990, the Company has reduced its corporate 
staff and related expenses to more accurately reflect the sippoit necessary for the existing bushiest, la 
this structure the Company anticipates operating profitably. 
Year Ended Mairfi 111 1HM m ant Year Ended March 31,198S 
Rental Rertaaes 
Gross revenues were $2*137,483 for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1989 as coaapared to grow 
revenues of $1,977,122 for fiscal year ended March 31,1968. The increase in sales was attributable to the 
increase in quantity and quality of the Company's cassette library m the supermarket concessions operated 
in the Pacific Northwest and the opening of six new concession operations, 
For the year ended March 31, 1989, the Company's 28 concession operations in Safeway Store* 
accounted for 68% of its sales. The Safeway contract expired in June, 1990 
Operating Losa 
There was a net operating loss in fiscal 1989 of $5,259 *$ compared to net operating income ol 
$77,128 for fiscal 1988. The decboe in operating incosne was attributable to two principal factor*. FUMI, 
depreciation expense of the videocassette library increased to $539,980 in fiscal 1989 as compared i». 
1443,411 in fiscal 1988 reflecting Che additional investment in the video library in fiscal 1989. Secoiut 
general and administrative expenses increased to $461326 in fiscal 1989 at compared to $247,910 in Sac*, 
1988. More than $83,000 of the increase in the general and administrative expenditure area was ia kgpl 
and crHvailting services associated with the recapitaixataon acfakwd in December 1988. 
The set loss of $5,259 far the fiscal year ended March 31, 1969 compares with net income ol 
184,631 for the fiscal year coded March % 1988. The decline in act bcoane resulted from the tame at 
lactcn dfarnsf it afrfffr 
U^aMtty and Capital Ram 111111 
At March 31, 1991 the Company had a working capital deficit of $603,473! as compared with 
working capital deficit of $576305 as of March 31* 1990. The increase in this deficit (or the current 
period resulted primarily from additional provisions far losa contingencies m connection with Htigarinn 
Tic Company is dealing with iu distributors on a a s h on defivery basis, hut k current in pay 
meats. The Company is trying to acquire trade credit. The Company wil sko be attempting to raise 
capital by aefling stock in the Company in the near fature. 
* 
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At March 31, 1991, the Company bad reduced its notes outstanding to banks of $86,206, from a 
balance erf $135,433 at Mart* 31, 1990. The Company also had a revolting credit qreemeot of 150,000 
which matured oo July 1, 1969. On July 13, 1989 aa agreement was signed to draw $44,000 on this line 
of credit based on a percentage of the then outstanding accounts receivable as dcilcrrngrd by a bank. On 
March 9, 1990, this bank and the Company agreed to consolidate the line of credit and term ban into a 
oew term baa for $132,433, which bean interest at 1% over the prime rate and is payable over two yean. 
Tbe Company funded certain other rapanaion activities by ^^ '««g two interest-bearing eotc* 
origbudly payable to Omni Video, lac which totalled $677,300 at the end of September, 1989, which were 
converted into 2^35^17 ifaares of preferred stock. The outstanding shares of preferred stock bear i 
cumulative dxvidead of 14% per annum, which w equivalent to $47,281 as of March 31, 1990. Onmi 
Video, Inc. made further advances aggregating $49,232 during 1990, nrHading agpegale accrued tntere&i 
of $15,962 These unpaid amounts, along with obligation aggregating 527,667 for overhead and rent ex-
penses accrued to other affiliates, were canceled effective March 31, 1990, by the conversion into 482,901 
additional shares of Series A Preferred Stock. The Company also paid additional shares of Scries A 
Preferred Stock and redeemed other shares for payment of liabilities by and to it at year end (as dis 
ckxed in Notes 3 and 7 to the Financial Statements.) Tin: Company obtained a $400,000 lme of credit in 
July, 1991 from an affiliate, which it befieves will supply sufficient cash for its operating requirements 
The line of credit provides for borrowings of up to $403,000 with interest of 12% per annum, payable 
monthly, on the outstanding balance. Principal and accrued but unpaid interest is due and payable 
Jaaaary 15,1993. 
Inflation 
Tbe Company believes that inflation does not have a signifirarl impact upon the coatiauing bun 
aess of the Company. 
ItemS, HoaDCialS^tdniei^si^Suppkn^a^D^. 
See 14(a). 
Item 9. Chaanes and Disagreements with A*™ri—| ™» A m ^ * and Financial Disclosure. 
On November 21,1990, die Company's independent auditors, Laventhol ft Horwath, who audited 
tbe Company's financial statements for the years ended March 31, 1990 and 1969, filed for protection 
from e r r o r s under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (The "Bankruptcy Code*.) In the 
event , e^oideis desire to assert a daim against Laveathol ft Horwath far a violation of the federal 
securities laws for fake and mjaltariiag financial tfstfaieafi or disclosures or under other appicable la**> 
shareholders will be adversely affected and m some instances baned by the Bankruptcy Code. Under UK 
Bankruptcy Code, it is likely that any legal action against Laveathol ft Horwadi which is commenced aftei 
Nbveanber 21,1990 will have to be filed in tbe United States Bankruptcy Court lor the Southern District 
of New York and, if filed elsewhere, will Bkely be suyed pending dm Bankruptcy proceedings Share 
holders should ako note that any meritorious legal claims of tbe nature descried above, to the enent 
penaktsd, are typically treated aa general unsecured claims against Laveathol ft Horwath^ bankruptcy 
estate. Although die Company has been mfaned that Laventhol ft Horwadi is a general partnership ami 
aa such its general partners are Sable for some of the firm's obligations, the stains and nature of such 
Udbiky, if any, in unclear at this time 
Additionally, concurrent with this bankruptcy fifing, Laventhol ft Horwath discontiaurd perform 
iog accounting and auditing services and substantially all of its partners withdrew from the partnership 
As a result, Laventhol ft Horwalk did not perform any subsequent review procedures with respect to :h« 
flaimdal statements covered by their report which are iadoded ia dus Form 10-K, and did not sip *• 
conscait to the use of its report in the Company's Fbnn S-8. 
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The discussion regarding certain efforts of the Laveatbot & Horwath bsnfcroptcy as set forth 
above is aot meant and should not be construed ia my way is legal advice to toy party and any share-
holder should consult with his or her own counsel with respect to the effect of the Laveatbol k Horwath 
baokrupecjr. 
Oa January 22, 1991, the Company appointed BDO Scidinaa as its new independent accountant* 
The Compaiy dki not consult with BDO Seidman or any other *erf»*^g firm regarding the application 
of accounting principles to a specified transaction, either completed or proponed, or the type of opinion 
that might be rendered regaining the Company's financial statements, nor dad the Company consult with 
BDC Seidman with respect to any accounting disagreement or any reportable event, at any time prior to 
die appointment of such firm. 
PART IU 
The foUowhtg table sets forth the name, age, position held, and term of office of each director sod 
iiffkrM of the Company, 
Position Held 
Position Held Continuouaiy 
ttmi Ag£ ffittitiigfftrow* SPOT 
Larry Trusty 44 President fundi line, 
1991) 1991 
OavidJ.Enzer j l Director 1989 
Elaine Melnyk 42 Vice President • Finance 1990 
DanidLezafc 57 Chiiiman 1991 
Burins* EipaiiumefDtaetan and « ^ ^ 
The blowing is a summary of the besmear cspexience of the Dircctora and Bmcutive Officers <>i 
the Company 
Larry Trusty was president of tke Company from March to June, 1999U and has been Chief Optrrn 
mg Officer since March, 199L from September 1985 to that time he was Regional Sake Manager f«>. 
Consoadasrd Video Systems, in Seattle, Washington Consolidated Video Systems operated video depaii 
mnnta in 1200 convenience stores. Mr. Tmaty was responsible for wry warehouse petaouel and forty sal 
people in the Western US. and Hawaii Ftam 1978 to 198S he was Regional Account Supervisor of B&t 
Safes, Ia&, respoustte for a staff of 25 salespeople in (he Western U5 He received a degree in bushn.. 
mlmiwtrration from the University of Montana. 
Mr. Enaer has been active in real estate and other burinem investments since March, 1989. 11 
was elected President in Jane, 199L Mr. Enter was an Associate * the law firms of Christoneen, Whu. 
Miler, Fink & Jacobs from April 1988 to March, 1989, Cooper, Epstein and Hunwtz from September 198/ 
to March 1988, and at Jeffier, Mangels and Butler from September, 1986 to August, 1987. Mr. Ewer ha>. 
ako been Chairman of Davcor, a corporation involved ia real estate development sod land planning aiul 
eattiement work, since December, 1988. Mr. Enter graduated PHI BETA KAPPA aad BETA G A M M A 
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SIGMA from the Uawenity of California at Berkeley in 1982 where he graduated with a B5 ia Account 
iag aad Real Estate from the Undergraduate Business School Mr. Enzer patted Che California CPA exai 
ia May 1983, and graduated with a JD- as a Thurston Society ©ember from the Halting* College of Lav 
mJ*ael986. 
Daniel Lezak, 58, has beea a director of the Company since 1989. He is the president and direc-
tor of Weaver Anns, Inc. (currently ia Chapter 11 bankruptcy), The Lezak Group, and a director of Gen 
oral Residential Corp., Lucky Chance Mining Company, Inc. (currently ia Chapter 11 bankruptcy) and 
various other publidy and privately held companies. Mr. Lezak is a business management coasafeanl ipt 
ciaihing ia the rekabiltatioa of financially distressed companies, aad has beea involved in over 50 bank-
ruptcy reorganizations. Mr. Lezak received a B-S. in Accounting from Roosevelt University and is s cei 
tified public accountant. 
Elaine Melnyk has beea Vice President • Finance for the Company since August, 1990. M, 
Melnyk held the position of Vice President for a privately held real estate syndication and property mait 
agneoi company. Ms. Melnyk was involved in all facets of cash m i n i y * * ^ partnership aad corpora 
accounting as well as payroll aad risk management. Ms. Melnyk studied at UCLA and Cat State North 
ridge majoring in Business Administration and Economics. 
The table below sets forth the compensation for fiscal 1991 for (a) ail of the executive officers <! 
che Company whose compensation exceeded $60,000 and (b) all the executive officers of the Company as J 
group. 
Capacities Cash 
James KolitzW $67,399 
AB Executive Officers $175432 
as a Group (6 Persons 
in the year ended 
March 31,1991) 
(1) The Coaipany also reimburses all travel aad entertainment and auto expense of the executive ,,i 
Seers incarred ia connection with activities of the Company. All such expeascs during fiscal 191M 
amounted to less than fMOQQ. 
(2) Excludes certain compensation comkting of personal use of expense accounts, ices paid by tin 
Company for industry memberships aad publications, aad auto allowance. Such compensation Hi,| 
not erneed the leaser of 10% of the compensation reported as cash compensation for the group '•-
SStyOOQ. 
(3) Mr.Kofitzwasempb^byiheOimpaayfrom^ 
Slack Optfoaa mad Grants. 
Oa January 22, 1991, the Company awarded cmaaaon stock to members of its Board of Director 
far their services as board members and for ronanhing mrvices under a Consulting Agreement aa folio** 
Afl shares issued to Mr. Lezak were registered in the aame <tf CD. Management, Inc, a eorporatioa am 
trotted by mm. 
David Enter 3^00,000 
Daniel Lezak l^ SQJJOO 
•11-
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i f l B J i , Secunrv Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owneq aH Ml^MTTT1 
The following table sets forth information as of March 31, 1991 relating to the benefice) 
ownership of the Company's Common Stock by the Company's Directors, Officers and Directors of th, 
Company as a group and all persons known by the Company to be beneficial owners of more than five 
percent of the outstanding Compaoy Common Stock. Unless otherwise noted, all person have sole toting 
sad disposkioa power with respect to ail shares listed as owned by (hem, subject to comrauniry proper!, 
laws. 
Name i Address 
tfB^fc^Q^Wr Number of Shares & B & 
Dav il Emer^M2) V9$50jUOfl) 49.9% 
Larry I'mscy**') -
Daniel Leak(2) 2^50,000 5.6% 
Elaine MetaykC2) 
DPI Video, Inc. 
c/o Drown News Agency 
13172 Golden West Center 
Westminster, CA 92683 2,000,000 5.0% 
Sherman MaznrC*) 4jOOQvOOO 5.0% 
All Officers and 
directors as a 
Group (4 persons): 22^00l000(1) 54.4% 
(1) Mr. En2er is president of That Pac Corporation, the General Partner of Holmby Capital Partner, 
and thus may be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the 16,450,000 shares of the Company coot 
mon stock held by Holmby Capital Partners. Does not indnde 25,424^80 common shares iasnahli 
upon conversion of the Series A Preferred Stock also held by Holmby. 
(2) Tbe address of each of these persons is care of the Company. 
(3) Includes aOQgOOO Shane of common stock held by The Lezak Group, which * a pri>lc company en* 
trotled by Mr. Lezak, and IfSOflXl Shares held by CD. Management, Inc, a prifHe company con 
trolled by him. 
(4) Indmfca 2^00^00 Shares held by I t a ^ 
On January 14, 1991, the Cosapany entered into a Qmsotfag Apeemenc with David EJECT, 
director, providing for refipra 
any acquisition made by the Company arranged by that consnhant The agreement provides for paymti i 
of ecpeneas and indemnification to Mr. Enxer for liability for hk actions as a director or actions under tl < 
agreement (excluding wiUibl misconduct) and other term* 
-12-
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In July, 1991, the Company executed a $400,000 revoking note arrangement with Hie Lezak Groi»|, 
a corporation controlrd by a Director, pursuant to which the Coopany ouy borrow op to $40X000 for 
working capital purposes. The note bean interest at 12% tad a& principal borrowed it due in Jammry, 
1S93. 
Tke Company sold its Encino retail store to SM. Acquisitions, Inc^ a corporation affiliated with 
Omni Video, Inc. (then a holder of 18,450,000 sbaxet of common stock) for the assumption of ail Telatc I 
liabilities and a non-recourse note for $488,026, which was equal to tke net book value of tke assets tram 
(erred Tke note was collateralized by a pledge of all of the Seriet A Preferred Stock held by Omni 11M 
Company repurchased certain of the assets for $308)761, by reducing the note by that amount. The it 
maiader of the note receivable was paid on March 30, 1991 by the redemption of 36QJH3 shares of t)i 
Series A Preferred Stock, valued at $.62 per share, the fair value of the common stock into which the Pre-
ferred Stock was then convertible. The above aittkmrnt of the note receivable resulted in a charge i* 
operations of appro&mately $44,300 in 1991. 
Additional shares of Preferred Stock were issued and cancelled for payment of other liabiiitk* 
See Note 7 to the Financial Statements. 
PABTIV 
]££B_l± Fxfajhits Financial Statements. Schedules and Reports on Ftarm » K £ag& 
(a) (1) Financial statements required by Item B of this form are filed as a 
separate part of this report fallowing part IV: 
Reports of Independent Certified Public Accountants F-2 
Consolidated Balance Sheets at March 31,1991 and 1990 F-* 
Consolidated Statements of Operations for the yean ended March 31, 
1991,1990 and 1989 P * 
r^mfrfltfffif/) $Mrjn*4tH ^ Struct* A H » T « F/fMty for ffaf 
yean ended March 31,1991,1990 and 1989 F ' 
Consolidated Statements of Cash Ffawt far the yean ended March 31, 
1991,1990 and 1989 Fh 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements F i n 
(2) Schedules required by Regulation S«X are filed with the Financial Statrmranr 
V Property, Plant A Equipment P 
VI Accumulated Depredation, Depiction and F--1 
Amoctiiuooo of Property, Plant and 
DC Short-Tern Borrowings F-21! 




Schedules oot listed above have been omitted because the information required to be set forth therein i 
not applicable or is shown is tic financial stateaaeuts ootet thereto. 
(3) Exhibits 
Exhibit No. 
Purchase Agreement between Ragktraot and Omni Video, Inc. dated March 
a , 1990 far assets of Endao StoreW. 
Stock Purchase Agreemcat between. Registrant and Marutaka Land Compaq >, 
Hollywood Land Tokyo. LtcL, and Haaiau Land Co, Ltd, dated June 2* 
1991, as amended August 2,199l(4X 
Articles of Incorporation of Registrant, as amended W. 
tion(2). 
B y W 1 ) . 
December, 198S Amendment to Regjiatraafa Artides of Incorporation.^). 
Certificate of Determination far Series A Preferred Stock®. 
M).4 Loan Agreemcat between Registrant and Key Bank (flea Seattle T"1! ui) ^ law I 
January 7,198*1). 
109 Notes from RepaUrant to Omni Video, h e dated June and August 19®(2). 
10.10 Stock Purchase Agreement between Regatrant and SBL Capital, lnc, »•» \ 
asaigned lo Omni Video, Inc^ aa aaeadedv). 
10.11 Reprised Key Bank Loan Agreement^). 
10.12 Cnnsnlring Agreement with David Bmerffl. 
10.13 Promatory Note to The Lezak Groqpl4). 
24J Conaeat of BDO Sadnu (1) Incorporated by reference to the Company'! Registration Statement on Form S-4 Hie No. 33-2974*1 
filed on Jaly 3,1989 (the "Rcgntraiion Statemeat"). 
(2) Piled with Aneadmenl No. 1 to the Registration Statement 
(J) FUedi^AiieadBaeiMhfa.2totiMRegpatratkaStatemea^ 
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Report of Independent CartIflad Public Accountanta 
Board of Directors and Shareholders 
L.A. Entertainment, Inc. 
Los Angelas, California 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of L.A. 
Entertainment, Inc., as of March 31, 1991, and the related statements 
of operations, shareholders9 equity, and cash flows for the year then 
ended* He have also audited the 1991 schedules listed in the 
accompanying index. These financial statements and schedules are the 
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to 
empress an opinion on the? . financial statements and schedules based < i 
our audit. The financial statements and schedules of L.A. 
Entertainment, inc. as of March 31, 1990 and 19S9 vers audited by otht> 
auditors who have ceased operations and whose report dated August 1, 
1990 expressed an unqualified opinion on those statements. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards- Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements and schedules are free of material misstatement. An audit 
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts 
and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes 
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates ma. I. 
by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement 
presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis 
for our opinion. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above 
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of 
L.A. Entertainment, Inc., at March 31, 1991, and the results of its 
operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Also, in our opinion, the 1991 schedules present fairly, in 
all material respects, the information set forth therein. 
7&o %juJL~~ 
BDO SEICMMI 
Los Angalas, California 
July 10, 1991 
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Form £*, Pile No. 33-41305, filed for prauctn uader depict l lof tte BoUotplcy Cote oa No*»bci 2lf 199a Tkat fiiag aiy hive 
ao advene effect on aa sfajrcfcoidtfs's ability .0 we tod recover Innayt ftoa Ual aattitfet S ™ ^ laptd to • «pon oa ifat 
Comaon/a SaiAoal tfjtemeou. Ptrtbcr. Uwthc l k Ekraadi daoaoiiflacd pctfenpiafacgMaiiaajaa^aadiaagaegncg 
21, WC, u a cuult. it %a* uoabfe co cooienc 10 tbe uae of its report ia toe Pom M. aad CM! aoc pttfom any aafcaaqucnt amor 
pfocedures with respect -JQ the fsuaKai tttttaaeaa uiduded * thai Ajuiaai Report as Fum 10-K. Tae lack of a oanaeau by Laveaahoi 
A fJoTOiaraa? preclude s lrcboid^ of 0 ^ 
Set *^c3i 9, Changes and DiaaptcaKoa wka AccouaJAaa oa Accotfatt* tad FliaacaM Daafatas * 
Tafl«ffl4^ irt aVrilten' I r a n 
Board of Directors and Shaxeboldaurs 
&• A. tatertaioaant, Xnc*
 # feraerly Jaioirn as 
Super larfcat Video, Ice., 
•ad Subsidiary 
LOT Angeles, California 
Ha have audited the acccapaoying balance sheets of ki« 
tBtertainaexxt, Inc., formerly kDcaa aa Super Mexfeet Video, laas-, aad 
Subsidiary « oMUrch 31, 1S9« and 1SS9, aad tbe related statements 
eat apacatioas, shareholders • equity, and cash flow* for the years 
thee eadad* These financial stataaents are the respeasibility of the 
Caaapesy's nanageaent. Oar responsibility is to express en opinion oa 
Jthafe financial stataasnts baaed en oar audits. 
*e coadacrted oar audits Ln accordance with generally accepted 
matltlnrj standards. Those standards require that we plan aad perform 
Che aaaltt to obtain reasonable assurance about vhather the financial 
statements are free of aatauriel aisartataaant. la aadit includes 
aasainiag, oa a teat basis, erideaca suppuiiitng the aaouuta aad 
diaaolosuras is the fiaeneial statsaaBts* Aa aadit alao l«—VrT~a 
teesating the accounting priaeiplaia used aad significant aatlnatos 
abde by aanageaent, as veil es evaluating the overall financial 
atsmaiait presentation- la baOieve that our audita provide a 
reeeeaable basis for oar opinion. 
In oar opinion, the financial stataaents referred to above present 
fairly, in all* aatarial respects, the financial position of L. A. 
fatartaiaeaot. Inc., foraerly taoaro as Super Kartost Video, Inc., aad 
Subsidiary *• of March 31, 1990 aad m s , aad tbe results of its 
nasTSttw and its cash floats for the years then eaded in ooaforaity 
vith generally aoceptaad accounting principles. 
In n nana i.t loo with our audit of ti* financial stataaanta referred to 
above, «e aad it ad the financial stataaent schedules listed, under Itea 
• • In our opinion, tha*se financial stataaent achorinloa presamt 
fairly, in all aatarial respects, the information stataid therein, 
Yhea considered in relation to the financial stataaMnts taken as a 
utole. 
aa» ^ scussed in note 2 to the financial stataaents, the Ooapeny has 
rftairjad froa presenting a stataaent of rhanqos in financial position 
for the year andad Harch 31, IMS, to presenting stataaents of cash 
flaws for the years ended March 31, 1390 and 1519. 
lAvnwaox. t aosmsB 
Los Angeles, California 
August 1 1390 *-3 
*4«r»» f***±t+M\AAXXlflAX^l t i n ^ « 
BALANCE SHEETS 
March 31, 
ASSETS 1991 1990 
CORXEHT: 
Cash % 11 000 $ 43 i/, 
Accounts receivable, lass allowance for 
doubtful accounts, $10,000 (Note 5) 59 986 78 2< 
Prepaid expenses 18 793 19 0 < M 
Videocassettes held for sale - 17 12a 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 89 779 157 56/ 
RENTAL VIDtOCASSBTTE LIBRARY, at coat less 
accuaulated depreciation of $2,866,827 
and $2,286,165 (Notes 2 and 5) 929 499 896 47 
F0RMIT0R1 AMD EQUIPMENT, net (Note 4) 267 860 __2flfi_3Jj, 







Currant portion of notes payable, banks 
(Note 5) 
Notes payable to shareholders (Note 6) 
Trade accounts payable 
Accrued expenses (Note 11) 
Capital lease obligations, current portion 
(Hote 4) 
Due to officers and affiliate 
TOTAL CUBRENT LIABILITIES 
HOTSS PAYABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS (Note 6) 
DOS TO OFFICERS AND AFFILIATE 
NOTSS PAYABLE (Note 5) 
CAPITAL LEASE OBLIGATIONS, net of current 
portion (Rote 4) 
Total liabilities 
C0MCIT«afTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Note 11) 
KORIHOLDERS9 EQUITY (Notes ? and 14): 
Preferred stock, $.001 per value; 
authorized 20,000,000 shares; issued 
and outstanding, 2,642,468 and 
2,818,420 shares (aggregate 
liquidation preference of $766,316 
and $317,342) 
Coeeon stock, $.001 par value; 
authorized 200,000,000 shares; issued and 
outstanding 40,050,000 and 32,900,000 
shares 
Additional paid-in capital 
Accumulated deficit 
Treasury stock, at cost (500,000 shares 
of coaaon stock) 
Less: Note receivable for stock issued 
March 
1991 
























2 263 195 





823 1J 4 
2 81 
32 90d 
2 145 52i 
(1 121 48J) 
1 059 759 
(32 47M 
Laaax Mote receivable froa affiliate (Note 3) - f48a 02>,i 
TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 466 513 S39 258 
SI 281 138 51 362 39; 
See aumnary of accounting policies and 
notes to financial atataaenta. 
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L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS 
YMf tlrfid KttrSfc 311 
CROW RENTAL REVENUES 
GR06J SALES REVENUES 
Total gross rental 
and salas revenue 
CONCESSION COMMISSIONS 
COST OF VIDEO AND AUDIOCASSETTES 
SOLD 
Total concession commissions 
and cost of video and 
audiocassettes sold 
Net rental and sales 
revenue 
OPERATING EXPENSES: 




General and administrative 
Total operating costs 
and expenses 
Operating (loss) income 




NXT LOSS PER SHARE OF 
CGBBIQlf STOCX 
1991 1990 1989 
$2 308 870 $ 2 277 140 $2 099 96 7 
63 106 206 610 37 51* 




2 483 750 l_127_i*< 
619 235 614 42i 
153 567 i£JU" 
772 802 630 42 1 










3 27? 7g? 2 800 6S1 J 4,93 561 
(f09 098) (1 08? 793) 13 491 
(30 300) 








» (S79 988> »ri 127 9201 $ LS-ii." 
s fo.021 $ U U ) $. JD 
Sea avmaary of accounting policies and 
notaa to financial statements. 
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L.A. UriERTAHtMnrT, IHC. 
STATtMEMTB OP SHAREHOLDERS • NUTTY 
Y E M U nrosD IUMCH 3 1 , 19*1 , 1*90 AMD 19*9 
Oorft»» A 
I f t f t r iH riffr 
(A«o%a*ul*t«4 
* U l t l o » * l * » f l e l t ) 
p a U - l a rotalno* 
•ALA*Ct, i p r t l 1 . 10*0 
0«t ^ y w a t i *o««i*o4 M I 
iuit« roe*l<r»»l« 
3tot lo *« 
aUUUKX. Nactli 3 1 . l M f 
A441t l«Ui 
14 450 MO 414 4 f t 4 032 433 4 30 #7 / 
I t 43* 000 10 430 000 34$ 
32 000 000 32 000 
1 
H j 
• 1 0«r l«» A Pro for r * * I tock 
( * • * # 7) 
D i v i 4 m 4 » Ooclarotf M I l e i i t i 
A trmtmwfd Stack (Hot* F) 
Bmt l o » * 
1AJL24K*, More* S I , 1000 
D l v l A m U 4 M U M 4 OO 
Oorloo A Pre face** Ocaak 
(Data 7) 
I I M M M M # f I t r l t t A F r a f a r * * * 
* t a e * (Oata 7) 
2 010 420 
_ 
,, 
0 010 420 
104 541 
2 010 
2 010 32 32 000 
105 
• t a x * UttMrf (Oata 71 7 150 000 7 150 
t l m a f eomm 
pvavidUd • • c a l l a t a r a l lo r 
•aea raaaivaala (Bat a 7) 
Ot ia^at lan a f k r l i * 
A Prafacca* Ocack »xavlaa4 
• • aallatacat fat* attt 
raea iaa t l a a i111 la ta (»ata 7) 
• • t l o t * 
BAUmcm. Naralr. 3 1 , 1001 
(340 313) <341> 











UUUM '-LM1 HJtt-fttt HtJUt *IMJUU H 
TroomiT ffofli laca lvaa la lo r acock 
$ < » ?44) 
4 005 
C500 000) (32 415) 32 475 
) sciLiJl) 
JaiaL 
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Se* suouMry of accounting pol ic ia l and 
notes to financial atatenenta. 
STATEMENTS OF CASH PLOWS 
Increase (decrease) in cash 
Year andad March 31. 
.1221. -122SL •1262 
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES: 
Cash received from customers $2 390 250 




Ket cash provided by operating 
activities 
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIBS: 
Capital expenditures 
Proceeds froa sales of assets 
tits 
$1 B82 358 $1 520 012 
Met cash used in investing 
activities 
CASH FLOWS FROM FIKAKCIMG ACTIVITIES: 
Payments on notes payable to 
shareholders 
Payments on note payable to bank 
Payments on capital leases 
Proceeds received on shareholder's 
note 
Proceeds froa sale of cosuaon stock 
Proceeds fro* bank note 
Increese (decrease) in due to 
officers and affiliate 
Met cash provided by (used in) 
financing activities 
M R (DECREASE) INCREASE IN CASH 
CASH, beginning of year 
CASE, end of year 






















 Q 0 Q 
(1 769 384) 
2 214 

































_ U _ 2 5 0 
S 406 29H 
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STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS 
(Concluded) 
Increase (decrease) in cash 
Year andad March 31. 
H91 IMP 1212_ 
RECONCILIATION OF NET LOSS TO NET 
CASH PROVIDED BY OPERATING 
ACTIVITIES: 
Net lose S T57Q 9891Sfl 127 920) $ L5_2v») 
Adjustments to reconcile net loss 
to net cash provided by operating 
activities: 
Depreciation and aaortization 782 807 902 442 671 lfi • 
Issuance of canon stock for 
consulting services and 
directors fees (Note 7) 233 736 
tfrite-dovn of assets to 
aarket (44 253) 
Cain on sale of video library 
cassette* (8 483) 
Accrued interest on shareholder 
note receivable - (2 796) (1 83a) 
Decrease in deferred incone 
taxes - (6 582) 
Increase (decrease) froa changes 
in: 
Accounts receivable 18 274 27 843 (19 44 S) 
Prepaid expenses 207 5 399 (5 19 2) 
Videocassettes held for sale 17 128 15 969 8 74 ' 
Trade accounts payable (126 689} 73 730 66 3«i> 
Accounts payable, affiliate 7 517 - 3 On t 
Accrued expenses 169 628 ita 876 2A_271 
1 049 «?2 1 I** 881 749 01 , 
NET CASK PROVIDED SY OPERATING 
ACTIVITIES S 478 883 8 71 961 8 743 8.V. 
See suaaary of accounting policies and 
notes to financial stateaenta. 
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SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES 
VIDIOCASSETTES HELD FOR SALE 
Vidaocaaaatte inventory hald for purpoaaa of raaala ia valu< I 
at tha lower of coat or market. Coat ia determined by tha firat-in, 
firat-out (FIFO) aathod. 
DEPRECIATION METHOD FOR RENTAL VIDEOCASSETTE LIBRARY 
Rental videocaseettee ara depreciated on tha rental uaaga 
aathod over their estimated useful livea of five yeare. The rental 
uaaga aethod ia baaed on the Company9a hiatorical experience regarding 
tha rental of ita vidaocaaaatte inventory. The Coapany9a experience 
fcae ehcwn that the rate of uaaga ia greatest in the firat year froa th« 
date of release to the video rental narket, and decreases in the second 
through fifth years. Based upon experience, the annual depreciation 
rataa are 57% in the first year, and 13%f 13%, 9% and 3% in the 
subsequent yeara. Company management believee tha rental uaaga aathod 
ia an appropriate repreaentation of depreciation for rental 
vldeocaeeettes since usage moat accurately matches the expiration of 
coat with rental income. 
FURMTORE AND EQUIPMENT AND DEPRECIATION 
Furniture and equipment are depreciated on the straight-line 
method over their estimated useful livea of five years. 
INCOME TAXIS 
Deferred income taxes are provided for differences in 
financial reporting and income tax reporting. 
Loaa PER comoN SHARE 
Lose per common share ia computed by dividing net loss, 
increased by preferred stock dividends, by tha weighted average number 
of common eharee outstanding. Common atocic equivalenta have been 
excluded from the 1991, 1990 and 1989 computations since their effect 
womld be anti-dilutive. The weighted average number of common share* 
outstanding warn 34,138,766, 32,900,000 and 21,723,014 for the yeara 
ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989. 
JOSCIASSIFI CATIONS 
Certain amounts within the accompanying financial statement* 
have been reclassified for comparative purpoaea only* 
F-10 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
NOW 1 - NATURE OP BUSINESS 
L.A. Entertainment, Inc. ("Company"), is primarily engaged in 
the bueineas of oparating praracordad vidaocaaaatta rantal concesaiona 
within aajor supermarket chains located in Washington and Oregon. Tha 
Ccaqpany also has one stand-alone retail videocassette rantal location 
in Seattle, Washington. 
A majority of tha Company'a outstanding common stock is avne.i 
by Bolmtoy Capital Partners, Ltd. (See Notes 3,7,9 and 11) 
NOTE 2 - CONCESSION OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND MAJOR CUSTOMERS 
Tha Company operates video rental outlets under concession 
oparating agreamenta which provide that tha Company bear all of the 
ooata of oparating tha outlets (exclusive of personnel coats relating 
to ranting of tha tapes) and that the store owner receive between 301 
to 35% of the outlets1 rental revenues. At March 31, 1991, the Company 
oparatad 40 auch outleta. 
Tha Company received approximately 53%, 64% and 68% of the 
gross rantal revenues from outlets in varioua atoraa of one aupermarkat 
chain for tha years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989. Tha Company , 
concession agraament with this supermarket chain expired in June, 1990. 
However, the Company continuea to operate the outleta on a monthly 
basis. 
In addition, tha Company received approximately 26%, 16% and 
14% of ita gross rantal revenues from outlets in various stores of 
another supermarket chain for tha years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 
1989. 
NOTE 3 - NOTE RECEIVABLE PROM AFFILIATE 
In August 1989, the Company opened a laasad retail 
"muperetore" located in Encino, California, which stocked praracordad 
videocaaaettas and entertainment related items for rental and sale. 
lfce Company oparatad the store until March 30, 1990, at which time the 
retail operation waa aold to an affiliate. The affiliate purchased al 
of the Company4a assets hald in the retail store and assumed all 
related liabilities in exchange for a note having a principal amount 
equal to the net book value of such asseta and liabilltiee, which was 
determined to be $488,026 aa of March 30, 1990. The note was non-
recourse and was receivable quarterly in interest-only installmenta 
F-ll 
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continued) 
MCTE 3 - NOTE RECEIVABLE FROM AFFILIATE (Continued) 
at 14% per annua with the principal and all unpaid interest due on 
April 1, 1993* The note was collateralized by a pledge of all of the 
shares of Series A preferred stock held by another affiliated entity. 
The note is presented as a reduction of shareholders1 equity on the 
accompanying balance sheet at March 31, 1990. 
On November 1, 1990, the Coapany entered into an agreement t<> 
repurchase certain of the assets, including video rental tapes and 
video shelving, of this "superstore19 for a $308,761 reduction of the 
related note receivable* The remainder of the note receivable was 
settled on March 30, 1991 through the redeaption of 360f 513 shares of 
aeries A preferred stock which were valued at $0.62 per share (see Notr 
7)• The above settlement of the note receivable resulted in a charge 
to operations of approximately $44,300 in 1991. 
The accompanying financial statements include the Company•* 
results of operating the superstore during the year ended March 31, 
1990 which are summarized below: 
Gross revenues $ 312 069 
Operating costs 1 M 9 342 
Loss from operations $ f777 2731 
In connection with the operation of the superstore, during 
the years ended March 31, 1990 and 1969, approximately $255,000 and 
$442,000 in rent for the retail space was paid to an affiliate. 
NOTE 4 - FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT 
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NOTES TO FIMAHCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continuad) 
•OTI 4 • FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT (Continuad) 
As of March 31, 1991 and 1990, total capitalised laaaa 
aquipaant includad in furnishings and aquipaant abova vae $175,742 for 
both years- Accumulated amortization tharaon vaa $84,825 and $49,677. 
•OTI 5 • NOTES PAYABLE, BANKS 
Tha Company renewed its commercial loan agraaaant with a Ba< 
on March 9, 1990, evidenced by a new note in the principal aaount of 
$135,433, which combined the unpaid balances of $91,433 and $44,000 
borrowed under expired loan and line of credit agreements- The note 
bears annual intareat at 1% above the bank's index rate, which waa 10% 
as of March 31, 1991. The note ia payable in 24 equal monthly 
installments of $6,310 through March 1992 and ia collateralized 
primarily by accounts receivable and videocaaaette assets. 
SCTI 6 - NOTES PAYABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS 
Notes payable to shareholders, bearing annual interest at lot 
are unsecured and payable on demand after April 1, 1992. Interest 
expense recorded on these notes waa approximately $6,685, $7,600 and 
$12,200 for the years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989. 
MOT1 7 - CAPITAL STOCK 
During the year ended March 31, 1991, the Company iaaued 
4,750,000 ahares of common stock to the directors of the Company aa 
compensation for their aervices as directors and consultants to the 
Company. In addition, the Company issued 2,000,000 sharas of common 
etocX to an outtide consultant and 400,000 shares of common stock to 
outside attorneys in consideration for aervicea provided to the Compaq 
during the year and amounts owing from the prior year. The above 
transactions resulted in a charge to general and administrative expenii 
Of $233,736. 
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continued) 
JTOTE 7 - CAPITAL STOCK (Continued) 
During 1987, the Coapeny issued 500,000 shares of common 
stock to an individual in exchange for a promissory note in tha amount 
of $25,000. in September, 1990, tha nota with a balance of $32,475 
including accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable. In March, 
1991, ae payment was not forthcoming, the 500,000 shares vera redeemed 
in settlement of the balance due. 
During the year ended March 31, 1990, the Board of Directors 
authorized the designation of 4,000,000 shares of Series A Preferred 
Stock. Holders of this class of preferred stock are entitled to 
receive cumulative dividends, payable quarterly, at the rate of 141 pi i 
annua and may at their option convert their preferred shares into 
shares of common stock at any time after June 30, 1991, at the rata of 
ten shares of common stock for each share of preferred stock. The 
Company may, at its option, issue additional shares of common stock to 
satisfy cumulative but unpaid dividends* This clams of preferred stoi t 
generally carries no voting rights and is redeemable at the option of 
the Company at any time at a redemption price of $.29 per share plus 
emulative dividends accrued and unpaid. 
The Company had two notes payable to its then controlling 
shareholder, Omni Video, Inc., for $400,000 and $277,300. These not** 
were due on demand and bore interest at 12% per annum. On September 
30, 1989, the principal of the notes vas canceled in exchange for 
2,335,517 shares of Series A Preferred Stock converted at a rate of 
$0.29 per share. The outstanding shares of preferred stock bear a 
cumulative dividend of 14% per annum, which was equivalent to $47,281 
as of March 31, 1990. Omni Video, Inc., made further advances 
aggregating $49,232 during the year ended March 31, 1990, excluding 
aggregate accrued interest of $15,862. These unpaid amounts, along 
with obligations aggregating $27,667 for overhead and rent expenses 
accrued to other affiliates, were canceled effective March 31, 1990, by 
thm conversion into 482,903 additional shares of Series A Preferred 
•took. 
Accrued dividends on Series A Preferred Stock totalled 
$114,428 for the year ended March 31, 1991. On March 31, 1991, 
additional preferred shares were issued in satisfaction of the unpaid 
dividends at the rate of $0.62 per share. 
On March 31, 1991, 360,513 shares of Series A Preferred Stoci 
were redeemed in settlement of the then outstanding balance of $223,51 n 
on the note receivable from an affiliate. See Mote 3. 
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continuad) 
NOTE 7 - CAPITAL STOCK (Continuad) 
Tha Company's Board of Diractora has authority, without 
action by tha shareholder*, to iaaua all or any portion of tha 
reoeaining authorized but uniaauad prafarrad etoctc in one or mora serit* 
and to determine tha voting rights, prafarancaa as to dividanda and 
liquidation, conversion rights, and othar rights of such aariaa. Sued 
prafarrad stock aay carry rights auparior to thoaa of tha common stocV. 
VOTE I - INCOME TAXES 
As of March 31, 1991, tha Company has nat oparating loaaas 
for both financial raporting purpoaaa and fadaral income tax purpoaaa 
of approxiaataly $1,546,000 expiring principally in tha yaar 2005. 
VOTE 9 - REIATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS 
From Fabruary 1969 to Juna 30, 1990, tha Company aharad 
oorporata offica spaca and aacratarial services vith an affiliata und« i 
a month-to-month sublaasa arrangeaent with tha affiliata. Tha fair 
aarket valua of tha shared offica apaca was chargad to tha Coapany 
baaad upon tha anount of apaca occupied until March 31, 1990. The rant 
was $5,000 par month for tha yaar ended March 31, 1990 and approxi-
aataly $51,000 was chargad to rant axpanaa undar this arrangement. See 
notaa 3 and 7. 
MOTE 10 - MAJOR SUPPLIER 
Tha Coapany had purchases of vidaocaasattee of approxiaataly 
114$,600, $601,000 and $601,000 froa a aajor supplier during tha yearn 
ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989. 
MOTS 11 - COMMITMENTS AMD CONTINGENCIES 
Operating leases 
Tha Coapany occupies space under operating leaaaa and rants 
office furniture and equipment on a month-to-month baais. Total rant 
expense chargad to oparatlona under noncancellabia lease agreements fo 
the years ended March 31# 1991, 1990 and 1989 was approximately 
$45,987, $47,000 and $45,500. 
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continued) 
NOTE 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Continuad) 
Oparating laaaaa (Continuad) 
Schadulad ainimum laaaa payaenta undar theee laaaaa for yeam 
eubeequant to March 31, 1991, ara praaantad below: 
Taar andlng 
march n< _i*Qimi_ 
1992 $46 310 




On March 28, 1990, tha Coapany antarad into a one-year 
aanagaaant agraaaant with Oani Video, Inc., purauant to which tha 
Company would aanage all concaaaiona purchaaad by Oani Vidao, Inc., in 
a euperaarkat chain in Texae in exchange for a aanagaaant faa of 19% u 
groaa oparating ravanuaa darivad froa tha vidao rantala. In addition, 
tha Coapany haa an option to purchaaa tha concaaaiona at Oani Vidao, 
Inc.(a coat. 
Oani Vidao, Inc.1a purchaaa of thia oparation ia currantly i 
dlaputa with tha seller, and tha Coapany la not currently racaiving 




A coaplaint for opan account waa filad againat tha Coapany 
April 11, 1990 by Liabaraan Entarpriaaa ("Liabaraan19}, a aupplier of 
vidao and auaic aarchandiaa for aala, concaming Liabaraan1 a provision 
of auch aarchandiaa to tha Coapany'a auperetore. Tha Coapany filad it 
croaa-coaplaint on or about Juna 4, 1990 againat Liabaraan for daaag* 
arialng out of Liabaraan1a failura to parfora ita auppliar agraaaant 
with tha Coapany. Tha Coapany antarad into a atipulatad judgaent in 
tha approximate nat amount of $190,000. Sutoaaquantly, in July, 1991, 
tha judgaant waa aattlad by a payaant of $100,000 to Liabaraan which 




NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continued) 
W0T1 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Continued) 
Litigation (Continued) 
Video Trend 
During 1991, Video Trend filed a claim for $130,890 regarding 
the sale of video cassettes to the Company. During the pendency of tht 
action payments have been made to Video Trend reducing the balance of 
this claim to approximately $100,500 as of March 31, 1991. While the 
Company believes it has substantial affirmative defenses and that Vid*. 
Trend is not entitled to the full amount sought, an accrual of $100,Sou 
ham been charged to operations to provide for probable losses. 
Bast Texas Distributing, Inc. 
The Company has an agreement with East Texas Distributing, 
Inc. ("ETD"), to purchase from ETD an average of $10,000 per month of 
new videocassettes at competitive prices for a total of $105,000. Th* 
term of the videocassette purchase obligation was from February 15, 
ISM, to December 31, 1988, However, the Company has not purchased an • 
videocassettes from ETD due to what it believes was the alleged breach 
by ETD of the competitive price provision of the contract. East Texai 
Distributing, Inc., refiled two complaints against the Company clalmiiM 
damages arising out of the agreement. The Company has settled one ot 
these claims for $15,000, which has been accrued on the accompanying 
balance sheet by a charge to operations. The Ccapany has begun to sal 
partial payments thereon while negotiating a settlement of the 
remaining claim. East Texas Distributing, Inc., has offered to settu 
the remaining claim for $10,000. While the Company believes it has 
substantial affirmative defenses, an accrual of $10,000 has been 
charged to operations to provide for probable losses. 
Matlin « Dvoretzlty Architects, Inc. 
On April 30, 1990, Matlin 6 Dvoretzky Architects, Inc. 
(•Ratlin8) filed a complaint against the Company alleging that 
approximately $47,000 is owed for services allegedly rendered. On June 
26, 1990, the Company filed an answer to the complaint asserting 
Hetlin's prior breaches of contract. On April 1, 1991, settlement was 
reached for $15,000 to be paid $500 per month. Therefore, an accrual 
of $15,000 ham been recorded as of Kerch 31, 1991. 
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MOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Continued) 
NOTE 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Continued) 
Litigation (Continued) 
Casino USA 
The Company is being sued for lost rants of $250,000 by the 
leaser of the Encino "superstore* subsequent to the closure of the 
related store. In the opinion of legal counsel and management of the 
Company, a preliminary notion will be made to disaiss the Conpany frou 
this case; however, in management1s and legal couneel's opinion, the 
ultimata outcome is not expected to have a material adverse effect on 
the Company. 
Miscellaneous 
During 1991, various businesses filed claims aggregating 
approximately $30,800 for the sale of goods and services. One of the:,<• 
cases was settled for $15,000. While the Company believes it has 
substantial affirmative defenses and that these businesses are not 
entitled to the full amount sought, an accrual of $27,500 has been 
charged to operations for possible losses. 
Threatened Litigation 
Two businesses have threatened to file claims for $71,600 
relating to the sale of videos, while the Company believes it has 
substantial affirmative defenses and that these businesses are not 
entitled to the full amounts sought, an accrual of $55,000 has been 
cbarged to operations to provide for possible losses. 
NOTI 12 - STOCK OPTIONS 
Under the 1990 Stock Option Plan, the Company may grant 
either Incentive or non-qualified stock options to any director, 
officer or employee of the Company to purchase up to 15,000,000 sharai. 
of oommon stock. The option price say not be leas than 100% of the 
fair market value of a share on the date the option is granted, for 
incentive stock options and 85% of the fair market value for non-
qualified stock options. Options are exerciaable generally over 10 
years beginning one year after the date of grant. The plan also 
provides for granting stock appreciation rights in conjunction with 
options granted. As of March 31, 1991, no options have been granted 
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BOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(Concluded) 
NOTI 13 - NONCASH TRANSACTIONS 
Noncash transactions during the years ended March 31, 1991 
and 1990 consists of the following: 
1*90 
Dividends declared on Series A 
Preferred Stock 
Issuance of Series A Preferred Stock 
Issuance of Common Stock 
Redemption of Conaon Stock 
Redemption of Series A Preferred 
Stock (223 518) 
Receipt of fixed assets in exchange 
for forgiveness of note receivable 
from affiliate that was presented 
as a reduction of shareholders1 equity 308 761 
NOTI 14 - SUBSEQUENT EVENT 
Subsequent to year end, in June, 1991, the Company entered 
into a stock purchase agreement whereby the Company vill acquire all <>f 
the outstanding common stock of three Japanese companies (the 
'Companies") in exchange for 1,000 shares of newly authorised Series H 
Preferred Stock to be issued by the Company. The Companies are 
principally engaged in the leisure, entertainment and real estate 
industries in Japan. 
Also, immediately after the issuance of the newly authorize! 
Series B Preferred Stock, the three Japanese companies will appoint a 
majority of the Board of Directors. 
The Series B Preferred Stock will have certain preferences 
and privileges, including voting rights, and will he convertible at a*., 
time after twelve or eighteen months of issuance, depending upon the 
outcome of certain future events, into 60% of the common stock of ths 
Company after giving effect to the conversion of the Series A Prefem.i 
Stock. The Company anticipates accounting for the transaction as a 
reverse acquisition. 
The above transaction is contingent upon the successful 
completion of certain due diligence procedures being conducted by the 
Company and the completion of audits of the financial statements of ti 
Japanese Companies by independent certified public accountants. 
In July, 1991, the Company entered into a promissory note 
with an affiliated company whereby the Company may borrow up to 
$400,000. The note is unsecured and provides for monthly interest only 
peyments at the rate of 12% per annus on the outstanding balance. 






Year ending Haroh 31, 1991: 
Rental vldeocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leasehold improvements 
computer software 
Year ending March 31, 1990: 
Rental vldeocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leasehold improvements 
computer software 
Year ending March 31, 1969: 
Rental vldeocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leasehold Improvements 
computer software 
L.A. EH*ERTAlMMUrr, IMC. 
PROPERTY, PLMIT AMD BOUIPHBMT 
COLUMN B 
Balance at 






















































































































































L»A. EHT1HTAIHHBIIT, IMC. 
ACCOMDIATBD DEPRECIATION, DEPLETION MID JlliaRTISATIOR OF PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
CQMJHH A 
Description 
Year ending March 31, 1991 r 
Rental videocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Pumitura and fixtures 
Leasehold improvements 
Computer software 
Year ending March 319 1990s 
Rental vldeocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leasehold improvements 
Computer software 
Year ending March 31, 19891 
Rental vldeocassette library 
Automobiles 
Equipment 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leasehold improvements 
Computer software 
counoi a Balance at 
beginning 
9t p+rlofl 






S2 8 2 6 024 




8 0 0 1 
50 919 
H P97 Hi 
$ 1 190 190 
15 396 




n 1M 375 
cOLwm c 
Additions 


































































Lance a t 
Mid Of 
2ft£lfid 
8 6 6 8 2 7 
9 4 3 9 
2 3 3 9 6 0 
3 0 1 5 7 5 
19 2 9 9 
78 4 3 8 
5 0 9 5 3 8 
2 8 6 16S 
8 104 
2 1 3 9 8 5 
2 3 7 3 1 3 
13 6 3 3 
6 6 8 2 4 
*?& B24 
7 0 4 8 4 2 
IO 8 3 6 
1 5 1 7 3 5 
1 6 0 8 9 1 
8 0 0 1 
SO 9 1 9 
P » 7 " « 
r-2l 
L.A, UflUiTAIWIBWT, INC* 
CPMMH h 
Category of aggregate 
short-tsni bprrowinqa 
Year ending March 31, 1991: 
Notes payable to banks 
Year ending March 31, 1990: 
Note payable to bank 
Year ending March 31, 1989: 
Note payable to bank 



































(1) The weighted average internet rate la calculated by dividing the related intereet expense bj 
the weighted average balance outstanding for the year. 
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SCHEDU) i X 
L . A . ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS 
-CQMMLft SfiUOIILJL 
Htm OimTtfd to e n « t « and «*p«n—• 
YMg «nd«d March 3 1 . 
1?91 1*90 1**9 
Mftinttntnc* and repairs $16 429 $21 854 $ 9 474 
A4v«rtis ing c o o t s $ 8 246 $30 847 $ 9 167 
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UiSCLOSLRE, 
Information Services, Inc. 
5161 Rlvtr Road 




E m a i l 2.2 
AMENDMENT TO 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
This Amendment ("Amendment1) dated at of the 2ad day of August, 1991 is between 
LA. Entertainment, loo, a Nevada Corporation fBuyeO, Hapme Wnda ^Seller0) tad himtaka Co^ 
lid. of which Selkr is die 100* owner of al of the outttsmding capital stock. 
The parties desire to amend certain sections of that certain Stock Purchase Afreeaxnl 
daced June 77,1991 CAgreaDBac^.aocordiag^ 
A. The folowmg paragraph inductions of te 
The preamble paragraph is ammrird as (OHOM: 
AGREEMENT, dated ss of the 27 day of June, 1991, among LA. Bnftectaiameut, Inc. a 
Nevada corporation (the •Buyer' or Xtapany"), and Hajfee Wada CSeOeO* who is the owner of aO of 
the issued and outstanding shares of capital stock of Marvtaka Co, Ltd, fMarutaka* or "Purchased 
Company). 
AJ1 references to Purchased Company* shad now be to Purchased Company and al 
references to Sellers shall now be to Seller. 
LL Sale of Shares. Section 1.1 is amended as follows: 
At the 1st Closing (as defined ia Section 2) (the 1st dosing") and subject to the terns 
and conditions of this Agreement, the SeBar hereby seOs to Buyer all of the Shires of the PvcJuaed 
Company (the •Purchased Shares") b encfaange for 5,000000 shares of Bayer's Common Shares 
("Common Shares-) and Bayer's Series B Preferred Stock, 1001 par value (the Ttefsned Shares'). The 
holders of Series B Preferred Shares shaO have the following rights (a) the right to elect a m^crity of 
the Board of Directors of the Company, (b) the right to convert after twelve months upon the receipt by 
the Company of information and documentation prepared by third party consokinh retained by the 
Company saflident to allow the Company to raise $10,000,000 for development costs of proposed golf 
coarse*. 
L2. P«YBflrt ?f ftp Purchase Price. Section L2 is amended as feBoan 
At the 1st Closing (as defined heranX the Bayer shall deliver co Seler, in accordance 
with Schedule JL2, such aamber of shares of Preferred Shares so Chat open cowversioa of the Preferred 
Shares! in addition to Ae SfltRJBBD shares of Common Slock to be defeated to Seller, Seler wtt own 
52% of the outatandfag Common Stock of Bayer after giving effect to the evrdse of al options and 
warrants omatandmg as of the 1st Closing and dm conversxm of the Series A Preferred Slock. 
L4 PaBwrrrfCommTShifffl' Section 14 is amended as fallows: 
At the 1st Closing the Company shall deleter to Seller the Common Shares and the 
Preferred Shares and the resignations of the Company's ofieers, as wefl as a certified resolution of the 
Board of Directors electing immediately two desipees of Seler to dm Board of Dkecton, with a third 
desqpoe of Seller to be appointed vpon the eleventh day after Bayer has (Bed ia notice of change of 
control with the U<S» Securities sod Bochaage Commission, to coasdtnte the Board of Directors together 
with two members of the current Board of Directors or their designees. Saeh notice shsllbefBed by 
Buyer promptly fbOowbg the cavntinn of this AfeemeaL The Certificate of Determinadoa m 
proposed to be filed for the Preferred Shares is attached hereto as BriiibitlA 




 ^ T I V l ^ V H l f r T I This Section ihafl be amended mfafloa* 
43 ilfflWiif*^ ** ft*"-* "«* ywfcffil a y ™ Seller ihafl oectte and deliver 
u iaftatmeat rcpraKatatioa letter at the lat Ocaing ia the Com attached aa Exhibit 43. 
5JO IjitTJitifjf H e reference* to the dale Docffliher 31, 1991 dull be aaraded to 
readf December 31,19».* 
6^£sisaflBr Thesecondsentenceof diis Section k aaeaded m blows: 
Seikr and Marutaka acknovriedge that 41 eaqpeaae of the accountant* and legal coeaael 
ahril be paid by Seller and Marutaka. 
7
 * flfflill FJniT"iillf P1W T^* section is amended aafoOow 
The partiea shall prepare a plan of financing to facilitate the development of 
aakaproved real estate ri^ta owned by Maruuki far the development into gotf comics. Company ahal 
aae ks best efforta to arrange for a public or private finairiag to rafae ao leas than tH^OOOjDOO for the 
Purchased Company's business plan. 
7,6 I&idgg. This aectioa ia eliminated. 
7J£s^asdiJattSl9&& Thkaedkmiaelimmnted. 
7. C w # W ftecec|cnt tp toQfrftgalwq of tfc ftffy ft flag. Section 7 is aateaded by 
adding: 
7A ^ H l l l i ^ Y P;|l fj|Mfft flilhtt S c U c r shall have completed prior to the tat 
Closing the acquisition of all of the real estate rights pertaining to ftGe and the 30% of Hollywood Land 
Tokyo aot currently owned by Seller and Seller's aJBiaie*. 
123 Notfres. Section 123(H) * amended by deleting the copy requbeamnt to Kagel & 
Seiner. 
B. Al other aecdona of die Agreemeat arc aot aetnutori. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the paitka have escorted (Ms Amendment oa the date first above 
winea. 










STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT, dated as of the day of Jeae, 1991, among LA. Entertainment, 
Lac t Nevada corporation (the "Bayer* or 'Company-), » d each of the person whose names, addresses 
and shareholdings are set forth on Schedule A annexed hereto (each a 'Seller1 aid colectivtiy the 
"Sellers"), who Mtc the owners of all of the issued aod outstanding shares of capital stock of Manitaka 
Co., LtA, CMarutaka")-
The Sellers are die owner* of all of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock, 
of Marutaka, being issued aid ootstandmg ihaiet of common stock, $ par valae 
per share, of Marutaka, and issued and outstanding shares of common stock, 
S par value per share. The Sellers wish to seS all of their Shares and the Buyer wishes to 
purchase such Shares upon the terms and conditions of this Apeement 
Accordingly, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
L Sale and Purchase of Shares. 
LI. Sak of Shares. At the lit Closing (at defined in Section 2) (the 'lit dosing-) and 
subject to the terms sad conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers hereby sell to Buyer all of the Shares 
of Manuka (the "Purchased Shares') ia exchange for shares of Series B Preferred Stock, 1001 par 
value of Buyer (the •Preferred Shares'). The holders of Series B Preferred Shares shall have the follow-
iag rights (a) the right to elect a majority of tbe Board of Directors of the Company, (b) the right, after 
twelve months or eighteen months from the receipt by the Company of information and docmaentstioa 
prepared by third party rnmnltants retained by the Company -<***«•* to allow the Compaay to raise 
$20^000,000 for initial development costs for a proposed theme park, to vote oa tbe same basis as tbe 
common stockholders for tbe dissolution or liquidation of the Company. 
1.1 Payment of tfc Pm^Tff? P™r At the 1st dosing (as defined herein), the Buyer 
shafl deliver to the Sellers, m accordance with Schedule L2, suck number of shares of Preferred Shares 
so thai, upon conrersioQ of the Preferred Shares, Seller will own 60% of tbe outstanding Common Stock 
of Buyer after giving effect to the exercise of all options and warrants cmtsfiwtiag as of die 1st Closing 
and the conversion of the Series A Preferred Stock. 
1 J. Delivery of Pffflitf* Myes. At die 1st Ooeiag, the Sellers shal deliver or cause 
to be delivered to the Buyer stock certificates representing afl of the Purchased Shares, duly eadoraed in 
blank, and wit h all appropriate stock transfer tax stamps affixed. 
IA tv f iyp nf fi-MCTT yfrpfr At the 1st dossa* the Company shafl deliver to 
Sellers the Preferred Shares and the reaigna dons of all of the Company's officers, as well as a certified 
resolution of the Board of Directors electing immediately two designees of the Sellers to the Board of 
Directors, with a third dongnee of Sellers to be appointed upon the eleventh day after Bayer has fled 
its aoth* of change of control with the US. Securities and Exchange Ounmisainn, to constitute the 
Board of Directors together with two members of tbe current Board of Directors or their draigrrra 
Sncb twice shall be fifed by Buyer promptly following the execution of this Agreement, tbe Certificate 
of Determination as proposed to be filed for tbe Preferred Shares is attached hereto as EaUbk 1.4. 
1 rHffifE r i t F r t P ^ ^ ' n * P"ties have executed this Agreement aa of the date tel 
forth above. At the first closing f l * doing1) tbe parties thai coafirm this Agreement, and all filngs 
related thereto, and Buyer shall thereupon own all tbe Purchased Shares. Duriag the period of time 
prior to the 1st dosing and thereafter up to the 2nd Closing, BDO Sddman, U 3 A , and its afiiate ia 
Tokyos Japan, Asafai SUnwu & Co* Certified Pubic Accoimtaata, and tbe attorneys for Buyer, 
McKtarkk, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckeapaugh and Amida * Hsrokawa, thai begjn performing due 
dttgence and complete tbe Audited Finandak Tbe parties expect to cmopbte all the kgal due 
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dfljgTM* on or prior to June 30,1991 tod for the lit Going to occar on or prior to that due (tbe *bt 
C U a f Dam"). Tie second doriag C2ad Closing-) ihafl take place on tbe date (tbe *2ad doling 
Dale") the Aidtted Financials have been completed. The 1st Oosiag and 2nd doing ire each referred 
to as a •Closing' and the 2nd Doling Date and 1st Closing Date are each referred to as "Closing Date.1 
Within 5 days after the 2nd Cosing, the required financial statements will be included on a Form 8-K to 
be filed by the Company. 
1 Bffprrftftttarioni and Warrants g* tfr Saflm and Marutaka, The Sellers aad 
Marutaka, jointly and severally, represent and warrant to the Buyer as follow: 
31. Due Incorporation and Authority Marutaka is a corporation duly organised, 
validly editing and in good standing under die law of Japan and each has aD requisite corporate power 
aad lawful authority to own, lease and operate its respective assets, properties and business and to carry 
on its respective business as now being conducted. 
32. fiyfajtivfiffi Each of the corporations Bated an Schedule 32 (the "Subsidiaries'), 
is & corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good tending under the laws of its respective 
jurisdtaiou and each has ail requisite corporate power and lawful authority to own, lease and operate its 
respective assets, properties and business and to carry on its respective busmeas as now being conducted. 
Other than those Subsidiaries, Marutaka does not directly or indirecdy own any interest in soy other 
entity, aod Marutaka owns 100% of the S ubtidiaries. 
33. Company RffBTfllrift* E * i o t Marutaka and SubsuSaries is duly qualified or 
odwwise authorized as a corporation, to transact basiness> and is in good standing in each jurisdtaioa 
set forth on Schedule 13 and those jurisdictions each m doing busiaem m; the failure to obtain such 
qualification or authorization in any other jurisdfetioe does not have a material adverse cAed on the 
'coodkioa of the Company4 (as defined in Section 1313). Certified copies of Company Registration are 
attached as Exhibit 13 hereof for Marutaka and Subsidiaries. 
14. fo^ffllffol rr*flfcrt Sfflfc The authorized, issued aad outstanding capitalization 
and ownership of each of Marutaka and Subsidiaries is set forth on Schedule 3.4. Marutaka has good 
and valid tile to all of the issued aad onttfanHing shares of the capital stock of the Subsidiaries which is 
also reflected on Schedule 3.4 (the "Subsidiary Shares1). The Sellers have good aad vafid tide to afl of 
the issued and outstanding Shares free and clear of any Ben or other encumbrance. No ctfhcr dam of 
capital stock or other equity interest of any Marutaka or Subsidiary is authorized or outstanding. AM o( 
the Shares and aD of the Subsidiary Shares are duly authorised, vaKdty issued and fully paid aad non-
assessable* 
15. Option or Q*hff Pfrte ' I^ e i t * M outstanding right, subscription, warraat, call. 
unsatisfied, preemptive right, option or other agreement of any kind to purchase or otherwise to receive 
from Marutaka or Subsidiary any of the outstanding; authorized but unissued, nnauthorimd or treasury 
shares of the capital stock or any other security or equity tnfeittf of Marutaka or Subsidiary, and there 
* no outttairifng security of any kind convertible into such eapkal ttock or other equity interest, eaeept 
as described on Schedule 3J. 
I d MltaltHI flf WriM ftf tofflrBSato Each of Marutaka and Subsidiaries has 
heretofore delivered, or by the 1st Closing will defiver to the Buyer, true aad complete copies of its 
certified copies of Company Regiatiration (certified by the appropriate governmental authorities) and its 
Articles of Incorporation (certified by its Secretary) an m effect on the dale hereof. Article* of 
Iacorporatioo are attached an Exhibits 16 for Marutaka and Sabadkriea. 
I T ffmmill ftgtmak The combined balance Aeets cf Marutaka and Subsidiaries 
m ot June 30, 1969,1990 and 1991, and the related combined slaieme** of income, stockholders' equity 
and capital and cash flows for the years then emfcd, mdtxfiog the footnotes to the foregoing thereto, 
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ifeU be certified by BDO Seidman sod Asaiu Sliiuwa St Co. (Ac 'Accountanto*) nidi an unquaKBed 
report thereon, sod will be delivered to the Buyer a the 2nd dosing, aod thai fiuriy present the 
financial position of Marutaka and Subsidiaries as al inch dates aod the combined results of operations 
of Marutaka and Subsidiaries, m each case in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
consistently applied for the periods covered thereby. (The foregoing financial rtatcanentt of Maruuka 
and Subsidiaries as of June 30,1989,1990 and 1991 and far the years then ended, are tomcrimes heron 
referred to as die "Audited Financials"). The Audited Haaaciais, to bo attached hereto as Exhibit 3.7, 
shal fairly present the financial position and the results of operations of Marutaka and die Subsidiaries, 
as of such dates and for sack periods as are staled therein. Hie unaudited combined balance sheet of 
Marutaka and Subsidiaries as of June 30, 1987,198B, 1989 and 3990, and the related combined state-
ments of income for the years then ended, which lane been previously delivered to the Buyer, to the 
bast knowledge of Sellers fairly present the combined financial position of Marutaka and Subsidiaries, 
and tesulte of operations, In each case in conformity with Japanese generally accepted aocouating prin-
ciples applied on a bask consistent with the prior year. 
18. No Material ^ffarft Q*ym Hacepc for the items listed in Schedule 18 attached 
hereto, as of the 2nd Closing Dale, to die knowledge of the Setters, there has been no material advene 
change in the condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, and die SeUm know of no inch change which is 
threatened, nor has there been any damage, destruction or lorn which could have or has had a material 
adverse effect on due condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries whether or not covered by insurance. 
19. laLMlttfia 
3.9.L Marutaka and Subsidiaries have paid all uses or governmental assess-
ments (including estimated taxes) (Taxes") required to be paid by any of them through the date hereof 
and through the Closings (other than taxes not material in the aggregate and the Unity for winch is 
adequately reserved for in the Audited Financials), and all drficieacies or other additions to tax, interest 
and peoakies owed by any of them; and shall timely pay (co or before the npntinn of the appropriate 
period or say extensions ftereof) any such Taxes, including additions, interest and penalties, required to 
be paid by any c£ them on or before the 2nd dosing Date. 
3.9.1 Marutaka and Subsidiaries have timely filed (on or before the expiration 
of die appropriate period or any eartcasions thereof) all tax returns required through the date hereof, 
and shall prepare and timely file (on or before tic expiration of die appropriate period or any exten-
sions thereof), in a manner mnifatnf with prior years, all tax returns required on or before die 2nd 
Closing. 
193. Schedule 19 seta forth die status of any and ail tax audits of the returns 
of Maruuka and Subsidiaries for each fiscal year for which the statute of Bmitarions or similar ap-
pficafab law has not expired, including dm amounts of any deficiencies or addbioas to tax sssrssmmnti, 
lateral aod penalties that have been made or proposed, and the amnunft of any payments made with 
respect thereto. Each tax return filed by Marutaka and Subsidiaries for which die tax audit has not 
been ranpkrttd accurately reflects the amount of its tax Kab&ty for such period. Neither Marutaka aor 
the Srifars kaow of any material adverse change in the rates or basis of macsanrnt of any tax (other 
than income tax) effective for die fiscal yours oatfiag 1987,1988* 1989,1990 sad 1991, of Marutaka or 
Subafciaries or of any uaaaaosaed tax deficiency proposed <y threatened agjunst Marr^ 
110. SgosiiaSBJBItLidU Except for the envkomneatat matters listed in Schedule 
110, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries is in violatioa or has received any notice of any alleged violation 
of any applicable law, ordmaaoa, regulation, order, judgment, Jnjmrrion, award, decree or other 
requirement of any governmental or regulatory body, court or arbitrator, winch violation could have a 
material adverse effect on the condition of Marutaka or Srisidiariee. Bach of Marutaka and Sabsitiar-




governmental oc icgulatoiy body that tre material to tlie conduct of tke business of Marutaka and Sub-
ddiaries (collectively, •Pcnnki"). Without limiting tke foregoing a d c*xpt for the environmental mit-
ten lined la Schedule 3.10, (I) aone of Msmtaka or Subsidiaries ia ia violation, or hai received lay 
aodce of say alleged violation, or has received any notice of aay alleged violation, of aay law rclatiag to 
pollution or protection of the environment, induriiiig, without limitation, law relating to n^risfanny dia-
chargra, releases or threatened releases of pollutants, ooataminaats, chemicals, or iadustrial, toaic or 
hazardous substances or wastes into the environment (indudm& without fr»kmfvM ambient air, surface 
water, ground water or land), or odierwke relating to the manufacture procesufc diafrihufinn, use, 
treatment, storage, disposal transport or handling of pollutants, contaminants, cheaurah or industrial, 
task or hazardous substances or waste* except to tbc often* suck £aiure to comply coald not have a 
material adverse effect on the condition of Marutaka and Subsidiaries, and (n) to tke knowledge of tke 
Sellers each of Marataka and Subsidiaries is in compfiaaoe with all terms and coadiriors of inch 
required environmcncal permits, aad is also in compliance with all other imitations, restrictions, condi-
tions, standards prohibitions, requirements, oMigarinns, schedules and timetables contained in such 
eavircsBoeatal laws or contained in any regulation, code, plan, order, decree, judgment, injunction, notice 
or demand letter issued, entered, promulgated or approved thereunder except to the extent failure to 
comply could not have a material adverse effect oa die coocitkm of Mantaka and Subsidiaries. All 
Permits are luted on Schedule 310 and are in full force sad effect No material violation* are or have 
been recorded in respect of any Permit; and no proceeding is pending or, to Sellers' knowledge, 
threatened to revoke or limit any Permit. Except as set forth in Schedule 110 none of Marutaka, 
Subsidiaries or Sellers has actual knowledge of any current or proposed Ifgitlarinn which has or may 
have material advene effect on the condition of Marntaka or Subsidiaries. 
3.1 L M* ft—^Tfr The cjopcntion, delivery and performance of the Agreement will ant 
(L) violate, conflict with or result in the breach of any provision of the Articles of Incorporation of aay 
of Marutaka or Subsidiaries; (i) violate or resalt in the breach of any of the material terms of, result m 
a material modification of, or otherwise give aay other contracting party the right to terminate, or 
declare (or with notice or lapse of time or both declare) a default under any material caacract or other 
agreement to which any of Marataka or Subsidiaries, by or to which any of them or aay of their respec-
tive assets or properties may be bound or subject; (fi) violate say order, nrit, judgement, injunction, 
award or decree of any court, arbitrator or governmental or regulatory body binding upon any of 
Marutaka or Subsidiaries or upon any material part of tke assets any of Marutaka or ubskSarier, (w) 
violate any statute, law or regidatioo of any jurisdiction, which viclatioe ooald have a material advene 
elect on tke condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries; (v) violate or resalt in the revocation or niaprnsina 
of any Permit 
3.12 Action and Procecdiaas. Eacept as set forth on Schedule 112 involving the 
equivalent of US. SlOQjOOO or more per daim, there are ao outstanding orders, jwlgririrfs, injunctions, 
awards or decrees of any court, arbitrator or governmental or regulatory body binding upon any of 
Maritaka or Subsidhries. Except as set forth on Schedule 112, to tke knowledge of Marntaka, 
Sahshiarios or Sellers, there are ao actions, suits or danas or legal, aibniaistiatiw or arbitral proceed-
ings or awfsligarirns (whether or not the defense thereof or kafaffitfcs in respect thereof are cowered by 
insurance) pending or threatened against or involving any Marutaka or Subodiaries or any or tfaeir 
respective properties or assets which, indfoiduafiy or in the aggregate, coald have a material advene 
effect upon Marataka or Subsidiaries. None of Marntaka or Subsidiaries has at any time during tke last 
five years had, nor, to tke knowledge of Marataka or Subsidiaries or Sellers, as there now doeainaed, a 
strike, picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or other labor trouble that had or may have a material 
adverse effect cm tke coaditko of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. None of Mar Oka or Sufcakfiarics is aware 
cf any peodbg or threatened union activity, tfrika, picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or other labor 
trouble with respect to the employees of aay of tke fuppBer* or customers fitted on Schedule 121 tkat 
may have a material adverse effect oa tke condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. All notices required 
to have been given to any insurance ooopany fisted as insuring against any action, sait or daim set forth 
on Schedule 112 have been timely and duly given and ao insurance company has asserted, orally or in 
writing, that suck dafaa is not covered by the applicable policy relating to such daim. Except as set 
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forth in Schedule 112, there arc no product liabSky claims again* or involving any of Marutaka Of 
Subsidiaries invoking the equivalent of US. $25,000 or more per daim or per aerie* of churn* ariaiag 
from any one incident and no such claims have been sealed, adjaduaied or otherwise disposed of since 
June 20,1990. 
3.13. Contracts and Otter Agreements. Schedule 3.13 sets forth afl of the fallowing 
contracts and other agreements to which any of Manitaka or Sobaidiariea is a party or by or to which 
aay of them or their assets or properties ire bound or subject: (I) contracts a d other agreements with 
aay current or Conner officer, director, shareholder or other afiQbte or with any other curea! employee 
or consultant or with any entity in which any of the foregoing is a controlling entity: (a) contracts and 
other agreements with any labor union cr moriation repreaeoting any employee; (S) cootracu or other 
agreements for the sale of any of their assets other than in the ordinary course of business or for the 
grant to any entity of any opdon or preferential rights to purchase any of their assets; (iv) joint venture 
agreements; (v) contracts or other agreements under which any of them agrees to indemnify any party or 
to share tax liability of any party, (vi) contracts and other agreement* which can be cancelled without 
liability, premium or penalty only on amety days' or more notice; (vii) contracts and other agreements 
with customers or suppliers for the sharing of fees, the rebating of charges or other simlar arrange-
ments; (viii) contracts and other agreemeals containing covenants of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries not 
to compete in any line of business or with any entity in any geographical area or covenants of any other 
entity not to compete with any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries in any tine of business or in any geographical 
area; (be) contracts and other agreements relating to the acquisition by aay of Manitaka or Subsidiaries 
of any operating business or the capital stock of any other entity, entered into since June 30, 1990 or 
under which any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries has existing obligations; (x) contracts and other agreements 
requiring the payment to any entity of an override or similar oomnrigirm or fee; (n) contracts and other 
agreements relating co the borrowing of money; (» ) cootracu and other agreements not made in the 
ordinary course of business; or (xfi) any other contracts and other agreements puissant to which pay-
menu in eacess of the equivalent of UJS. SSQjOOO have been or may hereafter be amde. Scllen have 
delivered to the Buyer true and complete copies of all the contracts and other agreements set forth on 
Schedule 3.13 or on any other Schedule. All of such contracts and other agreements are valid and bmd-
mg upon each of Manitaka and Substduries* as the case may be. None of Marutaka or Subaidiarisa is 
ha default in any material respect under any such agreements* nor, to dm frnowtrrlgr of any of Manitaka, 
Subsidiaries or Setters, is any other party to any such contract or other agreement in default thereunder 
m any material respect, nor does any condition emit that with notice or lapse of time or both would 
coaatitutc a material default thereunder. Schedule 113 also lists all contracts and other agreements 
carrcudy in aegotiatioa or proposed by any of Marutaka or Srividiariea of a type which if entered into 
by aay of Marutaka or SUbskfieriea would be reqahed to be listed on Schedule 113 or en any other 
Scheduirr The Sellers have delivered to dm Buyer true and correct drafts or summaries of al such 
coatracu and other agreements and copies of ail doannrnli relating thereto. Whenever the term 'of-
ficer* is used ia this Agreement, it shall refer to the appropriate equivalent undo Japnoeae law aad 
wage. 
114. n"TH l fa *1** Approvals. The execution and defiwry by the Selen of this 
A^pec meat, die performance by the Selen of their obligations hereunder, the ooarinnanm m fall force 
and effect of al contracts and agreements aet forth on Schedule 114 do not require the Selen, 
Marutaka or Subsidiaries to obtain aay consent* approval or notion o£> or make any fflmg with or give 
aay notice to, any entity or any governmental or regulatory body, except as aet forth in Schedule 114 
(the °S*8en Required Consents"). The patties recognize and unrtenrfand that aodficatfaa of the tranaac-
tioas contemplated by this Agreement must be given to the Japanese Ministry of Finance through the 
Bank of Japan by the Company, pursuant to the Japanese Foreign Erchaagc and Foreign Trade Coatrol 
law, and that thk Agreement will not be effective until such notice has been gtoen in accordance with 
such llaar. The Compaay agrees to give such notice immediately fallowing the eamcadon of this A^ree-
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3.15. Real Estate, TV Properties owned or leued by Marutaka and Subsidiaries are 
set forth on Schedule 3.15 J hereto, with their address and legal description. A (rue and correct son* 
maty of all leaies and other agreements relating to die properties s attached as Schedule 115.1 At-
tached as Exhibit 2,153 are certified copies of ail land and balding rcgistrarioas owned or leased by say 
of Marucaka or Subsidiaries, 
3.16. Receivables. All sccotmfs, lease obfigatioos and notes dae and racnikxtrri as 
reflected on the qnndilcd combined balance sheets of Marutaka and Subsidiaries aa cf June 30, 1990 
(the 'Balance Sheet") fRecembies") and, all Receivables due and uncolecied arising subsequent to 
Jane 30, 1990: (i) have arisen in die ordinary course cf business of Manitaka and Subsidiaries, (it) rep-
resent valid obligations due to Manitaka or Subsidiaries enforceable in accordance with their tons and, 
(S) subject only to a reserve for certain bad debts cornpind in a manner mnsistnnf wkfa past practice 
have been collected or are collrctiblc in die ordinary course of business of Marutaka and Subsidiaries in 
the igtfcgaki recorded amounts thereof in accordance widi their terms- Schedule 3.16 lists any obligor 
«hkk together with aO of ks affiliates owed accounts and notes due and unroBrctftri were refected on 
the Balance Sheet as of June 30, 1990 in an aggregate amount of dm equivalent of U£$SQ,0OO or aaorc. 
3.17. T"WBaM<> ^TffT^ The facilitiee, machinery, equipment, furniture, leasehold 
improvements, fixtures, vehicles, structures! any related rapitaMrird items and other tangible property 
material to the business of Manuka, and the Subsidiaries (die "Taxable Property*) considered in the 
agfregate are, in all material respects, in good operating condition sad repair, normal wear and tear 
eacepted, and none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has received any notice since June 30, 1990 that any of 
them is in violation of any easting law or any building, zoning, health, safety or other ordinance, code or 
regulation which violation could have a aaateriai adverse effect on the coodkioo of the Company. Dur-
ing the past three years there has not been any ngatfrant interruption of the operations of any of 
Marutaka or Subsidiaries due to inadequate tnamtmanre of the Tangible Property. AO material leases, 
conditional sale contracts, franchises or licenses pursuant to which Marutaka or Subsidiary may hold or 
use any interest owned or claimed by such Marutaka or Suhsafiary (kdiuSag without limifafion, options) 
m or to Tangible Property are m MI force and effect and, with respect to the performance cf Marutaka 
or Subsidiary, there is no material defasdt or event of de&uk or event which with notice or lapse of time 
or both would constitute a default 
3.18. fnf|MflHt Property. Schedule 118 sets forth al patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
service marks and trade names, aO applications Cor any of the foregoing, and all permits, grants and 
Bceaecs or other rights running to or from any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries relating to any of the fare-
gomg" and there are no other patents, eradeaaarks, copyrights, sendee marks and trade names which are 
aaacarial to the business of Manitaka or Subsidiaries as presently ooadaded or aa being developed. 
Marutaka and Sdbskfiaries have the right to uee, free and dear of any dams or rights of others, s i 
trade secrets, know-how, processes, technology, blue prints and designs utilised m or incident to the 
conduct of their business aa presently cotidiirtpd as being developed (Trade Secrets'). Except ss set 
forth on Schedule 3J8, Marutaka or Subsidiaries have no notion of any adversely held patent, invention, 
trademark, copyright, service mark or trade name cf any other entity or notice of any claim of any other 
entity relating to any of the property set forth on Schedule 3.18 or any Trade Secret cf Marutaka or 
Sahaidbries, and Marutaka, Subsidiaries or Sellers do not know of any basis for any such charge or 
dasrn There is no present or, to the knowledge of Sellers, dareateoed use or encroachment of any 
TVade Secret which could have a material adverse effect on the coodkioo of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. 
119. Tiifc to Assets. Manitaka and Subsidurks own ontrighl and have good and 
marketable title to ail of tbek assets including, without limitation, all of the assets reflected on the 
combined balance sheet of Marutaka and Subeidiariea u of Jane 30, 1991 or described in Schedules 
3.15,116 and 118, in each case free and dear of any Ben or other encumbrance, eacept in the caae of 
assets other than real property for (i) Gens or encumbrances specifically described in the antes to the 
Audited Pmanciak; (E) assets disposed of, or subject to purchase or sales orders, in the ordmary coarse 
of business since June 30, 1990; or (iii) lens or other encumbrances seeming tarns, assoarmriutt 
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goveraffieutnL charges or levies, or die claims of materialmen, carriers, landlords and Kke cootie*, al of 
which art act yet due aid payable or are being coatestcd in good faith, ao long as such cosiest does 
aot involve any substantial danger of tbe sale, forfeiture or loss of any assets material to die condition of 
the Company, or (iv) ia the case of that certaii wnmproved real property owned by Holywood which ia 
kascd aader a SO year lease deacribed in Schedule 115 2 hereto. 
3JO. ii»htfitw As of June 30, 1991, Marutaka and Subsidiaries <fid not have aay 
indebtedness, liability, daim or loss, liquidated or unKqnitiaffri, teemed or unsecured, accrued, absolute, 
contingent or otherwise, of a kind required by Japanese generally accepted arctmnfing principles to be 
set forth on s financial statement or in the notea thereto (Tiabitics*) that were individually or in the 
aggregate material to the condition of either of Marutaka or any Subsidiaries and were not hilly sod ad-
equately reflected or reserved against on the balance sheet aa of June 30, 1991 or deacribed on any 
schedule thereto. Eaocept as let forth on Schedule 3.20, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has, except in 
dm ordinary course of business, incurred any liahffirifn nnee June 30, 1990. At the lit Closing, the 
Company will deliver to Hajime Wads, a promissory note executed by the Company payable to Wada, in 
form and substance as set forth in Extibit 3 JO. 
3 .21. Cistomers sod Lessees, Schedule 121 lists, by dolar volume for the last twelve 
calendar month* ended March 31,1991, the fifteen largest customers, suppfim and lessees of Marutaka 
and Subsidiaries. During nch 12 months ao such supplier, customer or leaace of Marutaka or 
Subsidiaries has canceled or otherwise terminated, or threatened in writing to cancel or otherwise 
terminate, ha relationship with Marutaka or Subsidiaries or has during such 12 months decreased asatcri-
aUy, or, to Sellers' knowledge threatened to decrease to Emit materially, its ariMmtion of teaait space, 
supples or materials to Marutaka or Subsidiary or its uaage or purchase of the tenant space, services or 
products of Marutaka or Subsidiary, as the case may be. Neither Marutaka nor any Seller has any 
knowledge that any such supplier, leasee, or customer intends to caned or otfaenrise modify its rotation-
ship with Marutaka or Subsidiary or to decrease materialy or Emit its tenant space, suppBes or sasteriak 
to Marutaka or Subsidiary or its uaage or purchase of the tenant space, services or products of 
Marutafca or Subsidiary, mid the acquisition of the Purchased Shares by the Buyer wil not, to the 
knowledge of the Selers, adversely affect the relationship of Marutaka or Subsidiary with aoch supplier, 
customer or lessor.. 
3.21 FiMhnrr flfflfft P 1 W Schedule 122 sets forth a true and coaaplete list of al 
eaapioyec benefit plans of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. 
123. laflsTMKE Schedule 323 acta forth a list and brief description (specifying the 
insurer, describing each pending claim thereunder of snore than the equivalent of US. S2SJD00 and set-
ting forth tbe aggregate amounts paid out under each such poicy through the dale hereof) of aB poiidea 
or binders of fire, liability, product fiabflify, workmen's compensation, vehicular and other insurance held 
by or on behalf of Maramka and Subsidiaries. Such potkace and binders are in fill force and effect and 
insure against risks and Babilitfos to an extent and m a maner customary in the industries in whack 
Marutaka and Subsidiaries operate. Except for claims set forth on Schedule 323, there am ao outstand-
ing unpaid claims under such policy or binder, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has received any notice 
of (anflrlHtiqn or oca-renewal of any such policy or binder. There is no inaccuracy m any application 
lor sach policies or binders or any failure to pay premiums when due that would cause a lack of insur-
ance coverage. Except as set forth on Schedule 323, none of Marutaka or Subsufiaries has received any 
notice from any of its insurance carriers that any mturannr coverage fisted cm Schedule 323 wil not be 
available in the future on substantially the same terms (except far the prices or premiums payable there-
under) aa now in effect 
3.24. Qffiecrs. Directors and Kffy P^pK^V^ Schedule 324 sets forth the name and 
total compensation of each person who ia now or haa been during the last two fiscal yean of Marutaka 
or Subsidiaries any employee, consultant, agent or other representative of any of Marutaka or Subsidiar-
ies whose annual rate of compensation (including tonuses and commiasjnus) tmceedi or sirrcrind the 
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oqotafaai of US. 560,000. None of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has made a uiiiiuitiiicnt or sgieemeat to 
mcreaae che compensation or to acetify the conditions or terms of employment of any such peaon. 
None of such person* currently holdiag such a potitua has threatened to cancel or otherwise terminate 
snch person* relationship with Mantaka or Subsidiary. 
325. Oppntiooi of ^^Bafai Encept as set forth oa Schedule 325, since June 30, 
1990y none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has* crap* in the ordnmry course of business: 
(i) declared or paid say dividends or dedaied or aade say other 
dntributkms of any kind to ks shareholders, as the case aiay be (other than distribntioas aade by say 
Subsidiary to Marutaka), or made any direct or indirect redemption, retirement, purchase or other so 
quaotioa cf say shares of ks capital stock; 
(ii) incurred any mricbtftriaeas for bonowed money; 
(xii) reduced its cssh or short tern investments or their equivalent, 
odaer than to meet cash needs arising in the ordinary coarse tfbianaeas, consistent with past practices; 
(W) waived any material right under any contract or other sgrec 
meat of the type required to be set forth in any Schedule hereto; 
(v) made say material change m its srrmmtmg methods or 
practices or msde any material change ia depreciation or amortisation policies or rates adopted by it; 
(vi) materially changed say of its business poiciea, including, 
without Emifsfinn, advertising, distributing, marketing, pricing, purchasing, personnel, sales, returns, 
budget or product acquisition policies; 
(vfi) made say wage or salary increase or bonus (except for annual 
bonuses payable in the normal course to employees in m aggregate amount not to eaceed fifteen percent 
(13%)), or increase in sny other (Greet or indirect compensation, or say payment or uasualsrjir to pay 
any severance or term marina pay to sny of its officers, dvectors, employees, ronnrtranfi, agents or other 
representatives, or any accrual fas or commitment or agreement to make or pay the same, other than to 
entities other than its officers, directors or shareholders; 
(via) made any ban or advance to any of its shareholders, officers, 
directors, employees, consultants, ageats or other represeatattae (other than travel advaaces made in the 
ordinary course of business), or made any other bsn or advance; 
(a) incurred or assumed sny debt, ohMgatioa or fiaWUty (whether 
absolute or contingent and whether or not currently due and payable); 
(z) acquired any (a) inventory or equipment, aad (b) made any a* 
quhation of aO or any part of the assets, properties, capital stock or busmeu of ss^ otfam entity; 
(xi) Paid, directly or inducoly, sny of its TiaNlriee before the laauc 
became due in accordance with its terms; 
(a ) terminated or failed to renew, or received any written thecal 
(that was not subsequently withdrawn) to terminaie or tail to rcaew, sny contract or other sgreeaieat 
dmt is or was material to the condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries or 
(xii) engaged in say other traasactioiL 
jl»215fi2fi32fl0Q/O02(Vpwchasc ft 
12k Pflftrf*1 r>iTTflMif* "* Tiifgf«f. Eacept as set forth on Schedule 126, so officer, 
director or affiliate of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, ao Seller, so relath* or spoue (or relative of 
sack spouse) of say such officer, director or a£Bliate or of a Seller and no entity controlled by oae or 
more of tke foregoing: 
(i) owns, directly or indirectly, asy interest in (except for lets than 
1% stock boidingi for investment purposes in securities of pib&dy keld sod traded companies), or is m 
officer, director, employee or consultant ot» any entity which a, or is engaged in business ss a 
competitor, lessor, lessee, supplier or customer of any ofMsrutaka or dm Subsidiaries; 
(ii) owns, directly or bdircctiy, in whole or in part, any tangtte or 
intangible property that amy of Marutaka or Subsidiaries ases in tke conduct of business; or 
(in) has any cause of action or ctker claim whatsoever agpunst, or 
owes say amount to, any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, creep! far claims in the ordinary conrse of bun-
aass sock as for accrued vacation pay, accrued benefits under employee benefit plans sad medical, 
deatai aad other similar health benefit plana easting on die date hereof. 
127. ^Mltt frfllftrs and Prcuriea. Schedule 3J27 sets forth (i) the name of each bank, 
trust company, sfloirkiffs or other broker or other financial insritnlinn with which soy of Marutaka or 
Subsidiaries has aa account, credit line or ssfe deposit box or vaults; (ii) the name of each entity 
authorised by Marutaka or Subsidiary to draw thereon or to have access to any safe deposit bos or 
vault; and (iif) the names of ill entities authorised by proak* powers of attorney or other instruments to 
aa on behaff of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries in matters concerning its business or affairs. 
128. Pull Disclosure. AB documents delivered by or on behalf of dm Seflerx, Marutaka 
aad Subsidiaries in conned km with this Agreement are true, complete aad siifhrurir. To the Sellers', 
Marutaka and Subsidiaries knowledge, no representation or warranty of them contained in this Agree-
ment contains aa untrue statement of a material bet or omits to stale a material fret reqored to be 
stated ihertia or necessary to make the sfafftmmts made, ia the contort in which made, not materialy 
&ke oi* misleading. There is no face know to the Seders, Marutaka and Subsidiaries that any of them 
have not disclosed to dm Buyer in writing that could have a material adverse effect on the condition of 
the Company or the ability of the Seflers', Marutaka aad Subsidiaries to perform this Agreement-
3.29. ReflrfffMioM n^j WffTMfol fflt IB fflfflfflf P*tt» *"» representations and 
warranties contained m this Section 3 shall be true m s i outenal respects on the 1st Closing Date. 
4. fonramiitiwf mi ^ mnm qf E«fa fcta » to to Iftrtwri Stara BachSeOer 
represcnta aad warrants, jointly aad severally to the Buyer as (blows: 
4.2. Trth? ft fWTihlKti ftrf*- Such Seller owns beneficially and of record, free aad 
dear of any lien, option or other encumbrance, or owns of record and has full power sad authority to 
convey, free mid clear of any lien or other encumbrance; the Purchased Sham set forth opposite inch 
Seller's anme on Schedule 1.2, and, upon delivery of and payment for such Purchased Shares as 
provided in Sections 12 and l i , such Seller wil convey to die Buyer gpod and vafid title thereto, free 
and dear of any Ken or other encumbrance. Sellers shal cause all necessary procedures to be taken to 
obtain the consents of Che Board of Directors of ench of Marutaka and to cause the trsasfcr of Shares 
of Marutaka to be recorded in die records of shareholders of each of them. 
4.1 tolfcgrilT n flTTTltT Trf *7frrm AWWnWt Such Seller has the foil legal right 
and power aad all authority and approval required to enter into, eaecote and deliver this Agreement sad 
to perform fully such Seller's ^ t i g ^ n c hereunder. This Agreement has been duly executed aad 
deivered by such Seller and is the valid and binding obligation of soch Seller enforceable ta scoordance 
with k* terms. Tbe execution aad delivery by nek Seller of this Agreement and the performance by 
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inch Setter of this Agreement m accordance with its terms tad onnriitions will tot (i) require the ap-
proval or consent of any governmental or regulatory body or the approval or corneal of any ocber entity; 
(i) conflict with or result is any breach or violation of any of the tarma and coalitions o£, or constitute 
(or with notice or lapee cf time or both constitute) a default under, tay staluaa, repletion, order, judg-
ment or decree applicable to such Selkr or to the Purchased Shires held by such Selec, or any instrm-
neat, contract or other agreement to which such Sella is a party or by or to which such Seler is or the 
Shares held by sich Seller ire bound or subject; or (ia) result in the creation of say lea, or other 
©acuaabrance on the Purchased Shares held by such Seler. 
43. A/rT>imffff 6* ftrastaent. Soci Selkr is acquiring the Preferred Shires to be 
delivered to him parsuaal to this Agreement for investment and not for resale or distribution. Seller 
shai execute and deliver aa ixxwttaieat representation letter at the 1st Gosaig ia the ioem attached ss 
E*tfb*43. 
44. RgmwtriffW ^ WiFintiM « \A <3«Bg Plftr The repraeatations and 
warraaties coctaioed in this Section 4 shall be true in ail aisteriai respectt oa the lit Qosing Date. 
5. Renrwntarinus sod Warranties d thn Buyer. The Buyer represents and warrants to 
the Sellers as follows: 
5.1. Due Incorporation and Authority. Hie Coaapany ia a corporation driy organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under the la** of Nevada sad has all requisite corporate power 
sari lawful authority to own, lease and operate its aaaeift, properties and basinets and to carry on its 
respective business as now being conducted 
5.1 ^TfrrtfiirM. T** Company has no snbsidary. The Company does aot direcdy or 
indirectly own any interest in any other entity. 
53. rfrglifiH*ffH The Company is duly qualified or otherwise authorised as a 
corporation, to transact business, and ia in good itaadiag in each jurisdiction set forth on Schedule 5 J 
and jurisdictions it is doing business ia; the failure GO obtain such qualification or authorization in any 
other jurisdkuan does not have a material adverse effect oa the 'conditio* of the Company* (as defined 
b Section 13.U. Qualification Certificates (good standing) are attached as Exhibit 53 hereof for the 
Company. 
5.4. foffPllrffW Caoitil Stack. The anthemed, issued and outstanding capitalization 
and ownership of the Company, together with a shareholder list as of a recent date acting all restricted 
shares and die date of acquisitions by the holders thereof, and a list of aB affiliates, is set forth on 
Schedule 5.4. 
SS Qmmi gr flftr RMftl- There ia no oatstaading right, subscript**, warrant, call, 
unsatisfied preemptive right, option or other agreeaaeat of any kind to purchase or odurwise to receive 
from Company any of the outstanding, aothorized but unissued, unauthorized or treasvy shirts of the 
capital stock or any other security or equity interest of the Company, and there is no outstanding 
security of any kind convertible into such capital stock or other equity interest eaoept for die Series A 
Preferred Stock which dkuil be converted at the lit Closing, eacept as described on Schedule 5.5. 
5.6. ftmifraflf ¥ lncoroor»*ifln Md IMlYfl The Company has heretofore delivered to 
the Seller true and complete copies of its Certificate of Incorporation (certified by the Secretary of die 
State of Incorportfioo) and iu Bylaws (certified by its Secretary) as m effect on the date hereof, which 
are attached as Exhibits 5J6. 
5.7. Fftt fr l ^Mnrflf The balance sheets of che Coaapany as of March 31, 1989 




flow for the years cheo ended, including the footnotes to the foregoing thereto, have beea delivered to 
the Sellers and are attached as Exhibit 5.7. The combined balance sheets of the Company u of March 
31,1991, and the related combined statement* of income, gockhoiders' equity and espial and cash flows 
Cor the years then ended, indnding the footnotes to (he foregoing thereto, sod accompanied by an 
aucfted report of BDO Seadman, will be delivered to the Seder it the 2nd Qam^ sod ihall fiurty 
present the financial position of the Company as at such dates and the combined results of qpffirinns of 
die Company, in each case in accordance with generally accepted accounting prindples connstently sp» 
pled for tbe periods covered thereby. (The foregoing financial tfat f e a t s of Che Company as of March 
31, 1989, 1990 and 1991 and for the years then ended, are anmflimr* herein referred to ss the 
"Company financial*1). 
5.8. Fft MitPii k*wn QtOKr E«xpt for the items listed in Schedule 5.8 attached 
hereto, as of the 2nd Closing Date, to the knowledge of the Buyer, there ha* been no saaterial advene 
change in the condition of dm Company, md die Buyer knows of no sneh change which is threatened, 
nor hai there beea any damage, destruction or lorn which could have or has had a material advene 
e&ct oa the condition of the Company whether or not cowed by insurance. 
5.9. T** fcfaflerfr 
5.9.L Hie Company has paid all taxes or governmental assriaiinars fmdidhig 
esdaaated taxes) ("Taxes') required to be paid by it through the date hereof and through the Oosmp 
(other than taxes not material in die aggregate and the liabShy tor which is adequately reserved for in 
the Audited Financials), and all deficiencies or other additions to tax, interest and penalties owed by it; 
and shall timely pay (oo or before the apiraacn of the appropriate period or any ertensions thereof) 
any such Taxes, including additions, interest snd pnaltirs, required to be paid by k on or before the 
2ad dosing Date. 
5.9.2. Hie Company has timely filed (on or before the expiration of the appro-
priate period or any exteasions thereof) all tax mums required through the date hereof, and shall 
prepare and timely file (on or before the expiration of the appropriate period or any rat en pons thereof), 
in a manner consistent with prior yean, all tax returns required on or before the 2nd Closing. 
5.93. Schedule 5.9 sets forth the status of federal mo. <oe tax audita of the tax 
returns of the Company for each fkcal year for which the statute of limitation* has not expired, includ-
ing the^  amounts of any deficiencies and addition o tax, assessments, interest and ptnatfrs Jndfcsltrt oo 
any notice* of proposed deficiency or statutory .decs of deficiency, and the amounts of any payments 
made with respect thereto. Each return fled by the Company far which the income UK audit has not 
beea completed accurately reflects the amount of its tax liability for such period. Tie Buyer knows of 
no material advene change in the rates or bask of awasmrrt of any lax (other than income tax) effec-
tive for the fiscal yean ending 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, of the Company or of any anasscssrd 
tax deficiency proposed or threatened against the Company. 
5.10. CncmKancc with Laws. Except for the eurirofMaeatal matters listed in Schedule 
510, the Company is not in violation or has received any notice of any alleged violation of any ap* 
pticafele law, ordinance, regulation, order, judgment, injunction, award, decree or other requirement of 
any gorcnunentai or regulatory body, court or arbitrator, which violation could have a material adverse 
effect on the condition of the Company. Hie Company has al Eceuses, permits, orders or approvals of, 
and hat made all required registration* with, any governmental or mguLsaocy body that are material to 
the conduct of the buriness of the Company (collectively, "Company Penrnta'). Without limiting the 
foregoing and except for the environment^ matters Sated in Schedule 110: (i) the Cosapany is not in 
violation, or has received any notice of any alleged violation, or has received any aodce of any aDegpd 
violation, of any law relating to pollution or protection of ..v.: environment, mrinding, without limitation, 
laws reltti* to emissions, discharges, releases or threatened releases of polhtants, contaminants, 




limitntioo, ambient air, surface water, ground water or land) , or otherwise relating to the rcaasftrflirc, 
processing, distribution, we, treatment, storage, disposal, transport or handling of pollutants, 
contaminants, chemicals or industrial, toxic or hazardous sabstmces or wastes, cacspt to the extent such 
failire to comply could not have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company and 
subsidiaries and (ii) to the knowledge of the Buyer, the Coaapauy B in compliance with all terms and 
conditions of such required environmental permits, and is also in compfiaace wth all other ftiifations, 
restrictions, conditions, standards, prohibitions, requirements, obligations, schedules and timetables 
contained in tuck environmental laws or contained in any regulation, code, plan, order, decree, jodg-
sent, injunction, aotice or demand letter issued, entered, promulgated or approved thereunder except to 
the extent failure to comply could not have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company. 
All Company Permits are listed on Schedule 5.10 and are in full force and effect Mo material violations 
are or have been recorded in respect of any Company Permit; and no proceeding Is pending or, to 
Buyer' knowledge, threatened to revoke or hrk any Company Permit Escept u set forth in Schedule 
5.10 the Company, is not aware of any correal or proposed legislation which has or may have material 
advene effect on the condition of the Company. 
5.11. No Breach. Ibt execution, delivery and performance of the Agreement will not 
(i) violate, conflict with or result m the breach of any provision of the Certificate of Incorporation or 
Bylaws of the Company, (u) violate or result in the breach of any of die material terms o£ result in a 
material modification of, or othenuse give any other mnmrting party the right to terminate or declare 
(or with notice or lapse of time or both declare) a default under any material contract or other agree-
ment to which the Company, by or to which k or its assets or properties auy be bound or subject; (Ei) 
violate any order, writ, judgement, injunction, award cr decree of any court, arbitrator or governmental 
or regUatory body binding upon the Company or upon any material part of the assets of the Company; 
(tv) violate any statute, law or regulation of any jurisdiction, afeicb violation could have a material 
adverse effect on the condition of the Company; (v) violate or result m the revocation or saspension of 
any Company Permit 
5.12. Aflitrr l id f i y ^ l n B Except aa set forth on Schedule 5.12 involving VS. 
1100,000 or more per claim, there are no outstaadfag orders, judgements, injunctions, awards or decrees 
of any court, arbitrator or gownmeatul or regulatory body binding upon the Company, Except u set 
forth on Schedule 5J2, to the knowledge of the Company, there are no actions, safe or claims or legal, 
admfcrfscrative or arbitral proceedings or investigation* (whether or not dm defense thereof or fiabifities 
in respect thereof are covered by insurance) pending or threatened against or involving the Company or 
aay or its properties or assets which, iacSvidualy or in the aggregate, could hive a material advene 
effect tpon the Company. Tie Company has at no time during the last five years had, nor, to the 
knowledge of the Company, is there now threatened, a strike, picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or 
other labor trouble that had or may have a material adverse effect on the ennrfrinn of the Company. 
The Company is not aware of any pending or threatened anion activity, strike, picket, work stoppage, 
work slowdown, or other labor trouble with respect to the employes of any of the sappier* or custom-
ers fitted on Schedule 5-21 that may have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company. 
All notices required to have been ghen to any insurance company listed aa insuring against any action, 
auk or daim set forth oa Schedule 512 have been timely and duly given and no insurance company has 
neartcd, orally or in writing, that such daim is not covered by the applicable policy relating to such 
dais. Except as set forth in Schedule 5 J2, there are no product liability damns against or involving any 
the Company involving US. $25,000 or more per daim or per series of dans arising from any one 
incident and no such claims have been settled, adjudicated or otherwise disposed of since March 31, 
1990. 
5.13. rdMTKH Mf Pf tg AgWlMtt Schedule 113 sett forth aO of the following 
contracts and other agreementa to which Company k a party or by or to which it or its assets or 
properties are bound or subject (!) contracts and other agreements with any current or Conner officer, 
director, shareholder or other affiliate or with aay other current enpbyee or conaakaat or with any 
entity in which any of the foregoing is a controlling entity, (a) contracts and other agreements with sny 
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labor union oc association representing any employee; (in) contracts or other agreements for die sale of 
any of its assets other than ia the ordinary course of business or for the grant to sny entity of any op-
tica or preferential rights to purchase any of ita assets; (tv) joiat venture agreements; (v) contracts or 
other agreements under which it agrees lo indemnify sny party or Co share tax liability of sny party; (vi) 
coatrac&i and other agreements which can be cancelled without fcabflfoy, premium or penalty only on 
ninety days' or snore notice; (vii) contracts and other agreements with customers or suppliers Cor the 
sharing of fees, the rebating of charges or other similar arrangements; (vii) contracts said other agree-
ments containing covenants of Company not to compete in any liae of busiaess or with sny entity ia any 
geographical area or covenants of any other entity not to compete with Company in any ibe of business 
or ia any geographical area; (n) contracts and other agreements relating to dm af^risrt^ by Company 
of any operating business or the capital stock of any other entity, entered into since March 31, 1990 or 
under which Company has easting obligations; (x) contracts and other agreements requiring the paynaeot 
Co any entity of an override or similar commHsion or fee; (xi) contracts and other agreements relating to 
the borrowing of money; (xii) contracts and other agreements not made ia the ordinary course of bun-
aaas; or (nii) any other contracts and other agreements pursuant to which payments in esceas of U. S. 
SSIUtiO have been or may hereafter be made. Buyer has delivered to the Seller true and complete cop-
ies of ail the contracts and other agreements set forth on Schedule 5.12 or on any other Schedule. All 
of such contracts and other agreements are valid and binding upon the Company. The Company ia not 
in default in any material respect under any such agreements, nor, to the knowledge of Company, k any 
other party to any such contract or other agreement in default thereunder in any material respect nor 
does aay condition exist that with notice or lapse of time or both would rrmsriftfft a material default 
thereunder. Schedule 5.13 also lists afl contracts aad other agreements currently in negotiation or 
proposed by Company of a type which if entered into by Company would be required to be fisted on 
Schedule 513 or on any other Schedule. The Buyer has delivered to the Seders tme and correct drafts 
or summaries of al such contract* and other agreements and copies of all documents relating thereto. 
5.14. <7Tfflfltfl IP** Approvals. The execution and defray by the Buyer of this 
Apecaent, the performance by the Buyer of its *M»g^ **— hereunder, the fonrinnanfr in fail force and 
effect of al contracts and agreements set forth on Schedule 5.14 do not require the Buyer to obtain any 
consent* approval or action of, or make any fifing with or give any notice to, any entity or any govern-
mental or regulatory body, except as set forth in Schedule 5.14 (the "Buyers Required Coaaeats") and at 
referred to in Section 3JL4. 
5.15. Btll flffBft The Properties owned or leased by the Company are set faith on 
Schedule 5.15.1 hereto, with their address and legal description. A true and correct summary of all 
fames and other agreements relating to the properties is attached to Schedule 5J5.1 
116. Recehnhlca. All accounts, lease ohigatioaa aad antes due and uacoflecrrd as 
reflected on the audited combined balance sheets of the Company as of March 31,1990 ("Rcceivablec") 
and, all Receivables due and nncofectad vising subtcgomt to March XL 1990: (I) have arisen m the 
otdhwry course of business of Company, 00 represent valid oWigsrinm due to the Company enforceable 
ha accordance with their terms and, (3E) subject only to a reserve tor certain bad debts compntrd in a 
runaimr consistent with past practice have been collected or are collectible m the ortinary course of 
bnamnm of Company in the aggregate recorded amounts thereof in accordance with the*r terms. 
Schedule 5.M lats any obligor which together with all of ita affiliates owed accounts and notes due aad 
uncounted reflected on dm balance sheet as of December 31,1990 in an aggregate amount of $50,000 
or more. 
117. TMBMTf fTPpgfr- The facilities, machinery, equipment, furniture, Leasehold 
improvements, fixtures, vehicles, structures, any retated mpitafard kerns and other tangible property 
amterial to the business of dbe Compaay (the "Tangible Property) considered in the aggregate are, m al 
UHteri.il respects, m good operating condition and repair, normal wear and tear ncepted, aad the 
Company has not received aay notice since March 31, 1990 that k is ia violation of sny costing law or 
any building, zoning, health, safety or other ordinance, code or regulation which violation could have a 
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material advene effect cm the condition of the Company. During the past three yean that hm not 
been any tyiifirant interruption of the operations of Company due to inadequate mainfnnaan? or the 
Tangible Property. All material leases, conditional sale contract*, franchises or Sceases pursuant to 
which the Company may hold or use any interest owned or daimed by it (including without **"»f^q«, 
optioai) in or to Tangible Property are In fall force and effect and there ia no material default or event 
of default or event which with notice or lapse of time or both would constitute a default 
5.18. ^Hfflfr1? pr?rfTfv Schedule 5.18 sets forth at patents, trademarks, copyright 
service muJLs and trade names, ill applications for any of the foregoing, and all permit*, pants and 
Ikcaaes or other rights nning to or from Company relating to any of the foregoing" and there are no 
other patents, trademarks, copyright* service marks and trade tunes which are material to the business 
of the Company as presently conducted or as being developed The Company haa the right to use, free 
and dear of any claims or rights of others, all trade secrets, know-how, proceaaee, technology, bine prints 
and designs utilized in or incident to the conduct of their business as praently coodnctcd as being 
developed ("Company Trade Secrets*)* Eicept as ui forth on Schedule 502, the Company has ao 
notice of any adversely held patent, invention, trademark, copyright, service mark or trade name of any 
other entity or notice of any claim of any other entity relating to any of die property set forth on 
Schedule 5.18 or any Company Trade Secret, and the Company knows of no bams far any snch charge 
or daim. There is no present or, to the knowledge of Buyer, threatened use or encroachment of any 
Compaay Trade Secret which could haw a material adverse effect on the contBtson of die Company. 
5.19. ^Ifr \" iVrti Tto Company owns otfiight and has good and marketable title 
to al oi' hs astets, inrinrfing, without HoiUtioii, all of the aaaeta reflected on the balance sheet of the 
Company as of March 31,1990 or described in Schedule* 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 and 508, in each caae tree mid 
dear of any lien or other encumbrance, except m the case of asaett other than real property (or (i) 
Baas or encumbrances specifically described in the notes to the Company Financial*; (2) assets disposed 
ot or subject to purchase or sales orders, in the ordinary course of burinem once the March 31,1990; 
or (Hi) liens or other encumbrances securing taxes, assessment*, governmental charges or levies, or the 
claims of materialmen, carriers, landlords and He entities, all of which are not yet due and payable or 
am being contested in good faith, so long as inch conic* docs not iavohc any substantial danger of the 
sale, forfeiture or lose of any assets material to the condition of the Coepany. 
5J0. r%*ff*ff ** <* MMIK± 31, 1991, die Company did not have any indebtedness, 
labiity, claim or loss, liquidated or uniquiriated, secured or unsecured, accrued, absolute, contingent or 
otherwise, of a kind required by U-S. generally accepted accounting principle* to be set forth on a 
financial statement or m the note* thereto ('Company iiabffitie**) that were individually or ia the ag-
gregate material to the eondtfoa of the Company and wore not fuly and adequately reflected or 
reserved against on the balance sheet as of December 31, 1991 or described on any schedule thereto. 
Eacept a* set forth on Schedule? 520, the Company has not, eaeept in the ordinary course of businem, 
incurred any Cosnpasy liabflkies since December 311991. 
5J.L nnmrrn \M TriWIHl Schedule 5J21 lists, by dollar vdume for the last twelve 
ri kinder months ended March 31, 1991, the fifteen largest customers, suppleis and lessees of the 
Company. Except as disclosed an Schedule 52L, daring snch 12 months ao such sappier, customer or 
hsmee of die Company ha* ranrrilfri or otherwise terminated, or dhreatened in writing to cancel or 
otharase terminate, its relationship wth the Company or haa during such 12 moods decreased materi-
sly, or, to Buyer's knowledge, threatened to decrease to bail materially, its uriBralion of tenant space, 
supplies or material* to the Company or its usage or purchase of the tenant space, services or produou 
of the Company. Buyer ha* no knowledge that any such supplier, leasee, or customer intends to cancel 
or odKrwise modify its relationship with Company or to decrcuat materially or limit its tenant space, 
supplies or material* to Company or hi usage or purchase of the tenant space, aasvices or products of 
Company, and the sale cf the Shares by the Buyer wiB not, to the knowledge of the Buyer, adversely 
sflbct tie relationship of Company with such supplier, customer or leasee 
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521 F^rigr* Tfrafffif ^ V t Schedule 522 sets forth a One and complete Ik of all 
Company employee benefit plao& 
523. rnf\)lfi7i Schedule 523 sett forth a list and brief description (specifying the 
insurer, describing each pending daim thereunder of more than VS. $25£00 aad setting forth (he ag-
pepte amounts paid out under each cuch policy through the date hereof) of all policies or hinders of 
fire, lability, product liability, woctoncn's compensation, vehicular and other insurance held by or on 
behalf of the Company. Sack policies and binders are in fail force and effect aad insure apunst risks 
and liabilities to ancient and in a manner customary in the industries in which the Company operate. 
Bacept far dabas set forth cm Schedule 523, there are no omuwialing unpaid dairas wider such policy 
or binder; none of the Company hai received any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of any such 
policy or binder. There is ao inaccuracy in any application for inch policies or binders or any failure to 
pay premiums when due that would cause a lad of inaarance coverage. Except aa set forth on Schedule 
523, the Company baa aot received sny notice from any of its insurance carriers that any inaarance 
coverage listed on Scbcdutr, S23 wiB aot be available in dm future on substantially the same terms 
(aacept for the prices or premiums payable thereunder) as now in effect 
524. flflfaffi. T i f f i n " * *** B»*w«ga» Schedule 524 seta forth the oatae aad 
total compensation of each person who is now or has been during the la* two fiscal years of the 
Company any employee, oonanftam, agent or other representative of Company whose usual rate of 
compensation (including bonuses and commissions) eaceeda or decoded VS. ttDflto. The Company 
has made no commitment or agreement to increase the compensation or to modify the conditions or 
terms of employment of any soch person. None of such persons curready holding inch a position baa 
threatened to cased or otherwise terminate sueh person's relatfaodup with the Company. 
5 2 1 Operations of thaComnaav. Eacept as sat fbaits on Schedule 525, n e t March 
31,1991, the Company has not, except in the ordinary course of business: 
(i) declared or paid any dmdeads or declared or made any other 
distributions of any kind to ita shareholder*, or made any direct or indtoct redemption, retirement, 
pnrthasr or other acquisition of any shares of ita capital tfock; 
00 incurred any indebtednem for borrowed aumey; 
(m) redaced ha cash or short term iaveatmeata or die* equivalent, 
other than to meet cash needs arising in the ordinary conrae of business, ctmsJatrnt with past practices; 
(iv) waived any material rigbt under any contract or other agreeaaeot 
of the type required to be set forth in any Schedule hereto; 
(v) made any material chains in ita armnafing methods or practices 
or amde any material change in depreciation or sinottization policim or rates adopted by it; 
(vi) materially changed any of ita business policies, mdnriinfc without 
Hasttstfen, advertista* distributing, marirrriiifr pricing, purchaamg, personnel, sales, returns, budget or 
product acquisition polcies} 
(vi) made any wage or talary increase or boons (eacept for annual bonuses 
payable in the normal course to eaoploytes in an aggregate aaiouni not to eacced fifteen percent (15%)X 
or increase in any other <irect or indirect compensation, or any payment or fomatiafnt to pay any 
severance or ternmation pay to any of ita officers, directors, employee*, contultsnts, agents or other 
representatives, or any accrual for or oommitrnffii or agreement to make or pay the same, other than co 
catties other than its officer*, directors or shareholders; 
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(viii) made any loan or advance to any of its shareholders* officers directors, 
employees, connikaTUs, agents or other representatives (other than travd advances made in the ordinary 
coarse of business), or made any other loan or advance; 
(k) incurred or assumed any debt, obligation or liability (whether abaoiute or 
contingent and whether or not currently doe and payable); 
(z) acqaked any (a) iaveatory or equipment, and (b) made any acquisition of 
all or- any part of the assets, properties, capital stock or bonnets of any other entity; 
(B) Paid, directly n uhlan" ily iiif >i( njt Company liahfitirn before the same 
became dae in accordance with ki terms; 
(si) cenninated or faled lo renew, or received aay written threat (that was aot 
subsequently withdrawn) to terminate or tail to renew, any contract or other agroontot that is or was 
amterial to the condition of the Company or 
(xita) engaged in any other tnmaninn 
5.26. »HfB*ll r1T#fl I if IlB****- Bacept as let iorih on Schednk 126, no officer, 
cunsafriTit, director or affiliate of Company, ao relative or spouse (or relative of mch spouse) of any 
saeh officer, director or affiliate of Company and so entity controlled by one or more of the foregoing: 
(i) owns, directly or indirectly, any interest m (eaeept for less than 1% tfnek 
hoidiags for kvestmeat purposes in securities of pobfidy held and traded ooaapaaim), or ia an officer, 
director, employee or consultant at, any entity which is, or is engaged ia badness as a competitor, temor, 
Isaace, luppiier or customer of Company; 
(H) owns, directly or mdarectly, in whole or in part, any tangible or intangible 
property that Company uses in the conduct of business; or 
(in) has any cause of action or other data whatsoever against, or owes any 
asnoint to, Company, eaoept for claims in the ordinary coarse of business snch ss for accmod vacation 
pay, accraad benefits under employee benefit plans and medical, dental and other similar health benefit 
plans cAtsin on (he date hereof. 
5.27. ffflliii THftn ITJ fmfal Schedule SJ3 sets forth 0) the name oi each bank, 
trust company, securities or other broker or other financial hariftrtinn with which Company has an ao* 
count, credit line or safe deposit box or vaults; (5) the name of each parson anthoraed by the Company 
to draw thereon or Co have access to any account, credit ine or safe deposit be* or vauks; and (In) the 
names of afl persons authorized by probes, powers of attorney or other instruments to act on behalf of 
the Company in —art*** iKMKTn'ipa *ti bw"1*— or affisirt 
5<2& Fll P i r i a n AU documents delivered by or on behalf of (he Company in 
coawadion with this Agreement are true, complete aad authentic To the Company's knowledge, no 
lapicicatarioTi or warranty of it contained in thk Agreement contains an uatree statement of a material 
fact or omits to state a material bet required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
mads, in the contest m which made, not materially false or miilratlmg There iano fact known to the 
Ccmpmy that has aot been disclosed to the Seller in writing that could have a material adverse effect 
on the condition of the Cdmpany or the ability of the Coaapany to perform duiAgreemest 
5.29. Renorting Obligations. The Company shaE hate fled al reports required to be 
Sled under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the 1st Ooeag Date, eaeept for the Beam 1QK for 
the year ended March 3L 1991. Copies of such filings have been previously delivered to Se&ers. AD of 
such reports dace August h 1990, comply as to form with the 1934 Act to the beat knowledge of 
Company. 
530. Pfgiffffiltltfr"* ^ ^ Warranties OP lift ftoftf nTfe The representations and 
warranties contained in this Section 5 shall be true in ail material roapects oc the In Closing Date. 
6. r r ^ f f t l IP** Aareementa. The parties covenant and agree aa blows: 
6J. Conduct of Mimlillfll ?liinTT Ken the date hereof through the 2nd Closing, 
the Sellers shall cause Mamtaka and the Subsidiaries to conduct their business in the ordinary coorte 
and, without the prior written ooaaeat of the Buyer, agrees not to undertake any of die actions specified 
ia Section 3.25. 
62 r<rmNi IBB^^QM »** frTTfiWITWi Mer to the 2nd doing, Company 
shaA be entitled, through its employees* repreeeatatto and contractors, mdudmg, without liiaitafinii. 
lawyers and accrttintants to investigate die assets, properties, business and iyfV«»¥ of Mantfaka and 
Subsidiaries and to eacazaiae the books, records and financial ***Abi*r* of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries. 
Any sudi investigation and examination shall be conducted at icaaonable tines ind under reasonable 
ckouaaUnces and Marutakn and Subsidiaries and the Sellers shall cooperate fatty therein. No investiga-
tion by Company shall diminish or obviate say of the represeatationa, warranties, covenants or agre-
carats of the Sellers under this Agreement la order that the Company any have foil opportunity to 
make such physical, business, acemmring and legal review, faamnajWi or investigation * it may wish of 
Che business and affairs of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries, the Setters shnfl make avaiable aad shall cause 
Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries to nuke available to the represeatatives of the Company during sach period 
al audi information and copies of such cfcximrots concerning the affairs of Mamtaka tnd Subsidiaries 
as such representations may reasonably request, shall permit the contractors aad rcpreseatativea of 
Company access to the properties of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries and all parts thereof and shall cause its 
officers, employees, consultant!, agents, accountants aad attorneys to cooperate fully with such contrac-
tors and representative! in connection with such review and namination The Setters acknowledge (i) 
that the Company has received the material pertaining to this Agreement and listed m Schedule &2 (the 
'Mamtaka Pre-Eaecutku Due Diligence Materials") and that to the knowledge of the Seller, sach 
Mamtaka Pre-Executaon Due Difigpnce Materials does not contain any information which indicates that 
there is a breach or inaccuracy in any of the Seders' representations, warraatiea aad covenants nontajafd 
in this Agreement and (it) the Sellers have not made any representations or warranties in this Agree* 
amt or otherwise with respect to the accuracy or coaapkteaeas of any projections of the earning* of 
Mamtaka. 
Company acknowledges and agrees that k w31 conikne to receive both written and oral 
information from Mamtaka and Subsidiaries which they deem TrfrHrt-1 Company agrees to hold all 
sach coafidenrial information in trust and aiafirWvr for Selers until the earlier to occur of dm 1st 
Qosmg hereunder or December, 1991, aad not to disclose say sach confidential information to any third 
party during thk period without Mantfaka' prior written coaaeaL Furthermore! prior to dm earler of 
the 1st Gosmg hereunder, the rnrpiraricn of dm period of tu»«ti—ir»«w»
 Qr the information becoming 
pnbfidy available through ao fruit of the Company, dm Company agrees not to use such information for 
any purpose other than aa set faith herein. 
The Company's confidentiality obligation hereunder does not apply to mfinaiioo that 
(i) by written record, can be demonstrated to have been previously known by the Company and which 
Mamiafca agreed could be disdoeed pnbfidy, (ii) is rightfully received by the Company from a third 
party through no tank of the Company, (Hi) is independently developed by a third party, or (iv) in ap-
proved by Marutaka in writing far release. 
Upon termination of thk Agreement, the Company will defiver al files* document* and 
other media (and all copies and reproductions of any of the faregomg) m its posaeasJoa or under its 
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control which contain or pertain to the confidential information. Disclosure by the Company of the con-
fidential information to Company's employees or representatives shall be limited to those employees aad 
representatives who require the information for aac in connffclion with Compan/i mvesrigstina 
hereunder. 
63. Conduct of Company Business. Pram the dale hereof through the 2nd Closing, 
Compaay shall conduct its business in the ordinary course sad, without the prior written consent of the 
Sellers agrees act to undertake any of the actions specified m Section 125. 
6A fiftmrtift ^""'TlritlBi Ui IPT'ffffT1! ? « * to the 2nd O w n * the Sell* 
ers shall be entitled, through their employees, representative and contractors, indicting, without Kmka» 
tioa, lawyers aad accountants, to investigate the assets, properties, business and operations of the 
Company and to examine the books, records and financial condition of the Company. Any sacb 
investigation and nraniinarinn shall be conducted at reasonable times aad under reasonable drcumnancea 
and the Company shall cooperate fully therein. No mvesrigation by Che Sellers shall dbaaiah or obviate 
any of the representations warranties! covenants or agreements of the Company under this Agreement. 
In order that the SeUers may have fall opportunity to make such physical business, srrennririg and legal 
review, ranmmatinn or bvrsrignrtoii as they may ussh of the business and affairs of the Company, the 
Company shall make available to the representatives of the Sellers daring such period aB inch informa-
tion and copies of such documents concerning die affairs of the Company u such representatives may 
reasonably request, shall permit the contractors and representatives of the Sellers access to the proper-
ties of the Company and all parts thereof and shall came its offioers, employees, consiliums, spate, ac-
countants and attorneys to cooperate filly with such contractors and representatives m ctimrnlrn with 
such review and examination, The Company acknowledges that the Sellers have received the material 
pertaining to this Agreement fisted in Schedule 6.4 (the "Company P?e-Hsecution Due Diligence Mate-
riel") sad that, to the kaowiedge of the Sclera, such Company Pre-Eaecution Due Diligence Material 
does not coataui any information which indicates that there is a bread) or inaccuracy in any of the 
Company's representations, warranties ssd covenants contained in das Agreement 
The Sellers acknowledge and agree that the Sellers have and wiQ continue to receive 
both written and oral information from the Company which they deem confidential. The Sellers agree to 
hold ail such confidential information in trust and confides rr, for the Company until the earlier to occur 
of the 1st dosing hereunder or December, 1991, and not to disclose any inch confidential information to 
any third party during this period without the Company's prior written consent. Furthermore, prior to 
the earlier of the lrt Closing hereunder, the expiration of the period of nondisclosure or the information 
hecomiag publicly available through ao fault of the Sellers, the Seders agrees not to use such informatioa 
for any purpose other than as set forth herein. 
The Sellers' confidentiality obligation hereunder does not apply to informatioa that (i) 
by written record, can be demonstrated to have been previously known by the Sellers and which the 
Company agreed could be disclosed poblieiy, (a) is rightfully received by the SeOecs from s third party 
through no fault of the Sellers, (ui) is independently developed by a third party, or (iv) is approved by 
the Company in writing for release. 
Upon termination of this Agreement the Sclers will deltas al Sins, dnmnrnts and 
other media (and aU copies and reproductions of any of the foregoing) in the Solera's possession or 
under the Sdlers's control which contain or pertam to the mnfidratial information. Disclosure by the 
Sellers of the confidential information to the Sellers'* employees or representatives shal be linked to 
those employees aad representatives vAo require the information for use in connection with the Selers' 
investigation hereunder. 
fci. Consent to Jurisdiction and Scrvicr vi Procrus Any legal action, suit or 
proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement may be instituted in the federal courts of the 
Central District of California, and each party agrees not lo assert, by way of motion, as a defease, or 
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otherwise, in any soch action, suit or proceeding, my claim thai it is not subject personally to die 
jarisdictioa of sach court, chat the action, suk or proceeding k brought in an inconwiicat form, that 
the venae of the action, suit or proceeding is improper or that this Agreement or die sibject matter 
hereof may act be enforced in or by such court. Each party fiither irrevocably submits to the jiriadio* 
lion of $;uch court in any such activity or proceeding Any and all service of process and any other 
notice in any such action, suit or proceeding shall be effective again* any party if mven penoealy or by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any other means of mail that requires a 
signed receipt, postage prepaid, mailed to such party as herein provided. Nothing herein contained shall 
be deemed to affect die right of any parly to serve process in any manner permitted by law or to com-
mence legal proceedings or otherwise proceed against any other pasty in any other jurisdiction. If 
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist in die Federal courts of die Central District of California widi 
respect to any action, suit or proceeding referred to herein! this Section 6,5 wil be deemed to apply 
similarly to the Stat e Court of the S tnte of California in Lea Angeles County. 
6.6. Expenses. The Sellers shall pay any and ail stock transfer tax stamps associated 
wkh the execution and performance of this Agreement and shad, in addition, pay all legal, anmunring 
and transaction expenses of the Buyers incurred in oemmxtion with the preparation, execution and 
performance of this Agreement, in rinding, without limitation, fee* and expenses of agones, representa-
tives, legal counsel and accountants. Sellers acknowledge that all expenses of die arranntams and legal 
counsel shall be paid by Sellers; to this end. Sellers have previously delivered retainer checks to BDO 
Stidman for US. S4QJXQJUQ as partial payment and respectively. Othenriae, the parties to 
this Agreement shall bear thek respective expenses incurred m connection wkh this Agreement 
6J. [mj^n^ii^fy of Brokers, The Sellers jointly and severally represent and 
warrant to the Buyer that, except u described on Schedule 6/7, no broker, finder, agent or similar 
intermediary, has acted on behalf of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries or either Seller in connection with 
this Agreement and that there are no brokerage commissions, finder's fees or similar fees or 
skms payable in connection therewith based on any agreement, arrangement or understating with any 
of Marotaka, Subsidiaries or either Seller, or any action taken by any of Marutaka, Subsidiaries or either 
Seller. The Sellers agree to indemnify and save the Bayer harmless from any claim or demand foe 
commission or other compensation by any broker, finder, agpu or similar intermediary claiming to have 
been employed by or on behalf of any Sellers, Marutaka or Subsidiaries and to bear the cost of legal 
expenses incurred in defending against any such claim The Sailers agree to pay any such fee and to 
indemnify and safe the Buyers harmlras from any chum or demand for rrrnirrrissim or other compensa-
tion by any broker, finder, agent or similar intermediary claiming to haw been employed by or oa behalf 
of the Seller and to bear the cost of legal expenses incurred in firfenriing against any Each claim. The 
Buyer shall indemnify Sellers fax any chum or demand for a rnraimtricw or other compensation by any 
broker, finder, agent or similar intermediary claiming to hive been employed by or on behalf of the 
Seller and to bear the cost <tf legal expenses iacu^ 
&& ftrigfli fifties. The Sellers shall, prior to the 2nd Closing, pay or cause to be 
psad to each of Marutaka and Sumidisries all amounts owed to Marutaka or Subsidiary and reflected oa 
the Andked Financials or borrowed from or owed to Marutaka or Subsidiary since June 30,1990 by any 
of the Selkrs or any affilate of any of the Sellers. At and as of the 2nd Hosing, any debts of any of 
Marutaka or Subsidiaries owed to any of the Sellers or to any aJBHaLe of any of the Sellers shall be 
canceled. 
6.9. Ptoher Assurance. Each of the parties AaU accuse such donwimts and other 
papers and take such further actions u may be reasonable required or desirable to carry out the provi-
sions thereof. Each such party shall use its best efforts to fulfil] or obtain dm fuHDmem of the coudi-
tkas of the 1st and 2nd Closing, 
7. ^iflMlffi »»r*«fatt to me Ohmrarirm of rhr B u w tn Clem The obligation of the 
Buyer to enter into and complete the 1st Oora^ k subject, at its option, acting m accordance with the 
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provisions of this Agreement with raped to tcnmnaooc hereof, to the fhtfUnwit, on or prior to the In 
Cbsiag, of the foUowing conditio 
/.L Representations and r^Myj^r| The rcprcaraiUtions and warranties oi iht 
Sellers and Marutaka contained in this Agreement (as modified or augmented by the information 
reflected on the Schedules hereto, ill of which the Buyer acknowledges) shall be true m all miterial 
respects oo the lit Closing Date. Each of the Sella* sod Marutaka thaO have performed sad complied 
in ill material respects with all covenants sad agreements required by this Agreement to be performed 
or compiled with by such Sellers or Marutaka OA or prior to the 1st Closing. Each Seller shall hare 
delivered to the Buyer a certificate, dated the 1st Qcsmg, and signed by sudi Seller, to the foregoing 
effect, in the form attached as Edribi 7JL 
J J. QnWT"*l V* Approvals. All Sclera Reqiired Consents shall hive been 
obtained and be in full force and effect, and the Buyer shall have been furnished with appropriate 
evidence of die granting of such approvals, authorizations and corneals. 
73. Qpmv^ nf c**«**\ r* v r ^ i ^ ^^i f f f f i i H the Seiart. The Buyer shaB 
have received the opinioas of legal counsel to Marutaka,, SuMkiiafies and Setters, dated the I t Goibg, 
addressed to the Buyer in die form of Eshibit 73. 
/,4 (^ifti^g Agreement. On or prior to die lit Qoamgi the Company aad 
Mamtaka shall enter into a Consulting Agreement with TranaPac Corporatioa or its assigns and Seiko 
in the form of Exhibit 7,4 hereto. 
7 S Capital F ^ y p g P1T1 Wt* to the 2nd Closing, the parties shall prepare a 
piaa of financing to facifitate the development of diat certain unimproved real estate owned by Hal* 
lywood into an entertainmeat park. Company shall use its best efforts to arraage for t pnblc or private 
financing to raise no kss than S2DflBOjXKiJ0O for Marutaka' business plan, 
J A Sadfit Sellers hereby approve the operating budget (the "Budget") attached as 
Exhibit 7.6 to operate the Company in Los Angeles and perform and cany oat the actions coniemplated 
hereby. These costs in the Budget wiO be Company obligations and paid from the Company's assets 
including those of Mamtaka. 
7.7. Preferred f^flflffotm^ No disftiluiticm, dividend or liquidation preference shall 
apply as to the Series B Preferred Shares until alter the first day of the twelfth or right rratb month, 
wtachew the case may be* fallowing the date on which all information from architects and other thkd 
party consultants relating to the business and development of the Holywood real estate has been 
oefivcrcd to the consultants draffiheri in Section 7.4, as more fully described a the Certificate of 
Datnainaf ion and the Coranlting Agreement 
^wtifau Frxrhf n Tk fflrtnriin if iht Mfrn tft Qm *"* obfigatioo of the 
Seian to cater into and complete the 1st Closing is subject, * the SeOen' option acting in accordant 
with da pronsioa* of this Agreement with respect to termination hereof, to the fulfillment en or prior 
to 1st dosing, of the following conditions, any one or inore of which nay be watod: 
11. Representations and Cnwanii The representations and warranties of the 
Buyer contained in this Agreement (as modified or augmented by the afarmation reflected oa the 
Schedules hereto, all of which the Sellers acknowledge) shal be true m all material respects on the 1st 
Closing Date. The Bayer shal have performed and complied ia all material respects with all coveaaata 
and agreements required by this Agreement to be performed or complied with by it poor to the in 
Ckmag. Buyer shall have delivered to Seller a certificate, dated the lit Closing, and aigned by Buyer, to 
the foregoing effect 
jfa212/22632/00QAQQ^paxhaae.o 
82. friflT^li H^ Approvals. All Buyers' Required Contents shall have been 
obtained and be in full force and effect and the Company by its Secretary thai! inuie Sellers a 
Ccrtiicatc which states this fact, and evidence of the granting of such approvals, authorizations and 
rnaanfi 
8.3. Omaioo of Counsel to the Buver. The Sellers shall have received the opinion 
of legal counsel to Buyer, addressed to the Seiko, in the form of Exhibit 8J hereto. 
8.4. FfolT ftf ReWT The Company dull have begun its audit for the year ended 
March 31, 1991 and shall have Sled all reports required to be filed by it under the Securities Eachanp 
Act of 1934, on or before the Second dosing. 
9. rrcWT<Y fff Manmla. 1™J *fr frltafifln» All memoranda, notes, Hsfc, records and 
other documents or papers (and all copies thereof), mriading such kerns stored m computer licincrica, 
on ancrofiche or by any other means, made or oompird by or on behalf of either of the Sellers, or 
made available to either of the Sellers relating to any of Marataka or Subsidiaries, are and thai be such 
company's property until the 1st Closing. In the event any agnificant employee of Marataka leaves prior 
Co the 1st dosing, Sellers shall give Buyer written notice thereof, 
io. rrmrrIT«1rmrali,if;in 
ID.L Qbtotia tf tte IWfri to Inritfflnifr. 
1D.1.L The Sellers, Marataka and SribakSaries jointly and severally agree to 
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Buyer (and its directors, officers, employees, affiliates, succes-
sors and assigns) from and against al losses, ImbiBHm, damages, deficiencies, costs or expenses (bdnd-
iag interest, penalties and reasonable attorneys' lees and disbursements) (collectively the •Losses*) based 
upon, arising out of or otherwise in respect of any material inaccuracy in or any material breach of any 
representation, warranty, covenant or agreement of the Sellers, Marataka or Subsidiaries contained in 
this Agreement or in any document or other papers delivered pursuant to the Agreement. This obKga* 
tion shall require the current payment of all costs, mriuding legal fees. 
10.L2. Each Seller agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Buyer 
(and its directors, officers, employees, affilates, successors and assigns) from and against all Losses 
based upon, arising out of or otherwise in respect of say material inaccuracy in any representation or 
warranty of such Seller herein or any donunfat called tor hereunder. 
lOl flWJgf ™ rfft« I h f m ****—"*» 
102.1. l i e Buyer agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless tfae Sellers 
(and their dbecton, officers, employees, affiliates, successors sad assigns) Cram and against ail losses, 
KsMttka, damages, deficiencies, costs or expenses (mchidmg Interest, penalties and reasonable attorneys' 
fata and disbursements) (colectively, the Tosses^ based upon, arising oat of or otherwise In respect of 
any material inaccuracy in or any material breach of any representation, warranty, covenant or apeeaaeni 
cf fe Bayer rontaauvl in this Agreement or in any dnnnanut or other papers delivered parsaant to the 
AgroemeaL This dtfgution shafl require the current payment of sfi costs, iactndh| legal fa* 
103. r^Tf lad ftniwrfflmnr to Pftftail 
103.L HBtiW fff hKffi lllltiftT Prompdy alter receipt by any party hereto 
(the "Indemnitee*) of aotke of any demand, daim or drcamstances which, with the lapse of time, would 
or might give rise Co a daim or the commencement (or threatened coaaneaccment) of any action, 
proceeding or investigation (an •Asserted Liability1) that may result in s Loss* the lad—mime shall give 
notice thereof (the 1daims Notice") to any other party (or parties) obligated to provide indemnification 
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pnrsuaot to Section 11 1 m ! 1. 2 (the Indemnifying Party) . T i e Claims Notice d u l l describe the As-
serted Liability in reasonable detail* and shall indicate the amount (estimated, if necessary s s d to the 
a i t n l feasible) of the Loss tlwt has been or aiay be suffered by the Indemnitee, 
1 0 3 2 . QgpgfWnitY tQ De fend U s Indemnifying P u t y may elect to 
compromise or defend, at Us own expense and by its own counsel, any Asserted liability. If tbe 
Indemnifying Party elects to compromise or defend such Asserted Liability, it shaR wkhm 30 days (or 
sooner, If the nature of the Asserted Liability so requires) notify the ImVrnnitn* of its intent to do to , 
and the Indemnitee shall cooperate, at the expense of the Indemnifying Party, in the compromise of, or 
defense against, such Asserted l iability. If the Indemnifying Party tails to notify the Indrmrmrr of its 
election as herein provided or contests its obligation to indemnify under this Agreement, the Indemnitee 
may pay, compromise or defend such Asserted Liability. Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither the 
iadaffmitying Party nor the Indemnitee may settle or compromise any darns over the objection of the 
other, provided, however, that consent to settlement or compromise shall not be unreasonably withheld 
In any event, the Indemnitee and the Indemnifying Party may participate, at their own expense, in tbe 
defense of such Asserted liability. If the Indeamifyiog Party chooses to defend aay daim, the In-
demnitee shall make available to the Indemnifying Party any books, records or other documents within 
its control that are necessary or appropriate for such d e f e n s e 
10.33. y m y r rfiffi Urnm r * H « n r $«mBm Anything m sect** 
113 .2 to the contrary notwithstanding, in the case of any Asserted l iability by any leasee, supplier or 
customer of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries with respect to the business conducted by Marutaka or 
Subsidiary prior to the Closing in coooectioo with which tbe Indemnified Party may make a daim agahaU 
the Indemnifying Party for indemnification pursuant to Section 11, the Indemnified Party shall give a 
d a i m s Notice with respect thereto bat, unless the Indemnified Party and the Indemnifying Party 
otherwise agree, the Inriwrmifad Party shall hare the eadusive right i t its option to defend, at Seller's 
own expense, any such matter, subject to the daty of the Indemnified Party to consult with the 
Indiana fyiqg Party and their attorneys in connection with such defense and provided that no sach matte? 
shall be compromised or settled by the Indemnified Party itfdiout the prior consent of tbe Indemnifying 
Party, which consent shall not b e unreasonably withheld. The Indemnifying Party shall have the right to 
recommend in good £akh to the FarlmrnifWI Party proposals to compromise or settle claims brought by 
a supplier, lessee or customer, and the Indemnified Party agrees lo present sach proposed compromises 
or settlements to such supplier, lessee or customer. All amounts required to b e paid in connection with 
any such Asserted Liability pursuant to the determination of any canity governmental or regulatory body 
or arbitrator, all amounts required to b e paid m comtrf ion with aay n c h compromise or settlement 
consented to by dm Indemnifying Party, shaD be borne and paid by the Indemnifying Party. The parties 
agree to cooperate fully with one another in the defense, compromise or setdfineat of any Asserted 
liability. 
103.4. Reodyables. If a Loss is based open the lacdfcctftafcy of a Receivable, 
upon satisfaction of the Indemnifying Party obligation under das Section 11 with respect to such Loss, 
such Receivable wffl be assigned to the Indemnifying Party. 
TffEWMIfrfln 1* Afr»gHfflff^ 
1 1  1 TpfypaiipiL I In liiiiii i p II i!» i cat 11:1 ] * l:::ie terminated prior i:i: t:k I if: CI1: -
iag as follows: 
l l .LL M the election of the Solera, "£ any one or more CM i k i«l i -
does to the obligation of the Buyers to dose has not been fuBHlcd m of dm 1st Oonag Date; 
111.2, at die election of Che Buyers, if nay oae or more CM tali i > • 
dons to the obligation of the Sclera to d o s e has not been fulfilled u of the 1st Oos ing Date; 
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1 U 3 . at the election of the Sellers, if the Bayer has breached any 
arterial representation, warranty, covenant or agreement aiaramriri m this Agreement, which breach 
camotbeoruaoecurt^bythclitf 
11.1.4. at the election of the Bayer*, if the Sellers hive breached soy 
material representation, warranty, covenant or agreement conlamod a this Agreeanent, which breach 
cannot be or is not cured by the 1st Closing Date; 
If this Agreement so terminate*, it shall become null and raid and ham no farther force or effect, 
except as provided in Section 121 
111 Survival. If this Agreement is terminated and the transactions 
contemplated hereby axe not consummated as described above, this Agreement ahall become void and of 
no farther force and effect, except lor the provisions of Section 62 relating to the obligation of (he 
Bnytr to keep confidential and not to use certain information and data obtained by it from Marutaka 
and Subsidiaries, Section 6.4 relating to the obligation of the Seiers to keep omfirtnttnl and aot to use 
certain mfonnatioo and data obtained by diem from the Company tad except Cor Che provisions of Sec-
tion 6-5 and 6.6. No party hereto ihnll have any fiabffity to any other party in respect of a termination of 
the Agreement except pursuant to the above Sections £2,6.4,63 or 46. 
12. Ml^hlTT?1^ 
12L faf fil l?'rfilTtfowfl As used in das Agreement, the following areas 
have the following meanings unless the coatee otherwise requires: 
12.1.L 'Affifiltti' with respect to any person means any other person 
controlling, controled by or under common control with, or the parents, spouse, Inenl dmceidcnts or 
beneficiaries of such person. 
1111 "Collateral *fntWt\to* ***** aS of the agreements relased to 
or ssiociatod with the front km of this Agreement and the performance of the Contemplated Trans-
actions which arc specified on Schedule 13X3, 
tarn business, prospects, rtsuto of operation* and financial nnrftion of Mnrntatn and Snbskfiarics. 
1ZL4 TrmfrMI lid fltttT MmtmC ***** * contracts, agree-
ments, indentures, notes, bonds, loans, instrument* leases, mortgages, Kennies, co—wifmfsifn or other 
binding arrangements. 
1ZL5. TtaWfllt 9f fltar WW' «*«*« *W doaaamnt, agreement, 
iaaWMttat, certificate, notice, consent, affidavit, letter, telegram, telex, fax» staff mmf, schednk (indnding 
any Schedule to this Agreesnent), eihibic (iatttading any Eatint to this Agreement), or any other paper 
whatsoever. 
12.L6. 2at ia l aeaas any mdivirhial, person, corporation, partnership, 
firm, joint venture, msoriation, joint*stocl company, trust, wsmcorporated organisation, governmental or 
regulatory body or other entity. 
political subdivision thereof, whether federal, state, local or fioreip, or any agency or instrumentality of 
any such government or political subdivision. 
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^Ui. ,Knou4^dflc' means the knowledge of aay of the officers, direc-
t s or cantroiiiiig shareholders of the Cooptay, Marataka or Subsidiaries. 
1-2.1.9. 'liens or odjgu ^mppw^w^f means asy lea, pledge, mortgage, 
security uMcrest, daim, lease, charge, option, right of first refusal, casement, servitude, tnnrfer reaCricdoa 
under any shareholder or similar agreement, eacumbraoce or any odier restriction or fiinifarinn 
whatsoever. 
HIIC. ^Material*, whea measurable in monetary amount shall 
$25,000 or aaore; provided, howew, thai such measareaaeat iachide the aggregate amount of all items 
related to a single occarreace or arising from the same cause or even]. 
12.1 J l . 'Property means real, personal or nused ptoperty, tangible or 
iotaapble. 
122. P^ibldtY. No pubEciy releaae or amMimfmifflil ooaoeraiag this Agreement 
shaft be awde without advance approval thereof by the Sellers sod the Buyer. 
123. Najjar Any notice or other commwaanaa nsqiared or permitted acrcuodcx 
to a party shaD be in writing aad shall be delivered peraasally, telegraphed, telexed, seat by facsimile 
traaakakm or sent by certified, registered or exprm mail! postage prepaid. Any sach notice shall be 
deemed given if originating aad ending is the same country when so delivered peisooaBy, telegraphed 
tokaad or sent by facsimile transmission, or if mailed, fire (5) days after the date of deposit ta the mail, 
or, if mailed to aaother country, tea (10) days after deposit into the mail addressed to a fcrap country 
as blows: 
(i) if to the Buyer, to: 
LA. Entertaiaa&eat, lac 
U7S Cenovy Park East, #2679 
Los AagBies,CA 90067 
Atteation: Lisa Beaver, Assistant Secretary 
with a cx>py to: 
McBorici, jacfcsoa, DeMareo & Feckeapough 
Rowiaod W. Day H Eaq. 
4041 MaeArthur Boclavard 
Newport Beach, Cafifornai 92660 
(7M)75MSB5 
(714) 7574649 (frcaaub) 
0 0 iftotheScBert^to: 
Marataka, Inc. 
1*20-13 d e h o r n K*t»Ku Osaka 
Japan T550 
with a copy to: 
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Any party may by notice given ia accordance with this Sectioa to the other parties designate another 
address or person for receipt of aotices hereunder. 
12.4. P.^r^ faftfflru;^ This Agreement (indadbg die Schrriiilra tad Exhibits) and 
the collateral agreements exported in connection with the consummation of the transactions contemplated 
hereby contain the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the purchase of the Purchased 
Shares and supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, with respect thereto. 
PiMKlftT This Agreeznent may be amended, supersede, cancelled, renewed or eitcintorl, and the terms 
hereof may be waived, but only by a written instrument signed by the Buyer and the Sellers or, in the 
case of a waiver, by the party waiving corapfiance. No delay on the part of any party in mnrcisiag any 
rigjbt, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any waiver on the part of 
any party in of aay such right, power or privilege, nor any single or partial exercise of any such right, 
power or privilege, preclude any farther exercise thereof or die exercise of any other such right, power 
or privilege. The rights and remedies herein provided are cumulative and are not exclusive of aay rights 
or rcottdies that any party may odasrwne leave at law or in equity. The rights and remedies of aay 
party based upon, arising out of or otherwise m respect of any inaccuracy m or aay breach of aay 
representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in this Agreement shall is ao way be limited 
by die fact that the act, omission, occurrence or other state of facts upon itich any daim of any such 
inaccuracy or breach is based may also be the subject matter of any other representation, warranty, 
covenant or agreement contained in this Agreement (or in any other agreement between the parties) as 
to which there is no inaccuracy or breach. 
126. fr^OTTi Trf Notwithstanding the execution of this document in Japan, this 
Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the Stale ol 
Qstifcraia iachirtiag its laws governing conflicts of laws, 
12.7. ffflfffifffM T]wHBlBtt T** EagSsh version of due Agreement shall be the 
operative and controlling donmrmt between ail parties, notwithstanding any translations ; the 
documents and collateral agreements to the contrary. 
12& ffff^nff IRftrffi Pft i ^ r i w f t This Agreement shall be binding upon and 
iaare to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and legal representatives. No 
other person or entity shal be deemed to be a beneficiary, directly or indirectly of tins Agreement 
129. YsriUftM T f^Timnf Al pronouns and any variations thereof refer to the 
aasculue, feminine or neuter, smgabr or plural, aa dm contest may require. 
1210. frfflntrftir*1- ?** Agreement may be executed by die parties hereto ia 
separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and defeated shafl be an original, but all such 
counterparts shal together constitute one and the same instrument Each counterpart may consist of a 
number of copies hereof each signed by leas than al, hut together signed by all of the parties hereto 
1211. Ejfcb&t The Exhibits and Schedules hereto are a part of this Afpcemeut as if 
My sat forth and incorporated herein. Al references herein to Sections, subsections, clause* Eadnbu 
and Schedules shal be deemed references to such parts of this Agreement, unless the come* shal 
otherwise require. 
1212 flfaflm The headings in this Agreement are far reference only, and shall not 




m WITNESS WHEREOF, the partes have atoned, tfc* Agreeaeat on the dale fir* above 












CQNSULIIKfi M f i m P I 
ixl^THZS CONSULTING AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is sntsrad into this 
P day of January, 1991 at Los Angolas, California, by and between 
LA. Entertainment, a Nevada corporation "LAST" and DAVIS EHZ3R, an 
individual, hereiiiaiTU* rafarrsd to as "Consultant" or "Enjer*. 
WHEREAS, Lr.1T 1* actively engaged in the business of video 
rentals and sales to the general public through outlets located 
within markets, as veil as through free standing retain stores 
vhich are typically leased to LAST; 
WHEREAS, Consultant has a great deal of experience and i* 
extremely knowledgeable in various real estate markets, real 
property leasing, construction, financial and other business 
setters; and 
WHEREAS, Consultant currently also serves as ths sole directo, 
of LAET and as such shall be held harmless of liability by LASS in 
acting in such capacity or as a Consultant as described herein; ami 
WHEREAS, LAET and Consultant agree that it would be desirou* 
and advantageous to LAST to retain consultant on a monthly basis t.> 
advise LAST in connection with its real estate opportunities 
sales, and financing. 
HOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises 
covenants and agreements herein contained, and other good ar..i 
valuable consideration, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Commencing January 1, 1991, LAST does hereby hire 
Consultant as a Consultant to LAET and Consultant does here) , 
accept said employment. 
2. LAET shall pay Consultant the sum of $200.00 per month on 
.he first day of each month, commencing December 1, 1991. 
3. Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or LAET 
common stock as a bonus in the following percentages for 
transactions engaged by Consultant and closed by LAST in the 
following "booked" asset amounts: 5% of the first $100 M^V.-n, A\ 
*f the next $100 Million, 3% of the next $100 Millior ?% of ths 
next $100 Million, 1% of each $10r Million thereafter. LAET stock 
shall be valued on the closing day or the prior business day. 
4. Consultant shall be available to LAST on an "as needed 
basis" to review real property locations, sitss, leasee, 
construction plans, if necessary, and the financial condition aru 
business operations of LAET, including salss and projections. 
3. This Agraauant. nay be terminated by either party upon 
thirty (30) days written not let to tha other at vhich time all 
obligations hereunder shall ba brought up to data. 
6. It is specifically agreed, acknowledged and understood 
that Consultant is nc£ an employee of LAST, but an indapandsnt. 
contractor who is and will ba responsible for all taxes, of any 
nature, arising our of or occurring in connection with any 
compensation ^nn«uitant receives from LAST. 
In this regard, Consultant does hereby indemnify and hold LAJ:i 
harmless of and frca any and all tax liability of any kind, aria in i 
out of or in connection with any compensation received b; 
Consultant• 
7, LAST shall reimburse Conaultant for any and all •out-of 
pocket" costs or expenses reasonably incurred by Consultant/Snter 
in connection with M s duties as a consultant to or director ut 
IAK. 
8 Consultant agrees that during tha term of this Agreement 
and for a period of six (6) months after termination of to] . 
Agreement by either party and for any reason, Consultant shall n< 
consult with or ba employed by any other corporation! partnershij 
association or Individual engaged in the video sales and rent&i 
business. 
Further, for the term of this Agreement and for a period of 
six (€) months after termination of this Agreement by each party 
and for any reason, Consultant shall and will keep all information 
learned from or through LAIT strictly confidential and shall not 
disclose same to any third party without tha express consent of 
LAIT. 
9. LAST holds Consultant harmless and not liable, and shall 
indemnify Consultant, for any act or inaction of Consultant in 
conducting his responsibilitlss hsreundar vhich causa Injury to 
LAST, except acts or Inactions vhich are ultimately and finally 
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to constitute 
wilful misconduct by Consultant. 
19. IAET bolds Enaer harmless and not liable, and shall 
indemnify Ensar, for any act or inaction of Snaer in carrying out 
bis responsibilities as director of LAET vhich causes injury U 
1AET except act or inactions vhich are finally aa^uv^cated by a 
oourt of competent jurisdiction to constituts vllful misconduct b, 
Inzer* This provision shall apply retroactively to tha date April 
1, 1*90- the time truer first became a director or LAST. 
11. No party hereto may assign its rights or obligation* 
hsreunder (whether voluntarily, involuntarily , or by operation or 
lav) vithout the prior written consent of the other party hereto. 
12. This Agreeiaent is made pursuant to, will be conatru .d 
under, and will be conclusively deemed for all purposes to ha a 
been executed and delivered under the laws of the State ->r 
California, 
13. All notices or other communications to be given hereunder 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed received when personal./ 
delivered by commercial courier or otherwise, or three (3) busin#?.s 
days after deposit in the United States mail, registered *,r 
certiriec, return receipt requested, addressed as follows: 
If to LAET: 
L.A. Entertainment 
1875 Century Park East, #2679 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
Attention: James S. Kolitz 
If to Consultant: 
DAVID ENZER 
1875 Century Park East, #2679 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
14. This Agreement may be executed in two or mot n 
counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original and all ci 
which together will constitute one instrument. 
15. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be illegal , 
Invalid or unenforceable under present or future laws effecti^ 
during the term hereof, the legality, validity, and enforceabilit , 
of the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall not be affect. , 
thereby, and in lieu of such illegal, invalid, or unenforceable 
provision, there shall be added automatically as a part of th, . 
Agreement a provision as similar in terms to such illegal, invalid 
or unenforceable provision as say be legal, valid, and enforceable. 
16. This Agreement may be amended or modified only by i 
written instrument executed by LAET and Consultant. 
17. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreeme:. 
shall be valid and enforceable unless such waiver is in writing ai\ i 
signed by the party to be charged, and, unless otherwise stats 
therein, not such waiver shall constitute a waiver of any oth.-.i 
provision thereof (whether or not similar) or continuing a waiver 
18. The prevailing party m any legal proceeding based upc. 
this Agreement shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys• fees an 
court costs. 
19. The parties acknowledge and agree that aii 
representations and warranties by the respective parties containeo 
herein or made in writing pursuant to this Agreement shall be 
deemed material and shall survive the execution and delivery or 
this Agreement. 
IH WITNESS WHEREOF, tha parties hereto have executed tn.s 
Agreeaent as of the data first set forth abo^e. 





.BUG 05 '31 13=11 UtSit- s.*ris*.*- — BHIB3T lO.i-J 
1400,000.00 
a n » la. i-i 
to* fhtfJV M C C H V I O , the undersigned prnalaos to pay to Lesax Group, 
Zae. at M B O I cilabaaaa load, Calabaeaa, California tl300 or such 
ether placo designated thereby, by January 14, IMS, the principal 
jam of Poor Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000*00), with interest 
tram July if, litl at the rata of twelve par oast (12%) par 
en taa unpaid balance until paid or until dafault, principal and 
interest payabla in lavful sonay of taa United Itatas of haarloa. 
If not aoeaar paid, taa antira raeaining JTVlahtodnoee plus iataraat 
•nail be due and payable January IS, !St3. Unleee otherwiae 
provided, thia Vota nay ba prepaid la full or in part at any tin* 
without paaalty or preaiau. Taa iataraat on ths unpaid balance 1* 
payable nonthly vita taa first payment being dua en august 14, Iff) 
and continuing until all principal baa baan repaid. 
Za taa avast of dafault in paynaat of any principal or iataraat 
hereof as taa aaaa biursna dua and auch dafault is not curad within 
tan (10) days aftar vrittan notioa to aakar, than in either sueh 
•vast taa hollar nay without furthar notioo, daclara taa rasmindar 
of taa principal sua, tngothoT with all iataraat accrued tharaon at 
ansa dua and payabla. failure to aaarolso this option by 
baaafleiary or holdar haraof ahall not constitute a waiver of taa 
right to exercise taa aana at any othar time. Taa unpaid principal 
of this iota and any part aaraof, aoeruad iataraat an all othar 
sums dua undar this Xota shall baar iataraat at ths aexiaua legal 
rate aftar dafault until paid. Za no event say iataraat acerua at 
nora than taa maxiaua rata allovad by lav. 
All partiaa to thia Vota, including aakar and any suratias, 
andoraara, or guarantors haraby waive protost, praaantaant, notioa 
•f diahonor, and notioa of aoealaration of aetarity and agree to 
aoatinua to rasa In bound for taa payaaat of principal, iataraat and 
all othar suaa dua undar thia Vota, notwithstanding any change o* 
shantaa by way of release, surrender, exchange, modification or 
substitution of any aeeurlty for th*s Vota or by way of any 
•"tension or extensions of tins for ths payaaat of prinoipal and 
iataraat; and all such partiaa waive all and ovary hind of notlca 
of suoh change or ehangee and agree that taa saaa any .*»c aada 
wltLout notlea or oonaant of any of than. 
upon dafault taa holdar of this Vota any aaaloy attorneys to 
enforce taa holdar 'a righta and taaadlas, and taa aakar, principal, 
**raty, guarantor and andoraara of thia Vota haraby agree to pay to 
the attorneys* fees plus all other expenses incurred by the holde* 
in exeroiaing any of taa bolder1 a rights and reaadJae upon default. 
tta rlffeU tad raaadiaa of tha holdar aa provldad in thia Data 
all aa evjnlatlva and any ba porauad alafly or acteoaaaivaly in 
taa aala dlaaratiaa of tha holdar. tha failura to aaarolaa aay 
aaaa riant or raaady ahall aet ba a valvar, or ralaaaad of anon 
riaata ar raaadiaa or tha right to aaareiaa any of thorn at anothar 
tiaa. 
Ala fata ia to ba oovamad and conatzuad in aeeordanoa vith tha 
lava af tna atata of California. 
Shia nata ia a Maatar ffota and principal advaneaa will ba aado by 
uaan araup, Inc. from tiaa to tiaa op to tha aaalaaa of 
MOO#000.00. Tha intaraat duo will ba calculated upon only tha 
aataal advaaoaa aada. 
ar 'iMTaorif m o o r , aahar haa oauaad thia inatzunaat' to ba 
aaaaotad ia ita corporata aaaa by ita board of Diraetora duly 
fivan, an tha day and yaar firat abova vrittaa. tha undaraifnad 
aaa raad and agraoa to tha tana of thia Vota and aoknovladgaa 
raaaipt af a copy of aaaa. 
t 
EXHIBIT 24.1 
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
L.A. Entertainment, Inc. 
Los Angeles, California 
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectus 
constituting a part of the Registration Statement nunbered 33-41205 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission en June 14, 1991, u 
our report dated July 10! 1991, relating to the financial statements 
and schedules of L.A. Entertainment, Inc., appearing in the Company*a 
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 1991• 
?>vo 
BDO SEIDKAN 
Los Angeles, California 
July 10, 1991 
Tab 7 
McKITTRICK, JACKSON, DeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH 
A LAW CORPORATION 
4041 MacArthur Boulevard, Fifth Floor 
Post Office Box 2710 











ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND: 
EXWWT LSI 
cox iHGSsmrr. «p, ess, R ^ 
Enclosed please find the Schedule 13D for L.A. 
Entertainment, Inc.. Please review and sign. Should you have 
any questions, please contact Jehu Hand at (714) 851-7428. 
Thank you. 
] FOR YOUR FILES 
X] FOR YOUR INFORMATION 
] AS REQUESTED 
] PLEASE COMMENT 
X] PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN 
J PLEASE TELEPHONE ME 
( ] PLEASE ADVISE MB HOW TO REPLY 




SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington, D.C. 
SCHEDULE 13D 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Amendment No. )* 
L.A. Entertainment, Inc. 
(Name of Issuer) 
Common Stock 
(Title of Class of Securities) 
501699 10 2 
(CUSIP Number) 
Jehu Hand 
McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh 
4041 MacArthur Blvd., Newport Beach, California 92660 
f714) 752-8585 
(Name, Address, and Telephone Number of Person 
Authorized to Receive Notice and Communications) 
January 22, 1991 
(Date of Event Which Requires Piling of this Statement) 
If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Sched-
ule 13G to report the acquisition which is the subject of this 
Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of Rule 13d-
1(b)(3) or (4), check the following box [ ]. 
Check the following box if a fee is being paid with the State-
ment [X]. ( A fee is not required only if the reporting person: 
(1) has a previous statement of file reporting beneficial owner-
ship of more than five percent of the class of securities de-
scribed in Item 1; and (2) has filed no amendment subsequent 
thereto reporting beneficial ownership of five percent of less 
of such class.) (See Rule 13d-7). 
Note; Six copies of this statement, including all exhibits, 
should be filed with the Commission. See Rule 13d-l(a) for 
other parties to whom copies are to be sent. 
*The nasMiinder of this cover page shall be filled out for a re-
porting person's initial filing on this form with respect to the 
subject class of securities, and for any subsequent amendment 
containing information which would later disclosures provided in 
a prior cover page. 
The information required on the remainder of this cover page 
shall not be deemed to be "filed- for the purpose of Section 18 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 C A c f ) or therwise 





be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the 
Notes). 
I. Names of Reporting Persons S.S. or I.R.S. 
Identification Nos. of above persons: 
Daniel Lezak 




III. SEC Use Only 
IV. Source of Funds (See Instructions) PF 
V. Check if Disclosure of Legal Proceedings is Required 
Pursuant to Items 2(d) or 2(e) 
VI. Citizenship or Place of Organization U.S. 
Number of VII. Sole Voting Power 1,450,000 
Shares Bene-
ficially VIII. Shared Voting Power 800,000 
Owned by 
Each Report- IX. Sole Dispositive Power 1,450,000 
ing Person 
With X* Shared Dispositive Power 800,000 
XI. Aggregate Amount Beneficially Owned by Each Reporting 
Person 2,250,000 
XII. Check if the Aggregate Amount in Row (11) Excludes 
Certain Shares (See Instructions) 
XIII. Percent of Class Represented by Amount in Row 
(11) J J 




ITEM 1. Security and Issuer. 
Common Stock, $.001 par value, of L.A. Entertainment, 
Inc., 401 E. Pine Street, Seattle, Washington 98122. 
ITEM 2. Identity and Background. 
This statement is filed on behalf of: 
(a) Name: Daniel Lezak 
(b) Business Address: 4743 Barcelona Court 
Calabasa, California 91302 
(c) Present principal occupation or employment and 
the name, principal address of any corporation or 
other organization in which such employment is 
conducted: 
President, The Lezak Group, 4743 Barcelona Court, 
Calabasa, California 91302 
(d) During the last five years, Daniel Lezak has not 
been convicted in a criminal proceeding (exclud-
ing traffic violations or similar misdemeanors). 
(e) During the last five years, Daniel Lezak has not 
been a party to a civil proceeding of a judicial 
or administrative proceeding, the result of which 
was to make him subject to a judgment, decree or 
final order enjoining future violations of or 
prohibiting or mandatory activities subject to, 
federal or state securities laws or funding any 
violations with respect to such laws. 
ITEM 3. Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration. 
Daniel Lezak acquired 1,250,000 shares (which are 
owned through CD Management, Inc.) as director 
compensation on January 22, 1991. The Lezak Group, 
Inc., a public corporation controlled by Mr. Lezak, 
holds 800,000 shares and Mr. Lezak holds 200,000 
shares in his own name. These shares were acquired 
several years ago from personal funds. 
ITEM 4. Purpose of Transaction. 
See Item 3. The shares are held for investment. 
ITEM 5, Interest In Securities of the Issuer 
Of the 40,050,000 shares of L.A. Entertainment, Inc. 
Common Stock outstanding, Daniel Lezak has sole 
dispositive and voting power over 1,450,000 shares or 




dispositive and voting power over 2,250,000 shares, or 
5.6%. 
ITEM 6. Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relation-
ships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer. 
None. 
ITEM 7. Materials to be Filed as Exhibits. 
None. 
SIGNATURE 
After reasonable inquiry and to the best of my know-
ledge and belief, I certify that the information set forth in 
this statement is true, complete and correct. 
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1 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading s Y s > l 
L . A . E n t e r t a i n m e n t , I n c . LAET 
9. IRS w Social Security 
Person (Voluntary) 
4. Statement for 
Month/Year 
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9. If Amendment, 
Date of Original 
: (Month/Year) 
6. Relationship of Reporting Person to 
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4. Securities AcQuired (A) 
or Disposed of (D) 
(Instr. 9, 4 and 5) 
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1 2. Date of Brent Re-
murine Statement 
(Month/Day/Year) 
A u g u s t 1 , 1990 
3. IRS or Soda! Se-
curity Number of 
(Voluntary) 
4. Issuer Name and Tkfcn or Trading Symbol 1 
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6. Nature of Indirect 1 
Beneficial Ownership 1 
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Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. 
V r I R U S C 1001 and 15 U S C. 7*.ff(a). 
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June 26, 1991 
Date 
»te: Tile three copies of this Form, on^ of which must be manually signed. If space provided Is Insufficient, 
Ser Instruction 6 for procedure. 
Page 2 
SEC 1473 (.1/91) 
IAET00653 
FORM 3 1J.S, SECURITIES A N D E X C H A N G E COMMISSION Washington. D.C. 20549 
INITIAL STATEMENT OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES 
Filed pursuant to Section 16(e) of the Securities Exchange Ad of 1934, Sedlon 17(a) of the Public Utility 
Holding Company A d of 1935 or Sedlon 30(0 of the Investment Company Ad of 1940 
OMB APPROVAL 
32354104 
Exp***: February 1. 1994 
lEeHmated ataieoe burden 
. . . 0.8 
( 1. Name and Address of Reporting Person 
1 Bolsaby C a p i t a l P a r t n e r s , L . P . 
(Last) (First) (Middle) 
J 1875 Century Park East 
(Stred) 
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Reporting Person 
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BAKKE v. BUCK 
Cite as, WisluApp^ 587 P.2d 575 
would be so unusual and so unlikely that 
we would require it to be spelled out with 
particularity. Typically the loan proceeds 
are to be used for purposes which will 
promote the mutual enterprise and which 
will either enhance the vendor's equity in 
case he must foreclose his lien, or will 
provide funds from which he will be paid. 
A subordination agreement should be 
construed, unless it expressly provides 
otherwise, as permitting the loan pro-
ceeds to be used only for such purposes. 
(Footnotes omitted.) Accord, Pollock v. 17-
anoy 253 Cal.App.2d 183, 61 Cal.Rptr. 235, 
238 (1967); Ruth v. Lytton Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 266 Cal.App.2d 831, 72 Cal.Rptr. 521, 
527-28 (1968). 
[10,11] In view of the facts found, and 
the wording of the subordination agree-
ment and the financing documents connect-
ed therewith, we cannot say that the trial 
court erred in construing the agreements as 
it did. Nor was the alternative judgment 
otherwise erroneous. An action for specific 
performance of a contract, such as the case 
before us, is an equitable proceeding and 
when the equitable jurisdiction of the court 
is invoked by the parties, whatever relief 
the facts warrant will be granted. Kreger 
v. Hall 70 Wash.2d 1002, 1007-08, 425 P.2d 
638 (1967). 
[12] The developers' assignments of er-
ror addressed to the trial court's award of 
attorneys' fees to the owners is unaccompa-
nied by citation of authority and does not 
appear on its face to be meritorious. It is 
therefore denied. State v. Young, 89 
Wash.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978); 
Krause v. Mcintosh, 17 Wash.App. 297, 303, 
562 P.2d 662 (1977). The owners' request 
for attorneys' fees on appeal does not com-
ply with RAP 18.1(c), therefore, it, too, is 
denied. 
Wash. 575 
Marian P. BAKKE and John L Bakke, 
Co-Executors of the Estate of Herbert 
Noel Bakke, Deceased, Appellants, 
Parker J. BUCK and Helen D. Buck, his 
wife, Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants, 
William E. Sander and Marie Sander, his 
wife, Lawrence Warehouse Company, a 
California Corporation, Crow Roofing 
and Sheet Metal, Inc., a Washington 
Corporation, Franklin Savings and Loan 
Association, a Washington Corporation, 
and Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 
a Washington Corporation, Defendants. 
No. 3401-IL 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 2. 
Nov. 7, 1978. 
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 4,1978. 
Affirmed. 
McINTURFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., con-
cur. 
in ( O ^ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
2 I—Kl II fill I ,l^( \f 
Estate of decedent creditor brought ac-
tion against debtors on promissory note, 
and debtors counterclaimed under usury 
statute seeking penalties and attorney fees. 
The Superior Court, King County, No. 
798941, W. R. Cole, J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of debtors for usury 
penalties and attorney fees, and estate ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Pearson, C. 
J., held that: (1) original note which was 
not usurious and extension agreement 
which was usurious were subject to usury 
penalty in that two agreements could not 
be separated; (2) notwithstanding debtors' 
failure to file claim against creditor's es-
tate, debtors could use usury penalties they 
were awarded as setoff against claim of 
estate on promissory note; (3) where all 
claims of estate on promissory note were 
extinguished by setoff of usury penalties in 
favor of debtors, excess judgment in favor 
of debtors was claim against general assets 
of estate, and thus was barred by failure to 
file claim against estate; (4) where defense 
576 Wash. 587 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
by debtors established usurious nature of 
debt and extinguished such debt by means 
of setoff, debtors were entitled to award of 
attorney fees pursuant to statute governing 
such awards where debtor establishes usuri-
ous nature of debt, and (5) where it was not 
clear whether attorney fees awarded to 
debtors were for defense of action on prom-
issory note only, remand was necessary to 
determine amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded to debtors for trial court defense. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Contracts <*=> 245(3) 
Void contract cannot legally modify or 
extinguish earlier valid contract, thus origi-
nal agreement remains in effect and can be 
sued upon. 
2. Usury <*=»137 
Original promissory note which was not 
usurious and extension agreement which 
was usurious were subject to usury penalty 
in that two agreements could not be sepa-
rated. RCWA 19.52.030. 
3. Executors and Administrators to 231, 
434(5) 
Failure to file creditor's claim does not 
preclude using claim as setoff against de-
mand made by estate of decedent; how-
ever, effect of such claim is limited to ex-
tinguishment of the debt setoff. 
4. Executors and Administrators «=>434(5) 
Notwithstanding failure to file claim 
against estate of decedent, debtors could 
setoff usury penalties they were awarded 
against claim of estate on promissory note 
and extension agreement found to be usuri-
ous. 
5. Executors and Administrators <*=»231 
Where all claims of estate of decedent 
creditor on promissory note and extension 
agreement transaction were extinguished 
by setoff in favor of debtors for usury 
penalties awarded to them, excess judg-
ment in favor of debtors was claim against 
genera] assets of estate as opposed to setoff 
against specific obligation, and thus such 
excess judgment was barred by failure to 
file timely claim against estate of decedent. 
RCWA 11.40.010, 11.40.080. 
6. Executors and Administrators <s=>231 
Relief in excess of amount of setoff in 
favor of debtors needed to extinguish claim 
by estate of decedent creditor remained 
subject to requirement of statutes govern-
ing claims against decedent's estates which 
are in essence statutes of limitations which 
mandate that if claim is not timely filed, 
claim against estate is barred. RCWA 11.-
40.010, 11.40.080. 
7. Usury <*=>125 
Notwithstanding that because of fail-
ure to file creditor's claim, no affirmative 
relief in favor of debtors on promissory 
note was obtained against estate of dece-
dent creditor, defense in action by estate on 
promissory note resulted in establishment 
of usurious nature of debt sued on by estate 
and extinguishment of such debt by means 
of setoff in favor of debtors, and thus debt-
ors were entitled to recover cost and rea-
sonable attorney fees occurred in defense of 
action on promissory note under statute 
providing that debtor who establishes that 
obligation is usurious shall be entitled to 
costs and reasonable attorney fees. RCWA 
19.52.030. 
8. Appeal and Error «=» 1106(4) 
Where it was not clear in action by 
estate of decedent creditor against debtors 
whether attorney fees awarded to debtors 
who established that promissory note and 
extension agreement were usurious were 
awarded only for defense of action on 
promissory note or whether court also 
awarded attorney fees for other legal work 
associated with claims of estate against 
debtors, remand was required for determi-
nation of amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded to debtors for trial court defense 
of claim on promissory note and extension 
agreement. 
9. Bills and Notes «=>126 
Where promissory note and extension 
agreement sued upon by estate of decedent 
creditor were found to be usurious, and 
usury penalties awarded to debtors extin-
BAKKE v. BUCK 
Cite is, Wash.App., 587 ?2d 575 
Wash. 577 
guished obligation on note and agreement 
by setoff, there was no recovery of underly-
ing obligation, and thus estate was not enti-
tled to payment of reasonable attorney fees 
from debtors, notwithstanding that note 
provided for payment of such fees incurred 
in connection with collection of note. 
J. Vernon Williams, Seattle, for appel-
lants. 
Joseph C. Finley, Seattle, for respondents 
and cross-appellants. 
PEARSON, Chief Judge. 
The estate of Herbert Bakke appeals 
from a summary judgment in favor of the 
Bucks for $26,122.89 in usury penalties and 
$5,000 attorney's fees against the estate. 
We reverse in part and affirm in part. 
During the period from 1966 to 1973, 
Herbert Bakke loaned the Bucks $109,000. 
The Bucks signed promissory notes of $35,-
000, $25,000, $24,000, and $25,000. Shortly 
before Bakke's death in 1975, the Bucks still 
owed approximately $92,000 on the notes 
and had defaulted on their payments. The 
personal representatives of Bakke's estate 
elected to accelerate the debt and sued to 
collect. They obtained summary judgments 
on the second, third, and fourth notes. The 
validity of those judgments has not been 
challenged. Rather, the issues in this ap-
peal concern the status of the first note 
(Note I). 
Note I was originally due in 1968, but had 
been extended three times, the last exten-
sion continuing until 1982. The estate 
claimed that the Bucks owed $26,128.85, 
plus 12 percent interest and $2,000 attor-
ney's fees on this note. The Bucks counter-
claimed under the usury statute for more 
than $52,000 in penalties and $5,000 attor-
ney's fees. See RCW 19.52.030. The Bucks 
contended that Note I was usurious because 
they had paid $2,500 for the first extension 
agreement on the note, in addition to the 
note's interest rate of 12 percent, which is 
the legal maximum. See RCW 19.52.020. 
The estate conceded that the extension 
agreement was usurious, but argued that 
587 P2&-13 
Note I was not tainted by usury because 
the extension agreement was separate from 
the note. The trial court found that Note I 
and the extension agreement were a single 
contract, tainted by usury, and granted the 
Bucks' counterclaim for setoff of the usury 
penalties against the entire amount due on 
Note I, plus an excess judgment of $26,-
122.89, and attorney's fees. 
On appeal, Bakke's estate raises two is-
sues: (1) whether a suit brought on a prom-
issory note which was not itself usurious, 
but was later extended by a usurious agree-
ment, is subject to a counterclaim for usury 
on the entire note; and (2) whether an 
excess judgment may be had on a counter-
claim for usury against an estate when a 
creditor's claim was not timely filed. 
Repeating the argument made at trial, 
the estate contends that the usurious for-
bearance agreement is a separate agree-
ment. Thus, it argues that suit can be had 
on the original debt, thereby avoiding appli-
cation of the usury statute. In support of 
its argument, the estate relies on the gener-
al rule that a contract originally valid is not 
affected by a subsequent usurious transac-
tion. This rule has been noted, in dictum, 
in Weitzman v. Bergstrom, 75 Wash.2d 693, 
453 P.2d 860 (1969), Baske v. Russell, 67 
Wash.2d 268, 407 P.2d 434 (1965), and Hafer 
v. Spaeth, 22 Wash.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 
(1945). We are convinced, however, that 
the general rule is not appropriate in Wash-
ington. 
[1] A close reading of the cases from 
jurisdictions which support the general rule 
shows that they depend for their rationale 
on statutes that make usurious contracts 
void. See, e. g, In re Spiro's Will, 280 
App.Div. 982, 116 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1952). A 
void contract cannot legally modify or ex-
tinguish an earlier valid contract, thus the 
original agreement remains in effect and 
can be sued upon. See, e. g, 45 Am.Jur.2d 
Interest & Usury § 247 (1969) ("An obliga-
tion that is not usurious in its inception will 
not be vitiated by a subsequent usurious 
transaction with respect thereto, for the 
subsequent transaction, being entirely void, 
cannot extinguish or affect the original val-
578 Wash. 587 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
id contract." Footnotes omitted.); 91 C.J.S. 
Usury § 62a (1956) ("When the statute 
renders the usurious renewal void, action 
may be brought on the original valid obliga-
tion, which is not extinguished 
Footnote omitted.) 
[2] RCW 19.52.030 does not void usuri-
ous contracts, or even make them voidable. 
Instead, it subjects the creditor to certain 
penalties should he attempt to enforce the 
contract. As a result, courts examining 
modern statutes such as Washington's no 
longer separate a usurious extension agree-
ment from the original note. The entire 
transaction is considered one contract and is 
usurious. Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc., 
230 Cal.App.2d 746, 41 Cal.Rptr. 338, 16 
A.L.R.3d 464 (1964). In applying this rule 
to the case before us, we agree with the 
trial court's conclusion that Note I, original 
debt and extension, is subject to the usury 
penalty and that the two agreements can-
not be separated. We do not undermine 
the reasoning or results in Weitzman, 
Baske, and Hafer, supra. Although the 
court in those cases stated that the original 
debt could be separated from a subsequent 
usurious transaction on the same debt, this 
statement was dictum and not part of the 
holding, since in each case the suit was on 
the second agreement. 
Having determined that the trial court 
was correct in deciding that the entire Note 
I transaction was infected by usury, the 
question becomes: What, if any, affirma-
tive relief are respondents entitled to re-
ceive because of this usury? Respondents, 
as noted above, failed to file any timely 
creditor's claim in the estate. As we will 
discuss below, this failure to file a creditor's 
claim requires reversal of part, but not all, 
of the judgment appealed from. 
[3] We will first discuss that portion of 
tne judgment which can be used as setoff 
against respondents' obligation to appel-
1. In particular, we are discussing RCW 11.40.-
010 and RCW 11.40.080. These statutes read: 
"Every personal representative shall, imme-
diately after his appointment, cause to be pub-
lished in a legal newspaper published in the 
county in which the estate is being admsnis-
lants in the Note I transaction. It has, of 
course, long been the rule that the failure 
to file a creditor's claim does not preclude 
using the claim as a setoff against a de-
mand made by the estate. The effect of 
such a claim is limited, however, to extin-
guishment of the debt setoff. Peoples Na-
tional Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 
69 Wash.2d 682, 420 P.2d 208 (1966). This 
rule is the same as that which has long been 
applied in cases of the defensive use of 
claims otherwise barred by the statute of 
limitations. E. g, Ennis v. Ring, 56 
Wash.2d 465, 341 P.2d 885 (1959). 
[4] Applying this rule to the present 
case means that, without regard to the fail-
ure to file a creditor's claim, the respon-
dents may set off the usury penalties they 
were awarded against the claims of the 
estate on the Note I transaction. To the 
degree that the respondents' judgment con-
stitutes a setoff against a debt owed to the 
estate, it must thus be affirmed. 
[5] We now move to consideration of 
the $26,122.89 excess judgment awarded to 
respondents and the attorney's fees award-
ed to respondents as a result of usury by 
the appellant in the Note I transaction. 
Unlike the sums discussed above, this por-
tion of the judgment does not constitute a 
setoff against a claim made by the estate 
on the usurious transaction. Note I was 
the only transaction between the parties 
which was infected by usury. All claims of 
the estate in that transaction have already 
been extinguished by the setoff of usury 
penalties against them. The excess judg-
ment is thus a claim against the general 
assets of the estate as opposed to a setoff 
against a specific obligation. 
[6] Since the excess judgment is a claim 
against the general assets of the estate, and 
since no timely creditor's claim was filed by 
respondents, the excess judgment runs 
afoul of the provisions of Ch. 11.40 RCW.1 
An exception to the working of the credi-
tered, a notice that he has been appointed and 
has qualified as such personal representauve, 
and therewith a notice to the creditors of the 
deceased, requiring all persons having claims 
against the deceased to serve the same on the 
personal representative or his attorney of rec-
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tor's claim statute has been carved out in 
those cases involving setoff, but this excep-
tion is limited to extinguishment of the 
estate's claim. Peoples National Bank v. 
National Bank of Commerce, supra. Relief 
in excess of the amount of setoff needed to 
extinguish the estate's claim remains sub-
ject to the requirements of the creditor's 
claim statutes. Those statutes are, in es-
sence, statutes of limitation. In re Estate 
of Wilson, 8 Wash.App. 519, 507 P.2d 902 
(1973). They mandate that if a creditor's 
claim is not timely filed, the claim against 
the estate is barred. RCW 11.40.010; Ruth 
v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 
(1969). Because no timely creditor's claim 
was filed in this case, the excess judgment 
entered against the estate for $26,122.89 
must be reversed since it is barred by Ch. 
11.40 RCW. 
[7,8] The matter of the attorney fees 
awarded to respondents requires some fur-
ord, and file an executed copy thereof with the 
clerk of the court, within four months after the 
date of the first publication of such notice or 
within four months after the date of the filing 
of the copy of said notice to creditors with the 
clerk of the court, whichever is the later Such 
notice shall be published once in each week for 
three successive weeks and a copy of said no-
tice shall be filed with the clerk of the court. If 
a claim be not filed within the time aforesaid, it 
shall be barred, except under those provisions 
included in RCW 11 40 011 Proof by affidavit 
of the publication of such notice shall be filed 
with the court by the personal representative. 
In cases where all the property is awarded to 
the widow, husband, or children as m this title 
provided, the notice to creditors herein provid-
ed for may be omitted" (RCW 1140.010) 
"No holder of any claim against a decedent 
shall maintain an action thereon, unless the 
claim shall have been first presented as herein 
provided." (RCW 11 40 080) 
2. RCW 19 52.030 provides: 
"(1) If a greater rate of interest than is al-
lowed by statute shall be contracted for or 
received or reserved, the contract shall be usu-
rious, but shall not, therefore, be void. If m 
any action on such contract proof be made that 
greater rate of interest has been directly or 
indirectly contracted for or taken or reserved, 
the creditor shall only be entitled to the princi-
pal, less the amount of interest accruing there-
on at the rate contracted for; and if interest 
shall have been paid, the creditor shall only be 
entitled to the principal less twice the amount 
of the interest paid, and less the amount of all 
accrued and unpaid interest; and the debtor 
ther discussion since it, unlike the excess 
judgment, is not barred by RCW 11.40.010 
and 11.40.080. Under RCW 19.52.030,2 the 
debtor is entitled to recover penalties and, 
additionally, is entitled to recover costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in de-
fense of a claim on a usurious transaction. 
In the present case, the respondents were 
put to the cost of defending against a claim 
on a usurious note. Though, because of the 
failure to file a creditor's claim, no affirma-
tive relief against the creditor was obtain-
ed, this defense did result in establishment 
of the usurious nature of the debt sued on 
and the extinguishment of that debt by 
means of a setoff. In such a circumstance, 
respondents should recover their costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in de-
fense of the Note I obligation only. It is 
not clear from the record whether the at-
torney's fees awarded by the trial court 
were only for the defense of the Note I 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attor-
neys' fees plus the amount by which the 
amount he has paid under the contract exceeds 
the amount to which the creditor is entitled: 
Provided, That the debtor may not commence 
an action on the contract to apply the provi-
sions of this section if a loan or forbearance is 
made to a corporation engaged in a trade or 
business for the purposes of carrying on said 
trade or business unless there is also, in con-
nection with such loan or forbearance, the cre-
ation of liability on the part of a natural person 
or his property for an amount in excess of the 
principal plus interest allowed pursuant to 
RCW 19 52 020. The reduction in principal 
shall be applied to diminish pro rata each fu-
ture installment of principal payable under the 
terms of the contract. 
"(2) The acts and dealings of an agent in 
loaning money shall bind the principal, and in 
all cases where there is usunous interest con-
tracted for by the transaction of any agent the 
principal shall be held thereby to the same 
extent as though he had acted in person. And 
where the same person acts as agent of the 
borrower and lender, he shall be deemed the 
agent of the lender for the purposes of this act. 
If the agent of both the borrower and lender, or 
of the lender only, transacts a usurious loan for 
a commission or fee, such agent shall be liable 
to his pnncipal for the amount of the commis-
sion or fee received or reserved by the agent, 
and liable to the lender for the loss suffered by 
the lender as a result of the application of this 
act." (Footnotes omitted.) 
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case, or whether the trial court also award-
ed reasonable attorney's fees for other legal 
work associated with the related claims of 
appellants against respondents. It is, 
therefore, necessary to remand this matter 
solely for a determination of the amount of 
attorney's fees to be awarded to respon-
dents for the trial court defense of the Note 
I claim. Respondents shall not be entitled 
to reasonable attorney's fees on appeal. 
[9] Appellants also point out that the 
note they sued upon provided for payment 
of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with collection of it. They thus 
ask this court to fix reasonable attorney's 
fees for the Note I collection. Appellants 
are not entitled to this relief. While the 
estate has achieved a partial reversal of the 
affirmative relief entered against it, it has 
not achieved any recovery on the underly-
ing obligation. Quite the contrary, only the 
working of the bar of the creditor's claim 
statute saved appellants from having af-
firmative relief entered against them. In 
these circumstances, attorney's fees will not 
be awarded to appellants. Appellants shall, 
however, be entitled to their costs on ap-
peal, including statutory attorney's fees. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part 
and remanded for further proceedings, in 
accordance with this opinion, in the matter 
of attorney's fees for respondents. 
PETRIE and SOULE, JJ., concur. 
-/w\ 
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STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Claudia M. BQJNNER, Appellant 
No/2572-II. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 2. 
Nov. 8, 1978. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, Thurston County, Frank E. Baker, 
J., of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver and unlaw-
ful delivery of a controlled substance, and 
he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dore, 
J., held that: (1) trial court did not err in 
failing to grant defendant's motion for 
change of venue based on claimed prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity; (2) defendant was 
not denied fair trial because she was hand-
cuffed in hallway outside courtroom; (3) 
trial court did not err in admitting testimo-
ny of police officer outlining history of drug 
problem and drug enforcement in county; 
(4) trial court properly found that infor-
mant was not an "absent witness," and (5) 
trial court did not err in sentencing defend-
ant to consecutive rather than concurrent 
terms of imprisonment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=>259 
Due process requires a change of venue 
when probability of prejudice is shown; ac-
tual prejudice is not required. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amends. 5,14. 
2. Criminal Law *=>1150 
Trial court's decision upon a motion for 
change of venue will only be disturbed on a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. 
3. Criminal Law <*=* 1166(4) 
Defendant could not complaint she was 
prejudiced by pretrial publicity where she 
could have removed two jurors who admit-
ting reading articles about trial with use of 
peremptory challenges, but did not. 
4. Criminal Law <*=»121 
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in denying defendant's motion for change 
of venue, based on claimed prejudicial pre-
trial publicity. 
5. Attorney and Client <*=>32 
Deputy prosecutor did not deliberately 
violate Canons of Legal Ethics by comment-
ing on case to reporter where he apparently 
thought he was speaking to reporter off the 
record. CPR DR7-107(BX6). 
Tab 2 
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Cite as 808 ?2d 1089 (Utah 1991) 
Utah 1089 
(1) A person is guilty of bigamy when, 
Rowing he has a husband or wife or 
Rowing the other person has a husband 
o r wife, he purports to marry another 
person or cohabits with another person. 
(2) Bigamy is a felony of the third 
degree. 
Utah's constitution also prohibits plural 
marriages. Article III provides: 
The following ordinance shall be irrev-
ocable without the consent of the United 
States and the people of this State: 
First:—Perfect toleration of religious 
sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant 
of this State shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or 
her mode of religious worship; but poly-
gamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 
Petitioner Vaughn Fischer was already 
married to the other petitioner, Sharane 
Fischer, when he purported to marry Katri-
na Stubbs. The three of them live in the 
same household together with children of 
Mr. Fischer born by both Sharane and Ka-
trina. If the adoption were granted, the 
six Thornton children would be permanent-
ly added to this family, where on a daily 
basis they would be exposed to the teach-
ings and practice of plural marriage. It 
would be difficult to conceive of a factor 
which works more against the "interests of 
the child[ren]" than ongoing criminal con-
duct by the adoptive parents in the home 
where the children are being nurtured and 
raised. I cannot conceive of any factor or 
combination of factors favorable to an 
adoption or qualities which proposed adopt-
ing parents could offer which would out-
weigh the detrimental effect of felonious 
conduct engaged in by them. Teaching 
and demonstrating to children on a daily 
basis that the statute proscribing bigamy 
may be ignored and flaunted may well 
breed in the children a disrespect for ob-
servance of other laws. Since the children 
will probably spend their lives in this nation 
where the voluntary observance of all laws 
by its citizens is necessary, these six chil-
dren may never be taught that valuable 
lesson of citizenship. The state in its role 
as parens patriae of the children owes a 
high duty to them in approving whoever 
shall adopt them. In re Simaner's Peti-
tion, 15 I11.2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555 (1959); 
Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 50 
So.2d 364 (1951). That duty would not be 
met in granting the privilege to adopt to 
the petitioners, who live on a daily basis 
outside the law. 
The majority now orders an evidentiary 
hearing which will be fruitless because the 
trial judge has already made an assumption 
which is as favorable to the petitioners as 
can be had. The fact remains, and they 
have not attempted to deny it, that polyga-
my is taught and practiced in the home in 
which these children will be raised. That 
fact will not change on remand. We have 
previously held in Wilson v. Family Ser-
vices Division, 572 P.2d 682 (Utah 1977), 
that we will not interfere with a trial 
court's judgment in an adoption unless the 
action was clearly arbitrary or capricious 
or was not based on the evidence. No such 
showing has been made. I would affirm 
the dismissal. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in 




Arvin L. BELLON, Maurine G. Bellon, B. 
Curtis Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup, and 
A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
v. 
Marvel L. MALNAR, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880226. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1991. 
Assignees of defaulting vendee sued 
vendor for restitution of payments made 
1090 Utah 808 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
prior to default and forfeiture. The Eighth 
District Court, Duchesne County, Boyd 
Bunnell, J., awarded judgment against ven-
dor and in favor of assignees in amount of 
$71,173.33. Vendor appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held 
that: (1) vendor was entitled to proceeds 
from condemnation award as payment of 
damages to lands he repossessed inasmuch 
as vendee's equitable title was forfeited 
before award was made; (2) assignees 
were not entitled to appreciated value of 
property on which vendee defaulted; (3) 
vendor was not entitled to loss of bargain 
damages when property had appreciated in 
value; (4) court would not enforce forfei-
ture clause inasmuch as enforcement 
would allow unconscionable recovery to 
vendor; and (5) assignees were not entitled 
to prejudgment interest on award. 
Remanded for purpose of amending 
judgment. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser e»44 
Trial court's finding that vendor in-
tended to convey title to 6-acre tract of 
land to vendee at time of closing of real 
estate contract for 76 acres, rather than 
upon payment of $3,000 per acre over and 
above specified annual payments in con-
tract, so as to require exclusion of 6 acres 
from legal description in quitclaim deed by 
vendee to vendor was not clearly errone-
ous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
2. Quieting Title e»10(l) 
Trial court was not authorized to quiet 
title to 6-acre tract against vendor in suit 
by vendee's assignees for restitution of 
payments made by vendee prior to his de-
fault on contract for sale of 76 acres, 
where assignees of vendee never owned 
6-acre tract and made no claim to it, and 
appropriate parties to quiet title action 
were not before court. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>341(5) 
In restitution suit by vendee for pay-
ments made prior to default on real estate 
contract, fair market value of property was 
to be calculated at time of default, rather 
than at later date based upon assertion 
that vendee refused to acquiesce in forfei-
ture after default and interfered with mar-
ketable title, where vendor failed to plead 
interference with marketable title, and tes-
tified that between time of retaking proper, 
ty and obtaining stipulation from vendee 
acquiescing in forfeiture, vendor made no 
attempt to resell property or to list it with 
real estate broker. 
4. Vendor and Purchaser e»341(3) 
Trial court's factual finding that value 
of real property subject to real estate con-
tract on which vendee defaulted was $180 -
000 was not clearly erroneous in view of 
uncontroverted expert testimony that land 
was worth $180,000 at time of default. 
5. Eminent Domain e=>153 
Vendor was entitled to proceeds from 
condemnation award in payment of dam-
ages to lands she repossessed, where eq-
uitable title was forfeited by vendee before 
award of compensation was made, and 
vendee and his assignees stipulated that 
any proceeds would go to vendor. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-34-9. 
6. Vendor and Purchaser <*=»341(5) 
Vendee, who defaulted on property 
which had appreciated in value, was not 
entitled to appreciated value in suit for 
restitution of payments made by vendee 
before default. 
7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»341(5) 
Appreciated value of property, on 
which vendee defaulted, negated vendor's 
entitlement to damages for loss of advanta-
geous bargain in vendee's restitution suit 
for payments made before default 
8. Vendor and Purchaser «=»341(5) 
Attorney fees expended by vendor in 
eminent domain action were not damages 
which vendor could deduct in restitution 
suit by vendee for payments made prior to 
vendee's default, where vendor would have 
been required to pay fees in absence of 
contract with vendee. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>341(5) 
Vendee's failure to return 6-acre tract, 
title to which was conveyed at time of 
closing, upon vendee's default constituted 
item of vendor's damages in vendee's suit 
BELLON v. MALNAR 
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for restitution of payments made prior to 
default. 
Utah 1091 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice. 
Defendant Marvel L. Malnar appeals 
10. Vendor and Purchaser e=>341(5) 
Vendor's damages for vendee's nonre-
turn of 6-acre tract, title of which was 
conveyed at closing, represented 6 times 
contract price of $2,000 per acre, not value 
of tract when buyer defaulted on land con-
tract in vendee's restitution action for pay-
ments made prior to default, where vendor 
intended to convey title to 6-acre tract at 
closing. 
11. Interest <s=>13 
Trial court properly allowed vendor in-
terest on contract after default as alterna-
tive to fair rental value in vendee's restitu-
tion suit for payments made prior to de-
fault on land contract. 
12. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»79 
Court would not enforce forfeiture 
clause in real estate contract, where recov-
ery by vendor of over $26,000 in excess of 
actual damages indicated that liquidated 
damages bore no reasonable relationship to 
actual damages upon vendee's default. 
13. Contracts <®=»318 
Supreme Court will enforce forfeiture 
clause in contract unless it finds that for-
feiture would be so grossly excessive in 
relation to any realistic view of loss that 
might have been contemplated by parties 
that it would so shock the conscience that 
court of equity would refuse such forfei-
ture. 
14. Interest <^>39(2.30) 
Vendees were not entitled to prejudg-
ment interest on award in vendee's favor in 
suit for restitution of payments made on 
land contract prior to vendee's default and 
forfeiture, given highly equitable nature of 
action. 
Gordon A. Madsen, Robert C. Cummings, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Robert F. Orton, Virginia Curtis Lee, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees. 
from a judgment entered against her and 
in favor of plaintiffs, who are assignees of 
the buyer in a real estate contract with 
Malnar as seller. The action was brought 
by plaintiffs for restitution of the pay-
ments made by the buyer before he de-
faulted and Malnar forfeited his interest in 
the contract and the property. 
I. FACTS 
On December 19, 1980, plaintiffs' assign-
or, Ferron Elder, entered into a real estate 
contract to purchase from Malnar 76 acres 
of land in Duchesne County, together with 
twelve shares of water stock, for $152,000. 
The contract provided for a down payment 
of $23,500 and for annual installment pay-
ments of $26,345.18 beginning in December 
1981. A warranty deed to the full acreage 
was executed by Malnar and placed in es-
crow, with delivery conditioned upon com-
plete performance of the contract. A quit-
claim deed from Elder to Malnar was also 
placed in escrow with instructions that it be 
delivered to Malnar in the event of Elder's 
default. At the closing of the sale, Malnar 
executed a separate warranty deed to Eld-
er for 6 acres of the land. This deed was 
then recorded, which Malnar now asserts 
was due to a mistake. 
Elder made the down payment and the 
1981 and 1982 annual installments. Early 
in 1984, when the 1983 payment was past 
due, Malnar served a notice of default upon 
Elder. The default was not cured, and 
subsequently, the quitclaim deed to the 76 
acres from Elder to Malnar was delivered 
by the escrow agent to Malnar, who record-
ed it on February 3, 1984. Malnar asserts 
that at that time approximately one year's 
interest had accrued in the amount of $J.0,-
247.80 and there were delinquent real es-
tate taxes and water assessments. 
Shortly after default, Elder assigned his 
title and interest in the property and con-
tract to Eastern Utah Resources, which 
recorded a notice of interest against the 
entire 76 acres. One year after default, 
Elder conveyed the 6 acres to one Darrell 
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Didericksen, who thereafter encumbered it 
with a mortgage. 
On October 18, 1982, while the contract 
was in force, Deseret Transmission com-
menced an action to condemn a right-of-
way across the 76-acre tract to erect high-
tension power lines. On March 7, 1985, 
Malnar, Elder, and his assignees entered 
into a stipulation in that action that (1) 
Malnar was the owner of all the property, 
(2) Malnar was to receive the entire con-
demnation proceeds, and (3) Elder and his 
assignees retained the right to assert a 
claim to equitable restitution of the monies 
forfeited under the installment contract of 
December 19, 1980. 
The condemnation action was tried and 
resulted in a taking by Deseret Trans-
mission of a right-of-way over 5.21 acres. 
Malnar received compensation for the tak-
ing totalling $41,075. She expended $6,000 
for attorney fees in connection with the 
condemnation action, leaving her with $35,-
075. 
Eastern Utah Resources commenced the 
instant action for "equitable restitution" of 
the down payment and 1981 and 1982 annu-
al installments which were forfeited to Mal-
nar when Elder defaulted. Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). 
Before trial, Eastern assigned its interests 
to plaintiffs. A bench trial was held at 
which the value of the 76 acres when the 
default occurred was in dispute. Plaintiffs 
presented testimony that the 76 acres, in-
cluding the 5.21 acres over which the right-
of-way was taken, were worth $180,000. 
Malnar testified that the tract was worth 
$101,000 at most, not including the 5.21-
acre tract, but that in any event it was not 
worth more than $700 to $800 per acre. In 
addition, Malnar's appraiser testified that 
the value of the 70 acres (excluding the 6 
acres conveyed at closing) in 1985, at the 
time the stipulation between the parties 
was made, was $1,400 per acre, totalling 
$98,000. Testimony was also adduced that 
by the date of trial the value of the tract 
had decreased substantially due to econom-
ic decline in the Duchesne region. 
The trial court found that at the time 
Malner recorded the quitclaim deed to the 
76 acres, their value was $180,000. The 
court further found that the 6 acres con-
veyed at closing were mistakenly included 
in the description in the quitclaim deed and 
that Malnar had no interest in that tract. 
The court valued the 6-acre tract at $30,-
000 and subtracted that amount from the 
$180,000 total value to arrive at $150,000 
value for the 70 acres. To that amount it 
added the $35,075 net recovery in the con-
demnation action, for a total of $185,075. 
The trial court computed Malnar's dam-
ages by first subtracting the total amount 
paid in principal, $50,080.65, from $152,000, 
the contract price, leaving $101,919.35. 
The court then added $10,247.80 for the 
accrued interest due when the default oc-
curred and $1,774.52 for delinquent real 
property taxes and water assessments, for 
a balance owing to Malnar under the con-
tract of $113,941.67. 
The court subtracted that balance, $113,-
941.67, from the total amount she had re-
ceived, $185,075, and awarded judgment 
against her and in favor of plaintiffs in the 
amount of $71,133.33. Malnar appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We first enunciate the standard of re-
view for legal conclusions and factual find-
ings, as both are assigned as error in the 
instant case. "A trial court's legal conclu-
sions are accorded no particular deference; 
we review them for correctness/' Gray-
son Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989). However, a trial court's 
findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, will not be set aside 
on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id.; 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). This "clearly errone-
ous" standard is applicable in equity cases 
such as the instant case. Bountiful v. 
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 n. 1 
(Utah 1987). 
III. THE DISPUTED 6-ACRE TRACT 
[1] Malnar assigns as error the court's 
finding that she intended to convey the 
6-acre tract of land to Elder at the time of 
closing. This finding is reviewed under the 
BELLON v 
Cite as 808 P~Zd 
clearly erroneous standard. On the day of 
closing, December 19, 1980, four separate 
documents were signed which bear upon 
the disposition of the 6 acres: (1) an ear-
nest money receipt and agreement dated 
December 18, 1980, and signed either that 
day or the next day, providing for a sale 
price of $152,000 for 76 acres; (2) the real 
estate contract dated and signed on Decem-
ber 19; (3) a warranty deed conveying 6 of 
the 76 acres to Elder; (4) a quitclaim deed 
executed by Elder conveying 76 acres back 
to Malnar in the event of Elder's default. 
The real estate contract provides in para-
graph 17: 
Upon payment of the sum of $3,000 in 
addition to the annual payments here-
in required, Seller agrees to release 1 
acre lots. The releases will be upon ap-
proval of Bow Valley Resources of Den-
ver, Colorado. Buyer shall receive credit 
for all sums paid for lot releases on the 
last payments to become due. It is not 
intended that said $3,000 per acre should 
be extra consideration, but merely early 
payment for early release of the lot. 
(Emphasis added.) Malnar argues that this 
language in the contract indicates her in-
tention to release the 6-acre parcel only 
upon payment of $3,000 per acre "over and 
above the specified annual payments." 
Plaintiffs counter with language in the 
"earnest money receipt and offer to pur-
chase," which provides: 
Seller to carry balance over a five year 
period with 5 annual payments, first an-
nual payment 1 year from closing. In-
terest on the balance will be 10%. Seller 
to release 6 acres at closing and will 
release 10 acre parcels upon payment of 
$3,000.00 per acre all releases must be 
approved by Bow Valley of Denver Colo-
rado. Released parcel will start on the 
northern boundary line and move in a 
southerly direction. 
Plaintiffs argue that the 6-acre parcel was 
deeded "free and clear" and that the prop-
erty earmarked for early release upon pay-
ment of $3,000 per acre was one or more 
10-acre parcels separate from the 6 acres. 
The trial court heard testimony on the 
intent of the parties when they signed the 
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conflicting documents. Elder testified that 
he was being given title to 6 acres for 
paying $2,000 per acre for the 76 acres 
instead of $1,500 per acre, the original ask-
ing price. He paid for the 6 acres "at the 
time of the agreement" and testified that 
he "was given clear, free title." Malnar 
testified that she thought the deed to the 6 
acres was going into escrow and that she 
would not have signed the deed had she 
known the 6 acres were to be immediately 
conveyed to Elder. Another witness 
present at the closing testified that there 
was a lot of confusion at that time. The 
prices on the real estate contract had to be 
amended and the warranty deed signed. 
Due to the confusion, the parties did not 
make the change "on the Quit-Claim Deed 
nor the Warranty Deed to match what ac-
tually happened that day." 
The trial court found: 
It was the intent of Elder and Malnar 
that [Elder] receive title to the said six 
(6) acre parcel at closing on December 
19, 1980, as is more particularly evi-
denced by the following: the delivery to 
Elder on December 19, 1980, of the war-
ranty deed covering the six (6) acres and 
the recording by Elder of said deed; the 
earnest money agreement dated Decem-
ber 18, 1980, which provided that the said 
six (6) acres tract be conveyed to Elder; 
and the treatment by Elder after closing 
on December 19, 1980, of the said six (6) 
acres as his sole property by making 
conveyances and assignments with re-
spect thereto. 
In view of the intended immediate convey-
ance of the 6 acres, the court further found 
that the failure to exclude the 6 acres from 
the legal description in the quitclaim deed 
to Malnar was a mistake by Elder, Malnar, 
and the drafter of the instruments. 
While Malnar disputes the finding that 
she intended to immediately convey the 6 
acres, the intent of the parties is a question 
of fact. We will not disturb the trial 
court's finding unless it is clearly errone-
ous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sacramento 
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern 
Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 
1987). The findings are not "against the 
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great weight of evidence," Bountiful v. 
Riley, 784 P.2d at 1175, and are not clearly 
erroneous. 
[2] We do, however, agree with Malnar 
that it was error for the court to quiet title 
to the 6 acres against her. Neither plain-
tiffs nor Malnar sought to quiet title. In-
deed, plaintiffs never owned the tract and 
made no claim to it. Malnar could not have 
sought to quiet title in this action since 
neither Elder, Didericksen, nor his mort-
gagee was a party. It was therefore error 
for the court to decree that Malnar had no 
right, title, or interest in the tract. That 
part of the judgment is reversed. 
IV. VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY 
[3] Malnar contends that the trial court 
erred in finding the value of the property 
to be $180,000 in February 1984 when the 
default occurred. She first asserts that the 
date of valuation should be March 7, 1985, 
because Elder's assignees refused to ac-
quiesce in the forfeiture and claimed own-
ership in the property until that date. The 
trial court properly concluded as a matter 
of law that fair market value should be 
determined as of the time of breach, which 
was February 3, 1984. This is the general 
rule in real estate contracts. See Webster 
v. DiTrapano, 114 A.D.2d 698, 494 N.Y. 
S.2d 550 (1985); Quigley v. Jones, 174 Ga. 
App. 787, 332 S.E.2d 7, affd, 255 Ga. 33, 
334 S.E.2d 664 (1985); Lake Shore Inves-
tors v. Rite Aid Corp., 55 Md.App. 171, 461 
A.2d 725, affd, 298 Md. 611, 471 A.2d 735 
(1983); American Mechanical Corp. v. 
Union Mach. Co. of Lynn, Inc., 21 Mass. 
App. 97, 485 N.E.2d 680 (1985). As the 
trial judge stated from the bench, Malnar's 
assertion appears to be a claim for interfer-
ence with marketable title, which would 
have to be affirmatively pleaded. No such 
pleading was made, and the trial judge 
correctly confined his valuation to the time 
of default wh$n Malnar exercised her op-
tion to retake the property. In addition, 
Malnar testified that between the time of 
retaking the property and obtaining a stip-
ulation removing the cloud on the title, she 
made no attempt to resell the property or 
to list it with a real estate broker. Thus 
Malnar was not prevented from selling the 
property by any action of Elder or his 
assignees. 
[4] Malnar further asserts that the trial 
court's factual finding valuing the property 
at $180,000 is error. An expert witness for 
plaintiffs testified that the land was worth 
$180,000. Malnar's appraiser affixed a 
lesser value to the land in 1985 but was 
unable to give an opinion on the value of 
the property in 1984. The valuation find-
ing is therefore not clearly erroneous. 
V. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS 
[5] Malnar next contends that the trial 
court erred in charging her with the $35,-
075 net condemnation award as if it had 
been paid by the buyer as principal on the 
contract. When the condemnation action 
was filed, Elder held equitable title to the 
land. That title was forfeited before the 
award of compensation was made. After 
forfeiture and before the award, Elder and 
his assignees stipulated that any proceeds 
should go to Malnar. Malnar argues that 
where forfeiture occurs before a condem-
nation award is made, the vendor takes the 
land back burdened by the condemnation 
and is therefore entitled to the proceeds 
since they are in payment of damages to 
the lands he repossesses. We agree. 
The trial judge found that "on October 
18, 1982, an order of immediate occupancy 
was entered and a required cash deposit 
paid into the court by [condemnor] for the 
landowner." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 
provides in pertinent part: 
The rights of the just compensation for 
the land so taken or damaged shall vest 
in the parties entitled thereto . . . and 
the said judgment shall include . . . inter-
est . . . from the date of taking actual 
possession thereof by the plaintiff or or-
der of occupancy, whichever is earn-
e r — 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court's authority in protecting the 
vested interests of both parties was ex-
plained in Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial 
District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 475-76, 
511 P.2d 739, 742 (1973). The condemnor 
BELLON v. iMALNAR 
Cite as 808 ?2d 1089 (Utah 1991) 
deposits money in court. Upon proper ap- the property 
plication, the court orders it paid to the 
parties in interest. However, the vendee is 
normally entitled to the condemnation 
award as he is the equitable owner. The 
court can therefore make orders with re-
spect to encumbrances and liens to safe-
guard the security interest of the vendor. 
Justice, equity, and practicality are con-
sidered by the court in protecting the inter-
ests of the parties. 
In the instant case, however, before any 
disbursements were ordered from the 
funds deposited by the condemnor, default 
occurred. Both equitable and legal title 
vested in Malnar, with the concomitant 
right to receive the eminent domain pro-
ceeds. It was a practical solution for the 
parties to stipulate that the proceeds would 
go to Malnar. The proceeds stood in lieu 
of the right-of-way taken. The defaulting 
vendee is thus credited with returning the 
condemned land undamaged. It follows 
that the proceeds are not also payments 
toward the contract price; to so regard 
them would be double-counting. 
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VI. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
[6] Malnar contends that the trial court 
erred in departing from the method of cal-
culating damages formulated in Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 478-79, 243 P.2d 
446, 451-52 (1952) (this method is set out 
below). We have previously held that the 
factors used in the Perkins test need not 
be rigidly adhered to: 
Although these are reasonable factors 
to determine damages, they were not 
meant to be a rigid formula to be applied 
mechanically in every case. In determin-
ing equitable damages, the trial court 
may use whatever factors it finds most 
appropriate to achieve justice. 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 
(Utah 1977). However, in reviewing the 
method used by the trial judge to arrive at 
a judgment for plaintiffs of $71,183.14, we 
are left with "a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made.,, State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The trial judge in effect returned to the 
defaulting vendee the appreciated value of 
This was error. We stated 
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 
1256 (Utah 1987), that a vendee "is entitled 
to the appreciated value of the property 
over the contract purchase price as long as 
his or her interest has not been forfeited." 
(Emphasis added.) However, when the 
vendee defaults on property which has ap-
preciated in value, he is not entitled to the 
appreciated value. The appreciated value, 
however, negates the vendor's entitlement 
to damages for "loss of advantageous bar-
gain," the first factor in the Perkins test. 
See Harris v. Shell Dev. Corp. Nev., Inc., 
95 Nev. 348, 594 P.2d 731, 734 (1979) 
("Where . . . the market value of the land 
at the time of breach is higher than the 
purchase price, the vendor is entitled to 
only nominal damages plus proved conse-
quential damages."); Zareas v. Smith, 404 
A.2d 599, 600-01 (N.H.1979) (if the value at 
the time of breach is greater than the con-
tract price, the vendor can recover only 
nominal damages and not loss of bargain); 
accord Spurgeon v. Drumheller, 174 Cal. 
App.3d 659, 665, 220 Cal.Rptr. 195, 198 
(Ct.App.1985); Island-Gentry Joint Ven-
ture v. State, 57 Haw. 259, 554 P.2d 761, 
767 (1976); see also Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983) (defaulting purchas-
er testified that when he vacated the prop-
erty, it "was worth a substantial amount 
more than the contract price"; therefore, 
vendor was not entitled to loss of bargain 
damages). 
We recalculate the damages using the 
Perkins formula, which takes into consid-
eration the following elements: 
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the 
property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in 
market value of the property not al-
lowed in items Nos. 1 and 2; 
(4) For the fair rental value during the 
period of occupancy. 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 478-79, 
243 P.2d at 451-52; Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 
2d 263, 267, 300 P.2d 623, 627 (1956). 
[7] Loss of advantageous bargain: 
The contract price of the property was 
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$152,000. The value of the property, in-
cluding the disputed 6 acres, at forfeiture 
was $180,000. Malnar is not entitled to 
loss of bargain damages when the property 
has appreciated in value. Soffe v. Ridd, 
659 P.2d at 1085. 
[8] Damage to or depreciation of the 
property: The $6,000 attorney fees ex-
pended in the eminent domain action are 
not damages. Malnar would have been 
required to pay them in the absence of the 
contract with Elder. Taxes and water as-
sessments are owed in the amount of 
$1,774.52. 
[9,10] The nonreturn of the 6-acre 
tract constitutes an item of damage. Inas-
much as the trial court found that Malnar 
intended to convey that tract at closing and 
we have affirmed that finding, her dam-
ages are $12,000, representing six times 
the contract price of $2,000 per acre, not 
the value of the tract when the buyer de-
faulted ($30,000). 
Decline in value due to change in mar-
ket value not allowed above: None. 
[11] Fair rental value during the pe-
riod of occupancy: The trial court proper-
ly allowed Malnar interest on the contract 
as an alternative to fair rental value. See 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976). The total amount paid was $26,-
109.71. Another $10,247.80 accrued to the 
date of forfeiture. 
In summary, damages suffered by Mal-
nar are as follows: 
$ 1,774 52 delinquent taxes and water assessments 
12,000.00 value of 6 acres conveyed 
26,109 71 interest paid on contract 
10,247.80 accrued interest owing 
$50,132.03 
Malnar received the down payment on 
the contract of $28,500 and the 1981 and 
1982 annual installments of $26,345.18 
each, making a total of $76,190.36. 
[12,13] Th* contract provides that thir-
ty days after the default of the buyer and 
his failure to remedy the same within five 
days after written notice, the seller may 
"be released from all obligations in law and 
in equity to convey said property, and all 
payments which have been made thereto-
fore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be 
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated dam-
ages for the nonperformance of the con-
t r a c t — " If this forfeiture clause is en-
forced, Malnar keeps all payments made, 
including the excess of payment made over 
damages, which is $26,058.33, approximate-
ly 17 percent of the contract price of $152,-
000. We will enforce a forfeiture clause 
unless we find that the forfeiture would be 
so "grossly excessive in relation to any 
realistic view of loss that might have been 
contemplated by the parties that it would 
so shock the conscience that a court of 
equity would refuse such forfeiture." Jen-
sen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97, 485 P.2d 
673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 
14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacob-
son v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 
(1954). Examination of our case law indi-
cates that this court will enforce the forfei-
ture clause when the amount of forfeiture 
does not greatly exceed, or is less than, the 
amount of damages. In Cole v. Parker, 5 
Utah 2d at 264, 300 P.2d at 624, the vendee 
had paid $11,600 toward a contract price of 
$40,000. However, the difference between 
the purchase price and the value of the 
property at the time of default exceeded 
$11,600, and this closed further inquiry. A 
similar result was reached in Weyher v. 
Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 
(1965). In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 
272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958), the vendee paid 
$6,680 principal and interest toward a $22,-
000 contract price. The excess of payment 
over damages, which included rental value, 
was $2,119.94. The amount "was but 9V2 
percent of the purchase price, an amount 
that would exceed but little the real estate 
commission that would have to be paid on 
resale of the property " 8 Utah 2d at 
274, 332 P.2d at 990. In Strand v. Mayne, 
14 Utah 2d at 35G-57, 384 P.2d at 396, the 
vendees forfeited almost half the contract 
price because payments credited and rental 
value exceeded what they had paid. Sim-
ilarly, the vendee in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 
P.2d at 609-10, forfeited $12,150 paid to 
the vendor, but this amount was only 
$1,156 more than the interest payable on 
the contract during the period of occupan-
cy 
STATE 
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In these cases, and in the cases cited in 
Perkins v. Spencer, 
[i]t will be observed that in all cases 
where the stipulation for liquidated dam-
ages was enforced it bore some reason-
able relation to the actual damages 
which could reasonably be anticipated at 
the time the contract was made and was 
not a forfeiture which would allow an 
unconscionable and exhorbitant recovery. 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 474, 243 
P.2d at 449. In the instant case, a recovery 
of over $26,000 in excess of actual damages 
shows that liquidated damages bear no rea-
sonable relationship to actual damages. A 
forfeiture here would allow an unconscion-
able recovery. We therefore award plain-
tiffs the $26,058.33 that was paid in excess 
of Malnar's damages. See Perkins, 121 
Utah at 478-79, 243 P.2d at 451-52. 
[14] Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the tri-
al court's denial of prejudgment interest to 
them. A survey of our cases where pre-
judgment interest was awarded indicates 
that interest has been allowed in actions 
for damage to personal property, Fell v. 
Union Pac. Ry., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 
(1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Su-
perior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); in 
actions brought on a written contract, Jack 
B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 
107 (Utah 1976); Bjork v. April Indus., 
Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977); Jorgensen 
v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 
1983); Anderson v. State Farm Cos. & 
Fire Co., 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978); and in 
an action to recover a liquidated over-
payment of water subscription charges, 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 
664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). In many of 
these cases, we stressed that the loss had 
been fixed as of a definite time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy in accordance with 
well-established rules of damages. No 
case has been cited to us where we have 
allowed prejudgment interest in an action 
such as the instant case, which is for eq-
uitable relief. "A suit of this nature in-
volving the invocation of a forfeiture 
and/or the enforcement of a purchase con-
tract invokes consideration of the principles 
of equity which address themselves to the 
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conscience and discretion of the trial 
court." Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d at 610. 
In view of the highly equitable nature of 
this action where the court has discretion in 
determining the amount, if any, to be re-
turned to the defaulting vendee, we find no 
error in the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Remanded for the purpose of amending 
the judgment in accordance with this opin-
ion. Costs awarded to defendant. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bruce ELM, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890272. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Cullen Y. 
Christensen, J., of aggravated sexual abuse 
of child. Defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held 
that trial court could impose sentence of 
middle severity. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law e=*986.2(l) 
Sentencing court could conclude that 
mitigating circumstances of defendant's 
amenability to supervision, good employ-
ment, and support by parents did not out-
weigh aggravating circumstances of per-
sistence of conduct over considerable num-
ber of years, number of victims in addition 
to defendant's daughters, and vulnerability 
of victims, and, thus, court could impose 
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OPINIONBY: HOFFMAN 
OPINION: [*398] [***782] Introduction and 
Procedural History 
This action was commenced by plaintiff and respon-
dent Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), in the Los 
Angeles [**2] Superior Court on December 3, 1979, 
and alleged, against defendant and appellant McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation (Douglas), causes of action for 
negligence, strict liability, deceit, breach of warranty 
and breach of contract. 
In 1980, Douglas filed a complaint in the federal court 
seeking a declaration that the exculpatory provision of 
Article 12 of its Purchase Agreement with Continental 
was valid and barred Continental's action. Continental 
counterclaimed, raising essentially the same claims pre-
sented in its state court lawsuit. 
In early 1985, the federal court granted a partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of Douglas, confirming the va-
lidity of the contract's exculpatory clause. The court's 
ruling, which was made final, foreclosed Continental's 
state claims based on negligence, strict liability and 
implied warranty under principles of res judicata, nl 
However, the federal court stated it made no ruling with 
regard to Continental's claims for breach of the con-
tract's Warranty nor its Service Life Policy, since they 
were not properly presented in the motion. 
nl On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's rulings on these issues. (See Continental 
Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (9th Cir. 
1987) 819 F.2d 1519.) 
[**3] 
The trial in the superior court began on September 26, 
1985, on Continental's fraud, breach of express war-
ranty and breach of contract (the Service Life Policy) 
claims. At the conclusion of plaintiffs case, a nonsuit 
motion was made by Douglas; it was later granted only 
with respect to the breach of warranty cause of action. 
The case was submitted to the jury on five differ-
ent fraud theories and one breach of contract theory, 
based on the Service Life Policy. On January 30, 1986, 
the jury returned verdicts in favor of Continental for $ 
17 million on its claims for (1) fraud by misrepresen-
tation, (2) fraud by nondisclosure of known facts and 
(3) negligent misrepresentation. The jury returned ver-
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diets in favor of Douglas on Continental's claims for (1) 
fraud by concealment [***783] and, (2) fraud by mak-
ing a promise without intent to perform. On the [*399] 
breach of the Service Life Policy claim, the jury awarded 
Continental damages of $ 13.4 million. 
On March 19, 1986, the trial court denied Douglas's 
motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. In response to the jury's determination that 
prejudgment interest was appropriate, the trial court 
awarded Continental [**4] interest at the rate of 7 per-
cent from March 1, 1978, to January 1, 1983, and 
at 10 percent thereafter, on the fraud and breach of 
contract awards. Judgment was granted on the higher 
fraud award and, alternatively, on the breach of contract 
award, in the event the fraud verdicts did not withstand 
an appeal. 
This appeal is from that judgment. n2 We affirm the 
judgment as modified. 
n2 Continental's purported "cross-appeal" from 
the judgment was dismissed since it was not a party 
"aggrieved" by the judgment. (Cicinelli v. Iwasaki 
(1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 55, 64 [338 R2d 1005]; 9 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 
142, pp. 151-152.) 
Statement of Facts 
On March 1, 1978, a Continental DC-10 aircraft, 
which had been delivered to Continental by Douglas in 
1972, was in its takeoff roll at Los Angeles International 
Airport when two tires burst on the left landing gear. 
The captain elected to try to stop the plane, but it ran off 
the end of the runway at 85 miles per hour. The [**5] 
landing gear broke through the tarmac, burrowed into 
the ground, and was ripped from the wing, making a 3.7 
foot hole which allowed fuel to pour from the wing fuel 
tanks. The plane was severely damaged by the resulting 
fire and rendered unrepairable. 
Douglas had approached Continental in 1968 to sell 
Continental DC-10 aircraft. Douglas used a series of 
briefings and sales brochures in its sales campaign. 
The sales brochures given to Continental consisted of 
hundreds of pages of technical information drafted by 
Douglas's engineers, and reviewed by its top manage-
ment, for the express purpose of explaining the DC-
10 design and a "Detail Type Specification" (Detail 
Specification or Specification) to potential aircraft pur-
chasers. That Specification, as its name implies, de-
scribed the technical details of the DC-10. The brief-
ings, the question and answer period following, and 
the brochures, were intended by Douglas to constitute 
Continental's review of the DC-10 specifications. 
The Douglas briefings covered the landing gear and 
wing design, as did many of its brochures. Continental 
personnel used the brochures to write portions of 
Continental's "Tri-Jet Evaluation," a comparison be-
tween [**6] the [*400] DC-10 and Lockheed's L-1011, 
which became a basis for Continental's decision to pur-
chase the DC-10. 
The brochures contained statements that "[t]he fuel 
tank will not rupture under crash load conditions"; that 
the landing gear "are designed for wipe-off without rup-
turing the wing fuel tank"; that "the support structure 
is designed to a higher strength than the gear to pre-
vent fuel tank rupture due to an accidental landing gear 
overload"; that the DC-10 "is designed and tested for 
crashworthiness"; that the "landing gear will be tested" 
to demonstrate the fail safe integrity and wipe-off char-
acteristics of the gear design; and that "good reliabil-
ity" for the DC-10 landing gear could be predicted with 
an "unusually high degree of confidence" because of its 
close similarity to the successful design on the DC-8 and 
DC-9 aircraft. 
When Continental decided to purchase the DC-10, 
instead of the L-1011 aircraft, it finalized a Purchase 
Agreement with Douglas which contained an integra-
tion clause and incorporated by reference the Detail 
Specification for the DC-10. In contrast to the abso-
lute guarantees of the brochures, the Detail Specification 
used qualified language on the [**7] subject of the land-
ing gear breakaway characteristic. It recited, in relevant 
part, that the landing gear "shall be designed" so that, 
under certain specified load conditions, failure of the 
landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the wing fuel tanks 
or fuel lines. That clause, its interpretation, and the pre-
contract representations which varied the [***784] terms 
of the Specification, became the focus of the instant trial. 
Contentions 
I. Douglas contends with respect to Continental's fraud 
claims that: 
A. Continental's negligent misrepresentation claim 
was barred by the exculpatory clause of the Purchase 
Agreement. 
B. The jury instruction on fraud by "failure to dis-
close" was incomplete in two vital particulars. 
C. The trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to 
admit the "Six Bulletin." 
D. The trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the 
"Starlof Letter" and the evidence associated with it. 
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E. The trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to per-
mit Douglas's expert witness McCarthy to testify from 
documents prepared by his subordinates. 
[*401] F. The trial court prejudicially erred in permit-
ting the contractual term of the Detail Specification to 
be varied, amplified and [**8] supplemented by parol 
evidence. 
G. There was no substantial evidence of fraud: (1) 
the Detail Specification was not false, and (2) precon-
tract promotional materials cannot form the basis of a 
fraud claim. 
H. There was no substantial evidence that Douglas's 
misrepresentations were material or that Continental rea-
sonably relied on them in deciding to purchase the DC-
10. 
I. The trial court's treatment of the Service Life Policy 
issues prejudiced the entire case. 
J. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury on 
the measure of damages for fraud. 
K. The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment in-
terest at 10 percent. 
II. Douglas contends Continental's claim for breach of 
contract under the Service Life Policy was submitted to 
the jury in error because: 
A. The value of the aircraft cannot be recovered under 
the Service Life Policy. 
B. Continental never "triggered" the policy by giving 
the required notice. 
C. Continental's insurer had no standing to make a 
claim under the policy since it is nonassignable. 
Discussion 
I. The Fraud Claims 
A. Continental's Cause of Action For Negligent 
Misrepresentation Was Not Barred by the Exculpatory 
Clause of the Contract. 
Douglas contends Continental's [**9] claim for neg-
ligent misrepresentation was barred by Article 12 of 
the Purchase Agreement wherein Continental expressly 
agreed to waive all claims for negligence. Although 
the cause of action was submitted in accordance with 
BAJI No. 12.45, which is [*402] entitled "Fraud and 
Deceit ~ Negligent Misrepresentation," on the instruc-
tion given to the jury, the court changed the name of 
the tort to "fraud and deceit by representation without 
reasonable grounds." 
While Douglas makes much ado about this name 
change, the real question presented is whether negligent 
misrepresentation is a species of fraud which, pursuant 
to California statutory and case law, may not be waived 
by an exculpatory clause. 
The elements of a cause of action for negligent mis-
representation are: "1. The defendant must have made 
a representation as to a past or existing material fact, 
[para.] 2. The representation must have been untrue; 
[para.] 3. Regardless of his actual belief the defendant 
must have made the representation without any reason-
able ground for believing it to be true; [para.] 4. The 
representation must have been made with the intent to 
induce plaintiff to rely upon it; [para.] 5. The plain-
tiff [**10] must have been unaware of the falsity of the 
representation; he must have acted in reliance upon the 
truth of the representation and he must have been jus-
tified in relying upon the representation, [para.] 6. 
And, finally, as a result of his reliance upon the truth 
of the representation, the plaintiff must have sustained 
damage." (BAJI No. 12.45, italics added; see Wzlters 
v. [***785] Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 17 [147 
Cal.Rptr. 655], overruled on another ground in Gray 
v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal. 3d 
498, 505-507 [198 Cal.Rptr. 551, 674 R2d 253, 44 
A.L.RAth 763].) 
Section 1668 of the Civil Code declares unlawful as 
against public policy "[a] 11 contracts which have for their 
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from 
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to 
the person or property of another, or violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent . . . ." (Italics added.) 
Section 1710, subdivision 2, defines one form of de-
ceit as: "The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not 
true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing 
it [**11] to be true." (Italics added.) 
Section 1572, subdivision 2, provides that actual fraud 
includes the following act: "The positive assertion, in a 
manner not warranted by the information of the person 
making it, of that which is not true, though he believes 
it to be true." (Italics added.) 
Douglas argues that since section 1668 does not list 
"misrepresentation" among the kinds of conduct for 
which a party may not exculpate itself, coupled with the 
fact that the word "fraud" is not modified, whereas the 
modifier "willful or negligent" expressly applies only to 
the phrase [*403] "violation of law," that confirms that 
"fraud" is used in section 1668 in its traditional sense as 
an intentional tort. 
Douglas's argument is disingenuous. However, 
Douglas's assertion, that Continental's claim for neg-
ligent misrepresentation was barred by the exculpatory 
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clause of the contract, is bolstered by the erroneous hold-
ing of Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. (2d Cir. 1980) 617 F. 2d 936, in which the fed-
eral court, construing an almost identical exculpatory 
clause, declared that "[w]here there has been no vio-
lation of law, negligent misrepresentations [**12] in a 
commercial transaction such as that involved herein do 
not fall within the provisions of § 1668." {Id. at p. 
940.) The cases on which the Tokio Marine court re-
lied for that incorrect statement of California law {Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co. (1965) 238 
Cal.App.2d 95, 105-106 [47 Cal.Rptr. 518]; Werner 
v. Knoll (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 474, 475-477[201 R2d 
45J) do not support its conclusion. 
The Werner case involved a wrongful death action. 
The court held that lawsuit was barred by the excul-
patory clause of the parties' agreement, since contracts 
relieving individuals from the results of their own ordi-
nary negligence are not invalid under section 1668 for 
contravening public policy. (89 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 475-
476.) The Delta Air Lines case concerned an action for 
breach of warranty. The court determined the exculpa-
tory clause was valid and covered not only contractual 
warranty liability but also tort liability. (238 Cal.App. 2d 
at p. 101.) It further held the clause was not void 
as an attempt to [**13] exempt defendant from liabil-
ity for an express violation of law because defendant's 
complained-of acts did not constitute such violation. {Id. 
at pp. 105-106.) Neither of these cases involved a cause 
of action for negligent misrepresentation. 
We have found no other case which interprets the re-
lationship amongst sections 1668, 1710, subdivision 2, 
and 1572, subdivision 2, in this context, although all 
of these sections were enacted in 1872 as part of the 
original Civil Code. n3 
n3 None of the sections has ever been amended. 
The case law, however, is clear that in California neg-
ligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud and deceit 
under sections 1710, subdivision 2, and 1572, subdi-
vision 2. Thus, in Andrepont v. Meeker (1984) 158 
Cal.App. 3d 878, at page 884 [204 Cal.Rptr. 887], 
the court observed: "Since Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 
43 Cal.2d 481, 487-488 [], was decided, California 
courts have recognized that a negligent misrepresenta-
tion [**14] is actionable as a form of deceit. [Citing to 
and quoting §§ 1710, subd. 2, and 1572, subd. 2.]" In 
Gold [*404] v. Los Angeles Democratic League (1975) 
49 Cal.App.3d 365, at pages 373-374 [122 Cal.Rptr. 
732], the court declared: "Negligent [***786] misrep-
resentation is a form of 'actual fraud.' (Civ. Code, §§ 
1572, subd. 2, 1710, subd. 2; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 
43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, fn. 4 []; Clar v. Board of Trade 
(1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636, 644 [] . . . .)" In In re 
Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d587, at page 599 [207 
Cal.Rptr. 728], the court stated: "[N]o actual intent to 
defraud . . . need be shown, as fraud includes not only 
intentional misrepresentations but also negligent misrep-
resentations. {Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Hansen (1964) 
227 Cal.App.2d 173, 192 [].) Thus, 'scienter' is not an 
element of every cause of action for deceit. {Hale v. 
George A. Hormel & Co. (1975) 48 Cal.App. 3d 73, 84 
[].)" In Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law 
(1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 77, at page 80, footnote [**15] 4 
[148 Cal.Rptr. 278], the court noted that "[i]n order to 
state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege 
(1) a false representation of a material fact, (2) made 
recklessly or without reasonable ground for believing 
its truth . . . . (Gonsalves v. Hodgson [1951] 38 
Cal.2d91, 100-101 [].)" (See also 5 Witkin, Summary 
of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 722, p. 821; 5 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 676, 
pp. 126-127.) 
Under the weight of these authorities, we hold that 
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is in-
cluded within the meaning of the word "fraud" in sec-
tion 1668. Therefore, the exculpatory clause of the par-
ties' contract in Article 12, wherein Continental agreed 
to waive all claims for negligence, was not a bar to 
Continental's claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
B. The Court's Instruction on Fraud by Nondisclosure 
Constituted Prejudicial Error. 
Douglas contends the court's instruction on fraud by 
nondisclosure constituted prejudicial error. Specifically, 
it argues the two instructions relating to nondisclosure 
erroneously omitted any reference to the necessary intent 
and reliance elements [**16] of that claim. 
In Lingsch v. Savage (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 729 
[29 Cal.Rptr. 201], the court set forth the compo-
nents of a nondisclosure cause of action as follows: "(1) 
Nondisclosure by the defendant of facts materially af-
fecting the value or desirability of the property; (2) 
Defendant's knowledge of such facts and of their be-
ing unknown to or beyond the reach of the plaintiff; (3) 
Defendant's intention to induce action by the plaintiff; 
(4) Inducement of the plaintiff to act by reason of the 
nondisclosure and (5) Resulting damages." (Id. at p. 
738, italics added; see County of Mariposa v. Yosemite 
West [*405] Associates (1988) 202 Cal.App. 3d 791, 
812 [248 Cal.Rptr. 778]; Barnhouse v. City of Pinole 
(1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 171, 190, fn. 7 [183 Cal.Rptr. 
881].) 
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In the instant case, the court instructed the jury on 
five kinds of fraud - intentional, concealment, nondis-
closure, false promise, and negligence -- all derived 
from essentially the same operative facts. It actually 
instructed the jury twice, the first time when it informed 
[**17] the jury on the issues on which Continental had 
the burden of proof and a second time when it formally 
listed the elements of each theory. None of the instruc-
tions purported to cover more than one species of fraud. 
In other words, none can be interpreted to apply to any 
cause of action other than the specific one for which it 
was given. (Seefn. 4.) Eight of the ten instructions cor-
rectly informed the jury that fraudulent intent as well as 
reliance are elements of the cause of action to which the 
instruction referred. n4 However, the two instructions 
relating to nondisclosure omitted any reference whatever 
to intent and reliance. 
n4 In the instruction for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the necessary intent was properly defined as the 
intent to induce plaintiff to rely on a representation 
made without reasonable ground for believing it to be 
true. (See Walters v. Marler, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 17.) 
The first instruction, which relates to burden of proof, 
reads as follows: [**18] "As to fraud and deceit by 
nondisclosure of known facts: [para.] 1. That the de-
fendant failed to disclose to Continental a material fact 
[***787] known to McDonnell Douglas and not known 
to Continental; and [para.] 2. That McDonnell Douglas 
knew of material facts and also knew that such facts 
were neither known nor readily accessible to the other 
party; [para.] 3. That as a legal cause of the fraud and 
deceit Continental sustained damages; [para.] 4. The 
nature and extent of plaintiff's damages and the amount 
thereof." 
The second instruction, which defines the elements of 
the tort, was similarly defective. It reads: "The essen-
tial elements of fraud and deceit by failing to disclose 
known facts, each of which must be proved to recover 
damages under this theory are: [para.] Except as you 
may otherwise be instructed, where material facts are 
known to one party and not to the other, failure to dis-
close them is not actionable fraud unless there is some 
relationship between the parties which gives rise to a 
duty to disclose such known facts, [para.] A duty to 
disclose known facts arises where one party knows of 
material facts and also knows that such facts are neither 
known nor readily accessible [**19] to the other party." 
In his closing argument, when explaining intentional 
fraud and fraud by concealment to the jury, Continental's 
counsel used the court's proposed instructions for guid-
ance and covered all the elements of the claims, includ-
ing [*406] intent and reliance. But when he turned 
to nondisclosure, apparently still using the court's in-
structions, he failed even then to inform the jury of the 
elements of that cause of action. n5 Thus, the jury's 
findings against Douglas on the issue of nondisclosure 
did not include a finding of fraudulent intent nor of re-
liance. 
n5 Counsel argued to the jury: "In order to recover 
under that theory, we need to prove that McDonnell 
Douglas failed to disclose to Continental a material 
fact, always has to be a material fact. Can't be 
'tomorrow it is going to rain.' It has to be some-
thing more important that we would rely on, and 
we have to prove that Douglas knew that there were 
material facts, and knew that we didn't know about 
them, that Continental didn't know the facts, and 
that Continental did not have ready access to those 
facts, so if we can prove that Douglas knew that 
Continental didn't have all the facts and that Douglas 
had all the facts and they didn't tell us, and that 
[were] material, something that we did, then they're 
guilty of fraud and deceit by reason of nondisclosure 
of known facts, and again, obviously, we have to 
prove that that resulted in damages." 
[**20] 
Moreover, Continental can find no assistance in the 
jury's answers to the special interrogatories on the 
nondisclosure cause of action, since the jury simply 
found that "each of the elements of fraud and deceit by 
nondisclosure of known facts, as defined in the court's 
instruction" had been proved. (Italics added.) And, 
because each instruction specifically covered only one 
species of fraud, even when we consider the instructions 
as a whole, the error is not cured. (Compare, Pacific-
Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of 
North America (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 703, 714-715 
[212 Cal.Rptr. 754]; Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. 
Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 451, 464-465 [136 Cal.Rptr. 
653].) 
Continental, relying on Spahn v. Guild Industries 
Corp. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 143, 160 [156 Cal.Rptr. 
375], argues that, inasmuch as Douglas did not request a 
"specific proper" instruction, it cannot complain on ap-
peal that the instruction was defective. Continental's ar-
gument embodies a once common misapprehension con-
cerning the impact of Code of Civil Procedure section 
647, which obviates [**21] the need to object to an 
order "giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruc-
# evfc AJ^VI^ 9 
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tion, or modifying an instruction requested . . . ." The 
matter was clarified by the Supreme Court in Agarwal v. 
Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948-949 [160 Cal.Rptr. 
141, 603 R2d 58], decided six months after Spahn. The 
court, reconciling apparently divergent cases, ultimately 
quoted with approval from Rivera v. Parma (1960) 54 
Cal.2d 313, at page 316 [5 Cal.Rptr. 665, 353 P.2d 
273], as follows: ""'To hold that it is the duty of a 
party to correct the errors of his adversary's instruc-
tions . . . would be in contravention of section 647, 
Code of Civil Procedure, which gives a party an ex-
ception to instructions that are given . . . . While 
the exception will be of no avail where an instruction 
states the law correctly but is 'deficient merely by rea-
son of [*407] generality,' in other [***788] cases he 
will not be foreclosed from claiming error and preju-
dice.'"" (Agarwal, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 949; see 
Enis v. Specialty Auto Sales (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3d 928, 
939-940 [148 Cal.Rptr. 255]; [**22] see also Tannehill 
v. Finch (1986) 188 Cal.App. 3d 224, 227, fn. 3 [232 
Cal.Rptr. 749]; Puppert v. San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 205, 212 [186 Cal.Rptr. 
847].) 
Continental also relies on Spahn v. Guild Industries 
Corp., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 143, for the proposition 
that the omission of the reliance element from the in-
struction was not prejudicial. In Spahn, the verdict was 
saved because the evidence of reliance was so compelling 
the court found that "even if the jury had been specif-
ically instructed as to reliance, they could only have 
found that the franchisees relied on the misrepresenta-
tions . . . ." (Id. at p. 159.) Further, the court 
observed that "[g]iven the record . . . and assuming 
the most comprehensive instruction on reliance, there is 
no possibility that the jury could have returned a verdict 
favorable to the franchisors." (Id. at p. 160.) 
Spahn is distinguishable. In Spahn, only one element 
necessary to be proved - reliance ~ was omitted from 
the instruction, whereas [**23] here, the intent element 
was also omitted. Moreover, we cannot say in this case, 
as did the court in Spahn, that there "is no possibility" 
(94 Cal.App.3d at p. 160) the jury would have returned 
a verdict more favorable to Douglas on Continental's 
nondisclosure claim absent these errors. 
On the contrary, it appears probable the defect in the 
nondisclosure instructions did affect the verdict. We 
reach this conclusion because, when the jury was cor-
rectly instructed as to all the elements of fraud by con-
cealment, it found in favor of Douglas. It did so al-
though none of the instructions were specific as to the 
facts and Continental's counsel made no attempt in his 
argument to distinguish the facts upon which Continental 
based its claims, instead discussing the same matters pur-
portedly concealed, or not disclosed, interchangeably 
without reference to specific instructions or theories. 
In making our determination whether the defective in-
structions constituted reversible error, we are guided 
by the language of our Supreme Court in Henderson 
v. Hamischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 CaUd 663 [117 
Cal.Rptr. 1, 527 P.2d 353], [**24] wherein the court 
stated: "Generally speaking if it appears that error in 
giving an improper instruction was likely to mislead the 
jury and thus to become a factor in its verdict, it is prej-
udicial and ground for reversal. [Citation.] To put it 
another way, '[w]here it seems probable that the jury's 
verdict may have been based on the erroneous [*408] 
instruction prejudice appears and this court "should not 
speculate upon the basis of the verdict."'[Citations.] . . 
. 'The determination whether, in a specific instance, the 
probable effect of the instruction has been to mislead the 
jury and whether the error has been prejudicial so as to 
require reversal depends on all the circumstances of the 
case, including the evidence and the other instructions 
given. No precise formula can be drawn.' [Citations.]" 
(Id. at pp. 670-671; Frantz v. San Luis Medical Clinic 
(1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 34, 47 [146 Cal.Rptr. 146].) 
From our examination of the entire record, including 
the evidence and the other instructions, we can only con-
clude the court's error in instructing the jury on fraud 
by nondisclosure misled [**25] the jury, was prejudi-
cial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice; therefore, 
the judgment cannot stand to the extent it is based on 
the fraud by nondisclosure verdict. (Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 13; Henderson v. Hamischfeger Corp., supra, 12 
Cal.3d at pp. 670, 674; see Seaman's Direct Buying 
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 
752, 771, 774 [206 Cal.Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158].) 
However, as we discuss later in this opinion, the judg-
ment can be upheld based on the intentional fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation verdicts. 
[***789] C. The Robert Six Bulletin Was Properly 
Excluded. 
Douglas made numerous unsuccessful attempts at trial 
to introduce into evidence a December 1979 written 
statement which was issued to all Continental employ-
ees by Robert F. Six, then chairman of the board and 
chief executive officer of Continental. The statement 
informed them that a group of insurance companies re-
tained by Continental had filed a lawsuit against Douglas 
and others; that insurance companies customarily file 
such suits in the name of the client to whom they have 
paid benefits; that Continental [**26] was in fact not 
suing Douglas and had not been asked to participate in 
the preparation of the lawsuit. 
'•^fe<f) A I * i l # f f J i ^ 
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The bulletin concluded with the following sentence: 
"We continue to feel that the DC-10, which we have been 
flying throughout our system since 1972, is an excellent 
airplane -- safe, efficient, hardy and responsive." 
Douglas contends the bulletin should have been ad-
mitted into evidence because of "its obvious status as an 
admission" (Evid. Code, § 1220) n6 and points out that 
it was originally rejected in its entirety only because 
it [*409] mentioned insurance. In support of its ar-
gument, Douglas urges the court erred in excluding the 
evidence because Evidence Code section 1155, n7 which 
proscribes the admission of evidence that a person was 
insured "to prove negligence or other wrongdoing," is 
not applicable in the instant case. Citing North v. Vinton 
(1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 214 [61 P.2d 950], Douglas ar-
gues that where an admission makes only incidental ref-
erence to insurance, "the entire statement is admissible, 
not to prove the fact of insurance, but solely because the 
reference to the insurance is part of the admission." (Id. 
at p. 219, [**27] italics added.) 
n6 Evidence Code section 1220 provides: 
"Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by 
the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in 
an action to which he is a party in either his individ-
ual or representative capacity, regardless of whether 
the statement was made in his individual or repre-
sentative capacity." 
n7 Evidence Code section 1155 provides: 
"Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm 
was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially 
against loss arising from liability for that harm is 
inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdo-
ing." 
While we have no argument with that principle, the 
exception set forth in North, and relied on by Douglas, is 
not here applicable. To the contrary, what Douglas was 
attempting to do in the court below is that which North 
forbids, namely, "to prove the fact of insurance." (17 
Cal. App.2d at p. 219.) Douglas wanted to show the jury 
that Continental's insurance company, not Continental, 
is the real [**28] party in interest in this lawsuit and 
that, in fact, Continental disavowed any participation in 
its insurer's allegations of fraud or lack of safety. 
The trial court correctly perceived that bringing that 
information before the jurors would be highly prejudicial 
and misleading. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The same con-
siderations which underlie Evidence Code section 1155 
require exclusion of the evidence. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. 
Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 417, p. 391 ["[t]he evidence 
is regarded as both irrelevant and prejudicial"].) 
Further, the instant lawsuit was brought only in the 
name of Continental; Continental's status as the real 
party in interesl was not challenged by Douglas, al-
though such challenge was appropriate if the insurer had 
paid Continental in full for its loss. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 112, pp. 147-148.) 
Although the trial court excluded the entire Robert Six 
bulletin, it ruled the last sentence of the bulletin (quoted 
above) would be received in evidence if Douglas could 
show its relevance: It could do so by producing evidence 
it was issued before Continental made the postaccident 
design change to remedy the landing gear defect, as 
[**29] recommended by Douglas in its safety bulletin. 
Douglas, however, failed to carry its burden and now, 
on appeal, contends the court by its ruling improperly 
reversed the burden of the parties, [*410] confusing 
admissibility [***790] with weight. n8 That contention 
is devoid of merit. The last sentence of the Robert Six 
bulletin was not relevant to impeach Continental's claim 
it was defrauded by Douglas, regarding the safety of the 
aircraft, if Continental only "continued" to believe the 
DC-10 was safe after the landing gear defect was reme-
died. n9 Therefore, the sentence was properly excluded 
absent a proper foundation. 
n8 In urging that Continental had the bur-
den of proof on the question when the defect 
on Continental's fleet of DC-10's was remedied, 
Douglas asserts that information was particularly 
within the knowledge of Continental, pointing to the 
off-hand remark of Continental's counsel at bench 
that "nobody knows" when the changes to the air-
craft were made. While it may be true that counsel 
was unable to elicit that information at trial, cer-
tainly appropriate pretrial discovery directed to that 
question would have produced it. 
[**30] 
n9 We do not subscribe to Douglas's view that the 
last sentence of the Robert Six Bulletin characterized 
the DC-10 as safe "during the entire time Continental 
operated them." (Italics added.) 
D. The Starlof Letter Was Properly Admitted in 
Evidence. 
We find Douglas's argument that the trial court prej-
udicially erred in admitting the "Starlof letter," and the 
evidence associated with it, lacking in merit. 
William C. Starlof, the manager of Douglas's Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Liaison Office, sent a 
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letter on June 4, 1971 (the Starlof letter or letter), to the 
Aircraft Engineering Division of the FAA. The letter 
was sent for the specific purpose of demonstrating to the 
FAA that the DC-10 was in compliance with its special 
condition A-4. That condition related to protection of 
the fuel lines in the fuselage in the event of an accident. 
Condition A-4 had to be met before the FAA would issue 
a "type certificate" showing the aircraft met federal air 
regulation standards. 
In his letter, Starlof also made an evaluation of the 
breakaway characteristics of the aircraft's main landing 
[**31] gear with respect to the fuel lines and fuel tanks 
in the wings. On page two of the letter, Starlof made 
the following statement: "The overall effect of the fail-
ure modes described is that the landing gear will break 
cleanly without r[u]pturing the fuel tanks or fuel lines. 
In addition to the above, it should be noted that the 
DC-10 main landing gear and its carry-through struc-
ture is similar in design to both the DC-8 and DC-9. 
Laboratory failure tests on the DC-8 gear and service 
failures which have been experienced on the DC-8 and 
DC-9, in most cases, confirm that the gear will sever 
cleanly from the wing without failing surrounding pri-
mary wing structure." (Italics added.) 
Representations similar to that quoted above were 
made to Continental in the Douglas sales brochures 
and at the precontract briefings. However, [*411] 
Continental never saw the Starlof letter until after the 
accident, so there was no question that Continental could 
not have relied on a misrepresentation in the letter when 
purchasing the DC-10. 
Douglas claims the court prejudicially erred in admit-
ting the letter in evidence because it enabled Continental 
to present to the jury the distorted picture [**32] that 
misrepresentations in the letter, regarding the breakaway 
characteristics of the landing gear and wing structure, 
were relied upon by the FAA in issuing its type certifi-
cation for the DC-10. As Douglas correctly points out, 
the FAA did not have a requirement that applied to pro-
tection of the wing fuel tank and lines. nlO However, the 
FAA did have a proposed rule which covered that very 
subject, although it was not in effect when the Starlof 
letter was sent to the FAA. Nevertheless, Douglas's en-
gineers testified that the challenged paragraph was in-
serted in the letter in an attempt by Douglas to avoid 
imposition by the FAA of the proposed rule because it 
[***791] would have imposed more rigorous fuel tank 
protection requirements on Douglas. 
nlO The only evidence on this issue came from 
Leonard Williamson, a retired FAA official whose 
job for 35 years had been to review aircraft, includ-
ing the DC-10, to see if they met FAA standards 
and regulations prior to the issuance of type certifi-
cation. He testified the FAA would have ignored the 
challenged part of the letter in issuing the certificate 
inasmuch as federal aviation regulations in effect at 
the time did not require protection of the wing fuel 
tanks. 
[**33] 
Douglas argues the trial court erroneously failed to re-
quire Continental to prove all the elements of Douglas's 
alleged fraud on the FAA - especially reliance - as pre-
liminary facts (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1)) prior 
to admitting the Starlof letter into evidence. Douglas 
maintains the letter was only admissible on the fraud or 
breach of contract issues if the court first determined the 
FAA relied on the alleged misrepresentations in issuing 
the type certificate for the DC-10. The type certificate 
was, of course, Continental's assurance the FAA deter-
mined the aircraft was safe. 
Douglas's argument, however, overlooks the fact that 
the trial court stated one reason it received the letter 
was as circumstantial evidence of Douglas's fraudulent 
intent with respect to Continental. Under that theory, 
evidence of even an unsuccessful attempt by Douglas 
to avoid imposition by the FAA of the proposed rule is 
relevant circumstantial evidence of Douglas's intent to 
defraud Continental. And, under that theory, the FAA's 
reliance or lack thereof was not material to the question 
whether the letter was admissible. 
It is well established California law that "'[s]ince di-
rect proof of [**34] fraudulent intent is often impossi-
ble, the intent may be established by [inference [*412] 
from acts of the parties.' [Citation.]" nil (Delos v. 
Farmers Insurance Group (1979) 93 Cal.App. 3d 642, 
658 [155 Cal.Rptr. 843]; Miller v. National American 
Life Ins. Co. (1976) 54 Cal.App. 3d 331, 338 [126 
Cal.Rptr. 731]; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, 
op. cit. supra, at § 686, p. 787.) It is also settled law 
that if evidence is admissible for any purpose it must be 
received, even though it may be highly improper for an-
other purpose. (Daggett v. Atchison T. & S. F Ry. Co. 
(1957) 48 Cal.2d 655, 665 [313 R2d 557, 64 A.L.R.2d 
1283].) 
nil The Starlof letter was not inadmissible "other 
acts" evidence under the authority of People v. Holt 
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 451 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 
P.2d 1207], as Douglas contends. It was admissi-
ble under the exception of Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (b). (See The Atkins Corporation 
v. Tourny (1936) 6 Cal.2d 206, 215 [57 P.2d 480]; 
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1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, at § 385, p. 359.) 
[**35] 
However, the party against whom the evidence is of-
fered is entitled, upon request, to a proper instruction 
limiting the purposes for which the evidence may be 
considered. (Daggett v. Atchison. T. & S. E Ry. Co., 
supra, 48 CaHdatpp. 665-666; Evid. Code, § 355.) 
Here, the trial court properly refused the limiting in-
struction proffered by Douglas; it was too narrow and 
did not correctly inform the jury of the purposes for 
which they could consider the Starlof letter. nl2 (See 
Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal. 3d at pp. 950-
951; Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. 
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 519, 523 [113 Cal.Rptr. 277].) 
And, contrary to Douglas's assertion, the instructions 
the trial court gave the jury covered the material is-
sues and controlling legal principles of the case. (See 
Agarwal, supra, at p. 951.) 
nl2 Douglas's proposed instruction reads as fol-
lows: "The letter from William Starloff to the 
Federal Aviation Administration concerning the fail-
ure mode of the landing gear was admitted into evi-
dence solely because witness Dennis Parks received 
a copy of it after the accident and used it in his 
report. It is not evidence of a representation by 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation to Continental Air 
Lines concerning landing gear breakaway design be-
cause Continental Air Lines had not received it be-
fore it purchased the DC-10 aircraft." 
[**36] 
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 352, 353; 
Kessler v. Gray (1978) 77 Cal.App. 3d 284, 291-292 
[143 Cal.Rptr. 496].) The court's exercise of discretion 
will be upheld on appeal absent a clear error of law or 
manifest abuse (Michail v. Fluor Mining & Metals, Inc. 
(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 284, 286-287 [225 Cal.Rptr. 
403]) and there was neither. The record shows the judge 
weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its 
probative value. (Id. at p. 287.) A full expression of 
the court's basis for excluding or refusing to exclude ev-
idence under Evidence Code section 352 is not required. 
(Ibid.; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 
303, pp. 273-274.) 
[*413] [***792] E. The Trial Court Did Not 
Prejudicially Err in Limiting the Testimony of Douglas's 
Expert Witness McCarthy. 
refusing to permit their expert witness, John McCarthy, 
"to testify from documents prepared by his subordinates" 
or even to mention he relied on those documents in form-
ing his [**37] opinion as to the amount of damage the 
aircraft would have sustained had there been no fire. 
McCarthy was a Douglas employee who, for the last 
25 years, worked in a department known as "Recovery 
and Modification Services, Product Support" (RAMS). 
He was the manager of the unit for 15 years. His job 
in RAMS was to make aircraft repair estimates based on 
data furnished by subordinates. McCarthy was involved 
in at least a dozen such estimates per year for a quarter 
of a century: these estimates ran into the millions of 
dollars. 
McCarthy personally inspected the DC-10 at the site of 
the crash and, from his observations, determined which 
parts of the aircraft would have needed repair or re-
placement even if there had been no fire. Eventually, an 
attorney for Douglas asked him to estimate the cost of 
the impact damage had there been no fire as a result of 
the alleged fraud. McCarthy then requested two regular 
members of his staff, House and Rich, each to prepare 
an analysis. House's function was to identify and price 
the parts needed for the hypothetical job, while Rich 
developed the manpower figures and labor costs. 
According to McCarthy, the project was a "joint ef-
fort." However, [**38] although McCarthy was shown 
the numbers produced by House and Rich, he testified 
he did not verify them nor did he "review them hard" 
because "[t]hey looked like they were in the ballpark." 
McCarthy's cost estimate was developed from the in-
formation and work sheets they gave him and it was 
embodied in a report, Exhibit 11,000. 
Continental's counsel objected to McCarthy testifying 
on the basis of Exhibit 11,000, arguing that McCarthy 
had no personal knowledge of the facts in that report 
because he had not personally performed the underlying 
work. The trial court sustained the objection and ruled 
that McCarthy could not testify that he relied on the anal-
yses by House and Rich or as to the details of Exhibit 
11,000. Thus, Douglas argues McCarthy's testimony 
was eviscerated and rendered unpersuasive because, in 
the eyes of the jury, [*414] it was based on nothing 
more than his viewing of the aircraft after the accident 
and his general experience. nl3 
nl3 Douglas concedes "the evidence suppressed -
$ 9,825,000 -- and the evidence given - 'at least $ 
10 million' - were consistent as to amount." 
Douglas contends the trial court prejudicially erred in [**39] 
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The questions presented here are whether McCarthy 
should have been allowed to testify (1) that he relied on 
the House-Rich cost and price data in forming his opin-
ion on the cost of repairing the aircraft had there been 
no fire and (2) regarding the details of Exhibit 11,000. 
Under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), 
an expert's opinion may be M[b]ased on matter (includ-
ing his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
and education) perceived by or personally known to the 
witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, 
whether or not admissible, that is of a type that rea-
sonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an 
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates 
On direct examination the expert may state the reasons 
for the opinion and the matter upon which the opinion 
is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such 
reasons or matter. (Evid. Code, § 802.) The portions 
of an opinion based in whole or significant part on mat-
ter that is not a proper basis therefor must be excluded 
upon objection, although the expert may testify to that 
portion of the opinion which is based on proper matter. 
(Evid. Code, § 803.) 
Here, the analyses [**40] House and Rich com-
piled for McCarthy were themselves expert opinions. 
McCarthy based his final cost estimate for trial on those 
analyses, in the report designated Exhibit 11,000. Since 
[***793] House and Rich were not present in court to 
testify, however, their opinions, embodied in the report, 
were hearsay. 
In People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 69, at page 
92 [211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 R2d 189], the Supreme 
Court observed that in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 788-789 [174 Cal.Rptr. 
348], the Court of Appeal explained the current state of 
the law, nl4 quoting from Grimshaw with approval as 
follows: "'While an expert may state on direct exam-
ination the matters on which he relied in forming his 
opinion, he may not testify as to the details of such mat-
ters if they are otherwise inadmissible. [Citations.] The 
rule rests on the rationale that while an expert may give 
[*415] reasons on direct examination for his opinions, 
including the matters he considered in forming them, 
he may not under the guise of reasons bring before the 
jury incompetent hearsay evidence. [Citation.] [**41] 
Ordinarily, the use of a limiting instruction!,] that mat-
ters on which an expert based his opinion are admitted 
only to show the basis of the opinion and not for the truth 
of the matter[,] cures any hearsay problem involved, but 
in aggravated situations, where hearsay evidence is re-
cited in detail, a limiting instruction may not remedy the 
problem. [Citations.]'" (Italics added.) 
nl4 Douglas's reliance on Appel v. Burman (1984) 
159 Cal App. 3d 1209 [206 Cal.Rptr. 259], is mis-
placed. Appel predates People v. Coleman, supra, 
38 Cal. 3d 69, and to the extent its holding conflicts 
with Coleman, it is simply not California law. 
In other words, as relevant here, while an expert may 
rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming his or her opin-
ion (see People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at p. 
90), and may state on direct examination the matters on 
which he or she relied, the expert may [**42] not testify 
as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise 
inadmissible (38 Cal.3datp. 92). 
For example, in Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 
874 [112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588], the expert wit-
ness neurosurgeon testified that he saw no abnormality 
in certain x-ray films. He then testified, over objec-
tion, that he presented the films at "'grand rounds at 
Stanford"' to about 50 students, residents and faculty 
doctors and not one of them could see an abnormality 
or detect any pathology. {Id. at p. 894.) The Supreme 
Court held the testimony concerning the opinion of the 
other doctors who were not present in court was hearsay. 
(Ibid.) The reason was obvious. The opportunity to 
cross-examine the other doctors as to the basis for their 
opinions was denied to the adverse party. nl5 (Ibid.) 
nl5 This rule is not to be confused with the lim-
ited admissibility rule of Kelley v. Bailey (1961) 
189 Cal.App.2d 728, 737-738 [11 Cal.Rptr. 448]. 
Kelley held that physicians could rely on the reports 
of other physicians when testifying, not as indepen-
dent proof of facts, but as part of the information on 
which the testifying physician based his own treat-
ment or diagnosis. The court explained that, upon 
request, the jurors should be told that the evidence 
was to be considered only for that narrow and limited 
purpose. 
[**43] 
The Whitfield court cited to and relied on Frampton v. 
Hartzell (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 771 [4 Cal.Rptr. 427]. 
In Frampton, the court held the testimony of an expert 
witness psychiatrist as to the opinion of the medical staff 
at the hospital, where he was a supervisor-psychiatrist, 
was inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at p. 773.) The ratio-
nale for the holding was that the party to whom the testi-
mony is adverse is denied the right of cross-examination. 
(Ibid.) 
And, in People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App. 3d 891 
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[234 Cal.Rptr. 819], the Court of Appeal held that psy-
chiatric records relied on by two psychiatrist experts 
were inadmissible except to explain that the doctors re-
lied on [*416] the reports in reaching their conclusions 
regarding appellant's sanity. (Id. at p. 913.) The court 
stated the reports were hearsay and observed that "[t]he 
rule which allows an expert to state the reasons upon 
which his opinion is based may not be used as a vehicle 
to bring before the jury incompetent evidence." (Ibid.) 
As the court noted in Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp. 
(1987) 191 Qd.App.3d 851
 f at page 860 [236 Cal.Rptr. 
778]: [**44] "Experts may [***794] rely upon hearsay 
in forming opinions. They may not relate an out-of-
court opinion by another expert as independent proof of 
fact. [Citation.] It is proper to solicit the fact that an-
other expert was consulted to show the foundation of the 
testifying expert's opinion, but not to reveal the content 
of the hearsay opinion." 
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing authori-
ties, the trial court correctly ruled that McCarthy could 
not testify regarding the contents of the report, Exhibit 
11,000, even though it was, in McCarthy's words, a 
"joint effort." However, the trial court erred in preclud-
ing McCarthy from testifying he relied on the cost and 
price figures submitted to him by House and Rich in 
forming his expert opinion on the cost of repairing the 
aircraft had there been no fire. Douglas was not preju-
diced by the trial court's partially erroneous ruling. 
F. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err 
in Admitting the Parol Evidence Under the Fraud 
Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. 
Douglas next argues that the trial court erred in admit-
ting into evidence, over its strong objections, testimonial 
evidence and promotional brochures which varied and 
contradicted [**45] the negotiated terms of the parties' 
contract. Douglas urges the admission of this evidence 
violated the parol evidence rule, vitiated the integration 
clause of the parties' contract, and was unquestionably 
prejudicial to Douglas's cause. 
The contract negotiated by the parties, by which 
Continental acquired its fleet of DC-10's, consists of 
the Purchase Agreement and letter agreements, which 
are two inches thick, and incorporates by precise ref-
erence the Detail Specification which contains almost 
another four hundred pages. 
The Specification depicts, in detail, the features and 
configuration of the aircraft, and describes the perfor-
mance characteristics of its various components. Prior 
to finalization of the Purchase Agreement, the Detail 
Specification was provided to Continental, whose engi-
neering department reviewed it and negotiated numer-
ous changes. In Section 32-10.03.00 of the [*417] 
Specification, the parties agreed: "The main landing 
gear system shall be designed so that if it fails due to 
overloads during takeoff and landing (assuming the over-
loads are in the vertical plane parallel to the longitudinal 
axis of the aircraft), the failure mode is not likely to 
rupture [**46] the integral wing fuel tank or fuel lines." 
(Italics added.) 
Continental never asked for any change in the carefully 
drawn wording of the above-quoted section. 
The parties articulated their intention that the exten-
sive, detailed contract would constitute the entirety of 
their agreement and would not be subject to informal 
alterations, waivers or embellishments in the following 
integration clause: 
"A. This Agreement is the complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms and conditions of the entire agree-
ment between the parties hereto. . . . 
"B. This Agreement, and any term or condition 
thereof, shall not be varied, contradicted, explained or 
supplemented by an oral agreement or representation, by 
course [of] dealing or performance or by usage of trade, 
nor amended or changed in any other manner except 
by an instrument in writing of even or subsequent date 
hereto, executed by both parties by their duly authorized 
representatives." 
At the beginning of the trial, Douglas moved in lim-
ine to preclude Continental from introducing in evidence 
precontract promotional sales brochures Continental re-
ceived from Douglas and oral statements made by 
Douglas engineers and other personnel at [**47] pre-
contract briefings on the DC-10. The court denied the 
motion and, based on the "fraud exception" to the parol 
evidence rule, held the evidence was not barred. 
As a result of this ruling, at least nine sales brochures, 
two or three inches thick apiece, were placed before the 
jury. Portions of the brochures were blown up for em-
phasis. (See fh. 16.) Witnesses were questioned at 
length about the contents and about [***795] represen-
tations made by Douglas's representatives at briefings 
which antedated finalization of the contract. nl6 
nl6 Douglas also maintains (in a footnote to its 
brief) that the brochures were erroneously admit-
ted because Continental did not lay an adequate 
foundation for their receipt into evidence. That 
is not true. James Colbura, Continental's former 
vice-president of Engineering, who was originally 
in charge of the evaluation process for the DC-10, 
testified that he collected one of every engineering 
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technical brochure submitted to Continental during 
the Douglas engineering presentations (a volume ex-
ceeding one file drawer in his office) and that he 
read "every one" of them. Two of the brochures 
were found in Continental's files in the structural 
engineering department; key Continental personnel 
recognized certain brochures; others believed they 
read and relied on a particular brochure in evaluat-
ing the aircraft; still others recalled receiving infor-
mation similar to that which appeared in a brochure 
or recalled a representation made in a brochure; nu-
merous Douglas witnesses testified that they used 
the brochures for sales campaigns and briefings and 
that they routinely gave them to prospective pur-
chasers of Douglas aircraft; and, finally, portions of 
Continental's Tri-Jet Evaluation paraphrased repre-
sentations in several of the brochures. The fact that 
Continental personnel received, read and relied on 
the brochures to evaluate and reach a decision with 
respect to purchasing the DC-10 may be inferred cir-
cumstantially from the totality of the evidence. (See 
1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 284, 
pp. 253-254; § 285, pp. 254-255.) At the time 
of trial, approximately 15 or 16 years had passed 
since the DC-10 was evaluated and the contract fi-
nalized. Under these circumstances, there was more 
than adequate direct and circumstantial evidence that 
the brochures admitted in evidence were relied upon 
by Continental personnel in deciding to purchase the 
DC-10. It cannot be gainsaid that "[t]rial judges 
should be sensitive to the fact that a trial is a search 
for the truth and because of the nature of a fraud 
action liberality in the receipt of evidence should be 
indulged to a degree commensurate with the diffi-
culties of the proof." (Peskin v. Squires (1957) 156 
Cal.App.2d 240, 249 [319 P.2d 405].) 
[**48] 
[*418] In its opening brief, Douglas complains specif-
ically about the admission of a single sentence appearing 
in small print in several of the brochures, which made 
this promise for the DC-10: "The fuel tank will not 
rupture under crash load conditions." (Italics added.) 
As we will explain, under California law, the admis-
sion of this particular sentence in the brochures, and 
testimony of like oral promises Douglas made, was er-
ror. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1856 sets forth the 
parol evidence rule. Subdivision (a) of that section pro-
vides: "Terms set forth in a writing intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement with re-
spect to such terms as are included therein may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement." nl7 (Italics added.) 
nl 7 Section 2202 of the California Uniform 
Commercial Code is identical to this provision in 
all material respects. 
Subdivision (b) of section 1856 provides that terms set 
forth in a writing "may [**49] be explained or supple-
mented by evidence of consistent additional terms unless 
the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement." nl8 (Italics 
added.) Here, the parties did so intend. They apparently 
had this particular provision in mind when, in Article 
20 of the Purchase Agreement, they expressly stipulated, 
inter alia, that the terms of the agreement could not be 
"varied, contradicted, explained or supplemented by an 
oral agreement or representation" and that the agreement 
was "the complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
and conditions of the entire agreement. . . . " (Italics 
added.) 
nl8 Subsection (b) of section 2202 of the 
California Uniform Commercial Code contains es-
sentially the same provision. 
[*419] The justification for the admission of the parol 
evidence was the "fraud exception" to the parol evidence 
rule contained in subdivision (g) of section 1856, which 
provides in relevant part: "This section does not exclude 
other [**50] evidence . . . to establish illegality or 
fraud." nl9 (Italics added.) 
nl9 In making its ruling, the court stated: "The 
law in California is [that] fraudulent representations 
inducing the execution of a contract [are] generally 
admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule, 
and that a party cannot contract against the effect of 
his own fraud." 
But the fraud exception is not applicable where 
"promissory fraud" n20 is alleged, unless the false 
promise is independent of or consistent with the writ-
ten instrument. [***796] (Simmons v. Cal. Institute 
of Technology (1949) 34 Cal. 2d 264, 274-275 [209 P.2d 
581]; Newmark v. H and H Products Mfg. Co. (1954) 
128 Cal.App.2d 35, 37-38 [274 P.2d 702]; Cobbs v. 
Cobbs (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 780, 784-786 [128 P.2d 
373].) It does not apply where, as here, parol evidence 
is offered to show a fraudulent promise directly at vari-
ance with the terms of the written agreement. (Bank of 
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America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal. 2d 258, 
263 [48 P.2d 659]; [**51] see Simmons v. Cal. Institute 
of Technology, supra, 34 Cal.2datpp. 274-275; Green 
v. Del-Camp Investments. Inc. (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 
479, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr. 420].) 
n20 '"A promise made without any intention of 
performing it' constitutes actual fraud." (Coast Bank 
v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 581, 591 [97 
Cal.Rptr. 30]; Civ. Code, § 1572, subd. 4.) 
Douglas's representation that the fuel tank "will not 
rupture" is properly analyzed as a form of promis-
sory fraud. (See Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the 
Parol Evidence Rule (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 877, 881, 
882, 886.) 
In Pendergrass, supra, 4 Cal. 2d 258, at page 263, the 
Supreme Court announced the law of California as it ap-
plies to this question: "Our conception of the rule which 
permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity 
of the instrument is that it must tend to establish some 
independent fact [**52] or representation, some fraud 
in the procurement of the instrument or some breach of 
confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly 
at variance with the promise of the writing." (Italics 
added.) 
Here, the Detail Specification recited that (1) the land-
ing gear "shall be designed" so that (2) under certain 
specified load conditions (i.e., up and aft loads), (3) 
failure of the landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the 
wing fuel tanks or fuel lines. 
Therefore, the unequivocal promise in the brochures, 
elicited in testimony, that the wing fuel tank and 
fuel lines "will not rupture," varied and contradicted 
the qualified language of the Detail Specification. 
Continental's argument that the evidence of that abso-
lute guarantee was properly admitted fails to acknowl-
edge the existence and viability of Pendergrass. [*420] 
(See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View 
Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App. 3d 101, 161 [135 
Cal.Rptr. 802]; Davis v. Gulf Oil Corp. (CD. Cal. 
1983) 572 F.Supp. 1393, 1400-1401.) The cases on 
which Continental relies do not limit or vitiate its appli-
cability; several predate it; [**53] n21 others acknowl-
edge its limitation on the fraud exception; n22 while in 
still others, the parol evidence in question was not of-
fered to prove misrepresentations about subjects covered 
by the agreement. n23 
n21 Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co. (1932) 217 
Cal. 201, 203-204 [17P.2d 727]; Ferguson v. Koch 
(1928) 204 Cal. 342, 347 [268 P. 342, 58 A.L.R. 
1176]; Hunt v. L. M. Field, Inc. (1927) 202 Cal. 
701, 703-704 [262 P. 730]; Mooney v. Cyriacks 
(1921) 185 Cal. 70, 81-82 [195 P. 922]. 
n22 Hartman v. Shell Oil Co. (1977) 68 
Cal.App.3d 240, 251 [137 Cal.Rptr. 244]; Oak 
Industries. Inc. v. Foxboro Co. (S.D.Cal. 1984) 
596 F.Supp. 601, 607-608. 
n23 Richard v. Baker (1956) 141 Cal. App. 2d 857, 
863 [297 P.2d 674]; File v. U.S. Machinery Supply 
Co. (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 176, 179 [274 P2d 
913]; Morris v. Harbor Boat Building Co. (1952) 
112 Cal.App.2d 882, 888 [247P2d 589]. 
[**54] 
Continental's reliance on Munchow v. Kraszewski 
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 831 [128 Cal.Rptr. 762] is like-
wise unavailing. First, its incorrect pronouncement that 
"parol evidence is always admissible to prove fraud" (id. 
at p. 836, italics added) is dictum and, secondly, it re-
lies on a "line of cases" (ibid.) which consist of (1) 
decisions antedating Pendergrass, and (2) court of ap-
peal decisions in which the parol evidence offered was 
not at variance with the instruments in question (id. at 
p. 836, fn. 5). 
Finally, Continental's reliance on Cobbledick-Kibbe 
Glass Co. v. Pugh (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 123 [326 
P.2d 197] is misplaced. The holding in Cobbledick-
Kibbe is contrary to established California law and is 
factually distinguishable. The nub of the court's hold-
ing was that, inasmuch as the seller deceived the buyer 
by tendering a contract without warning him it contained 
language on the back contrary to the seller's oral rep-
resentations, the seller could not use that provision to 
bar the buyer's fraud action in which he claimed re-
liance [**55] on the inconsistent oral representations. 
[***797] Here, unlike the buyer in Cobbledick-Kibbe, 
Continental cannot claim it was unaware of the terms of 
the Detail Specification or of the integration clause in 
the contract. 
Although neither party has raised the issue, we note 
the Pendergrass rule, which precludes the admission of 
evidence of a false promise inconsistent with the terms 
of a written agreement to prove fraud, has been crit-
icized in at least one court of appeal decision (Coast 
Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 591-
592; see Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Marina View Heights Dev. Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 161) and in early [*421] law review articles 
of this state (Note (1950) 38 Cal.L.Rev. 535; Sweet, 
Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, supra, 
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49 Cal.L.Rev. 877). 
More recently, the eminent Bernard E. Witkin opined 
in his treatise on evidence (2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence 
(3d ed. 1986) § 1000, pp. 946-947) that the rule may 
be questioned today where a party seeks fraud damages, 
rather than merely attempting to avoid or nullify the main 
agreement. Mr. [**56] Witkin expressed that view be-
cause in 1985 the California Supreme Court reversed the 
long-standing and analogous rule that a tort action for 
damages could not be based on a false promise where 
the promise itself was unenforceable under the statute of 
frauds. n24 
n24 In Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 
Cal.3d 18, 29 [216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 R2d 212], 
the Supreme Court disapproved the then 44-year-old 
rule of Kroger v. Baur (1941) 46 Cal.App. 2d 801, 
803, that a tort action for damages could not be based 
on a false promise where the promise itself was un-
enforceable under the statute of frauds. One of the 
considerations of the Supreme Court which pointed 
to the "'demise of the Kroger rule'" (39 Cal.3d at 
p. 29) was "'Comment (c) to section 530 of the 
Restatement Second of the Law of Torts [which] 
states that a misrepresentation of one's intention is 
actionable [fraud] even "when the agreement is oral 
and made unenforceable by the statute of frauds, or 
when it is unprovable and so unenforceable under the 
parol evidence rule.""' (39 Cal. 3d at p. 29, italics 
added; see 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, 
op. cit. supra, at § 687, pp. 788-789 & § 688, pp. 
789-790.) 
[**57] 
However, while the Pendergrass rule may be subject 
to criticism, and even questioned, it is still the law and 
we are bound by it (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 
369 P. 2d 937]), as was the court of appeal which crit-
icized the rule 18 years ago in Coast Bank v. Holmes, 
supra, 19 Cal.App. 3d at pages 591-592. (SeeGlendale 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. 
Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 161.) (See fn. 25.) 
Thus, under the Pendergrass rule, the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence of Douglas's precontract promise 
that the wing fuel tank "will not rupture." n25 
n25 Evidence of Douglas's promise in its sales 
brochures, that "[t]he main landing gear will be 
tested on the full-scale wing, etc., fuselage speci-
men to demonstrate the fail-safe integrity of the land-
ing gear attaching structure and wipe-off character-
istics of the landing gear design," was not barred 
by the parol evidence rule. That promise does not 
vary or contradict section A.(l) of Article 10 of 
the Purchase Agreement which covers the subject. 
(Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass, supra, 
4 Cal. 2d at p. 263.) The test is within the category 
of bargained-for flight tests "to demonstrate compli-
ance with the performance guarantees set forth in the 
Detail Specification." (Art. 10, § A.(l).) Thus, it 
is consistent with the matters covered by the agree-
ment. Coast Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 591; Simmons v. Cal. Institute of Technology, 
supra, 34Cal.2datp. 274.) 
Likewise, the representation by Douglas in its 
sales brochures regarding the "successful DC-8 and 
DC-9 design experience" was not barred by the parol 
evidence rule, as it is an independent representation, 
not a promise directly at variance with the terms of 
the contract. (Bank of America etc. v. Pendergrass, 
supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 263.) 
[**58] 
[*422] Douglas argues it was prejudiced by the court's 
error in admitting that evidence because its effect was to 
permit Continental to parlay the qualified ("not likely") 
contract language it had negotiated into an absolute guar-
antee that the fuel tank rupture would never occur and 
to argue to the jury that since it did, Douglas must have 
committed a species of fraud. 
The question we must answer then is whether the er-
roneous admission of Douglas's precontract promise re-
quires a reversal of this cause. If the single sentence to 
which Douglas directs our attention [***798] were the 
only representation on the subject of gear breakaway and 
wing fuel tank rupture emphasized by Douglas in exam-
ining witnesses, and in closing argument, we might be 
persuaded by Douglas's claim of prejudice. However, 
it was not. Continental gave at least the same attention 
and emphasis to several similar representations which 
appeared in many of the brochures. Those other repre-
sentations were factual, and thus admissible under the 
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule, for reasons 
which we explain below. The following are examples: 
"The structure is designed and tested for crashwor-
thiness. The landing [**59] gear, flaps, and wing en-
gines/pylons are designed for wipe-off without rupturing 
the wing fuel tank or fuselage shell structure." (Italics 
added.) 
and 
"These multiple load paths [on the wing] are designed 
to provide strength greater than that of the gear itself in 
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order to prevent rupture of the fuel tank in the event of 
impact with some obstacle during landing and taxiing." 
(Italics added.) 
and 
"Under crash loading conditions, the main landing 
gear is designed to break away from the wing struc-
ture without rupturing fuel lines or the integral wing 
fuel tank." (Italics added.) 
and 
"The [wing] support structure is designed to a higher 
strength than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due 
to an accidental landing gear overload." (Italics added.) 
In its supplemental post-oral-argument brief, Douglas 
urges that the four representations quoted, supra, are 
also inadmissible parol promises of future performance, 
not admissible factual representations, because the air-
craft [*423] was "to be delivered in the future" and 
"Continental clearly understood that at the time . . . 
the brochures [were] distributed, the aircraft was still in 
the design stage." [**60] 
Douglas's argument fails, however, to acknowledge 
that one of Continental's main theories of the case was 
that when these precontract representations were made, 
there was in fact no such design in place with respect 
to the landing gear's breakaway feature; n26 i.e., there 
was never a written directive to accomplish such a de-
sign; Douglas's engineers never agreed on a description 
of how the gear was to fail safely; and the many sepa-
rate groups and departments at Douglas, responsible for 
the design, never met and never coordinated a design ap-
proach or concept with respect to the breakaway feature. 
(When the contract was entered two or three years later, 
its incorporated Design Specification notably provided 
instead that "[t]he main landing gear shall be designed 
so that if it fails . . . the failure mode is not likely to 
rupture the integral fuel tank or fuel lines.") 
n26 With respect to the contract claim only, the 
parties stipulated that the main landing gear, a "cov-
ered component," was designed in April 1969 for 
purposes of determining whether that covered com-
ponent had a design defect in view of the then-
existing state of the art. 
[**61] 
Therefore, the four representations from the 
brochures, quoted supra, which unequivocally an-
nounced that the landing gear breakaway design was then 
a fait accompli, were admissible as factual representa-
tions by Douglas to Continental that it had already ac-
complished its safety-oriented design for that particular 
feature of the aircraft. n27 That evidence was properly 
considered by the jury on each of Continental's relevant 
theories of fraud. 
n27 We have considered the other issues raised 
in Douglas's post-oral-argument supplemental brief 
and find them equally lacking in merit. 
All the representations from the brochures pertaining 
to the breakaway feature of the DC-10, quoted supra, 
were read to the jury in Continental's closing argument. 
Counsel did not unduly emphasize the single promissory 
representation from Douglas's brochures which, as we 
discussed, was admitted in error. Further, that promise 
was less the subject of inquiry during Continental's ex-
amination of witnesses than were the other representa-
tions [**62] about the breakaway feature. 
[***799] Thus, we must conclude, after an examina-
tion of the entire record, that the challenged evidence of 
promissory fraud was merely cumulative of other prop-
erly admitted evidence on that subject; consequently, 
its admission was not prejudicial to Douglas's cause. 
(Cal. Const., art., VI, § 13; Kalfus v. Fraze (1955) 136 
Cal.App.2d 415, 423 [288 P.2d 967]; 9 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure, [*424] Appeal, op. cit. supra, at § 338, 
pp. 345-346.) There was here no miscarriage of justice. 
(Ibid.) 
G. The Precontract Promotional Materials Can Form 
the Basis of Continental's Fraud Claims. 
Douglas's contention that the precontract promotional 
brochures cannot form the basis for a fraud claim is de-
void of merit. n28 
n28 For that reason, and for reasons which become 
apparent in the following sections, we need not dis-
cuss whether Douglas's representation in the Detail 
Specification itself was false. 
First, Douglas argues that "[t]he Uniform Commercial 
Code and [**63] cases interpreting it have recognized 
that general promotional observations of this type are 
merely expressions of opinion that are not actionable as 
express warranties nor as 'fraudulent statements.'" With 
respect to Continental's fraud claims, the only causes of 
action with which we are now concerned, the cases cited 
by Douglas do not support its argument. 
The alleged false representations in the subject 
brochures were not statements of "opinion" or mere 
"puffing." They were, in essence, representations that 
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the DC-10 was a safe aircraft. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 
14 CaUd 104, 111-112 [120 Cal.Rptr. 681, 534 P.2d 
377, 74A.L.R.3d 1282].) In Hauter, the Supreme Court 
held that promises of safety are not statements of opin-
ion ~ they are "representations of fact." (Ibid.; Keith 
v. Buchanan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 13, 21-22 [220 
Cal.Rptr. 392].) 
Next, Douglas urges that the statements in the 
brochures are not actionable because they are not ex-
press warranties under Commercial Code section 2313 
and, further, "they were effectively disclaimed by the 
parties' contract." The point Douglas [**64] is appar-
ently making with respect to the fraud claims is that the 
integration clause of the parties' contract bars any rep-
resentations in the brochures which are at variance with 
their negotiated agreement. 
We do not accept Douglas's argument, because to do 
so would be to nullify Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1856, subdivision (g), the fraud exception to the 
parol evidence rule, which specifically allows evidence 
of representations which contradict or vary the terms of 
a contract in order to establish fraud. The integration 
clause has no effect on the fraud exception to that rule. 
(2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 972, 
pp. 918-919.) "Such evidence does not contradict the 
terms of an effective integration since it shows that the 
purported instrument has no legal effect." (Id. at § 997, 
p. 944.) 
[*425] H. There Is Substantial Evidence That 
Douglas's Misrepresentations Regarding Landing Gear 
Breakaway Were Material and That Continental 
Reasonably Relied on Them in Deciding to Purchase 
the DC-10. 
Douglas contends in its opening brief that there was no 
substantial evidence that its precontract representations 
were material or that Continental reasonably [**65] re-
lied on them in deciding to purchase the DC-10. 
"When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that 
there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the 
power of an appellate court begins and ends with the 
determination as to whether there is any substantial ev-
idence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will sup-
port the finding." (Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 807, 810-811 
[120 Cal.Rptr. 429].) In assessing the sufficiency of 
the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the judgment, drawing all reasonable 
inferences and disregarding all contradictory evidence. 
(Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 
51, 60 [148 Cal.Rptr. 596, 583 R2d 121].) 
[***800] Here, the evidence is overwhelming that 
Douglas's representations, that the landing gear were 
designed to break away from the wing without ruptur-
ing the wing fuel tank (as quoted in section F, supra), 
were material and Continental justifiably relied on them. 
The materiality of the representations can hardly be 
questioned. Any airline shopping for aircraft [**66] to 
service its customers naturally searches for planes that 
are safe. (Cf. Hauter v. Zogarts, supra, 14 Cal.3d at 
p. 113.) 
While it is true, as Douglas urges, that to sustain its 
fraud verdict, Continental was required to demonstrate 
that those representations were of such materiality that 
the contract would not have been entered without them 
(Adkins v. Wyckoff (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 684, 689 
[313 P.2d 592]), it is equally true that they "need not be 
the sole cause of damage" (\hsquez v. Superior Court 
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 814, fn. 9 [94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 
P.2d 964, 53 A.L.R.3d 513]; Wennerholm v. Stanford 
Univ. Sch. of Med. (1942) 20 Cal. 2d 713, 717 [128 
P.2d522, 141A.L.R. 1358]). 
Further, reliance is also established "where the rep-
resentation substantially influenced [the] choice, even 
though other influences operated as well." (5 Witkin, 
Summary Cal. Law, Torts, op. cit. supra, at § 711, p. 
811; see BAJI No. 12.51.) Thus, Douglas's argument, 
that Continental [*426] [**67] must prove a clean land-
ing gear breakaway was a sine qua non of its decision to 
purchase the DC-10, rather than the L-1011, must fail. 
Moreover, it is not necessary to show reliance upon 
false representations by direct evidence, (\hsquez v. 
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 814.) "'The 
fact of reliance upon alleged false representations may 
be inferred from the circumstances attending the trans-
action which oftentimes afford much stronger and more 
satisfactory evidence of the inducement which prompted 
the party defrauded to enter into the contract than his di-
rect testimony to the same effect.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) 
In fact, where representations have been made in regard 
to a material matter and action has been taken, in the 
absence of evidence showing the contrary, reliance on 
the representations will be presumed. (Ibid.) 
Here, both materiality and reliance are demonstrated 
by the fact that Continental evaluated the DC-10 break-
away design in its "Tri-Jet Evaluation," which compared 
the DC-10 with the L-1011 for the purpose of deciding 
which aircraft to purchase. Douglas was the only possi-
ble source for the [**68] information; there was no way 
Continental could independently investigate or analyze 
the adequacy of that design. 
An examination of the Tri-Jet Evaluation shows that, 
in evaluating the DC-10, Continental's engineers fol-
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lowed virtually the exact format set forth in a Douglas 
briefing memorandum. n29 Donald DuPont, the 
Continental engineer who evaluated the aircraft's struc-
tures, recalls using Douglas brochures to prepare the 
DC-10 main landing gear evaluation. The wording of 
In fact, under the heading "Main Landing Gear 
Support," the Continental engineers simply paraphrased 
the description from Douglas's brochures in [**69] its 
evaluation: " . . . Multiple load paths are provided 
for fail safe capability. [*427] The wing structure 
[***801] is stronger than the main landing gear to pre-
vent fuel tank rupture in the event of a crash induced 
gear 'wipe-off.'" 
Numerous witnesses testified that Douglas made oral 
presentations to Continental regarding the DC-10 struc-
ture and landing gear design and provided Continental 
personnel with the promotional sales brochures. 
Martin Taylor, Continental's vice-president responsi-
ble for the DC-10 evaluation, said Continental asked for 
and received assurances that if the plane went off the run-
way, no fire would result from landing gear failure. He 
recalled that during numerous briefings, Douglas repre-
sented that the gear was designed to break away without 
rupturing the fuel tank. He said that was a very impor-
tant subject to Continental. 
Richard Adams, Taylor's superior, reviewed and re-
lied on the Tri-Jet Evaluation in determining the DC-10 
was a safe airplane. He testified that had he been told by 
his subordinates that the DC-10 gear was not designed 
to break away without rupturing the fuel tank, he would 
"definitely not" have recommended that Continental pur-
chase the aircraft. [**70] Alexander Damm, Adams's 
superior, and the President of Continental, said the tech-
nical evaluation of the two planes was very important to 
portions of the Tri-Jet Evaluation was the same as, or 
similar to, that in many of the brochures. 
n29 
him in deciding which aircraft to purchase. He, too, 
would not have recommended an aircraft he did not be-
lieve to be safe. 
The foregoing evidence provides more than substantial 
evidence that Continental relied on Douglas's represen-
tations regarding landing gear breakaway in choosing to 
purchase the DC-10 and that those representations were 
material. 
Douglas next argues, however, that if Continental did 
so rely, its reliance was unreasonable and unjustified as 
a matter of law. In support of that argument, Douglas 
points to the qualified language on the subject of land-
ing gear breakaway in the parties' negotiated contract 
and the contract's integration clause which recited that 
the Purchase Agreement contained the complete state-
ment of the terms between the parties. 
Douglas's reasoning, however, ignores the clear man-
date of our legislature that, when fraud is alleged, the 
parol evidence rule does not apply, and evidence of pre-
contract representations which vary or contradict the 
terms of an integrated contract are admissible. (Code 
Civ. [**71] Proc, § 1856, subd. (g); 2 Witkin, Cal. 
Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 972, pp. 918-919.) 
The theory of the exception is that such evidence does 
not contradict the terms of an effective integration, since 
it shows the purported instrument has no legal effect. 
(2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 997, 
pp. 944-945.) [*428] While we acknowledge that 
the exception renders the bargain of the parties and the 
integration clause of their contract meaningless, our ac-
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ceptance of Douglas's argument would nullify the fraud 
exception to the parol evidence rule which has been a 
part of California statutory law since the Code of Civil 
Procedure was adopted in 1872. That we cannot do; we 
must obey the mandate of our Legislature. 
Finally, Douglas appears to argue in its reply brief, 
both with respect to representations in the Design 
Specification and the brochures, that there is no sub-
stantial evidence of a "knowing or reckless misrepresen-
tation." We disagree. Fraudulent intent may be estab-
lished by inference from the circumstances and the acts 
of the parties. (Miller v. National American Life Ins. 
Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.3datp. 338; [**72] seeDelos 
v. Farmers Insurance Group, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 658.) 
Here, Douglas's sales brochures contain representa-
tions which amount to absolute, unqualified guarantees 
that the landing gear "is" or "are" designed to break away 
without rupturing the wing fuel tanks. However, the 
contract's Design Specification states the landing gear 
"shall be designed" so that under certain specified condi-
tions the landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the wing 
fuel tanks. By that language Douglas revealed that even 
at that later date, when the contract was executed, there 
was still no design yet in place which would warrant an 
absolute [***802] guarantee regarding the breakaway 
characteristics of the landing gear. 
Although the record is replete with evidence of fraud-
ulent intent, that fact standing alone supports a finding 
that Douglas was, at the least, reckless in making rep-
resentations to Continental, in its sales brochures and 
briefings, that the landing gear was designed to break 
away without rupturing the wing fuel tanks. Certainly 
Douglas's sales representatives should have known 
whether a particular feature of the aircraft Douglas was 
promoting with [**73] such vigor was already designed 
or was still being designed (so that its performance was 
yet uncertain). 
"[Fjalse representations made recklessly and without 
regard for their truth in order to induce action by an-
other are the equivalent of misrepresentations knowingly 
and intentionally uttered." (Yellow Creek Logging Corp. 
v. Dare (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 50, 55 [30 Cal.Rptr. 
629].) Therefore, there is substantial evidence of the 
requisite intent for intentional fraud. A fortiori, there 
is also substantial evidence of the intent required for 
negligent misrepresentation. 
For the foregoing reasons we conclude the evidence 
supports the jury's findings of liability on either or both 
of those theories of fraud. 
Life Policy Claim Did Not "Poison" the Entire Lawsuit. 
Douglas contends the trial court erred in submitting 
to the jury Continental's claim based on the Service Life 
Policy and in vague terms complains "prejudicial admis-
sion of documents and testimony relating to this spurious 
issue poisoned the entire lawsuit. . . . " 
Douglas's only specific complaint, however, is that 
its postaccident [**74] "Service Bulletins" regarding 
landing gear modification, admitted on the "spurious" 
contract claim to show a design defect, were improperly 
considered by the jury on the fraud claims, inasmuch 
as the trial court refused its requests for an instruction 
that the bulletins could not be considered "in determining 
whether Douglas committed negligent misrepresentation 
or fraud." (See Evid. Code, § 1151.) 
The record shows, however, that Douglas did not ob-
ject to the admission of one of the bulletins in evidence 
and did not request a limiting instruction when either 
bulletin was admitted. The bulletins were admissible not 
only to show notice and a defect with respect to the con-
tract claim, but were also admissible, and could properly 
be considered by the jury, on the factual question per-
taining to Douglas's statute of limitations defense to the 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. 
Thus, while the trial court may have erred in refus-
ing Douglas's requested limiting instructions, this court 
cannot say the jury's consideration of those bulletins 
with respect to Continental's fraud theories so preju-
diced Douglas's case that there was here a miscarriage 
of justice. (Cal. Const., [**75] art. VI, § 13.) 
J. The Jury Was Properly Instructed That the Measure 
of Damages for Fraud Is the Market Value of the 
Aircraft. 
Douglas argues the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on the measure of damages for fraud. Specifically, 
Douglas complains the trial court permitted Continental 
to recover the market value of the aircraft under a 
"benefit-of-the-bargain" theory, whereas the damages 
should properly have been measured by the "out-of-
pocket" rule. 
According to Douglas, the proper measure of dam-
ages in fraud actions involving the sale of property is 
"explicitly and exclusively" set forth in [*430] Civil 
Code section 3343 as "the difference between the actual 
value of that with which the defrauded person parted and 
the actual value of that which he received" - the "out-
of-pocket" rule - plus additional damages arising out of 
the particular transaction, as detailed in subdivisions (a) 
(1) through (4). 
[*429] I. The Trial Court's Treatment of the Service The court, however, instructed the jury that 
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Continental could recover as damages [***803] the 
market value of the aircraft at the time of the acci-
dent, less the amount of damages from causes other 
than the fraud, and less the value of the parts salvaged. 
Douglas maintains [**76] the court's damage formula 
used a benefit-of-the-bargain measure which improperly 
allowed Continental to use its fraud cause of action to re-
cover contractual-type expectations damages which Civil 
Code section 3343 forbids. 
Thus, Douglas raises two questions: (1) Does Civil 
Code section 3343 set forth the exclusive (out-of-pocket) 
measure of damages for fraud actions and (2) in such ac-
tions, is the out-of-pocket rule the only measure of dam-
ages which may be applied? We answer both questions 
in the negative for reasons we explain below. 
In Stout v. Turney (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 718 [150 
Cal.Rptr. 637, 586 P.2d 1228], which involved an ac-
tion for fraud in the sale of real estate, the Supreme 
Court, while discussing a damages question under Civil 
Code section 3343, unequivocally acknowledged the 
1963 enactment of the California Uniform Commercial 
Code, "which in section 2721 n30 permitted full 
'benefit-of-the-bargain' recovery to defrauded persons 
subject to its provisions." (22 Cal.3d at p. 726, fn. 
omitted.) n31 Here, Douglas's sale of the DC-10 [*431] 
fleet to Continental was clearly governed [**77] by the 
provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code. 
n30 California Uniform Commercial Code section 
2721 provides in pertinent part: "Remedies for ma-
terial misrepresentation or fraud include all reme-
dies available under this division for nonfraudulent 
breach. . . . " 
n31 A benefit-of-the-bargain measure of recovery 
is also appropriate under Civil Code section 3343. 
Douglas relies on Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 
31 Cal.2d 744, 762 [192 R2d 935], in which the 
Supreme Court held that section 3343 requires the 
exclusive use of the out-of-pocket rule as a measure 
of damages for fraud. However, Douglas ignores 
the holding of Vford v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal. 2d 
736 [336 P. 2d 534], in which the Bagdasarian rule 
was modified when the court, in order to achieve 
a just result, refused to limit recovery to plaintiff's 
out-of-pocket loss. Thereafter, in Coleman v. Ladd 
Ford Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 90 [29 Cal.Rptr. 
832], the Court of Appeal created a new exception 
to the Bagdasarian interpretation of section 3343, 
relying on the Supreme Court's departure from the 
out-of-pocket rule in Ward. In Coleman, the court 
declared fraud damages could be recovered under an 
alternative and cumulative "'loss of bargain' rule." 
(Id. at pp. 93, 94; cited in Stout v. Turney, supra, 
22 Cal. 3d at p. 726; see Hartman v. Shell Oil Co. 
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 240, 246-247 [137 Cal.Rptr. 
244].) "Both Ward and Coleman evidence the courts' 
concern over the mechanical application of the 'out 
of pocket' rule required by the Bagdasarian inter-
pretation of section 3343." (Notes (1964) 11 UCLA 
L.Rev. 859, 884.) 
[**78] 
In its opinion, the Stout court noted the Legislative 
Counsel's comment to section 2721 in which counsel 
observed that the purpose of the section, "'according to 
the [California Uniform Commercial Code] comments, 
is to make the remedy of buyer or seller where there is 
fraud as broad as, and coextensive with, the remedies 
where fraud is absent [and that the] section would per-
haps n32 change the rule of Civil Code § 3343 stating 
the so-called "out-of-pocket" rule . . . and substitute 
or permit the so-called "loss of bargain" rule . . . .' 
[Citation.]" (22 Cal. 3d at pp. 726-727, fn. 10.) 
n32 Douglas, pointing to the words "would per-
haps" in the Legislative Counsel's comment to sec-
tion 2721, argues the comment is mere speculation. 
However, the court's acknowledgment, 15 years af-
ter this state's adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, that section 2721 permits full benefit-of-the-
bargain recovery to persons subject to its provisions 
(22 Cal. 3d at p. 726), now removes any doubt as to 
the effect of that section. 
[**79] 
The Stout court also cited (at pp. 726-727) to a law 
review comment, Deceit Damages in California: Old 
Problem ~ New Departure? (1974) 14 Santa Clara 
Law. 325, 345-347, which stated: "The adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in California further compli-
cated the tangle of rules for fraud damages. California 
Commercial Code section 2721 allows defrauded per-
sons to secure the benefit of their bargain. The provision 
was intended to equalize the remedy of buyer or seller in 
fraud and breach of warranty cases. California's 'out-
of-pocket' statute [Civ. Code, § 3343] was not repealed 
despite its sharp conflict with the Commercial Code." 
n33 (Id. at p. 347, italics added, fns. omitted.) 
n33 Other law review articles of this state also 
suggest that section 2721, rather than Civil Code 
section 3343, governs when the fraudulent transac-
tion involves the purchase of goods. (See, e.g., 
Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in 
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Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving 
the Objective of Full Compensation (1986) 33 UCLA 
L.Rev. 1565, 1601, fit. 127; Hurd & Bush, 
Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for 
California Consumers (1973) 25 Hastings L.J. 1, 
27-28, Jh. 151.) 
[**80] [***804] 
And, Bernard E. Witkin, in his treatise on Torts (6 
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, 
§ 1441, p. 916), lists California Uniform Commercial 
Code section 2721 as an exception to the out-of-pocket 
rule of Civil Code section 3343, noting "[t]he purpose 
of [section 2721] is to give the defrauded buyer of goods 
the same remedies as those specified for breach of war-
ranty, and therefore in a proper case to give him the 
benefit of his bargain." n34 (Italics added.) 
n34 Douglas nonetheless maintains that princi-
ples of statutory construction lead to the conclusion 
that Civil Code section 3343 supersedes California 
Uniform Commercial Code section 2721. Relying 
on Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 
16Cal.3dl, 7[128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547R2d 449], 
it argues that the provisions of two different codes 
dealing with the same subject matter must be re-
garded as a single statute and harmonized to the ex-
tent possible. According to Douglas's argument, if 
they cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls. 
Pointing to the 1971 amendment to section 3343, 
Douglas argues that section 3343 is the later and con-
trolling statute, inasmuch as the Commercial Code 
was adopted earlier, in 1963. We are not persuaded. 
The rule of statutory construction most relevant 
here was stated by our Supreme Court in People 
v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, at page 479 [82 
Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 R2d580], as follows: "'It is the 
general rule that where the general statute standing 
alone would include the same matter as the special 
act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will 
be considered as an exception to the general statute 
whether it was passed before or after such general 
enactment.'" 
Here, Civil Code section 3343 is a general statute 
which provides the measure of damages when a 
party has been defrauded in the purchase, sale or 
exchange of all manner of property. In contrast, 
California Uniform Commercial Code section 2721 
is a special statute which provides remedies for fraud-
ulent transactions involving solely consumer goods. 
Therefore, under the rules of statutory construction, 
section 2721 is the controlling statute. 
[**81] 
[*432] The appropriate remedy for this case is con-
tained in California Uniform Commercial Code section 
2714, subdivision (2), which provides: "The measure 
of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at 
the time and place of acceptance between the value of 
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if 
they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount." (Italics 
added.) 
In comment number three of the Uniform Commercial 
Code comments to section 2-714, it is noted that 
"[s]ubsection (2) describes the usual, standard and rea-
sonable method of ascertaining damages in the case of 
breach of warranty but it is not intended as an exclusive 
measure. . . . " 
For example, in Harlan v. Smith (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) 
507 So.2d 943, 945, the court held a party's use of a 
product for a period of time after sale without notice of 
a defect constituted "special circumstances" which took 
the case out of the "time and place of acceptance" provi-
sions of section 2-714, subdivision (2). Therefore, the 
party who lacked notice needed to prove the value of the 
item at the time of the effective discovery of the [**82] 
defect rather than its value at the date of acceptance. 
(Ibid.) 
Most analogous to the instant matter are cases which 
involve breach of a warranty of title, where the purchaser 
used the goods for a period of time without any notice of 
defective title and, after discovery of the defect, is com-
pletely dispossessed of the item. In those cases, too, the 
courts have found special circumstances which take the 
case out of the time and place of acceptance provisions of 
section 2714. They hold the correct measure of damages 
is the value of the product at the time the buyer effec-
tively lost [*433] possession and use of it, not the price 
of the item at the time of sale. (See, e. g., City Car Sales, 
Inc. v. McAlpin (Ala. Civ.App. 1979) 380 So. 2d 865, 
868, cert. den. (Ala. 1980) 380 So.2d 869; Schneidt 
v. Absey Motors, Inc. (N.D. 1976) 248 N.W.2d 792, 
798; De Weber v. Bob Rice Ford, Inc. (1979) 99 Idaho 
847 [590 P.2d 103, 105]; Ricklefs v. Clemens (1975) 
216 Kan. 128 [531 P.2d 94, 99]; Metal Craft, Inc. v. 
Pratt (1985) 65Md.App. 281 [500A.2d329, 336-337]; 
[**83] Canterra Petro. v. Wstern Drill. & Min. (N.D. 
1987) 418 N.W.2d 267, 275; see also Annot., Measure 
of Damages in Action for Breach of Warranty [***805] 
of Title to Personal Property under UCC § 2-714 (1979) 
94A.L.R.3d583.) n35 
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n35 In a case decided before the 1935 enactment 
of Civil Code section 3343, and during the period 
when California subscribed to the benefit-of-bargain 
rule in fraud cases, the Supreme Court observed that 
the "measure of damages which a person is ordinar-
ily entitled to recover in an action for deceit in the 
sale of property is the difference between the actual 
value of the property and its value had the property 
been as represented, and that the measure of recovery 
is not affected by the price paid." (Hines v. Erode 
(1914) 168 Cal. 507, 510 [143 P. 729]; 6 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, op. cit. supra, at § 
1441, pp. 914-915.) 
(See fh. 36.) Here, special circumstances take this 
case out of the time and acceptance [**84] provisions of 
section 2714 and require the measure of damages to be 
the market value of the aircraft at the time Continental 
effectively lost use of it, namely, on the date of the acci-
dent. n36 However, inasmuch as Continental was able 
to sell the salvageable parts, that amount was properly 
subtracted from Continental's damages. So, too, any 
damage to the aircraft from the impact alone was not 
chargeable to Douglas. 
n36 With respect to trespass and other tortious in-
jury to personal property, "[i]f the property is wholly 
destroyed, the usual measure of damages is its mar-
ket value." (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, 
op. cit. supra, at § 1453, p. 927, italics in original.) 
Therefore, the instruction to the jury, to measure 
Continental's fraud damages by subtracting from the 
market value of the aircraft, at the time of the acci-
dent, the value of the salvageable parts and the amount 
of damages due to the impact alone, was in all respects 
correct. n37 
n37 Contrary to Douglas's contention, this for-
mulation of Continental's damages remedy does not 
include a recovery for lost profits, which Continental 
waived at trial. 
[**85] 
K. Prejudgment Interest May Be Awarded at No More 
Than 7 Percent Per Annum. 
In its Consolidated Final Judgment, the trial court 
awarded Continental prejudgment interest on the $ 17 
million fraud verdict and the $ 13.4 million contract ver-
dict "at the rate of 7 percent per annum from March 1, 
1978, until January 1, 1983, and at 10 percent per annum 
thereafter until January [*434] 30, 1986." Douglas cor-
rectly asserts the 10 percent prejudgment interest awards 
in the judgment were improper. 
In Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance 
Co. of North America (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 703, 716-
717[212 Cal.Rptr. 754], citing article XV, section 1, of 
the California Constitution, the court held that "[i]n the 
absence of any legislative act to the contrary, the rate of 
prejudgment interest is 7 percent," and reduced the trial 
court's prejudgment interest award from 10 percent to 
7 percent. (Accord, Northrop Corp. v. Triad Intern. 
Marketing S.A. (9th Cir. 1988) 842 E2d 1154, 1155, 
fn. 2; Stan Lee Trading, Inc. v. Holtz (C.D.Cal. 1986) 
649F.Supp. 577,583.) 
Since there is no relevant legislative act [**86] spec-
ifying a rate of prejudgment interest for a fraud claim, 
n38 the constitutional 7 percent rate applies and the judg-
ment must be modified accordingly. 
n38 There was no statutory enactment providing 
for a rate of prejudgment interest until 1985. In that 
year, the legislature added subdivision (b) to sec-
tion 3289 of the Civil Code, effective January 1986. 
(Stats. 1985, ch. 663, § 1, p. 2251.) As amended 
in 1986 (Stats. 1986, ch. 176, § 1, eff. June 23, 
1986), that subdivision provides as follows: "If a 
contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not 
stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall 
bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after 
a breach." 
II. The Service Life Policy Claim 
Inasmuch as the fraud judgment must be upheld, as 
modified, we need not discuss Douglas's contentions 
regarding the alternative judgment on the jury's award 
for breach of the Service Life Policy. 
The judgment is modified to reflect an award of pre-
judgment interest in the amount of $ 9,549,750, calcu-
lated [**87] at the rate of 7 percent per annum from 
March 1, 1978, until January 30, 1986. n39 As so 
modified, the judgment is affirmed. 
n39 The formula for calculating prejudgment in-
terest is: principal X rate of interest X number of 
days interest accrued / 360. 
[*435] [***806] The parties are to bear their own 
costs on appeal. 
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FEDERAL MINING & ENGINEERING 
CO., Limited, v. POLLAK. 
No. 3213. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Jan. 4, 1939. 
1. Mines and minerals <§=M04 
The obtaining of corporate note and 
mortgage by director to whom mining corpo-
ration was indebted was not evidence of 
fraud which would invalidate note and mort-
gage, where director did not vote on giving 
of mortgage and thereafter continued to loan 
money to the corporation. 
2. Mines and minerals <§=*I04 
A transaction by which director was to 
sell his stock and the note and mortgage exe-
cuted to him by mining corporation, and by 
which buyer was to be given a lease on min-
ing property after director acquired title 
thereto by foreclosure of the mortgage, and 
by which a sum of money called advance 
royalty was paid by buyer to director's ac-
count as a payment for the mortgage and 
stock, did not indicate such fraud as would 
invalidate corporation's prior execution of 
note and mortgage to director. 
3. Mines and minerals C=I04 
A special meeting of which no written 
notice was given to directors as required 
by by-laws of mining corporation, and which 
was not attended by a majority of directors 
plus one, which the by-laws provided should 
constitute a quorum, was not a legal meeting 
and no legal action could be taken at such 
meeting. 
4. Estoppel <©=»92(l) 
A person cannot accept the benefits de-
rived from a transaction and repudiate the 
burdens connected with the transaction. 
5. Corporations <§=>426(I0) 
A corporation cannot avail itself of the 
benefits of moneys loaned to it for its cor-
porate purposes, and disavow a mortgage 
given without authority by its agents to se-
cure the loan. 
6. Estoppel <§=*92(l) 
The rule that a person cannot both bene-
fit by and repudiate an instrument rests up-
on the equitable ground that a person can-
not claim inconsistent rights in regard to 
the same subject 
7. Corporations <§=»426(I0) 
A corporation, which knowingly accepts 
or retains the benefit of an unauthorized 
contract or other transaction by its officers 
or agents, thereby ratifies the contract or 
other transaction, and is estopped to deny 
ratification unless the' rights of the public 
are involved or unless the contract is in 
violation of some positive law or well-set-
tied rule of public policy. 
8. Mines and minerals <3=al05(2) 
A mining corporation was estopped from 
asserting invalidity of note and mortgage 
executed by corporation to director at a spe-
cial meeting of which the directors were 
not given written notice and which was not 
attended by a quorum consisting of a ma-
jority of the directors plus one as required 
by by-laws, where note and mortgage were 
executed in good faith to secure director's 
loans without which the corporation could 
not have continued in business, and the di-
rector did not procure execution of note and 
mortgage by fraud and did not vote on the 
motion calling for execution of note and 
mortgage, and all the directors knew of the 
giving of the note and mortgage and ac-
quiesced therein. 
9. Corporations <&»309(5) 
That a person lending money to corpo-
ration and taking security therefor is an 
officer of corporation does not of itself in-
validate the transaction, but merely require^ 
that the evidence be subjected to a close 
scrutiny as to the good faith of the officer, 
and such a transaction is valid if fairly en-
tered into. 
10. Pleading <S>237(4) 
An order requiring plaintiff to amend his 
reply to conform to the proofs submitted was 
not error, notwithstanding that order was 
not made during trial of case but on the 
settlement of the findings on question of cor-
poration's ratification and estoppel to deny 
validity of mortgage, where the case was 
tried on the theory that ratification and es-
toppel were in issue. 
11. Mines and minerals <£=>I04 
In action to foreclose mortgage executed 
by mining corporation to director loaning 
money to corporation, refusal to allow as a 
credit to the corporation a sum paid to di-
rector by third person in connection with 
transaction by which director was to sell his 
stock and mortgage to third person and was 
to give third person a lease on the corpora-
tion'.: mining property was not error, where 
transaction was not to be completed until 
after director acquired title to mining prop-
erty by foreclosure of the mortgage. 




12. New trial <S=*I02(I) 
The denial of motion for new trial on 
ground of newly discovered evidence was 
decree and from an order denying its mo-
tion for a new trial. The parties will 
henceforth be referred to respectively as 
proper where due diligence to procure such appellant, or the corporation, and respond-
evidence at the trial was not shown. ent. 
» The following salient facts appear in evi-
dence : Appellant, a mining corporation, on 
or about August 1933, secured from one 
Hanson, a lease and option to purchase 
the mining claims situate in Mineral Coun-
ty, Nevada, described in the mortgage in-
volved. By the terms of the lease and op-
tion the purchase price was to be $15,000, 
payable in installments, with final payment 
of $14,000 to become due the last of July 
1934. Hanson was to pay $1,500 of the 
purchase price to O. J. Belleville, one of 
the directors of the appellant corporation 
as a ten percent commission for consum-
mating the deal, and $3,000 thereof to one 
Howell, for certain maps and data pertain-
ing thereto. After securing the lease and 
option the corporation entered into posses-
sion of the mining property and began op-
eration of the same. 
Appeal from Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Mineral County; Wm. D. Hatton, 
Judge. 
Action by Robert M. Pollak against the 
Federal Mining & Engineering Company, 
Limited, to foreclose a mortgage on certain 
mining property and personal property ap-
purtenant thereto. From a decree for the 
plaintiff and from an order denying a mo-
tion for a new trial, the defendant appeals. 
Decree and order affirmed. 
Walter Rowson, of Reno, for appellant: 
Forman & Forman, of Reno, for respond-
ent. 
DUCKER, Justice. 
The plaintiff in the lower court, respond-
ent here, commenced this action for the 
foreclosure of a mortgage on certain min-
ing property and personal property appur-
tenant thereto. 
It was alleged in the complaint that the 
mortgage was given by the defendant to 
secure a promissory note made, executed 
and delivered by it to plaintiff in the sum 
of $25,000. Facts showing the necessity 
of appointment of a receiver to take pos-
session of the mortgaged premises and 
property were alleged. Defendant answer-
ed, denying generally the material allega-
tions of the complaint. It was alleged that 
the note sued on was procured by plaintiff 
by means of false and fraudulent state-
ments and representations, fraudulent con-
cealment of facts and without proper cor-
porate action. Like allegations were made 
with respect to the mortgage. It was also 
alleged that both note and mortgage are 
invalid and without consideration,, and that 
the mortgage is therefore void. The ne-
cessity of appointing a receiver was denied. 
The affirmative allegations of piaintifFs 
answer were denied in the reply. 
The trial court found in favor of plain-
tiff to the extent of seventeen thousand 
nine hundred and one dollars and forty-
three cents, and a decree of foreclosure 
was entered accordingly. The appeal, 
which was taken by defendant, is from this 
85 P.2d—34 
In January 1934 appellant sold to re-
spondent and received payment therefor in 
cash, stock in the corporation to the amount 
of $5,000. Shortly thereafter appellant 
commenced to borrow money from him for 
the purposes of the corporation in connec-
tion with said mining property. Beginning 
in March 1934 and extending to and in-
cluding August 3tlst of that year, respond-
ent had at various times advanced suras of 
money to appellant for such purposes, 
amounting to $6,221.55. 
" A stockholders meethrg was held in April 
1934 at which respondent was elected a di-
rector of the corporation. The remaining 
directors elected at that time were O. J. 
Belleville, P. B. Beamer, Edwin E. 
Sprague, Elmer E. Sprague, H. W. Lang, 
Dr. Barnard, Harry Kankamp and M. E. 
Bohannan, who thereafter, with respond-
ent, constituted the board. A directors 
meeting was held at that time at which 
respondent was elected president of the 
corporation. Elmer Sprague was elected 
secretary and H. W. Lang treasurer at this 
meeting. 
Respondent advanced $2,000 to the com-
pany at that time,, and in June following 
advanced $2,006 more. Soon thereafter the 
company was again 4n, financial difficulties, 
and the time to make final payment to, Hanr 
son O*L the lease ang option was nearing. 
Han&qn e x t e n d the tinae to the last of 
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August In the latter part of that month 
the company was considerably in debt. It 
had no money to meet its obligations or 
to make the final payment on the lease and 
option. In this exigency, Elmer Sprague, 
on Aug. 20th, wired respondent at Fort 
Wayne, Indiana, where the latter lived, for 
financial help, and was told by a return 
wire on Aug. 22nd, that respondent could 
furnish no more capital. On the same day 
Sprague sent him another pressing wire of 
the same import. Being unable to secure 
any money from respondent, Sprague went 
to Fort Wayne and induced him to come 
to Nevada to pay off Hanson. While in 
Indiana Sprague also conferred with di-
rectors Kankamp and Dr. Barnard, con-
cerning the matter. They understood that 
final payment was soon to become due; 
that a meeting of the directors was to be 
held in Mina about August 28th and it was 
expected to get the money from respondent 
to make the payment. Sprague informed 
them that their presence would not be nec-
essary to form a quorum. Respondent and 
Elmer Sprague flew to Salt Lake City, 
where they met director Edwin E. Sprague, 
and discussed with him the proposition of 
respondent putting up the money to make 
final payment. From Salt Lake City re-
spondent and Elmer Sprague went to Mina, 
in Mineral County, and thence to the min-
ing property on August 31st With the ex> 
ception of Kankamp^ T>r, Barnard and Ed-
win E. Sprague, the remaining, directors 
were in Mina and went with respondent and 
Elmer Sprague to the mining property. On 
their return to Mina on -the evening of the 
31st of August a meeting; of the directors 
was held at the Baker Hotel* at which 
it was agreed that if respondent, would ad-
vance the money to make final-payment to 
Hanson, and also money to the corporation 
to meet unpaid bills, taxes due* water rent 
due, and an additional accrued nayrofl, the 
corporation would execute; and deliver to 
him the note and mortgage in question. 
This was done and respondeat gave Hanson 
a check for $9,55$> in payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase pripe? and gave the 
corporation his checkjo? $2,72Q.45, for ob-
ligations of the corporation then due^  The 
total o f all the sums advanced by respond-
ent to the ottforatkm' and in its behalf, 
was $18,500. To this was* inducted* in Hie 
note and mortgage the said surt ef $5,000 
paid by him tb Hie corporation, atad< the 
sum of $1,500 for^dtfittocml expensed of 
the corporation, making in^ aH f$fe son* of 
$25*600. Respondent testified -> that * It* hid 
paid said additional expenses id the amount 
of $1,500. A resolution was'adopted at the 
meeting authorizing the secretary and 
treasurer to execute the note arid morf, 
gage. Respondent testified that O. J. Belle-
ville was present at the meeting, but the 
latter testified that he was not present, and 
the lower court accepted his testimony. 
The by-laws of the corporation provide 
that a majority of the directors plus one, 
shall constitute a quorum. So a quorum of 
the directors was not present at the special 
meeting at which the note and mortgage 
were given to respondent No written no-
tice of the special meeting was given to the 
directors, as provided by the by-laws. 
The court found, among other findings, 
as follows: 
"That at a meeting of the five directors 
6t the defendant corporation held- ta Mina, 
Nevada, August 31> 1 9 ^ the said, secretary 
and treasurer of defendant were pur-
portedly authorized and directed to execute 
and deliver said mortgage; that 119 written 
notice was given to the remaining oifW 
tors of the defendant corporation of the 
said meeting prior to the hording thereof, 
but that all of the remaining directors oC 
said defendant corporation had knowledge 
that said meeting was to be held and thk 
general purpose thereof; that tkevdiuec-
tors vat attendance at said meeting; in-
cluding'the plaintiff, constituted a majority 
of all I the directors: of - said defendant 
corporation,, but that- said director co& 
stkuted one les? than a. quorum (a majority 
phis one) provided lor by the by-laws oaf 
the" defendant; that the consideration^ of 
the said promissory note and mortgage 
consisted of moneys advanced by plaintiff 
to defendant corporations in the sum <*f 
$17,901.43, including taxes hereinafter 
mentioned; that apportion; of the moneys 
*o> advanced wersvadvacceri sirimltftttcousiy 
whir the said signing amd purported ex? 
ecKtkav and delivery of said note and 
mortgage and far supply tfarfmixiaae pficc 
of the? mining ckims described: irt sail 
mortgage, and were advanced, by plaintiff 
upon the purported condkioa, as adopted 
by said meeting of directors, that such 
moneys and any, moneys tfrefetofpjr^  i | 
thereafter advanced by plaintiff to a?-
ftt*&n* cofpor^n^lfdtt»>*e f*ficttfW*>'1 
sdidf todte 2nd ^kfrt&*g#f fBkt-ifef 
ccfffter&fen' fe&cfetM" skiff 
id the sin* df $17£0P.4* sfrtnade^ 
tittf, and said man*^>w*f* iis^ft^flef**^ 
*ftt (g^ratftif fftrife ttit^te^r^$ 
that all off* 
holders: ofc* 
a long tinio 
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that all of the directors, officers and stock-
holders of the defendant corporation for 
a long time past, have been upon notice 
or have had knowledge of the advancement 
and acceptance of the said aggregate sum 
of $17,901.43, and of the use of the same 
as aforesaid, and of the execution and 
delivery of the said note and mortgage, 
and have by their acquiescence and the 
said corporation has by its acquiescence, 
ratified the same as the debt and mortgage 
of the corporation to the extent of 
$17,901.43, and is estopped to deny the 
same. 
' T h a t the defendant has failed to pay 
taxes upon the property described in the 
mortgage for the years 1934 and 1935, 
which said taxes were a lien and charge 
upon the property described in said mort-
gage; that plaintiff herein has paid said 
taxes in the sum of $648.07. 
"That no fraud was practiced by plain-
tiff in any of the transactions involved 
in this court." 
These findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence, except possibly, as to all 
of the directors having knowledge that 
the special meeting was to be held. Edwin 
E. Sprague swears he knew nothing of the 
meeting until some time after. Belleville 
testified he did not know that the meeting 
was to be held. However, it appears he 
was not averse to respondent having 
security for the money he advanced, or was 
to advance. He testified that he went 
with respondent and the other directors 
to the mining property on the 31st of 
August, and while there respondent said 
to him, "What is the matter with the 
property, why doesn't it pay?" "I told him 
that the property was all right, it was 
the management. And he said that he 
had $8,700 in. the property, and I told 
him it was wocjji fifty thousand dollars 
of any man's, fiwmey, but that I would 
not put it up unless I had control or 
security." 
The record justified the finding *as to the 
absence of fraud on the part 6fc respond-
ent We will not attempt, to answer all 
of the contentions of respondent in this 
respect, a few general comments will suf-
fice. Of all of the directors, respondent, 
so far as the record shows, was the only 
one who put up any real money to obtain 
title to the property involved and to try 
to put it on a producing basis. He was 
liberal in this respect, and his liberality 
held good for some time. Naturally he 
wanted security for his outlay and Belle-
ville thought he should have it. When he 
got it we find Belleville on hand wanting 
to know what was to be done about his 
commission. That he was not present at 
the meeting does not appear to be through 
any connivance of respondent. Respondent 
testified that he was there and probably 
thought he was. Having told respondent 
that he would not put up money unless 
he had control or security, respondent 
would have naturally wanted him present 
to vote like he talked. 
[1] The obtaining of the note and 
mortgage by respondent is no evidence of 
fraud. He did not vote on the motion. 
After the execution of the note and mort-
gage he continued to put up money for 
corporate purposes. Thereafter he made 
several unsuccessful attempts to make a 
deal for the sale of the property, and was 
finally forced to commence suit to re-
imburse himself. 
[2] One of the incidents that appellant 
dwells upon as indicating fraud, is that 
after this action was instituted respondent 
entered into a deal with one Mooney to sell 
to him his mortgage and stock for $26,000, 
and by which Mooney was to be given a 
lease on the mining property, and in which 
he paid to respondent's account $3500, 
which was designated advance royalty, and 
which was to apply as a- payment by 
Mooney to respondent for his mortgage and 
stock. We see nothing fraudulent in this 
transaction. It was fully explained by re-
spondent. Moreover, it was a transaction 
accruing some time after the execution of 
the note and mortgage, and was wholly 
immaterial. The same is true as to other 
negotiations respondent had for the sale 
of the property during several years after 
the execution of the note and mortgage. 
The trial court disallowed a substantial 
part of respondent's claim included in the 
mortgage. No allowance was made for 
the sum of $5000 paid by respondent for 
his stock in the company, or for the sum of 
$1500 additional expense or for sundry 
other advancements, reducing the claim, as 
heretofore stated, from $25,000 to $17,-
901.43. It was found that the latter amount 
represented payments accepted by the cor-
poration for its corporate purposes. 
[3-5] The question is presented wheth-
er, under the facts of the case, the judg-
ment was warranted, on the ground of 
ratification by acquiescence, or estoppel, for 
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it must be conceded that notice of the spe-
cial meeting was not given to all of the di-
rectors, nor was there a quorum present 
when the note and mortgage were execut-
ed. As heretofore pointed out, the by-laws 
required that a written notice of any spe-
cial meeting must be given, and that a ma-
jority plus one should constitute a quorum. 
Consequently a legal meeting* was not held 
for want of proper notice. Defanti v. Al-
len Clark Co., 45 Nev. 120, 198 P. 549; 
Clark Realty Co. v. Douglas, 46 Nev. 378, 
212 P. 466. Aside from that, legal action 
was not and could not have been taken for 
lack of a quorum. Appellant's contention 
in these respects must be allowed. But 
generally speaking, it is a well settled rule 
of law that one cannot accept the benefits 
derived from a transaction and repudiate 
any burden connected with it. To state 
the rule more specifically in its application 
to the facts of this case, a corporation can-
not avail itself of the benefits of moneys 
loaned to it for its corporate purposes, and 
disavow a mortgage given without author-
ity by its agents to secure the loan. 
The rule is analogous to that which gov-
erns in a case where a party avails him-
self of the benefits flowing*from a part of 
an instrument and would repudiate the 
part carrying a burden. 
[6] In Alexander v. Winters, 23 Nev. 
475, 49 P. 116; Id., 24 Nev. 143, 50 P. 798, 
it was held that this could not be done, the 
court saying: <fIt is well settled that a 
person shall not be allowed at once to bene«-
fit by and repudiate an instrument, but, if 
he chooses to take the benefit which it con-
fers, he shall likewise take the obligations 
or bear the onus which it imposes." 24 
Nev. 143, 146, 50 P. 798, 799. The princi-
ple rests upon the equitable ground that 
no man can be permitted to claim incon-
sistent rights in regard to the same sub-
ject. 2 Herman on Estoppel, aad Res Ad-
judicata, Section 1028. 
[7] The generally accepted rule is thus 
stated in 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corpora-
tions, at page 826, anjd following: "Unless 
the rights of the public are involved or un-
less the contract is in violation of some 
positive law or well-settled rule of, public 
policy, as a general rule, if a corporation^ 
with knowledge of the facts, accepts or re-
tains the benefit of an unauthorized eon-
tract or other transaction by its officers OP 
agents, as where it receives and uses- or 
retains money or property paid by'the other 
party, or accepts the benefits of services, 
etc., it thereby ratified the contract or other 
transaction, or will be estopped to deny 
ratification." The authority goes on to 
say: "This rule is based upon the doctrine 
of ratification in toto, under which a prin-
ciple must either ratify the whole transac-
tion or repudiate the whole. He cannot 
separate the transaction and ratify die part 
that is beneficial to him, repudiating the 
remainder; but if he, of his own election 
and with full knowledge, accepts and re-
tains the benefits of an unauthorized trans-
action, he must also accept the part that 
is not beneficial, and will be held to have 
ratified the whole. In some states this rule 
is adopted by statute/' 
[8] We have no such statute in this 
state, but in view of the decisions hereto-
fore rendered by this court, the question as 
to the applicability of the rule to the facts 
of this case is not aa open one m our ju-
risdiction. 
The rule was applied in Defanti v. Allen 
Clark Co., 45 Nev. 120, 19& P. 549. In 
that case the mortgage was. made by two 
of the trustees of the corporation, which 
received the benefit oi the loan thtis se-
cured. The third remaining trustee; Allen 
Clark, received no notice of the meeting 
and contended that he had no knowledge 
of the transaction until a few .days before 
the institution of the suit for foreclosure.. 
The^court held the giving of the mort-
gage was an invalid* act, but as the corpora-
tion had received the money derived from 
the mortgage loan, the decree of fore-
closure should be affirmed. * Appellant con-
tends1 that the facts in Defanti v. Allen 
Clark Co., Supra, are so dissimilar to those 
of the instant case that it is not an author* 
ity in point. We think it*is controlling. 
In some respects the facts in* the cases are1 
strikingly similar, and iir others not so* 
variant as to invoke a different rule, ftr 
each there was an invalicTa&rof executing* 
a mortgage on the corporate property at-
a* meeting of which proper notice had lot 
been given to all^ of the directors. hiJeads 
the motley represented by the mortgage 
was of the utmost benefit to the coupara* 
Hon; tit fact of Itf e-savtn$r quality i* botfc 
cases. In the instant case the moneys ad& 
vaiieed ^  by < respondent 'were substantially 
die* tally resource of th* corpo&titta ft* 
its corporate purposes;, and saved? the lot* 
of titkto almost all of to mining property* 
If respondent had not put upr|9,5l§ otPtktit 
31st o* August 1934, tht; last day of tb* 
FEDERAL MINING & ENGINEERING CO. v. POLLAK 
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extension of time to make final payment on 
the option, the corporation would have 
been wrecked. In addition he, at the same 
time, put up $2,720.45, and subsequently 
large sums were advanced by him in good 
faith, which were disallowed. All of this, 
in addition to the large sums he had ad-
vanced for the benefit of the corporation 
prior to said 31st of August. 
In the Defanti v. Allen Clark Co. Case a 
similar portending disaster was averted by 
the mortgage loan, as indicated in the opin-
ion. The court said [page 551] : ' T h e 
loan was personally negotiated by Emily 
Clark, wife of Allen L. Clark, to protect 
the property of the corporation from being 
sacrificed, as well as to pay other existing 
obligations." 
But appellant contends that essential 
elements are lacking in the instant case 
that were present in Defanti v. Allen Clark 
Co., supra, namely, knowledge on the part 
of the corporation through knowledge of 
all of its directors, of the giving of the 
mortgage and the reception of the benefits 
derived from the loan secured, and ac-
quiescence therein. A number of cases 
are presented by him in support of his 
position that such are essential elements to 
show ratification by acquiescence or es-
toppel. But we think all are present in 
the instant case. As previously shown, the 
court found them to be present. 
Direct evidence, and evidence from 
which such knowledge is fairly inferable, 
supports such finding. To analyze it and 
show its probative force in this regard, 
would serve no useful purpose and impress 
this opinion with the vice of inexcusable 
prolixity. See Clark Realty Co. v. Doug-
las, 46 Nev. 378, 212 P. 466, for a recogni-
tion of the rule we approve herein. 
[9] Appellant contends that the re-
spondent being an officer of the corpora-
tion takes the case out of the rule we have 
approved, and invalidated the transaction. 
This is not so. Such fact only subjects the 
evidence to a close scrutiny as to the good 
faith of the officer of -a corporation who 
loans money to it and takes security there-
for. That such a transaction is valid if 
fairly entered into, is settled law. Hough 
v. Reserve Gold Mining Company, 55 Nev. 
375, 35 P.2d 742; Foster v. Belcher's 
Sugar Refining Co., 118 Mo. 238, 24 S.W. 
63; Terhune v. Weise, 132 Wash. 208, 231 
P. 954, 38 A.L.R. 94; Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. 
Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328. In 
Hough v. Reserve Gold Mining Company, 
supra, we held that a corporation could 
enter into a valid contract to purchase 
property from one of its officers. We said 
[page 745]: "In such a case the better 
view, sustained by the weight of authority, 
is that a contract between a corporation 
and an officer thereof 'is not void per se, 
nor is it voidable, except for unfairness 
or fraud for which it will be closely 
scrutinized in equity.' " 
In Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, supra, 
the court said [page 589] : "While it is 
true that the defendant, as a director of 
the corporation, was bound by all those 
rules of conscientious fairness which courts 
of equity have imposed as the guides for 
dealing in such cases, it cannot be main-
tained that any rule forbids one director 
among several from loaning money to the. 
corporation when the money is needed, and 
the transaction is open, and otherwise free 
from blame." 
The court in Terhune v. Weise, supra, 
held valid an agreement between a failing 
corporation and one of its officers, whereby 
in return for advancements to the corpora-
tion to enable it to continue business, the 
officer was given assignment of contracts, 
as the agreement was made in good faith 
and could not be questioned as a prefer-
ence. 
In Foster v. Belcher's Sugar Refining 
Co., supra, the directors of the corporation 
were commended by the court for loaning 
money to it for legitimate purposes of the 
corporation, and held it a valid claim 
against the corporation. 
The evidence in the instant case points 
clearly to the good faith of respondent 
and the directors who sought to authorize 
the note and mortgage. 
[10] On the question of ratification and 
estoppel the court ordered respondent to 
amend his reply to conform to the proofs 
submitted, which was accordingly done. 
The order was made by the court on the 
settlement of the findings when appellant 
objected to the findings relating to ratifica-
tion and estoppel. Respondent asserts that 
the amendment was probably unnecessary 
and was ordered by the court out of an 
abundance of caution. 
He cites Zenos v. Britten-Cook Land & 
Livestock Co., 75 Cal.App. 299, 242 P. 914, 
to sustain his theory, and refers to the 
Defanti Case in which this court decided 
the same on the theory of estoppel, on the 
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pleadings made in the lower court without 
there having ever been any amendments 
to the pleadings. Be that as it may, there 
was no error in the order. The case was 
tried on the theory that ratification and 
estoppel were in issue, and considerable 
evidence directed thereto was introduced. 
Appellant therefore could not have been 
misled by the fact that the amendment was 
not made during the trial of the case. 
[11] Error is predicated upon the re-
fusal of the court to allow as a credit to 
the corporation the sum of $3500 designated 
as advance royalty paid by Mooney to re-
spondent. The refusal of the court to al-
low it was based on the theory that if it 
was allowable in any event it should have 
been made the subject of a set-off on 
counterclaim, and in the absence of such 
a pleading there was no issue made there-
in. There was no error in this ruling. If, 
as claimed by appellant, knowledge thereof 
was gained subsequent to the filing of its 
answer in the suit, a supplemental answer 
setting up the claim was in order. More-
over, as heretofore pointed out, the deal 
in which the $3,500 was involved was en-
tered into after the commencement of the 
suit and was made as a part payment to 
respondent for his mortgage and stock. 
This transaction was to be completed after 
respondent received a deed for the mining 
property. It is difficult to see how the cor-
poration had any interest in the payment. 
[12] The motion for a new trial was 
properly overruled. The motion was sup-
ported by the affidavit af the attorney of 
appellant on the ground of* newly discover-
ed evidence. Assuming, without deciding, 
that the newly discovered evidence claimed 
is material and not cumulative, dne dili-
gence to procure it at the trial is. not 
shown. Such diligence must appear be-
fore a new trial would be warranted on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence. 
Howard v. Winters, 3 Nev. 539; Pinschow-
er v. Hanks, 18 Nev. 99, 1 P. 454 j. State v. 
Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 P. 240. 
We have examined all the other errors 
claimed and have discovered none. 
The decree and order denying, the mo-
tion for a new trial should be affirmed* and 
it is so ordered. 
TABER, C J„ and COLEMAN,, J-^  con-
cur. 
In re AMES. 
No. 3226. 
No. 3227. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Dec. 30, 193a 
Attorney and client <S=>38 
Under statute authorizing Supreme 
Court to adopt rules which shall be effective 
only after publication, where from uncon. 
tradlcted testimony it appeared that rui* 
adopted by the Board of Governors of the 
State Bar of Nevada, and approved by the 
Supreme Court, prohibiting the circulation 
of professional cards by making them avail, 
able to others than the persons with whom 
the attorney is In personal contact, was 
adopted on August 1, 1936, but was not pub-
lished until January, 1937, attorney was not 
guilty of professional misconduct because of 
allegedly unauthorized distribution of pro-
fessional cards on or about October, 193& 
OompXaws, « 540-590, 568,. 8377. 
Disbarment proceedings by the Local Ad-
ministrative Committee of the State Bar of 
Nevada, in and for District No. 5, against 
W. B. Ames, attorney at law,, wherein the 
defendant was found guilty and it was 
recommended that h« be suspended for 
three years and until further order of the 
Supreme Court. On petition for review. 
Findings,, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions* of the Loeal Administrative Commit-
tee and of the Board of Governors annulled 
and set aside, and proceedings- dismissed 
Clyde D. Souter, of Reno, for petitioner. 
R. K. Wittenberg, of Reno, for Nevada 
State Bar. 
COLEMAN, Chief Justice. 
The Local Administrative Committee of 
the, State Bar ofT Nevada, in and for District 
No, £, on or about December 11, 1936, iled 
a complaint against WVB. Ames, an attor-
ney at law, wherein it is averred, after al-
leging preliminary matter: 
"That heretofore, fco-wit, on or aboutOo» 
fober* 1936, with the intent then and there-
by to solicit professional employment, said 
accused caused) to be printed anddistrib-
utedina conspicuous place in a public pbse 
uVReaa, Washes' County, Nevada, frequent 
ed by the* genera^ public; to-rwi^  the puhBc 
lobby of the APHS Hotel^a large nuabqr 
eff tj& ,pr«iS£§ai«sal'rqards c*f the asousj^ 
Tab 5 
SCHRAFT v. LEIS 
Cite as 686 ¥2d 865 (Kan. 1984) 
Kan. 865 
William G. SCHRAFT, Appellant, 
v. 
Dan LEIS, et al., Appellees. 
No. 55954. 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Aug. 14, 1984. 
Plaintiff shareholder sought to recover 
on ground that defendant shareholder re-
ceived unauthorized salary and profit shar-
ing benefits, wrote checks after dissolution, 
and unfairly competed with corporation. A 
counterclaim was filed for supervised disso-
lution of corporation, tortious interference 
with corporation's business, and use of cor-
porate property for one's personal benefit. 
The Sedgwick District Court, David P. Cal-
vert, J., granted defendant's request for 
supervised dissolution, and awarded the 
plaintiff judgment against defendant on a 
credit card claim, but dismissed all other 
claims, and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Herd, J., held that: (1) fiduci-
ary duty owed by defendant to corporation 
and to plaintiff was properly discharged as 
to salary increase; (2) plaintiff was barred 
from asserting profit-sharing claim by es-
toppel, waiver, laches and ratification; (3) 
defendant was not chargeable with lack of 
good faith toward corporation when new 
company formed by him worked for former 
client of corporation shortly after dissolu-
tion; (4) act of defendant in writing wage 
checks without plaintiffs cosignature did 
not amount to a breach of his fiduciary 
duty; (5) trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to consider affidavits of 
certain witnesses on plaintiffs motion for 
new trial; and (6) recovery to which a 
plaintiff was entitled on his lease claim was 
properly diminished by amount of damages 
which he should have mitigated. 
Affirmed. 
1. Corporations <s=»54, 57 
The bylaws of a corporation are self-
imposed rules, resulting from an agree-
ment or contract between the corporation 
and its members to conduct the corporate 
business in a particular way, and operate to 
prescribe the rights and duties of the mem-
bers with reference to the internal govern-
ment of the corporation, the management 
of its affairs, and the rights and duties 
existing among the members. 
2. Corporations Q=*57 
Bylaws may be waived expressly or 
impliedly by a corporation or by a contin-
ued disregard thereof by parties for whose 
benefit they were enacted. 
3. Corporations <s=>308(4) 
Use of bylaws requiring that the board 
of directors would approve all salaries was 
waived where plaintiff, a fifty percent 
shareholder, entered into an informal 
agreement setting a $200 salary for de-
fendant, also a fifty percent shareholder, 
and thus ratified setting of that salary by a 
method other than that which was authoriz-
ed by bylaws. 
4. Appeal and Error <&=>989, 1010.1(6) 
The scope of review on appeal is to 
determine whether the trial court's find-
ings are supported by substantial compe-
tent evidence and whether the findings are 
sufficient to support trial court's conclu-
sions of law. 
5. Corporations s=»190 
Finding that defendant, an equal fifty 
percent shareholder with plaintiff in corpo-
ration, was not to be held to terms of 
contract regarding amount of his salary 
when parties had agreed that salary would 
be based on condition of company and ser-
vices performed was supported by evi-
dence. 
6. Corporations <3=>308(1) 
A director or officer of a corporation 
working as an operating manager has a 
claim for the value of his services even if 
there has been no resolution of the board 
of directors fixing his compensation. 
7. Corporations <3=>308(1) 
There was an implied contract to pay a 
fair and reasonable salary to the defend-
866 Kan. 686 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ant, an equal fifty percent shareholder with 
the plaintiff in corporation, for his duties 
as a managing officer of the corporation in 
the absence of an express agreement be-
tween the parties as to the amount of the 
salary and the terms of increases in that 
salary. 
8. Corporations <s»307 
The fiduciary duty owed by a manag-
ing officer to the corporation and its share-
holders includes full disclosure of corporate 
matters. 
9. Corporations <3=*307 
Duty of full disclosure which defend-
ant, an equal fifty percent shareholder with 
plaintiff in corporation, owed to corporation 
and its shareholders was properly dis-
charged with respect to increase in his sala-
ry as a managing officer of corporation as 
long as plaintiff had both actual and con-
structive knowledge of that increase. 
10. Estoppel e=>52.15 
Estoppel involves an assertion of 
rights inconsistent with past conduct, si-
lence by those who ought to speak, or 
situations where it would be unconsciona-
ble to permit persons to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which they may 
have already acquiesced. 
11. Estoppel <s=>52.10(2) 
Doctrine of waiver implies that a party 
has voluntarily and intentionally renounced 
or given up a known right or has caused or 
done some positive act or positive inaction 
which is inconsistent with the contractual 
right. 
12. Estoppel e=»52.10(2) 
Waiver is consensual in nature but the 
intention may be inferred from conduct and 
the knowledge may be actual or construc-
tive. 
13. Equity <3=»67 
Doctrine of laches is an equitable de-
vice designed to bar stale claims where an 
excessive amount of time has passed prior 
to assertion of claim. 
14. Equity <3=>72(1) 
Delay does not in itself constitute lach-
es and an action generally will not be de-
feated by laches alone unless some preju-
dice has resulted therefrom to rights or 
interests of adverse party. 
15. Principal and Agent <3=>163(1) 
Ratification is the adoption or confir-
mation by a principal of an act performed 
on his behalf by an agent without his au-
thority. 
16. Principal and Agent <^ 170(3) 
Upon acquiring knowledge of an 
agent's unauthorized act, the principal 
should promptly repudiate the act, other-
wise he will be presumed to have ratified 
and affirmed the act. 
17. Corporations <3=>190 
Estoppel <$=>63 
Act of plaintiff, an equal fifty percent 
shareholder with defendant in corporation, 
in signing corporate minutes establishing 
and terminating profit sharing plan operat-
ed to bar plaintiff, whether by estoppel, 
waiver, laches or ratification, from there-
after asserting improper payment of profit 
sharing benefits to defendant. 
18. Estoppel <3=>59 
A person asserting estoppel as a de-
fense must exercise good faith under the 
maxim that "one who seeks equity, must 
do equity." 
19. Corporations <3»315 
An officer or director is not chargeable 
with lack of good faith toward his corpora-
tion in regard to a contract previously held 
by it once the corporation has refused to 
renew or accept that contract and is free to 
form a new company and secure a contract 
for the new company. 
20. Corporations <3=>185 
Defendant, an equal fifty percent 
shareholder with plaintiff in corporation, 
did not breach fiduciary duty to corporation 
when his new company performed services 
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for a former client of corporation's shortly 
after dissolution where corporation was not 
in a position to work for that client after 
advent of dissolution. 
21. Corporations <3=>312(4) 
The party objecting to the act of the 
managing officer of a corporation in writ-
ing checks in violation of a corporate reso-
lution requiring cosignatures cannot recov-
er unless he proves injury to himself or the 
corporation by showing that the checks 
were unreasonable or improper. 
22. Corporations <®=>182.1(3) 
Act of defendant, an equal fifty per-
cent shareholder with plaintiff in corpora-
tion, in writing wage checks without the 
plaintiffs cosignature was not a breach of 
the defendant's fiduciary duty where the 
checks were not only reasonable in amount, 
but were for the defendant's wages and 
vacation pay, and no damage to the plain-
tiff was shown. 
23. Corporations ®=>190 
Punitive damages were not subject to 
being awarded against defendant, an equal 
fifty percent shareholder with plaintiff in 
corporation, in absence of evidence of a 
breach of a fiduciary duty. 
24. Appeal and Error <s=>980, 981 
New Trial <3=*82, 99 
The grant or denial of a new trial on 
grounds of surprise or newly discovered 
evidence is discretionary on the part of the 
trial court and will not be reversed on 
appeal unless a clear abuse of that discre-
tion is shown. 
25. New Trial <S=>140(1), 150(4) 
The burden is on the party seeking a 
new trial to show that the new evidence 
could not with reasonable diligence have 
been produced at trial and, if the party 
does not meet the burden, the trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
consider the contents of a supporting affi-
davit which contains the new evidence. 
26. New Trial <3=>150(4) 
Refusing to consider on plaintiffs mo-
tion for new trial, the affidavits of witness-
es who had testified at trial was not an 
abuse of discretion where the plaintiff had 
every opportunity to examine each of those 
witnesses and to elicit the information set 
forth in the affidavits, yet failed to show 
that the new evidence, particularly that 
included in the affidavits, could not have 
been produced at trial. 
27. Damages <s=»62(l) 
Recovery to which plaintiff was enti-
tled as owner in action on a lease for rent 
was properly diminished by amount of 
damages which should have been mitigated 
by plaintiff since he actually expelled de-
fendant by changing locks on offices and 
thereafter failed to mitigate his damages. 
28. Warehousemen <3=>34(7) 
Ruling prorating $740 per month lump 
sum claimed by plaintiff as lessor and 
award of $275 per month against defendant 
lessee for warehouse space was supported 
by substantial evidence. 
29. Evidence <s=>351 
Business records and writings are ad-
missible hearsay if they were made in the 
regular course of business at or about the 
time of the act recorded and if the sources 
of information from which they were made 
and the circumstances surrounding their 
preparation were trustworthy. 
30. Evidence <3=>373(1) 
The custodian of the business records 
need not be called to lay the information 
for their admission on their exception to 
the hearsay rule if the records can be iden-
tified by someone else who is qualified by 
knowledge of the facts. Rules of Evid. 
K.S.A. 60-460(m). 
31. Evidence <3=*382 
Determination of the presence of fac-
tors concerning admissibility of business 
records and writings under an exception to 
hearsay rule is within the trial court's dis-
cretion. Rules of Evid. K.S.A. 60-460(m). 
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32. Evidence ^351 
Testimony of an accountant respecting 
information he found in work papers of 
corporation's former accountant was ad-
missible under business records exception 
to hearsay rule in that papers, of which the 
accountant was the custodian, were appar-
ently "books and records" since they repre-
sented the corporation's only accounting 
after the last posting in the formal books, 
and the sources of information and method 
of time of preparation reflected trustwor-
thiness. Rules of Evid. K.S.A. 60-460(m). 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. The bylaws of a corporation are 
the rules of law for its government. The 
term "bylaw" may be further defined ac-
cording to its function, which is to pre-
scribe the rights and duties of the members 
with reference to the internal government 
of the corporation, the management of its 
affairs, and the rights and duties existing 
among the members. Bylaws are self-im-
posed rules, resulting from an agreement 
or contract between the corporation and its 
members to conduct the corporate business 
in a particular way. Until repealed, bylaws 
are the continuing rule for the government 
of the corporation and its officers. See 18 
Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 168. 
2. Corporations have power to waive 
provisions of their bylaws introduced for 
the protection of the company, and they 
may do so expressly or impliedly. Corpo-
rate bylaws may also be waived by a con-
tinued disregard thereof by the parties for 
whose benefit they were enacted. 18 Am. 
Jur.2d, Corporations § 173, pp. 703-04. 
3. Where the trial court has made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
scope of review on appeal is to determine 
whether the findings are supported by sub-
stantial competent evidence and whether 
the findings are sufficient to support the 
trial court's conclusions of law. See City 
of Council Grove v. Ossmann, 219 Kan. 
120, Syl. J 1, 546 P.2d 1399 (1976). 
4. A managing officer of a corpora-
tion owes a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion and shareholders. This duty includes 
full disclosure of corporate matters. See 
Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d 
743 (1983). 
5. A director or officer of a corpora-
tion working as an operating manager has 
a claim for the value of his services even if 
there has been no resolution of the board 
of directors fixing his compensation. 
6. Estoppel involves an assertion of 
rights inconsistent with past conduct, si-
lence by those who ought to speak, or 
situations where it would be unconsciona-
ble to permit persons to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which they have 
already acquiesced. See Harrin v. Brown 
Realty Co., 226 Kan. 453, 458-59, 602 P.2d 
79 (1979). 
7. Waiver implies a party has volun-
tarily and intentionally renounced or given 
up a known right, or has caused or done 
some positive act or positive inaction which 
is inconsistent with the contractual right. 
Waiver is consensual in nature but the 
intention may be inferred from conduct and 
the knowledge may be actual or construc-
tive. See Stratmann v. Stratmann, 6 
Kan.App.2d 403, 410-11, 628 P.2d 1080 
(1981). 
8. The doctrine of laches is an equita-
ble device designed to bar stale claims 
where an excessive amount of time has 
passed prior to the assertion of a claim. 
Delay, by itself, does not constitute laches 
and an action generally will not be defeated 
by laches alone unless some prejudice has 
resulted therefrom to the rights or inter-
ests of the adverse party. 
9. Ratification is the adoption or con-
firmation by a principal of an act per-
formed on his behalf by an agent, which 
act was performed without authority. 
Upon acquiring knowledge of his agent's 
unauthorized act, the principal should 
promptly repudiate the act, otherwise it 
will be presumed he has ratified and af-
firmed the act. See Equity Investors, Inc. 
v. Ammest Group, Inc., 1 Kan.App.2d 276, 
Syl. Ml 5-6, 563 P.2d 531, rev. denied 225 
Kan. 843 (1977). 
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10. A person asserting estoppel as a 
defense must exercise good faith, under 
the maxim that "one who seeks equity, 
must do equity." 
11. An officer or director is not 
chargeable with lack of good faith toward 
his corporation in regard to a contract pre-
viously held by it once the corporation has 
refused to renew or accept that contract. 
In such a case the officer or director is free 
to form a new company and contract for 
the new company. Parsons Mobile Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, Syl. 
1! 8, 531 P.2d 428 (1975). 
12. Where the managing officer of a 
corporation writes checks in violation of a 
corporate resolution requiring co-signa-
tures, the party objecting to the checks 
must prove injury to himself or the corpo-
ration by showing the checks were unrea-
sonable or improper, in order to recover. 
13. The granting or denial of a new 
trial on grounds of surprise or newly dis-
covered evidence is discretionary on the 
part of the trial court, and will not be 
reversed unless a clear abuse of discretion 
is shown. The burden is on the party seek-
ing the new trial to show the new evidence 
could not with reasonable diligence have 
been produced at trial. Where the party 
does not meet this burden, a trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
consider the contents of a supporting affi-
davit which contains the new evidence. 
14. In an action on a lease for rent, 
when evidence is uncontroverted that the 
owner could have mitigated his damages 
his recovery is diminished by what would 
have been the mitigated amount. 
15. Business records and writings are 
admissible hearsay if they were made in 
the regular course of business at or about 
the time of the act recorded and if the 
sources of information from which they 
were made and the circumstances sur-
rounding their preparation were trustwor-
thy. The custodian of the business records 
need not be called to lay the foundation for 
their admission if the records can be identi-
fied by someone else who is qualified by 
knowledge of the facts. The determination 
of the presence of factors concerning ad-
missibility is within the trial court's discre-
tion. 
Kenton D. Wirth, Wichita, argued the 
cause and was on brief, for appellant. 
J. Michael Morris of Sargent, Klenda, 
Haag & Mitchell, Wichita, argued the 
cause, and Gary M. Austerman and John B. 
Morris, Wichita, of the same firm, were 
with him on brief, for appellees. 
HERD, Justice: 
This is an action incident to the dissolu-
tion of a closely held corporation. William 
G. Schraft, a fifty percent shareholder, 
sued Dan Leis, the other fifty percent 
shareholder, who had been general manag-
er of the corporation. Schraft alleged Leis 
received unauthorized salary and profit-
sharing benefits, wrote checks after disso-
lution, and unfairly competed with the cor-
poration. Schraft also sued the corpora-
tion for rent, damage to rental property, 
and indebtedness on a note. Leis counter-
claimed for supervised dissolution of the 
corporation, tortious interference by 
Schraft with the corporation's business, 
and use of corporate property for personal 
benefit. 
Continental Structures, Inc., was formed 
in March, 1974, by appellant, William G. 
Schraft; appellee, Daniel Leis; and Roy 
Arnett. Each was a one-third shareholder. 
Arnett and Leis had been employees of a 
metal building construction company which 
had been a tenant of Schraft's. Continen-
tal Structures was to engage in the busi-
ness of metal building construction and re-
pair. 
Since the alleged overpayment of salary 
to Leis is the major portion of this lawsuit, 
we will examine the salary arrangements 
in some detail. Prior to incorporation, the 
parties agreed Arnett and Leis would man-
age the business for which they would re-
ceive salaries. Their salaries were initially 
to be the same as Arnett and Leis had 
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received from their prior employer, which 
was $300 and $200 per week respectively. 
Schraft was not involved in management, 
thus was to receive no salary. 
After incorporation, each of the share-
holders became a director and an officer. 
Arnett was elected president, Schraft vice-
president, and Leis secretary-treasurer. 
The bylaws, as adopted, contained the fol-
lowing salary provisions: 
'The Board of Directors, from time to 
time, as it may determine, shall have 
authority to appoint such superintend-
ents, general managers or other manag-
ing officers as may be deemed necessary 
or advisable, and to fix the salaries there-
of." 
The minutes of the corporation also contain 
the following statement as to salary: 
"The Board of Directors shall approve a 
salary . . . [for Arnett and Leis] consist-
ent with his position and what the corpo-
ration can reasonably afford based on 
profits and expenses." 
However, there was never a formal corpo-
rate resolution setting a specific salary for 
Arnett or Leis. 
Beginning in 1974, the salaries of Arnett 
and Leis were increased without formal 
corporate action. By the end of 1974, Ar-
nett had gone from $300 to $400 per week 
and Leis from $200 to $250, and then to 
$300 per week. On March 28, 1975, Arnett 
wrote a letter to Schraft wherein he ap-
prised him of the salary increases. The 
letter stated: 
"It was my understanding that as 
President of Continental Structures, Inc. 
I would take a salary relevant to 
the position and what the business could 
afford, based on profits etc." 
Schraft acknowledged receipt of the letter 
but did not discuss the salary matter with 
Arnett at that time. 
The letter also referred to a "monthly 
computer cost analysis" which, according 
to Schraft, was subsequently discussed. 
Schraft desired the analysis so he could 
have a monthly operating statement for the 
business. He testified when the company 
was formed it was agreed the company's 
financial information would be placed in a 
computer and the parties would receive a 
monthly computer analysis. Arnett testi-
fied, in accordance with his letter, that he 
did not feel the expense of the computer 
was justified since the corporate books r e 
fleeted the costs of doing business. He, 
therefore, terminated the reports. 
Schraft testified he repeatedly requested 
a monthly "comprehensive cost analysis." 
Schraft claims the failure to provide such 
statements resulted in his not being aware 
of the salary increases. Schraft, however, 
admitted receiving various financial state-
ments from Continental. He estimated 
that between 1974 and 1978 he received six 
or seven such statements. Arnett testified 
Continental's first accountants prepared 
such statements routinely on a quarterly 
and year-end basis as well as on demand. 
Such statements were delivered to all three 
shareholders. Arnett also testified that 
from 1974 to 1976 Continental was a sub-
chapter S corporation and copies of the 
corporate tax returns were delivered to the 
shareholders during these years. Schraft 
testified he did not see the returns until 
1980. 
The building leased by Continental for 
offices was owned by Schraft. Schraft's 
office was located in the same building. 
As a result, the books, records, and tax 
returns of Continental were readily avail-
able to Schraft. He testified he did not 
avail himself of the opportunity to view the 
company financial statements. 
Schraft also admitted between 1974 and 
1977 he did not talk to Continental's ac-
countants. In 1977, Continental changed 
its accountant to Ray Eyman, who was 
recommended to the company by Schraft. 
Eyman had prepared Schraft's personal tax 
returns. Schraft testified he talked to Ey-
man from time to time and received verbal 
information from him about the company. 
From 1979 on, Eyman kept the corporate 
books at his home. Eyman also furnished 
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financial statements to Schraft, as had the 
previous accountants. 
In August, 1978, Arnett was terminated 
as president and manager of the company 
because of a seventy thousand dollar loss 
for 1977. Schraft testified although he did 
not see the actual 1977 tax return until it 
was filed in 1981, Eyman furnished him 
with the figures from the front page of 
that return at the time of Arnett's termina-
tion. The first page of the 1977 return 
shows the compensation of the managing 
officers. It was, of course, in excess of the 
initial amounts agreed upon. 
Arnett testified that some time after his 
termination in August and before Novem-
ber, 1978 Schraft mentioned the matter of 
unauthorized salary. Arnett ignored the 
matter. Schraft denied that he learned of 
Arnett's salary at this time. In November, 
1978 the company agreed to buy Arnett's 
shares. After the buy-out, Schraft and 
Leis each became fifty percent sharehold-
ers. 
Leis became president of the company. 
Schraft testified that after the meeting 
electing Leis president, Leis stated that he 
should receive the same salary Arnett had. 
Schraft made no reply. He explained his 
lack of response saying he did not want to 
discuss the matter at that time. He later 
assumed the subject was dropped since it 
was not brought up again. He never asked 
Leis about the salary and did not check the 
books of the company. 
Schraft became treasurer of the compa-
ny, as well as vice president, when Leis 
became president. The duties of the trea-
surer specified in the bylaws were to "have 
custody of all money . . . of the corporation 
and keep regular books of account 
In November 1979, Leis and Schraft dis-
cussed a list of employees and proposed 
wages. At the conclusion Leis told Schraft 
he wanted an additional $150 per week, 
raising his salary to $650 per week. 
Schraft claims this is the first time he 
knew Leis was receiving a salary greater 
than the original $200 per week. 
After the November 1979 meeting on 
salaries, the relationship between Schraft 
and Leis deteriorated. Their efforts to ar-
rive at an agreement to buy or sell the 
company failed. In April 1980 Schraft filed 
the present action. At a special meeting of 
the board of directors, held August 14, 
1980, it was agreed to dissolve the corpora-
tion. Various resolutions, incident to the 
dissolution, were adopted. 
These resolutions were: (1) The corpora-
tion would proceed to pay off of its liabili-
ties; (2) the officers were directed to do all 
things necessary to dissolve the corpora-
tion; (3) all employees, except Delbert Sto-
ry, were to be terminated at 5:00 p.m., 
August 15, 1980; (4) no distribution of as-
sets to the shareholders would be made 
without mutual agreement; (5) the check-
ing account would be changed to require 
two signatures on each check; (6) all offi-
cers were terminated immediately except to 
sign instruments necessary to liquidate and 
dissolve the corporation; and (7) all credit 
cards were cancelled. 
The next day, on August 15, 1980, Leis 
signed payroll checks for the employees 
without Schraft's co-signature. Among 
these checks were three salary checks to 
himself, each in the amount of $429.96. 
Following the resolution to dissolve the 
company, Leis formed a new company, Su-
perior Structures, Inc. Schraft testified 
Superior did work on a building for a for-
mer client of Continental's, completing the 
work before August 26, 1980. 
Trial was to the court. At the close of 
Schraft's case, the court dismissed the 
claims against Leis for unauthorized sala-
ry, unfair competition, and writing checks 
the day after dissolution. In addition, the 
court dismissed a portion of Schraft's claim 
for rent against Continental and dismissed 
other claims of which no complaint is made 
on appeal. Leis had counterclaimed 
against Schraft for tortious interference 
with Continental's business and unauthor-
ized use of corporate assets. At the close 
of Leis's evidence, the court dismissed the 
tortious interference claim and the unau-
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thorized use claim except for Schraft's use 
of corporate credit cards after dissolution. 
The court made findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law on the remaining issues. 
Schraft was awarded judgment against 
Continental of $3300 for rent and $3000 on 
a note. Continental was granted judgment 
against Schraft for $115.00 on the credit 
card claim. The court granted Leis's re-
quest for supervised dissolution of the com-
pany. 
Schraft filed a motion to amend the judg-
ment or for a new trial. The court denied 
the motion but made additional findings. 
Schraft appealed. 
Appellant Schraft first argues the trial 
court erred in dismissing his claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and unfair compe-
tition. 
Schraft's principal claim in this case is 
that Leis received unauthorized salary in 
the amount of $75,000 from Continental 
Structures Inc. He contends he had no 
knowledge prior to 1979 Leis' salary had 
been increased beyond the initial $200 per 
week. He maintains the payment of salary 
in excess of the original $200 constitutes 
breach of the corporate bylaws and Leis' 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and appel-
lant individually. 
Leis contends it was agreed prior to in-
corporation that he and Arnett would re-
ceive salaries in the same amount as they 
were receiving in their prior employment 
with salary increases allowed consistent 
with the condition of the company and ser-
vices they performed. He acknowledges 
no formal board of directors action was 
taken to increase either his or Arnett's 
salaries. But appellee also contends there 
was an implied agreement to pay a reason-
able salary for his work. He also argues 
Schraft had knowledge, actual and con-
structive, of the salary increases and failed 
to complain or take any action. 
Appellant aruges the corporate bylaws 
provide the board of directors is to set 
salaries and since no formal board action 
was ever taken to increase appellee's sala-
ry above the initial $200, all salary received 
above that amount is unauthorized. 
[1] The bylaws of a corporation are the 
rules of law for its government. The term 
"bylaw" may be further defined according 
to its function, which is to prescribe the 
rights and duties of the members with ref-
erence to the internal government of the 
corporation, the management of its affairs, 
and the rights and duties existing among 
the members. Bylaws are self-imposed 
rules, resulting from an agreement or con-
tract between the corporation and its mem-
bers to conduct the corporate business in a 
particular way. Until repealed, bylaws are 
the continuing rule for the government of 
the corporation and its officers. See 18 
Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 168. 
[2,3] As previously stated, it is undis-
puted no formal board action was taken to 
set appellee's original salary despite the 
agreement between the parties that the 
board would approve all salaries. Rather, 
it was by informal agreement that it was 
initially set at the $200 level. Thus, 
Schraft ratified the setting of Leis' salary 
by a method other than that authorized by 
the corporate bylaws. It has been stated: 
"Corporations have power to waive 
provisions of their bylaws introduced for 
the protection of the company, and they 
may do so expressly or impliedly. Also, 
corporate bylaws may be waived by a 
continued disregard thereof by the par-
ties for whose benefit they were enact-
ed." 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations § 173, 
pp. 703-04. 
See also 8 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the law 
of Private Corporations § 4200, pp. 730-31 
(rev. perm. ed. 1982). The use of the by-
laws, therefore, was waived by both par-
ties. 
Appellant next argues appellee is to be 
held to the terms of his salary contract, 
regarding the amount of the salary and 
when it would be increased. For support 
appellant cites Sweet v. Stormont Vail Re-
gional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647 
P.2d 1274 (1982), and Manhattan Build-
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ings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 643 P.2d 
87 (1982). Appellee does not dispute this. 
There is disagreement, however, as to the 
terms of the employment contract. 
[4, 5] The trial court heard conflicting 
testimony as to the employment contract 
and found the parties had agreed salaries 
would be taken based on the condition of 
the company and services performed. Ar-
nett testified at trial the salaries taken 
were consistent with that standard. Fur-
ther, appellant admitted the $650 per week 
appellee requested in November 1979 was 
fair compensation for the work appellee 
performed. We have held where the trial 
court has made findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, the scope of review on appeal 
is to determine whether the findings are 
supported by substantial competent evi-
dence and whether the findings are suffi-
cient to support the trial court's conclu-
sions of law. See City of Council Grove v. 
Ossmann, 219 Kan. 120, Syl. U 1, 546 P.2d 
1399 (1976). The trial court's finding that 
the salary taken was fair for the work 
performed is supported by the evidence and 
must, therefore, be upheld. 
[6,7] The trial court fortified the fore-
going finding by also finding there was an 
implied agreement appellee would receive a 
fair salary for his duties as a managing 
officer of the corporation. A director or 
officer of a corporation working as an oper-
ating manager has a claim for the value of 
his services even if there has been no reso-
lution of the board of directors fixing his 
compensation. See 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corpora-
tions § 1402, p. 795. See also Sauberli v. 
Sledd, 143 Kan. 350, 55 P.2d 415 (1936). 
Thus, in the absence of an express agree-
ment as to the amount of his salary and the 
terms of increases in that salary, there was 
an implied contract to pay a fair and rea-
sonable salary to appellee. The trial court 
properly found the salary received was fair 
and reasonable for the work performed. 
[8,9] It is undisputed Leis owed a fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation and to 
Schraft. Thus, he owed Schraft the duty 
of full disclosure of corporate matters. 
See Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 
P.2d 743 (1983); Newton v. Hornblower, 
Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978). 
The trial court found this duty properly 
discharged as to the salary issue since ap-
pellant had both actual and constructive 
knowledge of the salary increase. The tri-
al court's finding was supported by sub-
stantial competent evidence and will not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
The trial court further found the appel-
lant was barred from asserting the profit-
sharing claim by estoppel, waiver, laches 
and ratification. These rulings are based 
on the finding that Schraft had signed the 
corporate minutes establishing and termi-
nating the profit-sharing plan. 
[10] Estoppel involves an assertion of 
rights inconsistent with past conduct, si-
lence by those who ought to speak, or 
situations where it would be unconsciona-
ble to permit persons to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which they have 
already acquiesced. See Harrin v. Brown 
Realty Co., 226 Kan. 453, 458-59, 602 P.2d 
79 (1979). 
[11,12] Waiver implies a party has vol-
untarily and intentionally renounced or giv-
en up a known right, or has caused or done 
some positive act or positive inaction which 
is inconsistent with the contractual right. 
Waiver is consensual in nature but the in-
tention may be inferred from conduct and 
the knowledge may be actual or construc-
tive. See Stratmann v. Stratmann, 6 
Kan.App.2d 403, 410-11, 628 P.2d 1080 
(1981). 
[13,14] The doctrine of laches is an eq-
uitable device designed to bar stale claims 
where an excessive amount of time has 
passed prior to the assertion of a claim. 
Delay, by itself, does not constitute laches 
and an action generally will not be defeated 
by laches alone unless some prejudice has 
resulted therefrom to the rights or inter-
ests of the adverse party. See Stratmann 
at 411, 628 P.2d 1080. 
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[15,16] Ratification is the adoption or 
confirmation by a principal of an act per-
formed on his behalf by an agent which act 
was performed without authority. Upon 
acquiring knowledge of his agent's unau-
thorized act, the principal should promptly 
repudiate the act, otherwise it will be pre-
sumed he has ratified and affirmed the act. 
See Equity Investors, Inc. v. Ammest 
Group, Inc., 1 Kan.App.2d 276, Syl. 1111 5-6, 
563 P.2d 531 (1977). 
[17,18] Appellant argues that since ap-
pellee's conduct was inequitable, appellee 
may not rely on estoppel. In Newton v. 
Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 515, 582 P.2d 
1136, we held the person raising estoppel is 
himself bound to exercise good faith. The 
trial court specifically found in this case 
there was no evidence of deceit on the part 
of appellee. Appellant indicates no evi-
dence to refute this finding. The appellee 
was thus not barred from raising estoppel. 
The trial court found the affirmative de-
fenses of estoppel, waiver, laches and rati-
fication applied to appellant's claim for 
unauthorized profit-sharing payments. Ap-
pellant testified at trial that in 1977 he was 
presented with the two sets of minutes of 
the board of directors' meetings, one dated 
March 12, 1974, and the other March 9, 
1976. One established and the other termi-
nated an employee profit-sharing plan. 
The minutes were prepared to satisfy an 
IRS audit. Appellant testified he had not 
known of the profit sharing plan prior to 
signing the minutes in 1977. Appellant 
testified he discovered much later that 
money had been distributed to employees, 
including $2102.46 to appellee, under the 
plan. 
Appellant contends the payments consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty since they 
were done without his knowledge. Appel-
lant testified, however, he signed the corpo-
rate minutes discussing the plan in 1977. 
Thus, he had actual knowledge of the plan 
several years before filing this action but 
failed to complain of it at the time. There 
is no evidence that payments made under 
the plan were concealed from the appellant 
or that he inquired about the plan after 
signing the minutes. The trial court, there-
fore, did not err in applying estoppel, waiv-
er, laches and ratification to appellant's 
claim for improper payments under the 
profit-sharing plan. 
Appellant also contends appellee breach-
ed a fiduciary duty to Continental when 
appellee's new company, Superior, did work 
for a former client of Continental's shortly 
after the dissolution resolution of August 
14, 1980. The work was a new job, but 
Continental had done work for the client 
before. 
[19] In Parsons Mobile Products, Inc. 
v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, Syl. 11117-8, 531 
P.2d 428 (1975), this court held: 
"When the customer list of a business 
is not confidential and the business is of 
such a nature as to rely on open competi-
tion to secure orders a former employee 
may solicit former customers of his em-
ployer without being guilty of unfair 
competition." (Syl. H 7) 
"An officer or director is not chargea-
ble with lack of good faith toward his 
corporation in regard to a contract previ-
ously held by it once the corporation has 
refused to renew or accept that contract 
In such a case the officer or director is 
free to form a new company and secure a 
contract for the new company." (Syl. 
118). 
[20] In this case, after the resolution to 
dissolve was adopted Continental was not 
in a position to work for the client. The 
trial court found there was no company for 
appellee or Superior Structures to compete 
against We agree. 
[21,22] Appellant next claims the trial 
court erred in dismissing his claims for 
checks which were written solely by appel-
lee on August 15, 1980. As part of the 
August 14, 1980, dissolution agreement the 
checking account was to be changed to 
require the signatures of both appellant 
and appellee on all company checks. Ap-
pellant contends appellee had the burden as 
a fiduciary to establish these checks were 
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fair and taken in good faith since they were 
written contrary to the dissolution agree-
ment. The record shows the checks writ-
ten by appellee were for his wages and 
vacation pay. Appellant does not argue 
that appellee was not entitled to this mon-
ey, but complains only that the checks were 
written without his co-signature. The 
checks were for wages, reasonable in 
amount, and there was no damage to appel-
lant by the failure of appellee to have them 
co-signed. Thus, the trial court did not err 
in ruling appellee did not breach a fiduciary 
duty by writing the wage checks without 
the co-signature of appellant. 
[23] The final issue raised by appellant 
as to the breach of a fiduciary duty is that 
the court erred in dismissing the claim for 
punitive damages. Punitive damages are 
proper when a breach of fiduciary duty is 
involved. Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 
Kan. 506, Syl. 1113, 582 P.2d 1136. In this 
case, the trial court properly dismissed the 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against 
appellee; thus, under the circumstances it 
was required to also dismiss the claim for 
punitive damages. 
Appellant next argues the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to consider 
on appellant's motion for new trial the affi-
davits of witnesses who had testified at 
trial. The affidavits included in the motion 
were those of Arnett; Don Riley, Continen-
tal's attorney; and Shirley Garrity, appel-
lant's accountant. 
In Arnett's affidavit, he states after the 
pre-incorporation agreement a misunder-
standing arose as to whether the salaries 
were to remain at the initial level. Arnett's 
position was the salaries could be in-
creased. Consistent with his trial testimo-
ny, the affidavit states he expressed this 
position in a March 1975 letter to Schraft. 
The affidavit states, however, Schraft ob-
jected to this and it was then agreed that 
the board of directors would determine the 
salaries. 
In denying the motion for new trial, the 
trial court stated it had not considered the 
affidavits. The court noted each affiant 
had testified at trial, and that Arnett's affi-
davit contradicted his trial testimony. The 
court concluded such contradictory evi-
dence is not allowed after the fact. 
[24] On appeal, appellant argues Ar-
nett's affidavit shows the statement in his 
letter respecting salary was never the 
agreement of the parties and the trial 
court's finding to that effect is erroneous. 
Motions for new trial are governed by 
K.S.A. 60-259, which provides: 
"A new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues when it appears that the 
rights of the party are substantially af-
fected: 
"[Because of] [e]rroneous rulings or 
instructions of the court. 
" . . . That the verdict, report or deci-
sion is in whole or in part contrary to the 
evidence. 
" . . . For newly discovered evidence 
material for the party applying, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial." 
[25] We have held the granting or deni-
al of a new trial on grounds of surprise or 
newly discovered evidence is discretionary 
on the part of the trial court, and will not 
be reversed unless a clear abuse of discre-
tion is shown. See Bott v. Wendler, 203 
Kan. 212, 229, 453 P.2d 100 (1969). The 
burden is on the party seeking the new 
trial to show the new evidence could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have been pro-
duced at trial. Where the party does not 
meet this burden, a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to consider 
the contents of a supporting affidavit. See 
Connolly v. Frobenins, 2 Kan.App.2d 18, 
25, 574 P.2d 971, rev. denied 225 Kan. 843 
(1978). 
[26] In this case, Arnett, Riley and 
Garrity all testified at trial as appellant's 
876 K a n 686 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
witnesses. Appellant had every opportuni-
ty to examine each of them and elicit the 
information set out in the affidavits. The 
appellant failed to show the new evidence, 
particularly that included in Arnett's affi-
davit, could not have been produced at tri-
al. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to consider the affidavits 
or in denying the motion for a new trial. 
The next issue is whether the trial court 
erred in ruling there was no evidence of a 
rental agreement on Continental's offices 
which were located at 805 South Main, 
Wichita, in a building owned by appellant, 
and that appellant failed to mitigate his 
damages. In addition to the office space, 
Continental also rented warehouse space 
from appellant at 1711 South Knight, Wich-
ita. 
Schraft testified he was seeking $8880 in 
rent from the company for the period Sep-
tember 1, 1980, to September 1, 1981. This 
sum represented a monthly rental of $740 
for both the office space and the ware-
house. Appellant testified he could not 
separate the rent for the two facilities. 
Among the resolutions adopted by the 
board of directors at the August 14, 1980, 
meeting dissolving the corporation was the 
following: 
"FURTHER RESOLVED: Delbert 
Story, employee of Continental Struc-
tures shall be placed in charge of seeing 
that all physical assets of the corporation 
are delivered to 1711 South Knight, 
Wichita, Kansas, as soon as possible." 
The intention of the shareholders was for 
Continental to move from the office space 
on Main to the warehouse as soon as practi-
cal. 
Despite this intent and resolution, the 
furniture and other office equipment was 
not moved from the office on Main Street 
until a year later, in August 1981, when an 
auctioneer removed it for sale. 
The trial court found there was insuffi-
cient evidence of a rental agreement for 
805 S. Main and that appellant had failed to 
mitigate his damages. On a motion to 
amend or for new trial the court found 
additionally appellant had directed Delbert 
Story to change the locks on Continental's 
office on Main shortly after the August 14 
resolution. Leis was not given a set of 
new keys. The court found the furniture 
and equipment had remained on the premis-
es because of the actions of appellant and 
he had breached his duty to the corporation 
to preserve its assets. Further, appellant 
made no effort to relet the offices until the 
furniture was removed in August of 1981. 
The court did find rent was due for the 
warehouse space at 1711 S. Knight. Rent 
for the warehouse was set by the court at 
$275 per month, plus interest 
[27] On appeal, appellant complains of 
the court's ruling concerning the existence 
of a rental agreement for 805 S. Main. 
Appellant points to appellee's answer to the 
second amended petition which contains an 
admission by appellee that a rental agree-
ment existed for 805 S. Main and 1711 S. 
Knight. Despite admission as to the exist-
ence of a rental agreement, appellant was 
properly not allowed to recover due to his 
failure to mitigate damages and actual ex-
pulsion of appellee by changing the locks 
on the offices. Appellant does not argue 
the trial court erred in its ruling on mitiga-
tion. For this reason, Schraft was properly 
denied rent on the office at 805 S. Main. 
[28] Appellant next complains of the 
court's proration of the $740 per month 
lump sum claimed by appellant and the 
award of $275 per month for the ware-
house space. Appellant contends this was 
done without supporting evidence. Appel-
lant's second amended petition, however, 
includes a lease, attached as an exhibit, 
covering only the 1711 S. Knight property, 
with rent set at $275 per month. Since 
appellant was unable to state how much of 
the $740 per month he claimed was attrib-
utable to the separate properties, the only 
evidence of rent due for 1711 S. Knight 
was the written lease for $275. The trial 
court's ruling is supported by substantial 
competent evidence. 
SCHRAFT v. LEIS Kan. §77 
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The final issue is whether the trial court 
erred in allowing the testimony of account-
ant Steve Houlik from the work papers of 
Continental's former accountant or in de-
termining the amount due appellant on a 
note. 
From 1977, to the date of dissolution of 
the company, Ray Eyman was Continen-
tal's accountant. Eyman, however, could 
not testify at trial for health reasons which 
had led to memory loss. Accounting testi-
mony, therefore, was received from Shirley 
Garrity, on behalf of appellant, and Steven 
Houlik, on behalf of appellee. Garrity tes-
tified based only upon her review of the 
company's books and records. She stated 
from her review of the general ledger, Con-
tinental owed appellant $7719.24. 
On cross-examination, Garrity testified 
the ledger book was posted only through 
March 31, 1979. She found no assets and 
liabilities listed for the period after that 
date, although there was an operating jour-
nal reflecting deposits and payments for 
the period April 7, 1980, through Septem-
ber 15, 1980. She never obtained or re-
quested Eyman's work papers. 
At the August 14, 1980, meeting dissolv-
ing the corporation, a resolution was 
adopted retaining Houlik to bring "the 
books of account to date, prepare any tax 
returns . . . and . . . perform any account-
ing services in conjunction with the liquida-
tion and dissolution of the corporation." 
Houlik testified at trial the general ledger 
was only fully posted through March 31, 
1978. It is unclear whether the difference 
between this date and the March 31, 1979, 
date testified to by Ms. Garrity is merely a 
clerical error. Entries after that date were 
found by Houlik in Eyman's work papers. 
Houlik testified there were entries in the 
work papers for the year ending March 31, 
1979, which showed Continental performed 
jobs for appellant, thereby resolving any 
indebtedness to appellant. 
After evaluating the testimony of the 
two accountants, the trial court determined 
the books and work papers considered to-
gether showed $3000 was owed by the com-
pany to appellant. 
[29] On appeal, appellant argues the 
court erred in receiving Houlik's testimony 
based on Eyman's work papers since the 
work papers were inadmissible hearsay and 
were admitted without proper foundation. 
If the work papers were not admitted, the 
company's indebtedness to appellant would 
remain at the $7719.24 amount shown in 
the general ledger. The court held the 
work papers were hearsay but admissible 
under the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule, K.S.A. 60-460(m), which al-
lows the admission of: 
"Writings offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions or events to 
prove the facts stated therein, if the 
judge finds that (1) they were made in 
the regular course of a business at or 
about the time of the act, condition or 
event recorded and (2) the sources of 
information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their prepa-
ration were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness." 
[30,31] In State v. Cremer, 234 Kan. 
594, Syl. 11 2, 676 P.2d 59 (1984), this court 
discussed the proper foundation for the 
admission of business records. 
"K.S.A. 60-460(m) does not require 
that the custodian of business records be 
called to lay the foundation facts for 
their admission into evidence. The foun-
dation facts may be proved by any rele-
vant evidence and the person making the 
entries in the records need not be called 
to authenticate them if they can be iden-
tified by someone else who is qualified 
by knowledge of the facts. The policy of 
the section is to leave it up to the trial 
court to determine whether the sources 
of information, method, and time of prep-
aration reflect trustworthiness." 
[32] Eyman was not available to testify 
at trial because of his health problems. It 
was clear from the testimony of Garrity 
and Houlik that the formal records of the 
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company were not fully posted after 1978 
or 1979. Houlik, who had been hired by 
corporate resolution to complete the compa-
ny's accounting, testified the missing post-
ings were in Eyman's work papers. Since 
the papers; represented the company's only 
accounting after the last posting in the 
formal books, they appear to be the compa-
ny's "books and records." Houlik had ob-
tained the papers from Mr. Eyman; there-
fore, Houlik was their custodian. 
The trial court determined the sources of 
information and method of time of prepara-
tion reflected trustworthiness. The ab-
sence of entries in the formal corporate 
ledgers and the existence of entries in Ey-
man's work papers were rationally ex-
plained. We find no abuse of discretion by 
the trial court in allowing Houlik's testimo-
ny based upon the records. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
Holmes, J., not participating. 
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THATCHER et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION et al. 
No. 7178. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
June 9, 1949. 
1. Attorney and client 0=^140 
The judiciary has power to determine 
what is a reasonable attorney fee when 
the law or the contract of the parties pro-
vides for a reasonable fee. 
2. Constitutional law <S=?89(I) 
Freedom of contract is a constitutional 
right which may give birth to, but which 
is not itself, a property right, and is sub-
ject to reasonable police regulation.1 
3. Attorney and client <^I44 
An attorney's fee is left to agreement 
between attorney and his client, subject to 
right of court to discipline the attorney 
where the fee charged is unconscionable, 
or advantage is taken of the ignorance of 
the client. U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40. 
4. Attorney and client G=32 
The judiciary does not regulate attor-
neys in the sense that it supervises them in 
their office transactions, and the matter of 
fixing fees is generally a matter of agree-
ment. U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40. 
5. Constitutional law <@»55, 80(2) 
Workmen's compensation <§=543 
Statute purporting to authorize the In-
dustrial Commission to regulate attorney's 
fees in a compensation proceeding is not 
unconstitutional on ground that it is an 
unwarranted legislative and executive in-
terference with the judicial branch of the 
government in violation of the Constitution. 
U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40, 42—1—81; Const, 
art. 1, § 7. 
6. Constitutional law <£=>89(4) 
Workmen's compensation <§»43 
Statute purporting to authorize Indus-
trial Commission to regulate and fix attor-
ney's fees in a compensation proceeding is 
not an invalid impairment of freedom of 
right of an attorney to contract with his 
IMcGrew v. Industrial Commission, 
96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 6C8. 
client for a fee, since the Legislature, un-
der its police powers, has right to give 
commission full power to regulate and fix 
fees. U.C.A.1943, 6—0-40, 42— 1—81.* 
7. Workmen's compensation <3=>ll 
One of the purposes of the compensa-
tion act is to provide an employee with a 
remedy without delays, expenses, and un-
certainties of a court trial. 
8. Workmen's compensation C=»I983 
Though attorneys may not hope to be 
compensated to the full measure of the val-
ue of their time and work in a compensa-
tion proceeding, they must not be limited 
by the Industrial Commission to such nig-
gardly fees that they cannot afford to accept 
compensation cases. U.C.A.1943, 42— 
1—81. 
9. Workmen's compensation <£»I983 
Though attorney and client in compen-
sation cases may contract on a fee for serv-
ices performed by the attorney before the 
Industrial Commission and before the Su-
preme Court, such contract is not binding 
on commission, and no greater sum can be 
charged than that fixed by commission, if 
fee so fixed is within limits of reasonable-
ness. U.C.A.1943, §§ 6—0—40, 42—1—81. 
10. Constitutional law <3=?3I8 
When work done by attorneys in com-
pensation proceeding is not great and com-
pensation to be allowed is comparatively 
small, Industrial Commission may fix at-
torney's fees without first granting attor-
neys a hearing, without denying attorneys 
due process of law, especially where all 
services performed are in matters which 
never reach the Supreme Court. U.C.A. 
1943, 42—1—81; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14, § 1. 
11. Constitutional law €=318 
If attorneys or applicant ask for a 
hearing on reasonableness of attorney's fees 
in a compensation proceeding either be-
fore fees are fixed, or for a rehearing after 
fees are fixed, hearing or rehearing should 
be granted in order to satisfy requirements 
2Tite v. Tax Comission, 89 Utah 404, 
57 P.2d 734; Ellis v. Industrial Com-
mission, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363. 
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of due process. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1. 
12. Constitutional law @=>3I8 
Where attorneys for compensation 
claimants sent letter to Industrial Com-
mission stating that they had agreed with 
one of the claimants for an attorney's fee 
of $1,000, and that, if commission had any 
doubt as to reasonableness of fee, attorneys 
would like to be heard on matter, but com-
mission ignored such request for a hearing 
and awarded only §375 attorney's fee, there 
was denial of due process. U.C.A.1943, 
42—1—81; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1. 
13. Workmen's compensation C=3|983 
Industrial Commission is not arbitrary 
or unreasonable in fixing attorney's fee in 
compensation proceeding unless it fixes fee 
which a reasonable mind, familiar with val-
ue of attorney's services, wrould say was less 
than reasonable. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—SI.3 
14. Workmen's compensation <§=>I983 
Industrial Commission in compensation 
proceeding cannot fix attorney's fee above 
amount which attorney and client have 
agreed to. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81. 
15. Workmen's compensation <§=M983 
Where fee of attorneys representing 
compensation claimant was contingent on 
success, case was lost before Industrial 
Commission when attorneys agreed to rep-
resent claimants, case was a close one turn-
ing largely on interpretation of a contract, 
decision of commission was set aside by 
Supreme Court, and on remittitur commis-
sion awarded claimants $7,250, $1,000 fee 
agreed on between attorneys and claimants 
was reasonable. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81. 
PRATT, C. J., dissenting. 
Original certiorari proceeding by Roy 
D. Thatcher, LeRoy B. Young, and Paul 
Thatcher, copartners doing business under 
the firm name and style of Thatcher & 
Young, against the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah and others to review 
a decision of the commission allowing the 
plaintiffs a fee of $375 in a compensation 
proceeding. 
ATRIAL COMMISSION Utah [70 
7 P.2d 178 
Decision of commission set aside ar.d 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
Thatcher & Young, Ogden, for plaintiffs. 
Grover A. Giles, Attorney General, and 
Zar E. Hayes and S. D. Huffaker, Assistant 
Attorneys General, for defendants. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Certiorari to the Industrial Commission 
to review a decision allowing the attor-
neys for the applicant a fee of $375 in the 
matter of Rosenbaum v. Industrial Commis-
sion. 
Plaintiffs are co-partners licensed to 
practice law and doing business as attor-
neys-at-law under the firm name of That-
cher & Young. 
In February, 1946, Morris Dewayne 
Rosenbaum died of injuries while in the 
employment of another. His widow 
claimed compensation for his death on the 
ground that when injured he was employed 
by one Sholty who had more than three 
persons in his employ. The real issue was 
as to whether Rosenbaum, was, at the time 
of his injury, in the employ of Sholty or of 
one Seashore, who had less than three per-
sons in his employ and who was, there-
fore, not subject to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The commission decided 
the case against Mrs. Rosenbaum, the 
widow of the deceased workman, holding 
that the deceased was at the time of his in-
jury in the employment of Seashore. The 
widow thereupon consulted with the plain-
tiffs herein who undertook to obtain a re-
versal of the commission's order denying 
an award, agreeing to charge a fee only in 
the event that they should be successful 
If successful, a fee reasonable in amount 
was to be agreed upon between the widow 
and her attorneys, plaintiffs herein. From 
this point, we outline in some detail the 
work of plaintiffs in order that the reader 
may have some idea of the services per-
formed. 
The plaintiffs, as attorneys for the de-
pendents of the deceased Rosenbaum, filed 
with the Industrial Commission an appli-
cation for rehearing which was denied. 
Plaintiffs then took the case to this court 
with the result that the order of the Indus-
3 Ellis v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, & P.2d 263. 
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trial Commission was, by a divided decision, 
set aside. See Rosenbaum v. Industrial 
ComrtL, Utah, 185 P.2d 511. 
The respondents in the Rosenbaum case 
filed a brief on rehearing but failed to file 
a petition for rehearing. Thereupon the 
plaintiffs herein, attorneys for dependents 
of deceased Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum, 
filed a motion in this court for the issuance 
of a remittitur. The respondents filed a mo-
tion to be relieved of their default in fail-
ing to file a petition for rehearing. The 
motion to remit the record was denied and 
the motion of respondents to be relieved of 
default was granted. The plaintiffs herein, 
as attorneys for the dependents of Rosen-
baum, thereupon prepared and filed a reply 
brief to respondents' brief for rehearing. 
The petition for rehearing was denied by 
this court and the record thereupon re-
mitted to the Industrial Commission. 
Thereafter plaintiffs and the widow of 
Rosenbaum agreed between them that the 
sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) was 
a reasonable fee, which the widow, acting 
for all the dependents, agreed to pay. On 
remittitur the commission vacated its pre-
vious order denying an award, and entered 
an order awarding to the dependents of the 
decedent benefits in the sum of seven thou-
sand two-hundred and fifty dollars ($7,250), 
at the same time fixing the fee of the plain-
tiffs herein for legal services rendered to 
the dependents of Rosenbaum at three hun-
dred and seventy-five dollars ($375). The 
plaintiffs thereupon filed with the Industrial 
Commission their application for a rehear-
ing on the ground that the sum of three 
hundred and seventy-five dollars ($375) 
was inadequate for the services performed 
and that one thousand dollars ($1,000) was 
a reasonable fee. The petition for rehear-
ing was by the commission denied, hence 
this review. 
The plaintiffs contend: (1) That Section 
42—1—81, U.C.A.1943, purporting to au-
thorize the Industrial Commission to regu-
late and fix attorney's fees, is unconstitu-
tional and void as an unwarranted legisla-
tive and executive interference with the ju-
dicial branch of the government in that it 
violates Article V, Section 1, of the Con-
stitution of Utah and therefore the order 
fixing the fees of plaintiffs is without au-
thority and null and void. 
(2) That the action of the commission in 
fixing the fees without notice to plaintiffs 
and opportunity to be heard was without 
due process of law and a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws in violation of Sec-
tion 1, Amendment XIV, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States and of Article I, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah. 
(3) Even if Section 42—1—81, U.C.A. 
1943, giving the commission authority to 
regulate and fix fees is valid, it acted ar-
bitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in 
refusing to approve the agreed fee of one 
thousand dollars ($1,000) and in fixing such 
fee at the sum of three hundred and seven-
ty-five dollars (^375). 
We consider the contentions in the order 
set forth above. 
The argument on the first contention runs 
as follows: That in our tripartite form of 
government the legislative and executive 
cannot intrude upon the judiciary and vice 
versa; that the judiciary has the para-
mount power to lay down rules of practice 
and procedure, although the legislature may 
make reasonable regulations in aid of that 
power but not supersede it; that the ju-
diciary has the sole power to license and ad-
mit attorneys to practice before the bar be-
cause as officers of the court they are part 
of the judicial system; that the judiciary 
has the sole power to discipline attorneys 
for unprofessional conduct and in pursu-
ance thereof to suspend and disbar attor-
neys guilty of such conduct; that this court 
has exercised and is in the process of exer-
cising its power in all three of the above 
named fields. It does not clearly appear 
from plaintiffs' brief whether they expres-
ly contend that the judiciary has the power 
to regulate the conduct of attorneys in their 
practice of the law and to fix or regulate 
their fees. It appears, however, that it 
would be necessary for us so to find in 
order to reach the conclusion they ask us 
to reach. At any rate, they contend that if 
any branch of the government has such 
power in respect to attorneys it is the ju-
diciary and not the legislative nor the 
executive branches. 
It is not necessary in this opinion for us 
to determine or even to discuss the difficult 
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questions of what are legislative, executive torneys is an exercise of the police power, 
and judicial functions nor to fix the boun-
daries of each field. Attention is called 
to the lengthy treatise on this matter con-
tained in Tite v. Tax Commission, 89 Utah 
404, 57 P.2d 734. 
It should be noted that Article V of our 
Constitution says that "no person charged 
with the exercise of powers properly be-
longing to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expressly directed or permitted." 
(Emphasis added) It does not say that 
no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of those 
departments shall not exercise functions 
which partake in their nature of the quality 
of those functions exercised by either of the 
other departments. Modern governments 
could not exist if that were the case. What 
was probably intended was that the func-
tion of primary law making shall be exer-
cised by the legislature; that the executive 
department shall have the duty of execution 
and enforcement of the laws (which duty 
may require manifold regulations and even 
secondary law making functions within the 
limits and according to the standards set by 
the legislature); that the judiciary shall 
have the final power and duty of interpret-
ing the laws. Administrative agencies in 
order to operate must at the outset exercise 
powers fundamentally in nature either ju-
dicial, legislative or executive or a combina-
tion of all, but they derive such power from 
the legislative branch and, while they must 
in many cases interpret the laws which in-
stituted them or other laws with which 
they must deal, these laws are subject to 
final adjudication and review by the ju-
dicial branch. We know by tradition and 
custom in a general way what masters all 
three of these departments deal with. It 
would be fruitless and unwise to try to de-
lineate in advance of specific and concrete 
cases the boundaries separating the func-
tional activity of any of the departments. 
The plaintiffs would not, we think, deny 
any of the above observations. What they 
contend for is that the regulation and fix-
ing of fees of attorneys is essentially and 
solely the power of the judiciary and that 
if such regulation and fixing the fees of at-
it must be applied by the judicial branch 
of the government. 
[1-5] Our difficulty with this argument 
is that we are not aware of any power in 
the judiciary to fix or regulate attorney's 
fees. We do not think it can be inferred 
from the power to promulgate rules of 
practice and procedure nor from the pow-
er to provide for the examination, licensing 
or regulation of admission to the bar of 
persons seeking to practice law, nor from 
the auxilliary power to discipline attorneys 
as officers of the court for unprofessional 
conduct. It is unnecessary at this time to 
determine whether the judiciary has the 
power to regulate or fix fees. It has the 
power to determine what is a reasonable fee 
when the law or the contract of the parties 
provides for a reasonable fee. That is a 
question presented by the litigation, and it 
fixes the fees for its receivers and other 
non-attorney officers. If there is power in 
the courts to fix a fee scale or regulate 
fees, it has not been exercised. In general 
it has been left to the freedom of contract 
which in the main opinion in the case of 
McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96 Utah 203, 
85 P.2d 608, has been called a property 
right. Freedom of contract accurately 
speaking, is a constitutional right which 
may give birth to, but is not itself, a prop-
erty right, and like many other constitution-
al rights is subject to reasonable police 
regulation. So, likewise, the attorney's fee 
is left to agreement between the attorney 
and his client subject to the right of the 
court to discipline the attorney where the 
fee charged is unconscionable, or advantage 
is taken of the ignorance of the client. But 
such conduct would be unprofessional con-
duct and for that reason the court might 
take cognizance of the case through the 
grievance committee of the Bar. We must 
therefore conclude that the judiciary does 
not regulate attorneys in the sense that it 
supervises them in their office transactions 
and that the matter of fixing fees is gen-
erally a matter of agreement. If this were 
not so, and if plaintiffs were correct in re-
gard to their contention that the judiciary 
has the sole right to fix or regulate fees, 
the provision in Sec. 6—0-^40, U.C.A.1943, 
formerly same section R.S.1933, reading: 
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"The compensation of an attorney and 
counselor for his services is governed by 
agreement, express or implied, which is not 
restrained by law," would be unconstitu-
tional. 
[6] The problem, therefore, reduces it-
self, not to one of determining what are the 
powers of the judiciary in regard to regula-
tion and fixing of fees, but of determining 
whether the legislature has the right to im-
pair the freedom of right to contract be-
tween an attorney and his client for a fee 
by giving to the Industrial Commission full 
power to regulate and fix reasonable fees 
of attorneys in cases before the commission 
in which attorneys have been employed. 
We have no doubt that legislature, under its 
police powers, has such right in compensa-
tion cases. 
The rule above stated was followed by 
this court in Ellis v. Industrial Comm., 91 
Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363. All of the judges 
concurring and dissenting in that case 
agreed on that proposition even to the ex-
tent of holding that the Industrial Commis-
sion had the power to fix the fee for serv-
ices performed not only before the com-
mission but before this court on certiorari 
issued to the commission. See also Corbin 
v. Wilkinson, 175 Okl. 247, 52 P.2d 45, 47, 
quoted with approval in the prevailing opin-
ion of the Ellis case. If the rule were 
otherwise, an overlarge share of the com-
pensation much needed to support the fam-
ily of the injured or deceased workman 
might be diverted to the attorney. In some, 
if not in most cases, counsel for the appli-
cant will have to take less than he might 
properly charge for work not involving 
workman's compensation, since the traffic 
may not bear the full value of the services 
performed. 
[7] One of the purposes of the compen-
sation acts was to provide the employee 
with a remedy without the delays, expenses 
and uncertainties of a court trial. Under 
the compensation acts, both employer and 
employee gave up certain rights—the em-
ployer losing his common law defenses and 
the employee his right to sue for large dam-
ages. In return, the employer received a 
liability limited and determinate and the 
employee received the sureness of a prompt 
and expeditious payment of his claim. 
Since the amounts which may be awarded 
under the compensation act are at all times 
very modest, and in inflationary times prac-
tically penurious, it is apparent that the 
very purposes of the act would be defeated 
if attorneys were limited only by the canons 
of professional ethics in the fixing of fees 
for services rendered in compensation cas-
es. To permit attorneys to charge usual 
fees in cases of this sort might practically 
emasculate any -value of the compensation 
act to the workman. And by this, we do 
not imply that attorneys habitually charge 
exorbitant or unfair fees for their services. 
Rather, in compensation cases, the attor-
neys must and are willing to accept for 
their services less than they would receive 
for the same amount of work in other types 
of cases. This is more or less in the nature 
of a professional duty somewhat similar to 
the duty to defend impecunious defendants 
in criminal cases. 
[8] And a word of caution to the com-
mission may be appropriate here. Wrhile at-
torneys may not hope to be compensated to 
the full measure of the value of their time 
and work, they must not be limited to such 
niggardly fees that they cannot afford to ac-
cept compensation cases. And particularly 
where it has become necessary to carry a 
compensation case to this court should the 
commission be at least moderately liberal in 
allowance of attorney's fees. Better that an 
applicant should lose 15% to 20% of his 
benefits in attorneys' fees than that he 
should receive no benefits at all merely be-
cause no lawyer could afford or would be 
willing to accept his case and properly pre-
sent it to the commission and the courts,, 
for the main reason that the compensation 
for such services would be grossly inade-
quate. 
[9] It thus transpires that while the at-
torney and client in compensation cases may 
have freedom of contract to agree on a fee 
for services performed by the attorney be-
fore the Industrial Commission and be-
fore the Supreme Court, such contract is 
not binding on the Commission and no. 
greater sum may be charged than that fixed 
by the Industrial Commission, if the fee so 
fixed by it is within the limits of reasonable-
ness even though the parties may have-
agreed on a larger sum. 
THATCHER v. IXDT'S 
Cite as 20' 
[10-12] The plaintiffs contend secondly, 
that they were denied due process of law in 
that the Industrial Commission ignored 
their request for a hearing as to what would 
be a reasonable fee for the services per-
formed. In this regard, the plaintiffs must 
prevail. The plaintiffs, attorneys for the 
defendants, sent a letter to the commission 
stating that they had agreed with Mrs. 
Rosenbaum for a lee of one thousand dol-
lars ($1,000) and that if the commission 
had any doubt as to the reasonableness of 
this fee, they, the attorneys, would like to 
be heard on the matter. Many times when 
the work done is not great and the compen-
sation to be allowed is comparatively small, 
the commission may fix the fee without first 
granting a hearing, This is especially the 
case where all the services performed are 
in matters which never reach the Supreme 
Court. Economy of time and effort to all 
concerned in those cases makes it practical 
for the commission to fix a fee from its 
experience in compensation cases without 
hearing as to the value of the services per-
formed. But if the attorneys or the appli-
cant ask for a hearing on the matter either 
before the fee is fixed or for a rehearing 
after the fee is fixed on the amount of the 
fee allowed, the same should be granted in 
order to satisfy the requirements of due 
process. The award of $375 attorneys' fee 
must therefore be set aside and a rehearing 
on that matter granted, and it is so ordered. 
[13] While ordinarily our power does 
not go beyond that of setting aside an order 
of the commission, in a case such as this 
we think it wise to advise the commission 
as to some of the factors which enter into 
the determination of a reasonable fee for 
legal work performed. The commission is 
perhaps not so cognizant as are we as to 
what is a reasonable fee for services per-
formed on a contingent basis for matters 
involving this amount of money recoverable 
in a death case where the applicant pre-
vails. The commission would not be arbi-
trary or unreasonable unless it fixed a fee 
which any reasonable mind, familiar with 
the value of attorneys' services would say 
was less than reasonable. That of course 
means that there must necessarily be a 
wide range because attorneys themselves 




fees for professional work. And it must be 
kept in mind that here we are dealing with 
compensation benefits. Much could be 
said regarding the amount of attorneys' 
fees. Lawyers perform differently accord-
ing to their ability and experience. Some 
work faster and more accurately and thor-
oughly than others. Each brings to his 
task his own capacity, expertness, ability, 
dispatch and experience. The author in 
a dissenting opinion in the case of Ellis 
v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, 
64 P.2d 363t dwelt at some length on these 
factors. It may be briefly said that an 
incompetent lawyer is apt to be a detriment 
to his client and is usually overpaid, what-
ever he receives, while a competent, well-
trained, and skillful attorney may ofttimes 
be underpaid for the services he renders. 
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Utah 
State Bar, adopted May 28, 1936, approved 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
March 1, 1937, with amendments effective 
March 10, 1940, provides as follows: 
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid 
charges which overestimate their advice 
and services, as well as those which under-
value them. A client's ability to pay cannot 
justify a charge in excess of the value of 
the service, though his poverty may re-
quire a less charge, or even none at all. 
The reasonable requests of brother lawyers, 
and of their widows and orphans without 
ample means, should receive special and 
kindly consideration. 
"In determining the amount of the fee, 
it is proper to consider: (1) the time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved and the skill re-
quisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) 
whether the acceptance of employment in 
the particular case will preclude the law-
yer's appearance for others in cases likely 
to arise out of the transaction, and in which 
there is a reasonable expectation that other-
wise he would be employed, or will involve 
the loss of other employment while em-
ployed in the particular case or antagon-
isms with other clients; (3) the customary 
charges of the Bar for similar services; 
(4) the amount involved in the controversy 
and for the benefits resulting to the client 
from the services; (5) the contingency or 
the certainty of the compensation; and (6) 
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the character of the employment, whether 
casual or for an established and constant 
client. No one of these considerations in it-
self is controlling. They are mere guides 
in ascertaining the real value of the service. 
"In determining the customary charges 
of the Bar for similar services, it is proper 
for a lawyer to consider a schedule of min-
imum fees adopted by a Bar Association, 
but no lawyer should permit himself to be 
controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole 
guide in determining the amount of his fee. 
"In fixing fees it should never be for-
gotten that the profession is a branch of 
the administration of justice and not a mere 
money-getting trade." 
It should be noted the above does not 
lay down a rule but presents guides 
for the fixing of attorneys' fees and so ex-
pressly states. It happens in this case that 
the plaintiffs were a firm of skillful and ex-
perienced attorneys. They snatched a 
brand from the burning in the sense that 
the case was lost before the commission 
when they agreed to represent Mrs. Rosen-
baum. It was a close case turning largely 
on the interpretation of a contract relation-
ship which in turn revolved about the inter-
pretation of conversation between Sholty 
and Seashore susceptible of a varying 
meaning to intelligent minds. The fee was 
contingent on success. 
It would be the duty of the commission 
by evidence to fix a fee within the zone of 
reasonableness. The commission would not 
ordinarily be required to determine from 
the evidence what would be the lower and 
upper limits of the zone for the services in 
any particular case. But it must be satisfied 
from evidence adduced as to the reasonable 
worth of the services Tendered that the fee 
it fixes is within the zone. Evidence from 
competent counsel as to the worth of serv-
ices founded upon a statement of what work 
was performed by the attorneys in the case 
and the skill required will itself usually be 
given in terms of a range for the reason 
that the testifying attorney will be aware 
that his opinion as to the worth of legal 
services is only an opinion and will vary 
somewhat from lawyer to lawyer depend-
ing to an extent upon the experience of the 
testifying lawyer and the strata of clientele 
with which he deals. 
[14,15] The commission cannot fix 
the fee above the amount which the attor-
ney and his client have agreed to, but it 
may in cases include that under the cir-
cumstances thereof, a fee agreed to may 
be unreasonable in that it takes too much 
of the compensation award, compensation 
being what it is. While we make no pro-
nouncement in this case binding on the 
commission, we can say that the fee agreed 
on in this case, to wit, $1,000, being on a 
contingent basis, is within the range be-
tween the highest and lowest reasonable-
ness. The client was fully satisfied with 
that sum realizing that she owed it large-
ly to the work, the faith and the con-
scientiousness of her attorneys. 
The order of the commission is set 
aside, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with the views 
herein expressed; costs to plaintiffs. 
LATIMER and McDONOUGH, JJ.> 
concur. 
WADE, Justice (concurring). 
I agree with the result and generally 
with the reasoning of the prevailing opin-
ion. But I do not see how we can reach 
this result without overruling Ellis v. In-
dustrial Comm., 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363. 
In my opinion, while, under Sec. 42— 
1—81, U.C.A.1943, the Industrial Commis-
sion is authorized to regulate and fix at-
torneys' fees, where attorneys are em-
ployed in industrial accident cases, it may 
only fix such fees as will reasonably com-
pensate the attorney for his services ren-
dered. When the amount of the fee as 
fixed by the commission is either so low or 
so high that it is beyond the bounds of 
what is reasonable compensation for the 
services of the attorney, then it is arbi-
trary and this court roust set aside such an 
award. In order to determine what is a 
reasonable fee in a given case the com-
mission should obtain all the evidence it 
reasonably can under the circumstances,, 
and to refuse to grant any hearing would 
also be to act arbitrarily. The commis-
sion is not bound to follow the expert 
opinion evidence on this question and in 
some cases might be justified in finding 
contrary to all of such evidence. It should 
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always keep in mind that a person who has 
suffered an industrial accident receives the 
very mimmum of compensation and that 
the attorneys' fees must be held down to 
as low a sum as possible within reason. 
The above section of the statute does 
not expressly require the commission to fix 
the attorneys' fees at a reasonable amount 
but I think that was intended. The fee 
of an attorney is his reward or wages or 
compensation for his professional serv-
ices. It is not a mere donation which may 
or may not be withheld and ordinarily 
he is entitled to what his services are 
reasonably worth. He is as much entitled 
to reasonable compensation for his serv-
ices in this kind of a case as anyone else 
who renders service. So when the stat-
ute authorized the commission to fix at-
torneys' fees it was intended that the 
amount fixed woud be within the bounds 
of what constitutes reasonable compensa-
tion for such services. I recognize that 
industrial accident cases are different 
from ordinary matters which a lawyer is 
employed to attend to. However, I do not 
believe that the legislature intended this 
kind of work to be done without compen-
sation or for unreasonably low compen-
sation. If we adhere to the rule that such 
compensation may be so fixed then many 
cases will have to be litigated without the 
benefit of legal counsel and many a de-
serving person who is entitled to com-
pensation will be barred therefrom be-
cause the commission does not understand 
the law correctly, and the applicant will 
not be fortunate enough to contact a law-
yer who would take his case, knowing 
that he would not be adequately compen-
sated for his services. The attorneys' fees 
should therefore be fixed within the 
bounds of reasonable compensation for the 
services rendered and should be sufficient 
so that the average lawyer can afford to 
take that kind of case without losing money 
by such employment. 
Of course there may be a wide range 
between what one person, lawyer or judge 
would consider a reasonable fee in a giv-
en case. And in each mind there would 
be some difference between the highest 
is first for the commission to determine 
and only when the commission refuses to 
hear evidence thereon or after hearing, 
acts beyond the bounds of reasonableness, 
does this court have the power to set aside 
its decision. This is the same rule as is 
applicable in any other finding of fact. 
Here the fact found is what is a reason-
able attorneys' fee. Where the evidence 
does not reasonably justify the finding 
then it is arbitrary and we set it aside. 
This court is particularly competent to 
pass on this question because its members 
are lawyers and have some knowledge of 
the value of such services. 
In order to reach this conclusion I think 
we must overrule the Ellis case, supra. 
This is what I understand the dissenting 
opinions in that case held, but I think 
such a holding is contrary to the majority 
holding. I think the difference was more 
than merely the difference in opinion as to 
what amount would be necessary to bring 
the award within the bounds of a reason-
able fee. The basis of the majority opin-
ion in that case was as expressed by Mr. 
Justice Folland that [91 Utah 432, 64 P. 
371], "where the circumstances call for 
a substantial fee, the commission would 
be acting arbitrarily if it fixed a mere 
nominal fee." In other words, we there 
held that as long as the fee fixed was more 
than a nominal sum regardless of how un-
reasonably low it might be, this court 
could not set aside the decision. Such is 
clearly not the rule adopted here in the 
prevailing opinion. That opinion requires 
that the fee fixed must be within the range 
between the highest and lowest fee which 
satisfies the requirements of reasonable-
ness. The fee of $375 is not a nominal fee 
any more than the fee of $300 was in the 
Ellis case and if we adhered to the same 
rules in this case which we followed in 
that case, we would have to affirm the 
decision of the Commission. To over-
rule the decision in principle without ex-
pressly so stating, tends to create confu-
sion as to the effect of our decision. 
PRATT, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I am directing my dissent to that part 
of the prevailing opinion which discusse5 and lowest bounds within the range of 
reasonableness. In all cases the problem the first contention of plaintiffs. 
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The controversial section of our code 
reads as follows: 
"Section 42—1—81, U.C.A. 1943: 
"In all cases coming before the indus-
trial commission in which attorneys have 
been employed, the commission is vested 
with fuU power to regulate and fix the 
fees of such attorneys." (Italics added.) 
This is an ill-considered bit of legisla-
tion that overlaps the powers of the judi-
ciary. No doubt the legislature had in the 
back of its mind the thought that it would 
be of benefit to the applicant before the 
commission. What they failed to realize 
was that it is rather effective in driving 
attorneys away from that class of litiga-
tion. It might be classed as a mild form 
of legislation comparable to a certain en-
actment of the territorial legislature of 
this state. Chapter VIII, Laws of Utah 
1852 was entitled: "An Act for the Reg-
ulation of Attorneys." Section 2 thereof 
reads: 
"No person or persons employing coun-
sel, in any of the courts of this Territory, 
shall be compelled by any process of law 
to pay the counsel so employed for any 
services rendered as counsel, before, or 
after, or during the process of trial in the 
case." 
If this comparison appeals to the reader 
as an exaggeration, let us examine the 
matter for a moment. 
The members of this court, all of whom 
were practitioners at one time or another, 
have no difficulty in appreciating the fact 
that a reasonable fee for handling cases 
before the commission should be measured 
in the light of the attorney's employment 
contracts and in the light of the funda-
mental purposes of our industrial acci-
dent laws. That is evidenced by the opin-
ions filed in this case. Such an apprecia-
tion, however, is not something arising 
out of judicial experience only. It arises 
from an analysis of the purposes of the 
law. The practitioner knows it as well as 
the judge; and both know it far better 
than the layman, who is unfamiliar with 
professional services, inexperienced in le-
gal analysis, and easily impressed with ad-
verse thoughts about the legal profession. 
Section 42—1—81, however, places the 
responsibility of applying this measure 
upon the shoulders of the layman, the 
least qualified of the three to understand 
the application. This fact alone however, 
means nothing. A jury of laymen have a 
final determination of similar questions 
of fact in trials before the courts. Many 
administrative fact finding bodies have 
given to them the power to make final de-
terminations of questions of fact. Such 
powers are not questioned if properly 
limited—in the jury case by instructions 
from the court; in legislation by stand-
ards or rules to govern their considera-
tions. In the case of Revne v. Trade Com-
mission, Utah, 192 P.2d 563, 3 A.L.R. 169, 
certain standards were fixed and discussed 
as a foundation for determining the price 
of hair cuts. But has section 42—1—81 
(quoted) any such limitations? No. 
No standards, rules or instructions are 
given the commission to advise them as 
to the method of determining the area of 
reasonableness within which they may fix 
the fees. Except by implication, there is 
not even an indication that the fees are to 
be reasonable. The word "reasonable" is 
not used. Furthermore, the indifference as 
to the possible arbitrariness of the com-
mission's rulings as to fees is evidenced in 
another way. No provision for appel-
late review of the commission's finding as 
to those fees is provided. This may seem 
a strange statement in view of the Ellis 
case, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363, cited in 
the prevailing opinion, and our acceptance 
of the present case. Our right to accept 
it is very questionable—so far as this stat-
utory law is concerned. The only review 
contemplated by the Industrial Act is of 
the award; and "award" is defined, par. 7, 
Sec. 42—1—42, as the finding or decision 
of the commission as to the amount of 
compensation due any injured, or the de-
pendents of any deceased employee. The 
award includes any of the appropriate 
items covered by such sections as 42—1— 
61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66f and 75, in none of 
which is reference made to attorneys' 
fees. Such fees are not part of the award. 
The fact that the alleged purpose of Sec-
tion 42—1—81 is to prevent the attorney 
taking too great a part of the award as 
fees, is a recognition that the amount o£ 
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the award is not governed by the necessity where arbitrariness is less apt to follow. 
of paying attorneys' fees. When laymen 
are handed "full pozver to regulate and fix 
the fees"—to control the purse strings— 
with no checks or balances, it is quite easy 
for their minds to assume that rather 
popular fear complex conceived in the be-
lief that the legal profession is afflicted 
with predatory instincts, and needs watch-
ing. As a result, situations develop just 
as developed here: A fee fixed without 
notice, without evidence, without knowl-
edge of professional services—arbitrarily. 
In the Ellis case we said that it did not 
make any difference whether or not the 
attorney had appeared before the com-
mission ; that the commission's power in-
cluded fixing fees for appearances solely 
before the Supreme Court. Is that true, 
regardless of the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice? 
"The practice of law is so intimately 
connected and bound up with the exercise 
of judicial power in the administration of 
justice that the right to define and regu-
late its practice naturally and logically 
belongs to the judicial department of our 
state government." In re Integration of 
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 
275 N.W. 265, 268, 114 A.L.R. 151. 
The power to affect the functioning of 
the judicial branch of the government will 
lie with the legislature only so long as 
the courts surrender that power to them. 
Integration Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N. 
W.2d 604, 151 A.L.R. 586. As a matter of 
comity and in the interests of teamwork 
between branches of the government, there 
are times when an insistence upon a strict 
adherence to division lines between bran-
ches of the government will accomplish 
little, but when the legislation takes the 
form of driving counsel away from a par-
ticular class of litigants, it is time for 
the courts to guard their rights and insist 
upon adherence to those divisions—not to 
protect the attorneys, but to prevent the 
maladministration of justice. 
It is human nature to shy away from the 
arbitrary control of others, and attor-
neys are no exception. Met with a law 
in which the layman is givers such un-
bridled control of his fees, attorney 
Who suffers as a result? The applicant 
before the commission, as he (or she, as 
in this case) is handicapped in acquiring 
justice. He either must accept inferior 
service, or must fight his battle alone 
against astute well paid counsel of—in 
many instances—his corporate employer. 
In this case the applicant lost before the 
Commission without counsel. Counsel 
saved the situation for her, and she re-
covered. 
The attorney is a necessary part of our 
judicial system. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 
102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 144 A.L.R. 
839; State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 
N.W. 441. He is also a citizen and should 
bear his share of the burdens of society— 
his share of the regulations of society. 
The really important line to be drawn is 
between the legislation which affects him 
merely as the citizen practicing a profes-
sion, and that which affects him in his 
capacity as a court officer. The latter is of 
public interest. 
On July 30, 1886, 24 Stat. 107, 48 U.S. 
C.A. § 1471, Congress enacted a law pro-
viding that the legislatures of the terri-
tories of the United States shall not pass 
local or special laws regulating the prac-
tice in courts of justice. When our State 
Constitution was adopted in 1896, this 
provision became par. 6, Sec. 26, Art. VI, 
of that Constitution. This has been in-
terpreted in Lyte v. District Court, 90 
Utah 369, 61 P.2d 1259. Recently, Chap-
ter 33, Laws of Utah 1943, our legislature 
recognized that, our Supreme Court has 
the power to regulate the practice before 
the courts; and provided that when the 
court's rules of practice are made effective 
they shall supersede all legislation in con-
flict therewith. These enactments are 
clear recognitions of the power in the 
judiciary to govern the matters of prac-
tice in the administration of justice. 
To discuss the section of our code, 42— 
1—81, in controversy, on the basis of an 
exercise of police power regulating at-
torneys, is to draw attention away from 
the harm to the public in the administra-
tion of justice. The power to regulate the 
practice of professions can be conceded; 
prefers to switch his attentiur* to fields but when legislation having the earmarks 
188 Utah 2(>7 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
of such a purpose, in reality interferes 
with the administration of justice, then 
the courts must take a hand. 
This legislation does affect the admin-
istration of justice—and does affect the 
practice before this court; and the power 
to govern the conduct or fees of attorneys 
as a matter of regulation is beside the 
point. There is not much difference be-
tween saying attorneys shall not be paid 
for their services (Chap. VIII, Laws of 
Utah 1852, quoted), and saying that in 
certain classes of cases they shall be paid 
only what a designated layman or group 
of laymen sees fit to grant them—the liti-
gant loses the benefit of the expert pre-
sentation of his case to the court on re-
view, and the preparation for review. It 
makes no difference that by judicial inter-
pretation we may place the proper safe-
guards around Section 42—1—81. This 
brings the matter down to what is sug-
gested in the prevailing opinion. 
That opinion appears to recognize a de-
ficiency in Section 42—1—81, although it 
upholds its provisions. This recognition 
appears in this way: The opinion quotes, 
as a guide for fixing fees, Rule 12 of the 
Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar with 
amendments. There is, however, nothing 
in the legislative enactment in question 
which indicates that the legislature 
thought the commission's determination 
should be upon a measure such as is out-
lined by the requirement of that rule. 
Nothing is said in the law about it. 
The question before us is not one of 
whether or not the court has power to 
fix a schedule of attorneys' fees; nor is it 
one to regulate attorneys in their office 
practice. It is a question of whether or 
not the legislature should be permitted to 
enact a section of the code which inter-
feres with the administration of justice. 
It is not a question merely personal to the 
attorneys, but one of great public im-
portance—one as to whether or not we 
should take a backward step in the direc-
tion of the 1852 law, quoted, and inter-
fere with the administration of justice by 
driving the attorney away from the kind 
of practice discussed herein. We can go 
back over the years if we want, step by 
step, but it might be advisable to think of 
those steps in the light of their effect on 
the administration of justice. The strength 
of our government lies in the maintenance 
of the strength and independence of its 
branches. 
Section 42—1—81, U.C.A.1943, should 
be declared unconstitutional and, in so far 
as this particular case is concerned, the 
fee agreed upon between attorney and 
client upheld. 
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veil would be determined with reference to 
UNITED STATES of America the law of the state of incorporation. 
Ronald L. DAUGHERTY and Thomas E. 
Daugherty, Individually and d/b/a 
Daugherty & Daugherty Construction 
Co., Inc., and Daugherty Brothers Con-
struction, Inc.; Daugherty & Daugherty 
Construction Co., Inc. and Daugherty 
Brothers Construction, Inc. 
No. CIV. 3-84-12. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Tennessee, N.D. 
Dec. 3, 1984. 
Government brought action to assess 
civil penalties under the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act against two 
corporations and their individual owners. 
Following grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Government against corporations, 
cross motions for summary judgment were 
filed as to individual liability. The District 
Court, Hull, J., held that (1) fact that one 
corporation was not qualified to do busi-
ness in Tennessee did not provide basis for 
holding individual shareholder and officer 
liable, and (2) there was no basis for pierc-
ing the corporate veil or applying the alter 
ego theory to hold individual shareholders 
and officers liable for the civil penalties. 
Judgment for defendants. 
1. Corporations <3=>653 
Failure of corporation to qualify to do 
business in Tennessee did not subject 
shareholder, officer, and director of corpo-
ration to liability for corporate debt under 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act Surface Mizung Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 197?* §§ 101-908, 30 U.S. 
C.A. §§ 1201-1328; T.C.A. § 48-1106(1, 3) 
(now § 48-l-1106(a, c)). 
2. Corporations *»640 
Question of whether individual could 
be held liable for corporate debt under al-
ter ego theory of piercing the corporate 
3. Corporations <S=»1.4(4) 
Under Kentucky law, factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether to disre-
gard the corporate entity under the alter 
ego theory are undercapitalization, failure 
to observe corporate formalities, nonpay-
ment or overpayment of dividends, siphon-
ing of funds by majority shareholders, and 
guarantee of corporate liabilities by major 
shareholders. 
4. Corporations «=»1.6(4) 
Where there was no showing of under-
capitalization, where corporate formalities 
were generally observed, although the req-
uisite number of directors were not elected, 
where no dividends were paid, and where 
no funds were siphoned or commingled, 
although corporate principal borrowed 
money to loan to the corporation when the 
corporation could not otherwise obtain the 
funds, corporate entity would not be disre-
garded under the alter ego theory so as to 
permit individual to be held liable for civil 
penalties assessed against corporation un-
der the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328; T.C.A. § 48-
1106(1, 3) (now § 48-l-1106(a, c)). 
5. Corporations *»54, 56 
Under Kentucky law, bylaws may be 
amended by board of directors and, al-
though penalty is prescribed if failure to 
amend the bylaws to conform with the con-
duct of business is a violation of statute, 
the bylaws may be waived. KRS271A.135, 
271A.640(2). 
6. Corporations «»1.5(3) 
Under Tennessee law, the "instrumen-
tality rule" is adopted to pierce the corpo-
rate veil where a subsidiary company is a 
mere instrumentality for the parent compa-
ny; corporate veil wflTfie pierced where 
there is parental domination of the fi-
nances, policy, and business practices, use 
of the domination to commit fraud or other 
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wrong, and proximate cause connecting the 
wrong with injury to the plaintiff. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Corporations «=1.4(4) 
All surrounding circumstances must be 
considered in determining whether the cor-
poration is a mere instrumentality of the 
shareholder; factors to be considered are 
inadequate capitalization, fraud, commin-
gling of funds, and failure to follow corpo-
rate formalities. 
8. Corporations €=>1.6(4) 
Where individual was sole shareholder 
of corporation, where bylaws requiring at 
least two directors were observed for some 
time until individual shareholder was elect-
ed sole director and president/secretary, 
where corporation held annual and special 
meetings of the directors and shareholders 
and recorded the minutes through 1980, 
where sole shareholder managed the day-
to-day operation of the business with help 
from his foreman and received only a sala-
ry as compensation, and where individual 
never received any loans from or made any 
loans to the corporation and no corporate 
property was used for personal business, 
except a corporate vehicle, corporation was 
not a mere instrumentality of the sole 
shareholder so as to permit him to be held 
liable for civil penalty imposed upon the 
corporation under the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 
§§ 101-908, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328; 
T.C.A. § 48-1106(1, 3) (now § 48-l-1106(a, 
c». 
9. Corporations e=»385 
Corporate action taken without requi-
site number of officers, and directors may 
be ultra vires, but, under Tennessee law, 
the action is not invalid and lack of capacity 
may be asserted only by certain parties in 
specific situations. T.C.A. 48-1-405. 
Robert S. More, Sp. Asst U.S. Atty., U.S. 
Dept. of the Interior, Knoxville, Term., for 
plaintiff. 
Charles Wagner, Knoxville, Tenn., for 
defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
HULL, District Judge. 
Pursuant to the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977 [the Act], 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp.1984), plaintiff 
brought a civil action for collection of civil 
penalties assessed agamst Daugherty and 
Daugherty Construction, Inc. [hereinafter 
D & D]; Daugherty Brothers Construction, 
Inc. [hereinafter DBC]; Ronald L. Daugh-
erty, individually and doing business as 
DBC; and Thomas E. Daugherty, individu-
ally and doing business as D & D. By 
order of the Court entered August 7, 1984 
[No. 43], summary judgment for plaintiff 
was granted as to D & D and DBC. The 
case is now before the Court on cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment on the issue 
of the liability of the individual defendants 
for the corporate debt 
Both D & D and DBC were assessed civil 
penalties for surface mining violations in 
1979 and 1980. Plaintiff seeks to "pierce 
the corporate veil" and hold defendants 
individually liable for the corporate debt on 
several theories. First, plaintiff contends 
that under the "identity theory" of piercing 
the corporate veil Ronald Daugherty is lia-
ble for the corporate debt because (1) he 
was the sole shareholder, director and 
stockholder of DBC; (2) he conducted the 
business of the corporation in violation of 
the bylaws; (3) he exercised exclusive con-
trol of the corporation and acted without 
authority; and (4) he used corporate prop-
erty for personal business. Second, plain-
tiff contends that under the "alter ego" 
theory of piercing the corporate veil, de-
fendant Thomas E. Daugherty is liable for 
the corporate debt because (1) he conducted 
the business of the corporation in violation 
of the bylaws; (2) he exercised dominant 
control of the corporation; (3) no stock 
dividend was paid; and (4) he loaned money 
to the corporation and guaranteed the 
debts of the corporation. Third, plaintiff 
argues that defendant Thomas E. Daugher-
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ty is liable for the corporate debt because 
D & D was a foreign corporationl not 
qualified to do business in Tennessee. 
[1] The Court first will address plain-
tiffs theories of liability with respect to 
defendant Thomas Daugherty. This Court 
previously has addressed the issue whether 
under Tennessee law a shareholder, officer, 
or director of a foreign corporation not 
qualified to do business in Tennessee is 
liable for a corporate debt, arising out of a 
transaction of business in the state. In 
United States v. Ryan, Civ. No. 3-83-130 
(E.D.Tenn. Sep. 28, 1984), this Court held 
that a shareholder, officer, or director of a 
nonqualifying foreign corporation is not lia-
ble for the corporate debt. The Court rea-
soned that enactment of the Tennessee 
General Corporation Act, Tenn.Code Ann. 
§§ 48-101 to 48-1407, specifically sections 
48-1106(1), (3), abrogated pre-Corporation 
Act case law which held the shareholder, 
director, or officer of a nonqualifying cor-
poration liable for the corporate debt. Al-
though the Tennessee courts have not ad-
dressed the issue, the decision is consistent 
with the decisions of courts of states which 
have adopted corporation acts similar to 
the Teeaessee act. See e.g., National 
A&ikQf Credit Management v. Burke, 
645j|2ci 1323, 1325, 26 (Colo.App. 1982); 
Mysels v. Barry, 332 So.2d 38 (Fla.App. 
1976); McAteer v. Menzel Building Co., 
Inc., 300 N.E.2d 583, 13 IU.App.3d 394 
(1973). Thus, the failure of D & D to 
qualify to do business in Tennessee does 
not subject Thomas Daugherty to liability 
for the corporate debt 
[2,3] The question whether Thomas 
Daugherty may be held liabkfc-fbr the cor-
poration debt under the "alter-q^i theory 
of piercing the corporate veil mudt be de-
termined with reference to the law of Ken-
tucky because D & D was incorporated in 
that state. Kentucky courts generally 
have displayed an aversion to any disre-
gard of the corporate entity. Thermoth-
rift Industries, Inc. v. Mono-Therm Insu-
lation Systems, Inc., 450 F.Supp. 398, 405 
(W.D.Ky.1978). However, the Kentucky 
v. DAUGHERTY 673 
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courts have stated that, under the alter ego 
theory, where there is such a unity of 
ownership that the corporate separateness 
has ceased and treatment as separate enti-
ties would sanction fraud and promote in-
justice, the corporate entity should be dis-
regarded. White v. Winchester Land De-
velopment Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.App. 
1979). The following factors must be con-
sidered in determining whether disregard 
of the corporate entity would be appropri-
ate: (1) undercapitalization; (2) failure to 
observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpay-
ment or overpayment of dividends; (4) si-
phoning of funds by majority shareholders; 
and (5) guarantee of corporate liabilities by 
major shareholders. Id. at 62. 
The record in this case discloses that D & 
D was incorporated in Kentucky in 1966 
(Affidavit of Thomas E. Daugherty, No. 15, 
[hereinafter TED Aff.]). One thousand 
shares of stock were issued and subscribed, 
Thomas Daugherty owning 500 shares and 
Gene Daugherty owning 500 shares. (Id.). 
In 1971 D & D redeemed the stock of Gene 
Daugherty, making Thomas Daugherty the 
sole shareholder. The bylaws required 
three directors and officers. D & D operat-
ed in compliance with the bylaws until 1973 
when only two officers and directors were 
elected (TED. Aff. at 2). Thomas Daugher-
ty served as a director and president, and 
Lee Ann Philips served as a director and 
secretary-treasurer and was also an officer-
administrative employee. (Id*). Until 1981 
the corporation held annual meetings of the 
shareholders and board of directors and 
occasionally held special meetings. Min-
utes of these meetings were recorded. The 
corporate charter was revoked in 1982. 
(T$yp Aff.). Prior to revocation of the 
^IgptB^the corporation conducted a coal 
i£jip&$ business apd had an office in Onei-
da, Teanessee, which it shared with anoth-
er corporation. (Deposition of Thomas E. 
Daugherty at 7, [hereinafter TED Depo.]). 
The corporation employed a secretary, a 
foreman, defendant Daugherty and occa-
sionally his son. (Id. at 6-9). The bylaws 
1. D & D was incorporated in Kentucky. Affida- vit of Thomas E. Daugherty, No. 15, at 2. 
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authorized the president to supervise and 
control the affairs of the corporation. (By-
laws of D & D, Art. IV, § 4). As president, 
Thomas Daugherty made day to day man-
agement decisions. (TED. Depo. at 9). He 
received no money from the corporation 
other than a salary. (Id. at 12). No divi-
dend was paid. (Id.). He borrowed money 
to loan to the corporation when the corpo-
ration could not otherwise obtain a loan. 
(Id. at 13-14). The corporation executed 
promissory notes for the loans. (Id.). All 
property owned by the corporation, except 
perhaps a corporate automobile, was used 
only for corporate business. (Id. at 15-18). 
The corporate bank account was not used 
for personal funds. (Id. at 18). 
[4,5] Based on the foregoing descrip-
tion of the corporate activity, the Court 
must determine, in accordance with the fac-
tors previously set forth, whether D & D 
was the alter ego of Thomas Daugherty. 
First, there is no proof of undercapitaliza-
tion. Second, corporate formalities were 
generally observed. Failure to elect the 
required number of directors is a de mini-
mus deviation from the corporate formali-
ties. Under Kentucky law, the bylaws may 
be amended by the board of directors. Ky. 
Rev.Stat 271A.135 (1981). If failure to 
amend the bylaws to conform with the con-
duct of business was a violation of the 
statute, a penalty is prescribed. Ky.Rev. 
Stat § 271A.640(2) (1981). However, the 
general rule is that the bylaws may be 
waived. See 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations 
§ 173 (1965). Third, no dividends were 
paid. Fourth, no funds were siphoned or 
commingled. Fifth, Thomas Daugherty 
borrowed money to loan to the corporation 
when the corporation could not otherwise 
obtain funds. Weighing these factors, the 
Court finds insufficient grounds to disre-
gard the corporate entity. D & D was a 
close corporation and of necessity the con-
trol of the corporation was primarily vested 
2. In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 
160 Tenn. (7 Smith) 57, 22 S.W^d 6 (1929), the 
testatrix directed the executor to cancel the in-
debtedness of her nephews but if one nephew 
was indebted and the other was not, the execu-
tor was to pay the nonindebted nephew a sum 
in Thomas Daugherty. However, corpo-
rate formalities were observed, and the cor-
poration was operated as a separate and 
distinct entity. The record discloses no 
fraud. Thus, defendant Thomas Daugher-
ty may not be held liable for the corporate 
debt. 
[6,7] The final issue for determination 
is whether defendant Ronald Daugherty is 
liable for the corporate debt of DBC, a 
Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee 
courts clearly have adopted the "instru-
mentality rule" to pierce the corporate veil 
where a subsidiary company is a mere in-
strumentality for the parent company. Un-
der the instrumentality rule the corporate 
veil will be pierced where there is: (1) 
parental domination of the finances, policy, 
and business practice; (2) use of the domi-
nation to commit fraud or other wrong; 
and (3) proximate cause connecting the 
wrong with injury to the plaintiff. Conti-
nental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of 
Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn.1979). How-
ever, the rule with regard to piercing the 
corporate veil in the case of a sole share-
holder and a corporation is less clear. In 
Oak Ridge Auto Repair Service v. City 
Finance Co., 57 Tenn.App. 707, 425 S.W.2d 
620 (1967), perm, to app. den. Aug. 7, 
1967, the Court held that the sole share-
holder was liable for the corporate debt 
where the "meager record" indicated that 
the corporation was at most a mere instru-
mentality of the shareholder. The opinion 
fails to discuss, however, what factors 
caused the corporation to be a mere instru-
mentality of the shareholder. In another 
case with rather unusual circumstances2 
the Court held that the corporate entity 
would be disregarded to render justice. Fi-
delity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 
160 Tenn. (7 Smith) 57, 22 S.W.2d 6 (1929). 
It further has been held that where the 
sole shareholder, officer and director had 
not treated the corporate assets as his own 
equal to the debt. The court held that a note of 
a private business corporation owned by the 
nephew payable to the testatrix V** a debt of 
the nephew because cancellati^ of the debt 
would inure to his benefit 
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and no fraud had been committed, the cor- (Id). Ronald Daugherty never received 
porate veil could not be pierced. Kopper any loans from or made loans to the corpo-
Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., ration. (Id at 12). No corporate property, 
436 F.Supp. 91 (E.D.Tenn.1977). The Court except for a corporation vehicle, was used 
believes that all the surrounding circum- for personal business (Id at 12-13). The 
stances must be considered in determining corporate bank accounts were never used 
whether the corporation was a mere instru- for personal funds or to pay personal obli-
mentality of the shareholder. Factors to gations. (Id at 14). In 1979 a transfer of 
be considered are: (1) inadequate capitali- corporate indebtedness was made to Ron-
zation; (2) fraud; (3) commingling of dale, Inc., a business in which Ronald 
funds; and (4) failure to follow corporate Daugherty owned a 25% interest. (Id at 
formalities. 14-17). 
The record discloses that DBC was incor-
porated in Tennessee in 1973. (Affidavit of 
Richard Daugherty, No. 14, [hereinafter 
RD Aff.], at 2). One thousand shares of 
stock were issued and subscribed, Richard 
Daugherty owning 500 shares and Troy 
Daugherty owning 500 shares. (Id). In 
1976 Richard Daugherty bought Troy 
Daugherty's stock and became the sole 
shareholder. (Id). The bylaws provided 
for three officers (with one person allowed 
to serve simultaneously in two offices, with 
the exception of president) and not less 
than two directors. (By-laws of DBC, Art. 
Ill, § 1; Art. IV, § 1). The bylaws were 
observed until 1976, when Ronald Daugher-
ty was elected sole director and presi-
dent/secretary. (Defendant Ronald L. 
Daugherty's Answers to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories, [hereinafter RD In-
terrogs.], at 5). Through 1980 the corpora-
tion held annual and special meetings of 
the directors and shareholders and the min-
utes of these meetings were recorded. The 
charter was revoked in 1983. (RD Aff. at 
3). Before the charter was revoked the 
corporation operated from an office in 
Oneida, Tennessee. (Deposition of Ronald 
Dougherty, [hereinafter RD Depo.], at 8). 
DBC employed a secretary, a foreman, and 
Ronald Daugherty. (Id at 9-11). Ronald 
Daugherty managed the day to day opera-
tion of the business with help from his 
foreman. (Id at 9-11). Ronald Daugherty 
received as compensation only a salary. 
3. Apparently even though the corporation has 
only one shareholder and one director, it is 
required to have a president and a secretary, not 
the same person. Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-1-811 
(1984). Thus, the action of a corporation not in 
[8,9] Considering the circumstances as 
a whole, the Court cannot find that DBC 
was a mere instrumentality of Ronald 
Daugherty. Because DBC was a close cor-
poration, out of necessity Ronald Daugher-
ty made the controlling corporate decisions. 
However, under the bylaws, as president, 
he was authorized to supervise the affairs 
of the company. (By-laws, Art. IV, § 3). 
Plaintiff says that because Ronald Daugh-
erty conducted the business of DBC in vio-
lation of the bylaws requiring at least two 
directors and three officers, the actions of 
Ronald Daugherty were without authority 
and subject him to liability for the corpo-
rate debt under Tennessee Code Annotated 
§ 48-1-405 (1984). This Court has held 
that section 48-1-405 is inapplicable where 
the corporation has been duly incorporated 
and is in legal existence. United States v. 
Phillips, Civ. No. 3-84-157, unpublished 
slip op. (E.D.Tenn. Aug. 28, 1984). The 
corporate action taken without the requi-
site number of officers and directors may 
have been ultra vires; but under the Ten-
nessee Code such action is not invalid and 
such lack of capacity may be asserted only 
by certain parties in specific situations. 
See Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-1-405 (1984). 
Further, where all the shares are owned by 
one shareholder, the corporation is required 
to have only one director.3 Tenn.Code 
Ann. § 48-l-802(a)(l) (1984). To the extent 
that the bylaws provide for more than one 
director and officer, the bylaws may be 
compliance with the statute may be ultra vires. 
Again, as stated in the text, such action though 
ultra vires is not invalid and may not be assert-
ed by plaintiff herein. See Tenn.Code Ann. 
§ 48-1-405 (1984). 
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waived. See 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations, 
§ 173 (1965). The record discloses that 
D6C was operated as a separate and dis-
tinct entity. There is no proof of commin-
gling of funds or fraud or other improper 
purpose. The corporate formalities ob-
served. The mere fact that Ronald Daugh-
erty was the sole shareholder, director and 
officer is insufficient grounds to disregard 
the corporate entity. Kopper Glo Fuel, 
Inc. v Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F.Supp. 
91 (E.D.Tenn.1977). 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs mo-
tion for summary judgment is DENIED 
and defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment is GRANTED. 
Order Accordingly. 
Terry Wayne ROGERS, Plaintiff, 
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER CO. a 
foreign corporation, and Fruehauf Cor-
poration, a foreign corporation, De-
fendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BIRMINGHAM MANUFACTURING CO., 
INC., an Alabama corporation, Third 
Party Defendant 
No. 82-1335-CIV-EPS. 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida, 
Miami Division. 
Dec. 3, 1984. 
In products liability action, defendant 
filed third-party complaint against nonresi-
dent manufacturer of trailer, asserting 
court's jurisdiction under state long-arm 
statute. On manufacturer's motion to dis-
miss, the District Court, Spellman, J., held 
that (1) Florida long-arm statute could not 
be applied retroactively against manufac-
turer, where product at issue had been sold 
prior to statute's effective date, and (2) 
defendant could not assert state's jurisdic-
tion over manufacturer on basis of statute 
providing for jurisdiction over party which 
distributed property to person in state 
through wholesalers or distributors, in ab-
sence of any allegation that manufacturer 
exercised control over its wholesalers or 
distributors within state. 
Motion granted. 
1. Federal Courts «=»76 
Florida long-arm statute could not be 
applied retroactively to allow service as to 
alleged wrongful act or omission commit-
ted before enactment of statute. West's 
F.S.A. § 48.193. 
2. Federal Courts <**77 
For purposes of products liability de-
fendant's third-party complaint against 
nonresident manufacturer, essential date 
for application of Florida long-arm statute 
was date on which product was sold, and 
thus, court could not assert jurisdiction 
over manufacturer under long-arm statute, 
where product giving rise to action was 
sold prior to statute's effective date. 
West's F.S.A. § 48.193. 
3. Federal Courts <*»76.15 
Assertion of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendant under Florida statute au-
thorizing such jurisdiction over party which 
distributes property to person in state 
through brokers, wholesalers, or distribu-
tors requires that alleged injury be occa-
sioned by defendant's business activities 
within state. West's F.S.A. § 48.181. 
4. Federal Courts <*=>94 
Plaintiff who asserts Florida jurisdic-
tion under statute providing for jurisdiction 
over party who distributes personal proper 
ty to person within state through brokers, 
jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors must 
allege and prove that defendant had requi-
site degree of control over broker, jobber, 
wholesaler, or distributor alleged to have 
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§915, Effect of statutory provisions. 
A majority of jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing 
that contracts or transactions between an interested director 
and the corporation are not automatically void or voidable solely 
by reason of the director's interest.1 The Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act defines a conflict of interest transac-
tion as a transaction with the corporation in which a director 
has a direct or indirect interest.2 The Revised Act provides that 
a conflict of interest transaction is not voidable by the 
corporation solely because of the director's interest in the 
transaction if the transaction was fair to the corporation, or, if 
the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest 
were disclosed or known to the board of directors, a committee 
of the board of directors, or the shareholders entitled to vote, 
and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified.3 The 
Model Act provisions and most state statutes pertaining to 
director's conflict of interest reject the common-law principle 
that all conflict of interest transactions entered into by directors 
are automatically voidable at the option of the corporation 
regardless of the fairness of the transaction or the manner in 
which the transaction was approved by the corporation.4 Most 
state statutes governing corporate transactions with interested 
directors are a response to earlier doctrines which held that all 
contracts between directors and corporations on whose boards 
they sat were voidable at the instance of any aggrieved 
shareholder.5 Such statutes generally provide that conflict of 
interest transactions will not be voidable at the instance of an 
aggrieved shareholder if (1) they are fair, or (2) they are 
approved by a "disinterested" majority of the directors, or (3) 
they are ratified by the shareholders. As stated in an excellent 
analysis appearing in the Harvard Law Review, "Most transac-
tions between corporations and their directors are valid under 
the disinterested' director exception, since generally only a 
direct pecuniary interest in a transaction will disqualify a 
director from voting to ratify it."6 "Even if the disinterested 
director' route is not available, self-dealing majority sharehold-
ers may ratify their contracts with the corporation by means of 
a shareholder vote . . . . And although many state courts speak 
in terms of a high burden of proof on the director seeking to 
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demonstrate the fairness' of his self-dealing, the consensus of 
commentators is that such standards are not effective."7 
The California statute declares that no contract or other 
transaction between a corporation and one or more of its 
directors, or between a corporation and any corporation in 
which one or more of its directors has a material financial 
interest, is either void or voidable because such director or 
directors are present at the meeting of the board or a committee 
thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or 
transaction, provided that any one of three conditions is met.8 
The conditions are: (a) the fact of the director's interest is 
known to the board and the contract or transaction is autho-
rized or approved by a vote sufficient without counting that of 
the director, or (b) the contract or transaction is approved or 
ratified, with knowledge of the director's interest, by a majority 
of the shareholders, or (c) the contract or transaction be just and 
reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized or 
approved.9 The effect of the California statute is to permit 
contracts between the corporation and a majority of its directors 
just as it permits contracts to be made between two corporations 
with a majority of their directors in common.10 However, the 
California court has held that the burden of proving fairness is 
on the person seeking to uphold the transaction and further that 
mere disclosure is not sufficient to otherwise sustain an 
otherwise unfair transaction.11 New York has enacted a statute 
which is similar to the California provision.12 The Delaware 
General Corporation Law contains a section relating to the 
validity of contracts or transactions involving one or more 
interested directors or officers,13 and the Delaware statute 
specifically applies even though the disinterested directors be 
less than a quorum.14 
Statutes sometimes expressly prohibit loans by banks or 
other corporations to directors or other corporate officers15 or 
prohibit the issuance of bonds to a director,16 or prohibit a 
director or officer of a bank from purchasing or selling for his or 
her personal benefit any obligation or asset of the bank for a 
sum less than shall appear on the face of the obligation.17 
The effect of the various statutes on interlocking director-
ates is considered in another section.10 
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1
 United States. United Found-
ers Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat. 
Life Ins. Co., 447 F2d 647, 653 (re-
viewing statutes); Smith v. Robinson, 
343 F2d 783 (applying North Caroli-
na statute). 
Alabama. Ala Code § 10-2A-63. 
Arizona. Ariz Rev Stit Ann 
§10-041. 
California. Cal Corp Code 
§310. 
Colorado. Colo Rev Stat 
§7-5-114.5. 
Connecticut. Conn Gen Stat 
§33-323. 
Statute relating to corporate 
transactions with directors and oth-
ers was inapplicable to agreement 
approved by board of directors and 
executed prior to effective date of the 
statute. Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain 
Co., 153 Conn 527, 218 A2d 526. 
Delaware. Del Code Ann Tit 8, 
§144. 
Florida. Fla Stat §607.124. 
Georgia. Ga Code Ann 
§ 14-2-155. 
Idaho. Idaho Code §30-1-41. 
Illinois. Ill Rev Stat ch 32, par 
8.60. 
Indiana. Ind Code §23-1-10-6. 
Kansas. Kan Stat Ann 
§ 17-6304; Oberhelman v. Barnes In-
vestment Co., 236 Kan 335, 690 P2d 
1343. 
Kentucky. Ky Rev Stat 
§271A.205. 
Louisiana. La Rev Stat Ann 
§ 12:84. 
Maine. Me Rev Stat Ann Tit 
13A, §717(1). 
Maryland. Md Corps & Ass'ns 
Code Ann §2-419. 
Michigan. MSA §§21.200(545), 
21.200(546); MCL §§450.1545, 
450.1546. 
Minnesota. Minn Stat 
§302A.255. 
Missouri. Mo Rev Stat 
§351.327. 
Montana. Mont Code Ann 
§35-1-413. 
Nebraska. Neb Rev Stat 
§21-2040.01. 
Nevada. Nev Rev Stat §78.140. 
New Hampshire. NH Rev Stat 
Ann §293-A:41. 
New Jersey. NJ Rev Stat 
§§14A:6-8(1), 14A:6-8(2). 
New York. NY Bus Corp Law 
§713. 
North Carolina. NC Gen Stat 
§55-30(b); S&W Realty & Bonded 
Commercial Agency, Inc. v. Duck-
worth & Shelton, Inc., 274 NC 243, 
162 SE2d 486 (NC Gen Stat §55-30 
(b)). 
Smith v. Robinson, 343 F2d 783 
(applying North Carolina statute). 
Ohio. Ohio Rev Code Ann 
§1701.60. 
Oklahoma. Okla Stat tit 18, 
§ 1.175a. 
Oregon. Or Rev Stat §57.265. 
Pennsylvania. Pa Cons Stat tit 
15, §1409.1. 
Rhode Island. RI Gen Laws 
§7-1.1-37.1. 
South Carolina. SC Code Ann 
§33-13-160. 
Tennessee. Tenn Code Ann 
§48-1-816. 
Vermont. Vt Stat Ann tit 11, 
§ 1888. 
Virginia. Va Code §13.1-691. 
Washington. Wash Rev Code 
§23A.08.435. 
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West Virginia. W Va Code 
§31-1-25. 
Wisconsin. Wis Stat § 180.355. 
Wyoming. Wyo Stat 
§17-1-136.1. 
Rev Model Bus Corp Act §8.31; 
Model Bus Corp Act §41. 
See also Rev Model Bus Corp 
Act Ann 3rd §8.31, Official Com-
ment. 
As to form of contracts in which 
directors are adversely interested, see 
Fletcher Corp Fms §1068 (4th Ed). 
Webber, Arkansas corporate fi-
duciary standards—interested direc-
tors' contracts and the doctrine of 
corporate opportunity, 5 U Ark Little 
Rock LJ 39; Mintz & Schwartz, In-
terlocking directorates and interest 
group formation, 46 Am Soc Rev 851; 
Clatterbuck, Section 21-2040.01: In-
terested director transactions and 
considerations of fairness, 58 Neb L 
Rev 909; Moore, The "interested" 
director or officer transaction, 4 Del J 
Corp L 674; Anderson, Conflict of 
interest: efficiency, fairness and cor-
porate structure, 25 UCLA L Rev 
738; Murphy, Keys to unlock the 
interlocks: Dealing with interlocking 
directorates, 11 U Mich JL Ref 361. 
2
 Rev Model Bus Corp Act § 8.31 
(a). 
3
 Rev Model Bus Corp Act § 8.31 
(a). 
4
 See Model Bus Corp Act Ann 
3rd §8.31, Official Comment. 
See also §930. 
5
 Marsh, Are directors trustees?: 
Conflict of interest and corporate 
morality, 22 Bus Law 35. 
See Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874, 
citing Fletcher Cyc Corp §§929-930 
(Perm Ed). 
•Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874. 
7
 Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874, 
citing Fletcher Cyc Corp §§929, 930 
(Perm Ed). 
See also, Folk, State statutes: 
Their role in prescribing norms of 
responsible management conduct, 31 
Bus Law 1031; Cary, Federalism and 
corporate law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 Yale LJ 663. 
8
 California. Cal Corp Code 
§310; Thrasher v. Thrasher, 27 Cal 
App 3d 23, 103 Cal Rptr 618; Ameri-
can Center For Education v. Cavanar, 
26 Cal App 3d 26, 102 Cal Rptr 575; 
Cechettini v. Consumer Associates, 
Ltd., 260 Cal App 2d 295,67 Cal Rptr 
15 (validity upheld under former Cal 
Corp Code §§820, 823 where ap-
proved by sole shareholder), or ap-
proved. 
'California. See Caminetti v. 
Prudence Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n (Cal 
App), 142 P2d 41, affd 62 Cal App 2d 
945, 146 P2d 15. 
10
 Ballantine, Law of Corpora-
tions (Rev Ed), p 175. 
11
 California. Thrasher v. 
Thrasher, 27 Cal App 3d 23, 103 Cal 
Rptr 618 (dominating officer and 
director held liable on loan contract 
notwithstanding former Cal Corp 
Code §820); Remillard Brick Co. v. 
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal App 
2d 405, 241 P2d 66. 
12
 NY Bus Corp Law §713. 
13
 Del Code Ann Tit 8, § 144. 
United States. Under Delaware 
Gen Corp Law § 144(a)(l, 3), a con-
tract or transaction is not void or 
voidable solely by reason of being 
between the corporation and one of 
its directors if material facts as to 
interest of the director and as to the 
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contract or transaction are disclosed 
or known to board of directors and 
the board in good faith authorizes the 
contract or transaction by affirmative 
vote of majority of disinterested di-
rectors, or if the contract or transac-
tion is fair to the corporation as of 
time it is authorized, approved or 
ratified by the board. Weiss v. Kay 
Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F2d 1259, 
1268. 
Delaware. Weiss v. Kay Jewel-
ry Stores, Inc., 470 F2d 1259 (apply-
ing Delaware statute). 
Illinois. By the terms of the 
Delaware provision, any transaction 
between a corporation and one of its 
directors apparently need not be fully 
disclosed in order for it to be valid; 
however, the fairness of any such 
transaction to the corporation at the 
time of its approval must be affirma-
tively shown by the individual at-
tempting to enforce the contract. 
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. 
Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 111 App 
3d 542, 368 NE2d 629. 
14
 Delaware. Del Code Ann Tit 
8, § 144(a)(1). 
15
 See §1245. 
16
 United States. Toledo, St. L. 
& K. C. R. Co. v. Continental Trust 
Co., 95 F 497. 
17
 Montana. Montana statute 
providing that no director or officer 
of bank shall for his own personal 
benefit purchase or sell or be interest-
ed in purchase or sale of any obliga-
tion or assets of bank for sum less 
than shall appear on face of obliga-
tion prohibited bank president from 
purchasing realty from bank which he 
later leased to oil company. Johnson 
v. Kaiser, 104 Mont 261, 65 P2d 
1179. 
"See §962.1. 
§915.1. —Charter and bylaw provisions. 
In order to meet modern business conditions, there has 
been a growing tendency to insert in the articles or certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws provisions permitting interested direc-
tors to contract with the corporation and permitting contracts 
between corporations with common directors.1 In fact it is 
common knowledge that this is a standard provision inserted in 
corporate articles by all law firms.2 Many of these directors' 
immunizing clauses seem to give an unrestrained authorization 
for contracts with directors with common directors, despite 
fraud or unfairness or the lack of an independent quorum or 
vote.3 
The law is not clear as to the legal effect of these clauses 
although in a few cases courts have upheld charter provisions 
permitting the counting of interested directors for quorum 
purposes.4 The charter of the Sperry Corporation specifically 
addresses itself to this problem: "Any director whose interest in 
any such contract or transaction arises solely by reason of the 
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1
 See chap 39. 4 See chap 23. 
2
 See chap 37. 5See chap 11. 
3
 See chap 25. 6 See chaps 40, 41. 
§3001. Form and contents—In general. 
So far as the body of the contract is concerned, no special 
rules apply, except that if the contract is intended to bind only 
the corporation, it should clearly appear as one of the parties 
and the promises and covenants should be in its name. Unless 
there is a statutory provision to the contrary, corporations may 
make their contracts in the same manner as individuals.1 So in 
the absence of an acceptance of an offer by any officer or agent, 
there can be no acceptance by the corporation,2 subject to the 
rules relative to implied contracts or promissory estoppel.3 
Moreover, in accordance with basic contract law, the acceptance 
on behalf of the corporation must be unequivocal and the terms 
of the contract must be reasonably certain,4 including mutuality 
of obligation.5 If the surrounding facts and circumstances show 
that the party in interest was not dealing with the corporation 
but with one of its officers individually, the corporation is not 
bound.6 However, a corporation has a duty to reveal its 
corporate status to the persons with whom it deals.7 
A corporate contract may take the form of a resolution of 
the board of directors.8 But as a general rule a vote or other 
action on the part of the board of directors need not be a formal 
resolution entered on the minutes or records of the corporation, 
unless it is expressly required by statute.9 If a corporation, by a 
vote of a majority of the directors, adopts a resolution to enter 
into a certain contract, it is binding, although a formal contract 
is not thereafter executed between the parties.10 However, if the 
resolution which authorizes the contract also directs the manner 
of entering into and executing it, those directions must be 
followed.11 The formalities of a corporate resolution may not be 
required where the contracting party is a close corporation, 
since courts are likely to permit the shareholders and directors 
to bind their company by personally executing the agreement.12 
In accordance with well-settled rules of contract law, a 
memorandum of a proposed contract, intended by all the parties 
merely as a basis for negotiating a future formal contract, does 
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not constitute a binding corporate agreement, especially where 
the memorandum is not signed by the corporation but by an 
officer individually,13 and where the directors may withdraw 
their assent at any time before it is reduced to writing and 
formally executed as a written instrument.14 If the assent of the 
board of directors to a corporate contract is not a matter of 
record, it may be proved by parol evidence.15 
1
 Alabama. University of Ala-
bama v. Moody, 62 Ala 389. 
California. Yeng Sue Chow v. 
Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal App 3d 
315, 122 Cal Rptr 816. 
Oregon. Doehler v. Lansdon, 
135 Or 687, 298 P 200. 
Texas. Smallwood v. South-
down, Inc., 382 F Supp 1106 (D Tex). 
Virginia. Altavista Cotton 
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637. 
Wisconsin. Blunt v. Walker, 11 
Wis 334, 78 Am Dec 709. 
2
 California. See Southern Cal-
ifornia Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, 
Inc., 71 Cal 2d 719, 79 Cal Rptr 319, 
456 P2d 975. 
Colorado. Central Inv. Corp. of 
Denver v. Container Advertising Co., 
28 Colo App 184, 471 P2d 647 (corpo-
ration's acceptance of offer not with-
in reasonable time under circum-
stances and hence no binding con-
tract). 
Illinois. Lee Shell Co., Inc. v. 
Model Food Center, Inc., I l l 111 App 
2d 235, 250 NE2d 666. 
Pennsylvania. See F.W. Wise 
Gas Co. v. Beech Creek R. Co., 437 
Pa 389, 263 A2d 313 (jury question as 
to acceptance by railroad of plaintiff s 
offer to purchase certain real estate 
not needed for railroad purposes). 
3
 See §2580. 
4
 United States. In re Colorado 
Mercantile Co., 299 F Supp 55 (ap-
plying Colo Rev Stat Ann 
§155-9-402(1). 
Colorado. The Colorado statu-
tory amendment of its Uniform Com-
mercial Code §9-402(1) eliminating 
the requirement of a manual signa-
ture would be given retroactive effect 
so as not to render invalid a corpora-
tion's filed financing statement for 
failure to sign it manually. In re 
Colorado Mercantile Co., 299 F Supp 
55 (applying Colo Rev Stats Ann 
§155-9-402(1)). 
Illinois. Lee Shell Co., Inc. v. 
Model Food Center, Inc., I l l 111 App 
2d 235, 250 NE2d 666. 
An alleged acceptance by a cor-
porate contractor which changed the 
terms of the subcontractor's bid 
amounted to a rejection and counter-
proposal and no contract was created 
between the parties where the sub-
contractor refused to execute present-
ed documents, nor could the contrac-
tor invoke the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in view of its own conduct in 
failing to accept the bid. Brook v. 
Oberlander, 49 111 App 2d 312, 199 
NE2d 613. 
North Carolina. Howell v. 
CM. Allen & Co., 8 NC App 287, 174 
SE2d 55. 
5
 United States. Merlite Land, 
Sea & Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv. 
Properties, Inc., 426 F2d 495 (apply-
ing Florida law). 
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Florida. Merlite Land, Sea & 
Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv. Proper-
ties, Inc., 426 F2d 495. 
Kentucky. Buttorff v. United 
Electronic Laboratories, Inc., 459 
SW2d 581 (Ky). 
Texas. Texas Gas Utilities Co. 
v. Barrett, 452 SW2d 508 (Tex Civ 
App) (written contract to furnish 
natural gas by utility company unen-
forceable for lack of mutuality of 
obligation). 
6
 Louisiana. Collins v. Cliff Oil 
& Gas Co., Inc., 177 So 120 (La App) 
(oil and gas lease). 
Mississippi. Brownlee Lumber 
Co. v. Gandy, 125 Miss 71, 87 So 470. 
See §3034. 
7
 Georgia. Rizk v. Tucker Coal 
& Brick Co., 147 Ga App 155, 248 
SE2d 215. 
8
 Illinois. Public Service Co. v. 
Leatherbee, 311 111 505, 143 NE 97 
(resolution authorizing stipulation to 
easement). 
Maryland. Schlens v. Poe, 128 
Md 352, 97 A 649 (legal effect of 
resolution cannot be changed by 
memorandum on records after ad-
journment of meeting without con-
sent of other parties). 
Pennsylvania. Lafean v. Amer-
ican Caramel Co., 271 Pa 276, 114 A 
622. 
Wisconsin. A corporation has 
the power to enter into a contract 
evidenced by a resolution. Peters v. 
Peters Auto Sales, Inc., 37 Wis 2d 
346, 155 NW2d 85 (citing Fletcher 
Cyc Corp §3001 (Perm Ed)). 
•United States. Where an 
equipment lease was signed by the 
president who was intimately con-
cerned with the everyday operations 
of the corporation, the lack of evi-
dence of an authorizing directors' 
resolution or a corporate seal was 
insufficient under Pennsylvania law 
to invalidate the lease on ground that 
it was improperly executed. Speyer, 
Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 
275 F Supp 861. 
California. Allen v. Central 
Counties Land Co., 21 Cal App 163, 
131 P 78 (not needed for employment 
contract). 
Virginia. Altavista Cotton 
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637. 
10
 Pennsylvania. Lafean v. 
American Caramel Co., 271 Pa 276, 
114 A 622. 
11
 Iowa. Black Hawk Nat. Bank 
v. Monarch Co., 201 Iowa 240, 207 
NW 121. 
12
 South Dakota. See First Nat. 
Bank of Beresford v. Nelson, 323 
NW2d 879 (SD). 
13
 Iowa. Segner v. Guaranty 
Fund Realty Co., 194 Iowa 582, 189 
NW 745. 
Texas. Hoover v. Self, 279 SW 
572 (Tex Civ App). 
14
 Idaho. Where the lessee 
signed an equipment lease agreement 
in blank and the blanks in the printed 
form were not filled in by the corpo-
rate lessor's representative in accord-
ance with an oral agreement or un-
derstanding between the parties prior 
to the execution of the written instru-
ment, the alleged fraud presented a 
question of fact for determination by 
the trial court under the evidence. 
C.I.T. Corp. v. Hess, 88 Idaho 1, 395 
P2d 471. 
Texas. Hoover v. Self, 279 SW 
572 (Tex Civ App). 
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contract because not approved at a directors' meeting when a 
quorum was present, where the buyer has expended money in 
reliance and the seller has ratified the contract.5 
Pennsylvania. Car Advertising 
Co. v. Rohr McHenry Distilling Co., 
49 Pa Super 442. 
2
 United States. Barnes v. Red 
Bayou Oil Co., Inc., 271 F 297 (ap-
proval of board necessary). 
Massachusetts. Eastern Adver-
tising Co. v. E.L. Patch Co., 235 Mass 
580, 127 NE 516. 
3
 United States. Barnes v. Red 
Bayou Oil Co., Inc., 271 F 297. 
4
 Texas. Transcontinental Oil 
Co. v. Wofford, 6 SW2d 165 (Tex Civ 
App). 
9
 Pennsylvania. Greensboro 
Gas Co., 222 Pa 4, 70 A 940. 
{3016. Ratification, waiver and estoppel—In general. 
Defectively executed contracts of a corporation may be 
ratified by it so as to be binding,1 as where it receives and 
retains the benefit of the transaction, with full knowledge of all 
the facts.2 The ratification may be express, or may be inferred 
from silence and inaction, and, if the corporation, after having 
full knowledge of the unauthorized act, does not disavow the 
agency and disaffirm the transaction within a reasonable time, 
it will be deemed to have ratified it.3 Thus, continued acquies-
cence by the directors in a defectively executed contract, with 
knowledge of the circumstances attending its execution, and 
their failure to object, may render it binding on the company.4 
Accordingly, even though a contract is made by an officer or 
agent of a corporation in his or her own name, the corporation 
will nevertheless be liable where it has adopted the contract, 
acquiesced in it, or received the benefits of it.s Thus, an 
agreement purporting to be only the individual undertaking of 
certain stockholders, and signed only by them, may bind the 
corporation, where it was in fact executed for and in behalf of 
the corporation which received the benefits of it.* A deed 
151 
1
 Georgia. E. Frederics, Inc. v. 
Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga App 
320,198 SE 324 (contemplated signa-
ture of secretary not necessary). 
Louisiana. A provision in an 
agreement that the times and 
amounts of installment payments by 
corporation shall be determined by its 
president was potestative, but of no 
effect with regard to the other party 
who had performed. Muhoberac v. 
Saloon, Inc., 210 So 2d 572 (La App). 
Oklahoma. McCray v. Sapulpa 
Petroleum Co., 102 Okla 108, 226 P 
875 (approval of board required). 
Oregon. Salquist v. Oregon Fire 
Relief Ass'n, 100 Or 416, 197 P 312. 
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executed without authority may be rendered the binding deed of 
the corporation by ratification.7 Although failure to object can 
constitute ratification if the trier of fact draws the inference 
from such silence that the principal intended to affirm the 
agent's conduct, silence is not as a matter of law sufficient to 
constitute ratification.8 
The fact that it appears on the face of a deed that the 
corporation caused it to be executed, which deed has since been 
recognized as valid, is sufficient, after a lapse of more than 
thirty years, to establish presumptively the authority of the 
corporate grantor to execute the deed.9 A corporation cannot 
deny the proper execution of an indorsement on a negotiable 
instrument which is signed by the same officer who on its behalf 
executed the instrument itself. "If this person had authority to 
draw the bill, he certainly had authority to indorse it."l0 Defects 
and irregularities in the execution of corporate instruments may 
also be waived by the conduct and course of dealing of the 
parties.11 
On the other hand, if officers of a corporation make 
contracts in their own name and upon the security of their own 
property, and there is nothing to show that corporate liability 
was intended by either party to the contract, the corporation is 
not liable although it received the benefits of the contract.12 
1
 United States. In re Boston 
Confectionery Co., 282 F 726 (lack of 
formal vote immaterial where all but 
one director knew of transaction); In 
re C.W. Bartleson Co., 275 F 390. 
Alabama. Taylor v. Agricultural 
& Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala 229. 
California. Kruce v. Parlier 
Winery, 208 Cal 723, 284 P 671 
(execution of promissory note). 
Connecticut. Mercer v. Steil, 97 
Conn 583, 117 A 689. 
Illinois. Western Union Tel. Co. 
v. Chicago & P.R Co., 86 HI 246, 29 
Am Rep 28. 
Kentucky. Union Motor Co. of 
Paducah v. Taylor, 206 Ky 398, 267 
SW 170. 
Minnesota. Anderson v. Camp-
bell, 176 Minn 411, 223 NW 624 
(informal approval of directors es-
topped corporation). 
New York. Spitzer v. Bom, 194 
App Div 739, 185 NYS 875, revg 111 
Misc 595, 182 NYS 327. 
Oklahoma. A corporation, like 
a natural person, may ratify, affirm, 
and validate any contract made or 
done in its behalf which it was capa-
ble of making or doing in the first 
instance. East Cent Oklahoma Elec. 
Cooperative, Inc. v. Oklahoma Gas & 
Electric Co., 505 P2d 1324 (Okla). 
Virginia. Altavista Cotton 
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1,112 SE 637. 
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Corporation's ratification of un-
authorized contracts in general, see 
§752 et seq. 
2 United States. In re Boston 
Confectionery Co., 282 F 726; Mur-
phy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 
I l l F Supp 608 (applying New 
Alabama. Taylor v. Agricultural 
& Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala 229. York 
law). 
Arizona. Air Technical Devel-
opment Co. v. Arizona Bank, 101 
Ariz 70, 416 P2d 183. 
California. Campbell v. Han-
ford, 67 Cal App 155, 227 P 234. 
The fact that the corporation 
knew all the terms of a contract 
through its president who signed the 
contract in his individual name, acted 
upon an assumption that it had exe-
cuted the contract and accepted the 
benefits payable under the contract 
constituted a ratification of the con-
tract by the corporation which cured 
any defect in the execution of the 
instrument. Fairlane Estates, Inc. v. 
Carrico Const. Co., 228 Cal App 2d 
65, 39 Cal Rptr 35. 
Connecticut. Mercer v. Steil, 97 
Conn 583, 117 A 689. 
Missouri. Buffalo Trust Co. v. 
Producers' Exchange No. 148, 224 
Mo App 199, 23 SW2d 644. 
New York. Spitzer v. Born, 194 
App Div 739, 185 NYS 875, revg 111 
Misc 595, 182 NYS 327 (payment of 
rent). 
Murphy v. Bankers Commercial 
Corp., I l l F Supp 608. 
Virginia. Altavista Cotton 
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637. 
See §§3011, 3012. 
3
 Nebraska. D&J Hatchery, 
Inc. v. Feeders Elevator, Inc., 202 
Neb 69, 274 NW2d 138. 
4
 United States. In re Gilchrist 
Co., 278 F 235. 
California. Associates Discount 
Corp. v. Tobb Co. 241 Cal App 2d 
541, 50 Cal Rptr 738. 
Connecticut. Stambovsky v. 
Saddle Peak Productions, 8 Conn 
App 371, 513 A2d 162. 
Massachusetts. Anderson v. 
K.G. Moore, Inc., 6 Mass App 386, 
376 NE2d 1238 (contract to repur-
chase stock known to and acquiesced 
in by all directors, officers and share-
holders enforceable despite lack of 
procedural formalities). 
Nebraska. Unauthorized acts 
of an officer may be ratified by a 
corporation by conduct implying ap-
proval and adoption of the act in 
question. D&J Hatchery, Inc. v. 
Feeders Elevator, Inc., 202 Neb 69, 
274 NW2d 138. 
9
 United States. Keyes v. First 
Nat. Bank, 25 F2d 684. 
Arkansas. Bryant Lumber Co. 
v. Crist, 87 Ark 434, 112 SW 965. 
California. Rauer v. Fernando 
Nelson & Sons, 53 Cal App 695, 200 
P 809. 
Colorado. American Agency & 
Investment Co. v. Gregg, 90 Colo 142, 
6 P2d 1101 (assignment of contract 
not necessary). 
Missouri. Morton v. Manches-
ter Inv. Co., 181 Mo App 364,168 SW 
904. 
Oklahoma. Citizens' State 
Bank of Denison, Tex. v. Drumright 
State Bank, 116 Okla 213, 244 P 178. 
Utah. McGarry v. Tanner & 
Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P 93. 
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Wisconsin. Carl Miller Lumber 
Co. v. Meyer, 183 Wis 360, 196 NW 
840. 
What constitutes ratification of 
unauthorized signature under UCC 
§3-404, 93 ALR3d 967. 
6
 United States. American Pre-
servers' Trust v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 46 
F 152. 
7
 Connecticut. Howe v. Keeler, 
27 Conn 538. 
Mississippi. Rivervalley Co. v. 
Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank, 331 F Supp 
698 (corporation held estopped under 
Mississippi statute and circum-
stances involved from asserting that 
officers not authorized to executed 
note and deed of trust). 
Tennessee. Turner v. Kingston 
Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 59 SW 
410 (Tenn Ch). 
• United States. Shearson Hay-
den Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F2d 367 
(CA7, 1978). 
• Oregon. Altschul v. Casey, 45 
Or 182, 76 P 1083. 
10
 Missouri. Buffalo Trust Co. 
v. Producers' Exchange No. 148, 224 
Mo App 199, 23 SW2d 644. 
"Arizona. The trend of au-
thority is to uphold as binding on a 
corporation the contracts or obliga-
tions executed on its behalf by an 
officer or stockholder who owns all or 
practically all of the outstanding 
stock, even though there is lack of, or 
defect in, some corporate step or 
action. Russell v. Golden Rule Min. 
Co., 63 Ariz 11, 159 P2d 776; Air 
Technical Development Co. v. Arizo-
na Bank, 101 Ariz 70, 416 P2d 183. 
North Carolina. A lease made 
to several motor bus companies as 
lessees is binding on the company 
signing it by its president, who stated 
that he had an oral agreement with 
the other named lessees for the use of 
premises, such statement, and user of 
the premises by the lessee signing, 
amounting to a waiver by it of signa-
tures of others named as lessees. 
Raleigh Banking & Trust Co. v. Safe-
ty Transit Lines, 198 NC 675,153 SE 
158. 
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222 
P 45. 
xt
 Colorado. Sperry v. Pittsburg 
Short Method Smelting & Refining 
Co., 9 Colo App 314, 48 P 315. 
§3017. —Estoppel arising from implied or ostensible 
agency. 
A corporation which suffers appearances to exist, and its 
officers and agents so to act, as to give persons dealing with it 
reason to believe that they are dealing with the company, is 
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redemption, and the decree of fore-
closure is afterwards reversed on the 
ground that the mortgage is invalid 
because the corporation had no power 
to make the loan secured by it, the 
parties are entitled to be restored to 
their former rights, as nearly as possi-
ble. Thompson v. Davis, 297 111 11, 
130 NE 455. 
Michigan. Day v. Spiral 
Springs Buggy Co., 57 Mich 146, 23 
NW 628. 
Missouri. Wellston Trust Co. v. 
American Surety Co., 224 Mo App 
241, 14 SW2d 23. 
New York. McVity v. E.D. 
Albro Co., 90 App Div 109, 86 NYS 
144. 
•United States. Jenson v. Tol-
tec Ranch Co., 174 F 86. 
§3572. Restoration as condition to rescission. 
Where a corporation is permitted to rescind an ultra vires 
contract, it must restore the benefits received under it.1 The 
equitable doctrine which imposes on a corporation or the other 
party to an ultra vires contract the obligation to restore what it 
or they have received under the contract applies when affirma-
tive relief by rescission and recovery of property is sought in a 
court of equity. A corporation cannot maintain a suit in equity 
to rescind or cancel an ultra vires contract, as a lease, for 
example, and recover what it has parted with, if it retains 
money or property which it received under the contract.2 The 
same principle applies where a corporation borrows money 
without authority and secures payment of the money by delivery 
of securities. Neither the corporation nor its receiver can 
repudiate the transaction and recover the securities in equity 
without repayment of the money received by it.3 So if a lumber 
company makes an ultra vires contract to build a railroad in 
consideration of an agreement to convey standing timber at a 
reduced price, and then repudiates the agreement to build the 
road as ultra vires, the grantor of the timber may recover the 
•United States. Central Rail-
road & Banking Co. of Georgia v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 F 
263. 
10
 Illinois. Western Cottage 
Piano & Organ Co. v. Burrows, 168 
111 App 120. 
11
 Roberts v. W.H. Hughes Co., 
86 Vt 76„ 83 A 807. 
12
 Iowa. See Wisconsin Lumber 
Co. v. Greene & Western Tel. Co., 
127 Iowa 350, 101 NW 742. 
South Dakota. Sweeney v. 
United Underwriters Co., 29 SD 576, 
137 NW 379. 
See also § 1538. 
13
 Illinois. Melvin v. Lemar Ins. 
Co., 80 111 446. 
See also § 1541. 
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difference between the contract price and the actual value of the 
timber.4 
1
 United States. Lewis v. Fifth-
Third Nat. Bank, 274 F 587; Shearer 
v. Farmers Life Ins. Co., 262 F 861; 
Anderson v Kentucky Title Trust 
Co. of Louisville, 5 F Supp 384. 
Where an action is brought by a 
corporation to set aside a transfer of 
certain property on the ground that 
the transfer was unauthorized, it is 
incumbent upon it to show that it has 
made a tender to the defendant of the 
amount it received on the property, 
or, at the least, a clear and definite 
offer to restore such amount. An offer 
by the corporation to allow the 
amount in question to apply in reduc-
tion of a judgment which it might 
secure against the defendant does not 
fulfill the requirement. The basis of 
this holding is that he who seeks 
equity must do equity; that there 
must be restoration before suit or at 
least a bona fide offer to restore 
whatever has been received as consid-
eration from the other party for the 
transfer before there can be a rescis-
sion of the contract. Alaska & C. 
Commercial Co. v. Solner, 123 F 865. 
While a national bank cannot 
repudiate its ultra vires contract until 
it disgorges its benefits, the rule does 
not apply where the bank does not 
have in its possession any such bene-
fits , and the plaintiff refused to 
repossess the property, as it could 
have done, but notified the bank's 
receiver that it proposed to sell the 
inventory and sue for the difference. 
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 20 F 
Supp 571. 
Illinois. Warner v. Munson, 280 
111 App 484. 
Iowa. Upon the insolvency of a 
bank and the acceptance by the 
officers of an insurance company of 
the bank stock and certificates of 
deposits in payment of the money on 
deposit with the bank, the bank was 
entitled to have the property returned 
before the insurance company could 
repudiate the transaction. Fidelity 
Ins. Co. v. German Sav. Bank, 127 
Iowa 591, 103 NW 958. 
Michigan. Mead v. Detroit-
Traverse Realty Co., 251 Mich 478, 
232 NW 355. 
Minnesota. Benson Lumber Co. 
v. Thornton, 185 Minn 230, 240 NW 
651. 
New York. Losie v. Ken-Vic, 
43 NYS2d 914 (Misc), affd 44 NYS2d 
473 (App Div); McVity v. E.D. Albro 
Co., 90 App Div 109, 86 NYS 144. 
2
 United States. United Lines 
Tel. Co. v. Boston Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 147 US 431, 37 L Ed 231, 
13 S Ct 396; New Castle Northern R. 
Co. v. Simpson, 23 F 214; Memphis & 
L.R. Co. v. Dow, 19 F 388; Manville 
v. Belden Min. Co., 17 F 425; Ameri-
can Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. 
Co., 1 F 745, 1 McCrary 188. 
Kansas. Brown v. Atchison, 39 
Kan 37, 17 P 465. 
Missouri. Buford v. Keokuk 
Northern Line Packet Co., 69 Mo 
611. 
3
 Ohio. A state superintendent of 
banks who has taken charge, for liq-
uidation, of the affairs and business 
of an insolvent state bank which had 
committed an ultra vires act in secur-
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ing a private deposit of trust funds by 
giving collateral to secure the deposit, 
cannot take possession of the collat-
eral without paying to the depositor 
the amount owing to it, where there 
is no claim that any equities of third 
persons has intervened. State v. 
Dean, 47 Ohio App 558, 192 NE 278. 
Texas. If it were true that a 
national bank were without power to 
1
 United States. Citizens' Cent. 
Nat. Bank v. Appleton, 216 US 196, 
54 L Ed 443, 30 S Ct 364, affg 190 
NY 417, 83 NE 470; De La Vergne 
Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German 
SavingB Inst, 175 US 40, 44 L Ed 65, 
20 S Ct 20; Waters v. Disbrow & Co., 
70 F2d 572; Falk v. Levine, 60 F Supp 
660 (applying Massachusetts law); 
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 20 F 
Supp 571; Anderson v. Kentucky 
Title Trust Co. of Louisville, 5 F 
Supp 384; Coon v. Smith, 4 F Supp 
960. 
See Central Trans. Co. v. Pull-
man's Palace Car Co., 139 US 24, 35 
L Ed 55, 11 S Ct 484. 
The fact that a contract by a 
national bank to receive and collect 
securities and reinvest the proceeds 
for the owner was ultra vires does not 
relieve the bank of the obligation to 
secure title to stock in another corpo-
ration pledged to it as collateral, the 
pledgor, nevertheless, could not 
retake the stock without payment of 
the loan. Fulton v. National Bank of 
Denison, 26 Tex Civ App 115, 62 SW 
84. 
4
 North Carolina. Herring v. 
Wallace Lumber Co., 163 NC 481, 79 
SE 876. 
return the securities or account to the 
owner for their value. Emmerling v. 
First Nat. Bank of Pembina, 97 F 
739. 
Arizona. McQueen v. First Nat. 
Bank of Mesa City, 36 Ariz 74, 283 P 
273. 
Colorado. Stockyards Nat. 
Bank of Denver v. Brown, 81 Colo 
331, 255 P 624. 
Illinois. Mercantile Trust Co. of 
Illinois v. Kastor, 273 111 332, 112 NE 
988; United States Brewing Co. v. 
Dolese & Shepard Co., 259 111 274, 
102 NE 753; Awotin v. Atlas 
Exchange Nat. Bank, 265 111 App 238, 
275 111 App 530, affd 295 US 209, 79 
L Ed 1393, 55 S Ct 674 (contract for 
repurchase of securities). 
Indiana. State Life Ins. Co. v. 
Nelson, 46 Ind App 137, 92 NE 2. 
Massachusetts. Nashua & L.R. 
§3573. Action on implied contract—Right to main-
tain. 
The obligation to restore property or money received under 
an ultra vires contract, on refusing to perform the contract, is 
enforced when possible, even in courts of law, by allowing an 
action quasi ex contractu to be maintained,1 although in some 
cases recovery is denied if the contract is contrary to public 
policy or prohibited by charter or statute.2 Such an action 
disaffirms the ultra vires contract and does not enforce it.3 This 
rule is often applied in national bank cases.4 
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X. WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES 
14200. Waiver. 
Bylaws which are not required to be adopted by the charter 
or statute and which operate in favor of the corporation are 
subject to waiver, both express and implied, by the corporation, 
considered as an entity separate and apart and having rights 
distinct from those of its stockholders or members.1 It has been 
held that the waiver may even take place after the member's 
death, where prior to death the member took the steps setting in 
motion the waiver.2 Indeed it has been held that provisions of 
the bylaws of a mutual benefit society which attempt to put it 
beyond the power of the society to waive compliance with the 
bylaws by its members are nugatory.3 It would seem that the 
fact that a corporation does waive its bylaws cannot be objected 
to by third persons.4 A corporation and its majority stockholder 
do not waive the right to enforce a bylaw restricting stock sales 
to outsiders by entering into an option agreement with a minor-
ity stockholder without advising the minority stockholder of the 
bylaw restriction.5 
Where there are statutes, usually specially applicable to 
fraternal benefit corporations, restricting the power of 
subordinate bodies or their officers to waive the constitution or 
bylaws of the corporation, waiver cannot be predicated on the 
acts or omissions of an officer of a subordinate body,9 although 
it was held that the statute did not apply to a waiver by the 
supreme body although the waiver was predicated on an omis-
sion of a subordinate body toward the parent body.7 The power 
of a subordinate body to waive bylaw regulations of the parent 
body has been doubted.8 It has been held that such a statute 
does not apply to a foreign benefit corporation.11 
When the board of directors has power to adopt bylaws, it 
has power to waive those adopted,10 unless the right of waiver is 
authoritatively limited, as by the statute, charter, or certificate 
of incorporation;11 but when the power to make bylaws is vested 
in the stockholders or members, and they have made bylaws for 
the protection of the corporation, they cannot be waived by the 
directors or other officers of the corporation.12 It is the general 
rule that the officers of a mutual association cannot waive a 
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bylaw relating to the substance of the contract between it and 
its members.13 
Stockholders or members may waive the bylaws, particu-
larly those which operate in their favor or which advance or 
protect their rights as stockholders or members.14 The waiver 
can be express or implied; noncompliance with formalities does 
not necessarily negate an interpretation that waiver has 
occurred.15 Similarly, the members of a mutual association may 
permit the directors or other officers to act in disregard of a 
bylaw, even one relating to the substance of the contract 
between it and the members, or they may ratify their action, 
and in that case there is a waiver of the bylaw by the stockhold-
ers.16 Where the corporation acts or contracts in disregard of a 
bylaw with the consent or acquiescence of the stockholders or 
members, there is a waiver of the bylaw, whether it is afterwards 
sought to set up the bylaw as against strangers or as against its 
stockholders or members.17 
A corporation will not be permitted to assert in an action to 
enforce liability against it that the liability was incurred in 
contravention of its bylaws where there has been a continued 
disregard of bylaws acquiesced in by the stockholders.18 
Knowledge of the facts rendering a bylaw applicable is, of 
course, essential to its waiver,19 but since waiver depends solely 
on the intention of the party against whom it is invoked, knowl-
edge by a member of a benefit society of the waiver of a bylaw a 
finding of waiver.20 Waiver must be pleaded.21 
Where a bylaw of a fraternal benefit society constitutes an 
important part of the contract between the society and its mem-
bers, the waiver of it is not to be inferred from slight evidence.22 
In any event, the question whether there has been a waiver of a 
bylaw is ordinarily one of fact for the jury.23 
Ala App 7, 166 So 864, cert den 231 
1
 United States. Bank of Com- *** 872> 166 So 868 (forfeiture for 
merce v. Bank of Newport, 63 F 898; nonpayment of dues waived). 
United States v. Daugherty, 699 F Arkansas. Woodmen of the 
Supp 671 (ED Tenn 1984) (applying World Life Ins. Society v. Counts, 
Kentucky law). 221 Ark 143, 252 SW2d 390 (presi-
Alabama. Mutual Building & dent waived bylaw prohibiting double 
Loan Ass'n of Eufaula v. Guice, 27 indemnity policy for person of draft 
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age); Springfield Mut. Ass'n v. Atnip, 
169 Ark 968, 279 SW 15. 
California. Supreme Lodge of 
Fraternal Brotherhood v. Price, 27 
Cal App 607, 150 P 803. 
Connecticut. Richmondville 
Mfg. Co. v. Prall, 9 Conn 487. 
Delaware. McKenney v. Dia-
mond State Loan Ass'n, 8 Houst 557, 
18 A 905. 
Georgia. Mathews v. Fort Val-
ley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580,176 SE 
505. 
Illinois. Kresin v. Brotherhood 
of American Yeomen, 217 111 App 
448. 
Indiana. Almy v. Commercial 
Travelers* Ass'n, 59 Ind App 249,106 
NE 893; Supreme Tent Knights of 
Maccabees of World v. Volkert, 25 
Ind App 627, 57 NE 203. 
Iowa. Kesler v. Farmers' Mut. 
Fire & Lightning Ins. Ass'n, 160 Iowa 
374, 141 NW 954; Thornburg v. 
Farmers' Life Ass'n, 122 Iowa 260,98 
NW 105; Watts v. Equitable Mut. 
Life Ass'n of Waterloo, 111 Iowa 90, 
82 NW 441. 
Kansas. Boman v. Bankers' 
Union of World, 76 Kan 198,91 P 49. 
Kentucky. United States v. 
Daugherty, 599 F Supp 671 (ED 
Tenn 1984). 
Maryland. Continued disregard 
of a bylaw may be equivalent to an 
express repeal. Poole v. Miller, 211 
Md 448, 128 A2d 607, citing this 
treatise. 
Massachusetts. Blabon v. Hay, 
269 Mass 401, 169 NE 268; Clark v. 
New England Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6 
Cush 342. 
Minnesota. Swedish Christian 
Mission Soc. of Minneapolis v. Law-
rence, 79 Minn 124, 81 NW 756; 
Wiberg v. Minnesota Scandinavian 
Relief Ass'n, 73 Minn 297, 76 NW 37; 
Davidson v. Old People's Mut. Ben. 
Society, 39 Minn 303, 39 NW 803. 
Mississippi. United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America v. Graham, 57 So 2d 870 
(Miss); Bank of Holly Springs v. Pin-
son, 58 Miss 421. 
Missouri. Shartle v. Modern 
Brotherhood of America, 139 Mo 
App 433, 122 SW 1139; Laker v. 
Royal Fraternal Union, 95 Mo App 
353, 75 SW 705. 
New Hampshire. Currier v. 
Continental Life Ins. Co., 53 NH 538; 
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Keyser, 
32 NH 313. 
A bylaw requiring a certain per-
centage of the subscriptions to the 
corporation's capital stock to be paid 
at the time of subscribing, and declar-
ing that subscriptions without the 
payment shall be void, is intended for 
the benefit of the corporation only, 
and may be waived by it, and, if the 
corporation accepts and treats as 
valid subscriptions unaccompanied 
by payment, the subscribers are 
bound Piscataqua Ferry Co. v. Jones, 
39 NH 491. 
New York. Chemical Nat. 
Bank of New York v. Colwell, 132 
NY 250, 30 NE 644; Robinson v. 
National Bank, 95 NY 637; Isham v. 
Buckingham, 49 NY 216, 222; Knox 
v. Eden Muaee American Co., Ltd., 
25 NYS 164, affd 74 Hun 483, 26 
NYS482. 
A bylaw provision relative to the 
giving of notice of suspension to a 
member who had disappeared may be 
waived by the corporation; and where 
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the notice was required to be given at 
once upon receiving notice of the 
member's disappearance, it was 
waived by receiving dues from his 
beneficiary for five years after that 
without giving notice, especially 
where the circumstances were such as 
to raise an estoppel against the corpo-
ration. Steuernagel v. Supreme Coun-
cil of Royal Arcanum, 234 NY 251, 
137 NE 320, affg 198 AD 1002, 190 
NYS 953. 
Pennsylvania. Hughes v. Citi-
zens' Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co., 
226 Pa 95, 75 A 15; Susquehanna 
Mut/ Fire Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 124 Pa 
484, 17 A 24; Botko v. National 
Slovak Soc. of United States of 
America, 122 Pa Super 603, 186 A 
758 (tender of payment of back dues 
in beneficial society). 
Rhode Island. American Nat. 
Bank v. Oriental Mills, 17 RI 551, 23 
A 795. 
A bylaw providing that prior to a 
sale of stock to a third person the 
holder shall make a written offer of it 
through the treasurer to the stock-
holders, may be waived. American 
Nat. Bank v. Oriental Mills, 17 RI 
551, 23 A 795. 
Tennessee. Snyder v. Supreme 
Ruler of Fraternal Mystic Circle, 122 
Tenn 248, 122 SW 981. 
Texas. Modern Woodmen of 
America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156 
(Tex Com App); Sovereign Camp, 
W.O.W. v. Sabalza, 93 SW2d 177 
(Tex Civ App) (forfeiture of life 
insurance policy for failure to pay 
assessment); Grand Lodge, Knights 
& Daughters of Tabor v. Vann, 282 
SW 265 (Tex Civ App) (method of 
changing beneficiaries); Sovereign 
Camp, W.O.W. v. Ray, 262 SW 819 
(Tex Civ App) (insurable age limits). 
Washington. Frank v. Switch-
men's Union of North America, 87 
Wash 634, 152 P 512. 
Wisconsin. Ledebuhr v. Wis-
consin Trust Co., 112 Wis 657, 88 
NW 607; Morrison v. Wisconsin Odd 
Fellows' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Wis 
162, 169, 18 NW 13. 
Wyoming. A corporation may 
waive provisions of the articles of 
incorporation as to the manner of 
executing corporate instruments, 
where the provision is in effect only a 
bylaw. Farmers State Bank of River-
ton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222 P 45. 
Waiver of bylaw creating lien on 
shares of stock, see § 4207. 
2
 Texas. Grand Lodge Knights 
& Daughters of Tabor v. Vann, 282 
SW 265 (Tex Civ App). 
3
 Minnesota. Leland v. Modern 
Samaritans, 111 Minn 207, 126 NW 
728. 
Missouri. Cline v. Sovereign 
Camp Woodmen of World, 111 Mo 
App 601, 86 SW 501. 
Texas. Modern Woodmen of 
America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156 
(Tex Com App). 
4
 California. Supreme Lodge of 
Fraternal Brotherhood v. Price, 27 
Cal App 607, 150 P 803. 
Indiana. Almy v. Commercial 
Travelers' Ass'n, 59 Ind App 249,106 
NE893. 
5
 California. Tu-Vu Drive-In 
Corp. v. Ashkins, 38 Cal Rptr 348, 
391 P2d 828. 
Texas. McCurry v. The 
Praetorians, 90 SW2d 853 (Tex Civ 
App). 
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6
 Alabama. Jones v. Sovereign 
Camp, W.O.W., 233 Ala 216, 171 So 
359. 
Mississippi. Sovereign Camp, 
W.O.W. v. Valentine, 170 Miss 707, 
155 So 192. 
Texas. Sovereign Camp, 
W.O.W. v. Todd, 283 SW 659 (Tex 
Civ App). 
7
 Alabama. Jones v. Sovereign 
Camp, W.O.W., 233 Ala 216, 171 So 
359. 
New York. Where a waiver by 
the supreme body of the order was 
based on knowledge of a subordinate 
lodge which it was the duty of the 
latter as agent for the supreme body 
to collect and communicate to it, but 
which was not so communicated. 
Steuernagel v. Supreme Council of 
Royal Arcanum, 234 NY 251,137 NE 
320, affg 198 AD 1002,190 NYS 953. 
8
 Arkansas. It may well be 
doubted whether a subordinate lodge 
of a fraternal insurance society has 
the power to waive a requirement of 
the constitution and laws of the 
supreme lodge relative to member-
ship in the society. Supreme Lodge 
Knights & Ladies of Honor v. John-
son, 81 Ark 512, 99 SW 834. 
Illinois. Camp clerk of local 
lodge of beneficiary association, in 
accepting and receiving for delin-
quent dues and filling out forms in 
connection with it, acts within appar-
ent scope of his authority and, if he 
thereby waives forfeiture, the waiver 
will bind association. Blair v. Modern 
Woodmen of America, 282 111 App 36. 
New York. Bradley v. O'Hare, 
11 AD2d 15, 202 NYS2d 141 (power 
of local union to waive the express 
provisions of an international union's 
constitution not implied), citing this 
treatise. 
•New York. Steuernagel v. 
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 
234 NY 251,137 NE 320, affg 198 AD 
1002, 190 NYS 953. 
10
 Georgia. Mathews v. Fort 
Valley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580, 176 
SE505. 
Indiana. State v. Wiley, 100 Ind 
App 438, 196 NE 153, citing this 
treatise. 
Louisiana. Hill v. American 
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241, 
quoting this treatise. 
Action of board of directors in 
electing plaintiff comptroller of cor-
poration for one year was held not 
ultra vires because corporation's 
bylaws provided that board of direc-
tors shall elect comptroller to serve 
during pleasure of board since direc-
tors by electing plaintiff for one year 
abrogated bylaws to that extent. Hill 
v. American Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 
590, 197 So 241. 
Mississippi. Bank of Holly 
Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss 421. 
New Jersey. Magnus v. 
Magnus Organ Corp., 71 NJ Super 
363,177 A2d 55. 
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222 
P45. 
11
 Louisiana. Hill v. American 
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241, 
quoting this treatise. 
New Mexico. Contract reem-
ploying corporate treasurer and 
comptroller as comptroller for suc-
ceeding year was not nullified by cor-
porate bylaw requiring election of 
treasurer by board of directors after 
annual election of directors, where 
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bylaws were amendable by board of 
directors, since action of the board in 
entering into the employment con-
tract modified in its legal effect all 
inconsistent bylaws and prevailed 
over them. Jennings v. Ruidoso Rac-
ing Ass'n, 79 NM 144, 441 P2d 42. 
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222 
P45. 
12
 Louisiana. Hill v. American 
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241, 
quoting this treatise. 
Massachusetts. Mulrey v. 
Shawmut Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 4 Allen 
116; Hale v. Mechanics' Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 6 Gray 169. 
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222 
P45. 
13
 Massachusetts. Crowley v. 
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund, 
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276; Brewer v. 
Chelsea Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Gray 
(Mass) 203, 209; Lyon v. Supreme 
Assembly of Royal Soc. of Good Fel-
lows, 153 Mass 83, 26 NE 236. 
The law is well settled that the 
officers of a mutual insurance com-
pany cannot waive the company's 
bylaws which relate to the substance 
of the contract between a member 
and his associates in their corporate 
capacity. McCoy v. Roman Catholic 
Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Mass 272, 25 NE 
289. 
New Jersey. Kocher v. 
Supreme Council Catholic Benev. 
Legion, 65 NJL 649, 48 A 544. 
North Dakota. J.P. Lamb & 
Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 18 ND 253, 119 NW 1048. 
Oklahoma. Home Forum Bene-
fit Order v. Jones, 5 Okla 598, 50 P 
165. 
14
 California. Horner v. 
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n, 
175 Cal App 2d 837, 1 Cal Rptr 113 
(waiver of bylaw limitation on union 
officers salaries), citing this treatise. 
Colorado. The stockholders 
may waive a bylaw requiring notice of 
assessments to be published in a 
newspaper. Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. 
Fruita Improvement Co., 37 Colo 
483, 86 P 324. 
Florida. Coleman v. Coleman, 
191 So 2d 460 (Fla App) (waiver and 
estoppel as to bylaw restriction on 
transfer of stock), quoting this 
treatise. 
Kansas. Schraft v. Leis, 236 
Kan 28, 686 P2d 865 (action incident 
to dissolution of close corporation 
involving two 50% shareholders, one 
having been general manager). 
Pennsylvania. Section of the 
bylaws of corporation providing that 
the bylaws could be altered, amended, 
modified or added to by the vote of 
stockholders holding a majority of 
the stock of the company was not 
intended to exclude the right of all 
the stockholders to waive provisions 
of the bylaws made for their benefit. 
Elliott v. Lindquist, 356 Pa 385, 52 
A2d 180. 
Texas. Where all of the stock-
holders authorized a five-year con-
tract for their comptroller they 
waived the bylaw provision of a one-
year term for officers, as the bylaws 
permitted their amendment and if 
the stockholders and directors could 
change the bylaws they could waive 
their application in a particular case. 
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Dixie Glass Co., Inc. v. Pollack, 341 
SW2d 530 (Tex Civ App). 
Wisconsin. A member of a 
mutual insurance company may 
make a binding waiver of the invalid-
ity of an amendment to the com-
pany's bylaws which constitutes a 
breach of his contract. Voss v. North-
western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 137 Wis 
492,118 NW 212. 
15
 Alabama. Resolution that 
was interpreted as ratification of 
directors' acts was not a nullity 
merely because it was not presented 
by the resolution committee; compli-
ance with technical requirements was 
not necessary to decide that waiver 
had occurred Elgin v. Alabama Farm 
Bureau Federation, 431 So 2d 1151 
(Ala). 
Kansas. Schraft v. Leis, 236 
Kan 28, 686 P2d 865 (waiver may be 
inferred and knowledge may be actual 
or constructive). 
1 i
 Alabama. Kelly v. Mobile 
Building & Loan Ass'n, 64 Ala 501. 
California. Underbill v. Santa 
Barbara Land, Building & Improve-
ment Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P 1049. 
Missouri. McMahon v. 
Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees 
of World, 151 Mo 522, 52 SW 384; 
Galvin v. Knights of Father Mathew, 
169 Mo App 496, 155 SW 45. 
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank 
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222 
P45. 
17
 California. Underbill v. 
Santa Barbara Land, Building & 
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P 
1049. 
Georgia. Mathews v. Fort Val-
ley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580,176 SE 
505; Tifton Production Credit Ass'n 
v. Burkhalter Chevrolet Co., 92 Ga 
App 571, 89 SE2d 210. 
Illinois. Where a provision as to 
the age limit of members is waived, 
the company cannot set up that the 
member was over age to escape liabil-
ity to the beneficiary. Kresin v. 
Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 
217 111 App 448. 
Maryland. It cannot be said 
that the secretary of a building and 
loan association was not authorized 
to collect dues from a stockholder at 
his home, where the association had 
acquiesced for a long time in the 
practice, although a bylaw provided 
for the receipt of dues by the secre-
tary at the regular meeting time and 
place of the association but where no 
bylaw specifically prohibited pay-
ment of dues at other times or places. 
Patterson Park Permanent Bldg. 
Union No. 3 of Baltimore City v. 
Juengst, 153 Md 36,137 A 498. 
Cooperative housing corpora-
tion's long time practice of collecting 
administrative fees from selling mem-
bers caused a waiver or repeal by 
acquiescence of any bylaw provision 
which prohibited the practice. Green-
belt Homes, Inc. v. Nyman Realty, 
Inc., 48 Md App 42, 426 A2d 867, 
citing this treatise. 
New Hampshire. Currier v. 
Continental Life Ins. Co., 53 NH 538. 
New Jersey. Magnus v. 
Magnus Organ Corp., 71 NJ Super 
363, 177 A2d 55. 
New York. Haff v. Long Island 
Fuel Corp., 233 AD 117, 251 NYS 67. 
Pennsylvania. McCloskey v. 
Charleroi MounUin Club, 390 Pa 
212,134 A2d 873, citing this treatise; 
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Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Elkins, 124 Pa St 484, 17 A 24. 
Vermont. Henry v. Jackson, 37 
Vt431. 
Washington. A bylaw may be 
abrogated by nonusage by directors 
with knowledge and acquiescence of 
stockholders. Huxtable v. Berg, 98 
Wash 616, 168 P 187. 
18
 New Hampshire. Salvail v. 
Catholic Order of Foresters, 70 NH 
635, 50 A 100. 
New York. Where during the 
entire existence of a corporation the 
bylaws have been disregarded, the 
corporation cannot take advantage of 
such delinquency to avoid notes given 
by it in settlement of a valid debt. 
Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233 
AD 117, 251 NYS 67, citing this 
treatise. 
Washington. Blair v. Metropol-
itan Sav. Bank, 27 Wash 192, 67 P 
609. 
19
 California. Underhill v. 
Santa Barbara Land, Building & 
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P 
1049. 
Illinois. Blair v. Modern Wood-
men of America, 282 111 App 36; Mod-
ern Woodmen of America v. Wieland, 
109 HI App 340, 351. 
Knowledge of the agent may be 
charged to the corporation. Kresin v. 
Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 
217 131 App 448. 
New York. Knowledge of a 
subordinate lodge of a fraternal bene-
fit society may be imputed to the 
supreme body. Steuernagel v. 
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 
234 NY 251,137 NE 320, affg 198 AD 
1002, 190 NYS 953. 
Texas. Modern Woodmen of 
America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156 
(Tex Com App). 
20
 California. Underhill v. 
Santa Barbara Land, Building & 
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P 
1049. 
Missouri. Watkins v. Brother-
hood of American Yeomen, 188 Mo 
App 626, 176 SW 516; Galvin v. 
Knights of Father Mathew, 169 Mo 
App 496, 155 SW 45. 
A fraternal benefit society will 
not be estopped to take advantage of 
a bylaw by its continued nonenforce-
ment of it when it does not appear 
that the member alleging the estoppel 
knew of the nonenforcement, since 
the member was not misled or 
deceived by it. Shartle v. Modern 
Brotherhood of America, 139 Mo 
App 433, 122 SW 1139. 
21
 Nebraska. The fact that 
there has been a waiver of a bylaw 
must be pleaded. Swett v. Antelope 
County Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 91 
Neb 561, 136 NW 347. 
22
 Massachusetts. Crowley v. 
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund, 
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276. 
Burden of proving waiver rests 
on beneficiary alleging it. Blair v. 
Modern Woodmen of America, 282 111 
App 36. 
Application for certificate and 
bylaws of society are part of contract 
between society and members, see 
§ 4198. 
^Massachusetts. Crowley v. 
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund, 
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276. 
Minnesota. Villmont v. Grand 
Grove U.A.O.D., 111 Minn 201, 126 
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NW 730; Leland v. Modern Samari- Texas. Jury properly found on 
tans, HI Minn 207,126 NW 728. the evidence that both stockholder-
New York. In regard to a non- seller and stockholder-purchaser of 
profit cooperative housing corpora- the corporation's stock waived any 
tion, it has been held that the accept- applicable bylaw restrictions on 
ance of rent by the corporation was transfers of stock. Kensinger v. 
not a waiver of a tenant-shareholders McDavid, 380 SW2d 54 (Tex Civ 
violation of the corporate rules and App). 
regulations. Linden Towers Coopera- Wisconsin. Reisz v. Supreme 
tive No. 1, Inc. v. Bass, 47 Misc 2d Council American Legion of Honor, 
60, 262 NYS2d 243. 103 Wis 427, 429, 79 NW 430. 
South Carolina. Fortune v. 
Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 175 SC 
177, 178 SE 872. 
§ 4201. Estoppel and laches. 
Under the doctrine of estoppel, a corporation may be pre-
vented from availing itself of the full force and effect of a partic-
ular bylaw as against a stockholder or member.1 Thus, a frater-
nal benefit corporation which has made it impossible for a 
member to pursue or exhaust the means provided, by it to secure 
the allowance of a claim for benefits, cannot avail itself of a 
bylaw requiring exhaustion of all internal remedies as a condi-
tion precedent to suit in the courts.2 
A stockholder may be estopped, by consent or acquiescence, 
to object to the mode in which a bylaw was adopted,3 or to 
object to the validity or enforcement of a bylaw,4 except, it 
seems, where the objection is that the bylaw is contrary to the 
charter, public law or public policy.8 The rule of estoppel has 
been held applicable to a transferee with notice.9 A member's 
laches may also prevent the member from objecting to a bylaw.7 
But a corporation and its majority stockholder are not estopped 
to enforce a bylaw restricting sales to outsiders where the defen-
dant minority shareholders cannot claim lack of knowledge of 
the restriction^ 
afterwards that the amendment was 
1
 California. A corporation n o t le«ally adopted. Buford v. Florin 
leading its members to rely on an F™& Growers' Ass'n, 210 Cal 84,291 
amendment of the bylaws, to their P 170. 
prejudice, is estopped to contend Florida. Coleman v. Coleman, 
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